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ABSTRACT 
The New Zealand Government has developed and revised different climate change 
policies (GCCPs) over the last nine years in order to meet its Kyoto obligations and 
address the challenges of climate change. The key GCCPs are the carbon tax proposed 
in 2002 but cancelled in 2005; the Projects to Reduce Emissions (PRE) scheme during 
2003-2004; and an emissions trading scheme (ETS) announced in 2007, legislated in 
2008 and then modified in 2009. These GCCP changes are likely to impose significant 
costs and additional volatilities and pressures on electricity generators because their 
production activities are emissions-intensive. Consequently generators have been the 
direct targets of various GCCPs. 
This study addresses the following research question: “What are the management 
control system (MCS) implications arising from strategy choices New Zealand 
electricity generators make in managing economic volatility and societal pressures 
resulting from a prolonged period of GCCP change?”. In answering this question, the 
study adopts a multiple-theory research framework that builds on insights from prior 
literature and the theoretical perspectives of transactional cost economics, institutional 
theory and resource-based theory. This study uses a multiple-case study that analyses 
interviews and 10-years of documentary data related to five major generators within the 
New Zealand electricity industry over five periods from 2000 to 2009.  
The results suggest that GCCP changes impose external economic volatilities and 
societal pressures on the generators and affect their costs, market competitiveness, and 
social legitimacy. The diversity of internal characteristics and capabilities of the 
generators are found to moderate their relative degree of exposure to these external 
volatilities and pressures. Ten GCCP-related environmental strategies were formulated 
and implemented by the generators, with different levels of proactiveness (i.e. scope and 
timing), varying top management emphasis, as well as distinct underlying objectives. 
These strategy choices had significant implications for organisational MCS. In response, 
a wide range of controls and control systems were adopted. These can be classified into 
eight MCS component types and three MCS component groups, each of which 
supported one or more environmental strategies. Managers varied the degree of use of 
these MCS component types and groups to match the level of strategy proactiveness and 
top management emphasis pursued within each period. Additionally, the organisational 
MCS was underlined by three main objectives (cost control, competitiveness, and 
iv 
 
legitimacy) which in turn were driven by each generator’s primary strategy objectives 
and GCCP-related external exposure.  
This study addresses a number of gaps in the academic literature and demonstrates the 
merits of a multiple-theoretical framework in examining GCCP-related strategy and 
MCS changes. The results also have significant implications for managers and 
practitioners when planning organisational adaptation to a carbon-constrained economy. 
Further, the study provides a useful basis for regulators and policy-makers in making 
the appropriate assessment and providing advice to improve the GCCPs’ environmental 
and economic outcomes.   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The Government recognises that New Zealand needs to do its share to help the world 
address the challenges presented by climate change (New Zealand Government, 2007a). 
On 19 December 2002, the New Zealand Government ratified the Kyoto Protocol and 
since then has developed and revised different policy packages in order to meet its 
Kyoto obligations (MfE, 2008). On 29 April 2002, a preference for carbon tax was 
announced as a key measure of the Government climate change policies (GCCPs). The 
purpose of a carbon tax was to change behaviour through an imposed tax on carbon 
emissions generated from the transport and energy sectors. Then, from 2003 to 2004, 
the Government implemented the Projects to Reduce Emissions (PRE) scheme which 
grants carbon credits to projects that reduce emissions, i.e. wind farms and landfill 
projects. However, in 2005, the Government decided that they would no longer proceed 
with the proposed carbon tax, but did not announce a substitute policy. 
In October 2007, the Government announced a new climate change policy package, 
including an Emissions Trading System (the Original ETS) and supporting 
sustainability initiatives (MfE, 2008). The fundamental aim of the ETS is to manage 
climate change through the use of an economic intervention to engage emitters and the 
community in emission reduction activities. As a result of ETS implementation, there is 
expected to be an increase in energy and fuel prices due to the added cost of emissions. 
The resulting price increase will affect all sectors and encourage more efficient and 
effective use and the adoption of low-emissions technologies. The Original ETS was 
enacted on 20 September 2008. From October 2008, as a result of the change in 
Government, the Original ETS was delayed and then reviewed. An ETS Review Bill 
was drafted and tabled in Parliament in September 2009. This Bill proposed a number 
of changes to the Original ETS including a price cap of $25 per carbon credit. This Bill 
was passed into law on 25 November 2009 (hereafter referred to as to the Moderated 
ETS).  
The introduction of the GCCPs is likely to bring additional volatilities and pressures to 
bear on New Zealand businesses. As a regulatory economic intervention, a GCCP such 
as a carbon tax or an ETS, monetarises carbon emissions and internalises them within 
an organisation’s strategic and operational decisions. Therefore, organisations and 
sectors that have compliance obligations under the GCCPs or are indirectly affected by 
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them through carbon-related electricity and fuel price increases, are likely to experience 
significant cost rises.  
Among various sectors in the economy, electricity generators (hereafter referred to as 
generators) are likely to be those most substantially affected by GCCPs. Since an 
increase in electricity prices will ultimately affect all sectors, electricity generators have 
been the target of the various GCCPs since 2002. Further, due to the burning of fossil 
fuels to generate electricity, thermal generators have a high level of emission intensity. 
The long useful life of generating assets means that once the choice of a thermal-based 
technology is made, a generator will incur substantial amounts of total emissions and 
associated carbon compliance costs under the GCCPs. Carbon costs for electricity 
generators are also likely to be higher than for other sectors, because generators are 
among the first to enter the ETS (from 1 July 2010). Hence, they will experience the 
immediate impacts of the ETS. In contrast to other sectors, generators do not get any 
financial assistance from the Government (e.g. free carbon credits) to help them 
mitigate these impacts (New Zealand Government, 2007a).  
In addition to the direct financial impacts, the GCCPs have a significant influence on 
generators’ external operating environments. Firstly, the various GCCP changes from 
2002 to 2009 are likely to impose significant uncertainty and volatility on the 
generators. Secondly, a carbon tax or ETS changes the economics of the fuel sources 
available for generation use, and hence affects generators’ investment decisions. 
Thirdly, the enforcement of an ETS creates a demand for carbon credits, which can be 
sourced from domestic or international markets. Further, to meet their obligations under 
the ETS, generators are inevitably exposed to carbon market fluctuations. Lastly, the 
public debate and discussion around the GCCPs intensifies societal pressures and 
expectations regarding climate change responsibility (Tomkins, 2009).  
Consequently, the GCCPs are likely to impose direct compliance costs on electricity 
generators as well as expose these organisations to additional external volatilities and 
pressures. The research problem that arises is, what internal changes have been 
planned, and implemented within generators to manage organisational performance in 
the changing GCCP-focused environments where past externalities will be internalised 
in the future. This study examines changes in the environmental strategies generators 
adopt to respond to volatilities and pressures associated with the GCCP changes. In 
doing so, the implications for the organisational management control system (MCS) to 
enable the effective planning and implementation of these strategic changes can be 
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identified. This study is motivated by a number of practical and theoretical reasons, as 
discussed next. 
1.2. Motivations 
This study is operationally and theoretically important because a search of the existing 
practice-oriented and academic literatures has found very little research that addresses 
the research problem outlined above.  
Operational motivations 
Practice-oriented literature makes some suggestions regarding the possible strategic 
responses organisations can adopt to control carbon costs and respond to GCCP-induced 
volatilities and pressures (PWC, 2008, 2009; Brown, 2009; Tomkins, 2009). An 
increased emphasis on carbon emission management will be required in internal 
strategies (such as in production planning and generation investments) as well as in 
external disclosure and reporting (Tomkins, 2009). Organisations will also need to 
identify climate change opportunities and formulate sustainability-oriented strategies to 
seize such opportunities and gain a competitive advantage (Brown, 2009; PWC, 2009).  
In a GCCP-focused context, the key challenge for organisations lies in designing and 
using an appropriate MCS to enable them to implement their strategic responses in an 
effective and efficient manner. Therefore, organisations will need controls and control 
systems that measure, monitor and report their organisational carbon emission levels 
and emissions-reduction initiatives (NZBCSD, 2002; PWC, 2009; Brown, 2009). A 
carbon accounting system is required to identify potential carbon cost saving 
opportunities and to achieve compliance with GCCP requirements (NZBCSD, 2002). 
Appropriate MCS design and use will also allow organisations to monitor external 
carbon prices and appraise the impacts of price volatility on their operations and 
compliance costs, based on which appropriate strategic and operational changes can be 
planned (PWC, 2008).  
However, the key limitation with these suggestions from the practice-oriented literature 
is that they are descriptive and prescriptive, without empirical evidence to support their 
validity. As a result, little is known about what changes have been implemented within 
New Zealand organisations, especially generators, to prepare themselves for the planned 
GCCPs. In particular, the above suggestions regarding MCS are strongly compliance-
focused and do not provide sufficient links to the strategic changes generators might 
make in response to the volatility and pressures associated with the GCCPs.  
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Consequently, in examining changes in organisational MCS to support the strategy 
choices made by generators in managing the organisational impacts imposed by the 
various GCCPs, this study is motivated by four practical reasons. First, there is a 
potential to identify the GCCP-related external and internal factors that drive or affect 
generators’ decisions to change their strategies. Second, this study can provide an 
understanding of how generators have responded and adapted organisationally to the 
changing external environments associated with the planned GCCPs. Third, it can 
assess the implications for organisational MCS to enable and support the strategy 
choices generators make in relation to the GCCPs. An assessment can be made 
regarding the extent to which generators have changed their MCS to enable and support 
the pursuit of lower-impact strategies aimed at managing the financial pressures of the 
GCCPs. Fourth, practical insights can be gained regarding why generators chose and 
undertook the strategic and MCS changes they did. In this way, the motivations 
underlying their GCCP-related internal decisions can be identified.  
Theoretical motivations 
The theoretical importance of this study stems from a number of research gaps 
identified in the prior academic literature. Environmental regulation is found to be a 
significant driver of the adoption of environmental policies and initiatives by 
organisations (Garrod and Chadwick, 1996; James et al., 1999; Doonan, Lanoie and 
Laplante, 2005). However, these studies have primarily focused on traditional 
environmental regulations that target individual industries and sectors rather than the 
GCCPs which have economy-wide impacts. Furthermore, the traditional environmental 
regulations specify environmental management standards, while the GCCPs impose 
direct and wide-ranging economic impacts on organisations through the monetisation 
and internalisation of carbon emissions. The prior studies also lack a coherent basis to 
explain the mechanisms by which economic factors influence strategy and MCS choice. 
Therefore, there is a lack of explanation as to how and why environmental regulation 
with strong economic impacts such as a carbon tax or an ETS, may lead to a change in 
environmental strategies and MCS. 
Additionally, many studies identify other external and internal drivers relating to the 
organisational choice of environmental strategies. Externally, economic volatilities (e.g. 
market competition and regulatory changes) and social pressures (e.g. from different 
stakeholder groups, peer and field groups, and wider society), are found to motivate 
organisations to undertake particular environmental strategies (Bowman and Haire, 
1975; Greening and Gray, 1994; Sharma, 2000; Brammer and Pavelin, 2004; Bansal, 
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2005). Internally, prior studies suggest that factors such as organisational size, 
technological and financial capabilities, and managerial awareness and commitment, the 
organisation’s prior experience and expertise, and organisational culture, drive 
organisations to pursue particular environmental strategies (Bansal, 1995; Sharma and 
Vredenberg, 1998; James et al., 1999; Collins et al., 2007). However, these studies 
consider these drivers independently from each other, and thus few insights are 
available regarding the interactions and dynamics between internal and/or external 
drivers in relation to organisations’ environmental strategies.  
Prior research also indicates that a number of controls and control systems are required 
in the implementation of organisations’ environmental strategies. These include 
informational scope and budgetary controls, environmental performance management 
systems, environmental accounting, and communication and coordination systems 
(Hutchinson, 1996; Judge and Douglas, 1998; Chenhall, 2003).  Additionally, these 
controls and control systems can be used diagnostically or interactively (Simons, 1991), 
and employed in internal decision-making, as well as for external disclosure purposes to 
demonstrate environmental responsibility (Bungay and Goold, 1991; Judge and 
Douglas, 1998). However, these studies fail to distinguish between different roles 
played by organisational MCS. Thus, little is known about which controls and control 
systems are primarily used to control existing environmental strategies, and which MCS 
components/types assist strategy review and planning. 
Therefore, in conducting its empirical enquiry, this study is further motivated by five 
theoretical reasons. First is the potential to understand the choice and change of 
environmental strategies under the impacts of the GCCPs. Second, utilising an 
appropriate theoretical lens, a further explanation can be gained about how 
environmental regulations with strong economic impacts influence environmental 
strategies and MCS. Third, insights can be gained regarding the impacts of a 
longitudinal period of GCCP changes on the external and internal environments in 
which organisations operate and the inter-relationships between external and internal 
drivers in driving environmental strategies and MCS responses. Fourth, there is an 
opportunity to further examine the link between environmental strategy and 
organisational MCS and the role of MCS in strategy planning. The different types of 
controls and control systems that serve varying roles in relation to environmental 
strategies can be examined to determine how they are used to fulfil these roles. Fifth, 
this study is motivated by a potential to develop a theoretical framework to explain 
organisations’ internal adaptation to external environmental regulatory changes.  
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1.3. Research aim and research question 
Based on the background and practical and theoretical motivations discussed above, it 
can be argued that the GCCPs will impose direct financial costs and potentially change 
the external economic and social environments in which generators operate. These costs 
and external changes are likely to affect environmental strategies and have implications 
for organisational MCS design and use. Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine 
the impacts of GCCP changes (from 2002 to 2009) on the environmental strategies and 
organisational MCS of New Zealand electricity generators. This aim leads to the 
following research question: 
 
1.4. Research framework 
To answer the research question, this study adopts a multiple-theory research 
framework that builds on different but complementary insights from transactional cost 
economics (TCE), institutional theory (IT) and resource-based theory (RBT). These 
three theories provide a useful basis to examine the GCCPs' multiple impacts on 
organisations’ environmental strategies and MCS. Transactional cost economics 
considers the implications of GCCP-related economic factors in the generators’ external 
and internal operating environments on organisational transactional costs, which in turn 
drive strategy and MCS decisions (Williamson, 1975; Covaleski, Dirsmith, and Samuel, 
2003). Institutional theory focuses on the social, political and cultural aspects of 
organisations’ environments and argues that these aspects lead organisations to 
undertake strategy and MCS change for legitimacy purposes (Meyer and Rowan 1977; 
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983). Conversely, RBT highlights that in order to survive, 
organisations need to pursue differentiation-oriented environmental strategies by 
developing and utilising unique internal capabilities and resources, including 
appropriate MCS, that can generate a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Hart, 
1995). Although providing different insights regarding strategy and MCS, these three 
theories have a number of commonalities. Firstly, all of them examine organisational 
performance, though from different perspectives, i.e. competitiveness, costs, or 
legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Williamson, 1991; Barney, 1991). Secondly, 
they all consider the importance of institutional environments and institutional demands 
What are the MCS implications arising from strategic choices New Zealand 
electricity generators make in managing economic volatility and societal 
pressures resulting from a prolonged period of GCCP change? 
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and expectations (Williamson, 1991; Covaleski et al., 2003). Thirdly, resources are 
recognised as an important factor in explaining organisational changes driven by 
legitimacy, cost control, and/or competitiveness concerns (Meyer, Scott, and Deal, 
1983; Williamson, 1999; Barney, 2001).   
Therefore, using the three theories simultaneously enables the capturing of a wide range 
of GCCP-related external and internal factors and their impacts on generators. 
Furthermore, it is possible to understand the multiple objectives and motivations 
underlying the environmental strategy and MCS choices made by generators in a 
GCCP-related context. A multiple-theory framework also allows for theory 
triangulation through assessing the relative importance of different GCCP-related 
factors to a generator and investigating how such importance is reflected in its strategy 
choice and MCS design and use. Consequently, the use of the three theories in 
conjunction provides richer insights than are potentially achievable by using a single 
theory. For example, IT enriches TCE by considering the institutional factors in cost-
minimising decisions and thus explaining why in some cases, optimal efficiency is not 
achievable (Roberts and Greenwood, 1997). Resource-based theory enhances IT and 
TCE insights by explaining why organisations with particular characteristics and 
capabilities are seen as more legitimate, or are able to achieve a higher degree of 
internal efficiency (Barney, 2001). Institutional theory extends RBT by suggesting that 
competitive advantage needs to be generated within the bounds of what is considered 
acceptable by the institutional environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Hart, 1995).  
Based on the three theories, a multiple-theory research framework is developed that also 
integrates the external and internal drivers of environmental strategies as identified from 
the review of the industry-related and academic literature (as briefly outlined in Section 
1.2). These external and internal drivers are proposed as the relevant factors that 
influence or drive the generators’ choice of environmental strategies under a GCCP-
focused context. Based on TCE, IT and RBT, it is suggested that GCCP-related external 
and internal drivers affect the generators’ costs, competitiveness, and legitimacy and 
provide an organisational motivation for environmental strategy change. The research 
framework further indicates that a change in environmental strategies requires 
appropriate modification in organisational MCS. To measure the scope and timing of 
environmental strategies, this study uses strategy proactiveness as suggested in prior 
studies (Russo and Fouts, 1997; Jansson, Nilsson and Rapp, 2000). Additionally, it is 
argued that generators may not adopt new environmental strategies but simply place 
more strategic emphasis on them (i.e. more top management attention to particular 
8 
 
current strategies). For organisational MCS design and use, this study follows Simons’ 
(1991) classification of MCS types. The potential objectives underlying MCS design 
and use are also identified based on previous studies (Brunsson, 1989; Hart, 1995; 
Otley, 1999; Scott, 2001).  
The multiple-theory framework leads to four propositions:  
P1: External GCCP-related economic and institutional drivers impact on 
generators’ competitiveness, costs and legitimacy. 
P2: Internal GCCP-related characteristics and capabilities impact on generators’ 
competitiveness, costs and legitimacy. 
P3: The impacts of GCCP-related external and internal drivers in turn lead to a 
change in environmental strategies. 
P4: The change in environmental strategies requires corresponding 
modifications in organisational MCS.  
1.5. Research methodology 
To answer the research question and assess the four propositions, this study adopts a 
longitudinal multiple-case study approach. This approach involves a 10-year analysis of 
multiple cases within a single industry, the New Zealand electricity generating sector. 
Such an approach allows an investigation of a contemporary event, e.g. the GCCPs, 
within a real-life context (Yin, 2003). Multiple cases are utilised due to the significant 
diversity in organisational characteristics possessed by the generators. This approach 
has more limited depth than a single case study. However, the advantage is that it 
generates cross-case patterns that can be generalised to other organisations, sectors and 
contexts (Lillis and Mundy, 2005). Further, it provides an understanding of changes and 
movements in environmental strategies and MCS over time within multiple 
organisations concurrently. 
Using the longitudinal multiple-case study approach, the five major generators in the 
New Zealand electricity generating sector are examined. These five generators in 
aggregate make up 91% of the wholesale market share and 95% of the retail market 
share. There are significant differences between them in terms of the major fuel choice 
of generation (renewable versus thermal-based), generation volumes and carbon 
emission levels, and ownership type (privately-owned versus state-owned). Due to these 
different characteristics, the five generators will experience differentiated degrees of 
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exposure to the volatilities and pressures associated with the GCCPs, and thus, will 
undertake varying strategic and MCS responses. Further, to enable the longitudinal 
analysis, the study period covers 10 years from January 2000 to October 2009, split into 
sub-periods that match the key GCCP changes.  
The main data sources are interviews and documents which relate to the environmental 
strategies and MCS within the five generators from 2000 to 2009. Triangulation 
between different data sources and between generators and external organisations is 
used to ensure the reliability of the data and results and to enrich the potential insights 
gained from analysis (Miller, Dingwall and Murphy, 2004; Flick, 2009). Collected data 
are coded using a coding system set up within NVivo8. Then, the data are analysed 
utilising quantitative and qualitative techniques and matrix data displays (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; May, 2001; Silverman, 2006). The use of these different analytic tools 
allows both longitudinal and cross-sectional insights into changes in environmental 
strategies and organisational MCS, over time and across generators.  
1.6. Thesis structure 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter, Chapter 2, provides a 
background overview of the GCCPs and their potential impacts on generators and 
highlights the need for these organisations to change their environmental strategies and 
organisational MCS in response. In Chapter 3, prior literature is reviewed to gain an 
understanding of previous studies’ findings regarding the external and internal drivers 
of organisations’ environmental strategies and the design and use of organisational 
MCS to implement such strategies. Chapter 4 justifies the multiple-theory framework 
based on the findings from prior literature and insights from the three theories, TCE, IT, 
and RBT. The use of a longitudinal multiple-case study approach and methods for data 
collection and analysis will be discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the case-based 
evidence of changes in environmental strategies and MCS within the five generators 
across the five time periods from 2000 to 2009. Chapter 7 analyses this evidence and 
discusses the results regarding GCCP-related external and internal drivers and their 
impacts on generators’ environmental strategies. Following this, Chapter 8 presents the 
results relating to changes in MCS design, use and objectives to support the generators’ 
environmental strategies, and deduces the implications for organisational MCS in a 
GCCP-focused context. Lastly, Chapter 9 discusses the key findings, assesses them in 
relation to the research framework and the propositions, highlights this study’s 
contributions as well as limitations and provides a conclusion to the thesis.  
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Chapter 2 – Government climate 
change policies and Electricity 
generators 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the study’s operational setting and outlines 
practical motivations underpinning the research question. Specifically, the chapter 
highlights the practical importance of studying the implications of various GCCPs over 
a prolonged period from 2002 to 2009 for generators’ organisational MCS. The rest of 
this chapter is organised into four sections. The next section provides an overview of the 
GCCPs. Following this, the significance of generators from a GCCP perspective and the 
potential impacts by the GCCPs on these organisations are discussed. The third section 
reviews practice-oriented literature to understand possible strategic responses and MCS 
changes that organisations are recommended to undertake in order to effectively 
respond to the GCCP impacts. The fourth section summarises the industry background, 
outlines the practical motivations to this study and presents the research question.  
2.2. The Government’s climate change policies  
2.2.1. Climate change and New Zealand’s obligations 
Climate change is widely recognised as a global issue. A recent report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate suggests that the high level of past and present 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions will cause substantial climate change for the coming 
century and beyond (New Zealand Government, 2007b). As a result, the world is 
projected to experience “rises in temperature, increasing sea levels, frequent extreme 
weather events and changes in rainfall patterns” (New Zealand Government, 2007a, 
p.ix).  
Over time, many countries have begun to recognise that immediate steps need to be 
undertaken at global and national levels to reduce the GHG emissions caused by human 
action (NZIER, 2007; MfE, 2008). The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement 
linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change with an aim to 
set binding targets for 37 industrialised countries and the European community to 
reduce GHG emissions. New Zealand ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 19 December 2002 
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and committed itself to reducing its average net GHG emissions over the first 
commitment period (2008-2012) to below 1990 levels or to take responsibility for the 
difference by purchasing or generating Kyoto-compliant units (MfE, 2008).  
The GHG emissions from the New Zealand economy have grown strongly since 1990, 
mostly due to growth in the economy (MfE, 2009c). Total gross GHG emissions in 
2008 were 22.8% in excess of the 1990 levels, representing an average of 1.3% growth 
per year (MfE, 2009c). Contributing primarily to this growth are the energy and 
industrial process sectors. The energy sector contributed 45.3% of total emissions in 
2008 and emissions from electricity generation in 2008 increased by 140% when 
compared to 1990 levels (MfE, 2010). Without appropriate policy measures, strong 
growth in emission levels would continue and New Zealand would therefore be unlikely 
to meet its international obligations (New Zealand Government, 2007b). 
2.2.2. An overview of the history of climate change policies 
The New Zealand Government has developed and revised different climate change 
policies since 2002 in order to meet its Kyoto obligations. On 29 April 2002, the 
Government released its 2002 Climate Change Policy Package which had the following 
significant components (MfE, 2008):  
• A carbon tax on energy, industrial, and transport emissions, capped at $25 per 
tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), to be applied to most economic 
sectors and gas emissions, except for agricultural methane and nitrous oxide 
emissions. 
• Negotiated Greenhouse Agreements (NGAs) for large emitters who face 
potential changes in their competitiveness compared to producers in countries 
with less stringent or no climate change policies. The NGAs aimed to help these 
emitters improve their production efficiency and reduce emissions at a low cost.  
• Projects to Reduce Emissions (PRE) under which the Government would grant 
Kyoto units to the projects that generate additional emissions reductions in the 
first commitment period.  
After this announcement, substantial debate emerged domestically questioning the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of a carbon tax scheme in meeting New Zealand’s 
Kyoto obligations. This led to the review of climate change policy options in 2005. 
Following the Review of Climate Change Policies and Next Step report (MfE, 2005a), in 
December 2005 the Government abandoned the proposed carbon tax but made no 
announcement as to its replacement (MfE, 2008). Additionally, no further NGAs and 
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PREs were available after 2005. Consequently, from January 2006 to September 2007 
there was no explicit GCCP. However, a draft of the New Zealand Energy Strategy 
(NZES) released issued in December 2006 indicated a preference for an ETS and 
identified emissions reduction and renewable investments as among its key objectives 
(MED, 2006). 
In October 2007, the Labour Government announced its new package of climate change 
policies, including the Cap-and-Trade Emissions Trading System (ETS), a ten-year ban 
on new thermal generation (thermal ban), and a target to have 90% of electricity 
generated from renewable sources by 2025 (MfE, 2008). This ETS (hereafter referred to 
as the Original ETS) was to be implemented on a nation-wide basis, across all industries 
and sectors (New Zealand Government, 2007a). The Climate Change Bill, which 
outlined the operational mechanisms of the ETS and the thermal ban, was released for 
public consultation in December 2007 and became respectively the Climate Change 
Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act and Electricity (Renewable Preference) 
Amendment Act on 25 September 2008. The Electricity (Renewable Preference) 
Amendment Act (2008) effectively stopped generators from building any new base-load 
fossil-fuelled thermal plants for ten years, except where an exemption was granted to 
ensure national security of supply (SoS).  
Under the Original ETS legislation, the required entry date of the stationary energy 
sector into the scheme, including generators, was to be 1 January 2010. The generators 
were required to take 100% responsibility for their carbon emissions and, thus, would 
receive no financial assistance from the Government, as the latter considered that these 
generators would be able to pass the cost of carbon fully to customers. In contrast, large 
industrial organisations that compete with overseas producers were to be assisted by the 
Government for up to 90% of their emissions so as to partially mitigate the impact of 
electricity and fuel cost increases due to the ETS.  
In October 2008, the National Party won the general election and formed a new 
government. As a result of an agreement with the ACT Party, the National Government 
set up an ETS Review Select Committee to examine the Original ETS (New Zealand 
Government, 2008). The National Government also removed the thermal ban in 
December 2008 as part of this agreement (Brownlee, 2008). The report from the ETS 
review committee was released on 31 August 2009. Based on this report’s 
recommendations, an ETS Review Bill (its full name being Climate Change Response 
(Moderated Emissions Trading) Amendment Bill) was drafted and tabled in Parliament 
on 24 September 2009 (MfE, 2009b). For the transitional period from 1 July 2010 to 31 
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December 2012, this revised ETS (hereafter referred to as the Moderated ETS) puts a 
NZ$25 cap on carbon prices and requires participants in the stationary energy and liquid 
fossil fuel sectors to surrender only one carbon credit for every two tonnes of emissions 
(50% obligation). The ETS Review Bill also proposed a new entry date for the 
stationary energy sector into the Moderated ETS from 1 July 2010. This Bill was passed 
into law on 25 November 2009 (NZPA, 2009).  
Consequently, between 2002 and 2009, the GCCPs underwent several changes. From 
April 2002 to December 2005, the main GCCPs were the carbon tax plan and the PRE 
scheme. From January 2006 to September 2007, the carbon tax was abandoned, the PRE 
scheme discontinued and an ETS was signalled. From October 2007 to September 2008, 
the announcement of the Original ETS and the passage of its legislation were the key 
GCCP focus. However, from October 2008 to October 2009, there was a change of 
government which led to a select committee review of the Original ETS and substantial 
legislative changes being proposed under the ETS Review Bill. These changes are 
summarised in Figure 2-1. 
Figure 2-1: Summary of climate change policy changes from 2002 to 2009 
 
The GCCPs, such as the carbon tax and an ETS, are economic instruments through 
which the Government and their regulators re-allocate resources in the economy among 
different sectors to achieve particular environmental, economic and social objectives 
(Helm, 2005). In the case of the GCCPs, they are designed to ensure that businesses 
“start taking the environment into account in the economic choices” they make and thus 
combine economic interests with environmental ones (Hodgson, 2005, p.1). 
Accordingly, carbon pricing affects the prices of goods and services and makes energy-
intensive technologies more expensive, while clean technologies become cheaper and 
more affordable. Additionally, carbon pricing affect both demand and supply sides of 
the market, thus encouraging climate-friendly investments and behaviour, not only by 
businesses and other organisations, but also by consumers (Helm, 2005; Parker, 2008a). 
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Furthermore, integrating a price for emissions into the economy enables New Zealand 
to transit smoothly into a future carbon-constrained world where limits are placed on 
carbon emissions and rights to emit are traded (Hodgson, 2005; Parker, 2008a). 
Therefore, the GCCPs are not purely environmentally-driven, but are also motivated by 
the economic management necessary to position the New Zealand economy favourably 
in the future.  
This study chooses to focus upon the impacts of these GCCPs on the generators. The 
next section explains the reasons for this choice and provides a background to the NZEI. 
2.3. Electricity generators and the potential impacts of the GCCPs 
2.3.1 The significance of the electricity generating sector from a GCCP 
perspective 
Though the GCCPs and the associated carbon pricing mechanisms affect all sectors, 
their impacts on the electricity generators are different and likely to be more significant 
than in many other sectors. Electricity is essential to the functioning of the economy and 
society and thus ensuring a secure, affordable and environmentally responsible supply 
of electricity is very important (MED, 2006). Further, climate change has become a 
cornerstone issue in the development of the national energy strategy (Clark, 2007; 
Parker, 2008b). Therefore, how to accelerate the uptake of renewable technologies, and 
achieve substantial carbon emissions reductions from electricity generation, is one of 
the key objectives of New Zealand’s GCCPs (Parker, 2008b). Consequently, the 
electricity generating sector is the direct target of many of the GCCPs. Accordingly, it 
receives more attention and emphasis than most other sectors within the scope of GCCP 
design. 
Further, given the asset-focused and technological nature of electricity generation, 
generators are likely to be those most significantly affected by any GCCP. First, 
electricity generation is one of the most emission-intensive sectors in the economy 
because a high level of carbon emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels is an 
inevitable product of the generation process (MED, 2007b). Second, electricity 
generation entails large capital investments with the lives of generating plants spanning 
decades and requiring a long pay-back period. If a generator chooses to use a thermal-
based technology for one of its plants, there is generally a high level of stability in the 
amount of fuel used over the plant’s useful life with little variation in the level of carbon 
emissions discharged (MfE, 2005a). Third, generators will be among the first to enter 
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the ETS (from 1 July 2010) 1  and accordingly, will incur ETS-related emissions 
liabilities earlier than many other sectors. These generators receive no financial 
assistance from the Government, i.e. granting of free carbon credits to help offset 
carbon costs (New Zealand Government, 2007a). However, under the Moderated ETS, 
their obligations will be halved until the end of 2012. 
The above factors suggest that not only is the electricity generating sector the focus of 
many of the GCCPs, it is also likely to incur a higher degree of carbon costs than many 
other sectors. Such costs have significant implications on organisational profitability 
and potentially survival in the short and long term. An examination into how generators 
respond and adapt organisationally to the changing GCCPs potentially provides critical 
understanding regarding the effectiveness of the GCCPs in triggering businesses’ 
strategic shift towards the adoption of more climate-friendly technologies and 
processes. Such a strategy shift, in turn, requires appropriate modifications in 
organisational MCS design and use in order to enable efficient and effective strategy 
implementation. An investigation of strategy and MCS change also allows insights into 
how organisations exposed to the impacts of the GCCPs can manage their 
organisational performance. For these reasons, this study chooses to examine generators 
and their strategy responses to the GCCPs and the implications for organisational MCS. 
An overview of the structure and history of the NZEI is provided in the next section.  
2.3.2. History and Structure of the NZEI (1987-2003) 
The New Zealand electricity industry was, until 1987, completely publicly owned and 
regulated. From 1987 a series of reforms were undertaken to create competitive markets 
for electricity generation and retailing, while maintaining natural monopolies in 
transmission and distribution. Figure 2-2 below presents the timeline of the reforms 
from 1987 to 2003 in NZEI. These reforms led to changes in the structure of the NZEI. 
This new structure, as described below, remains relevant throughout the period 
investigated by this study (2000-2009). 
                                               
1
 The forestry sector entered the ETS from 1 January 2008, followed by the transport and energy sectors 
both of which will enter the scheme from 1 July 2010. 
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Figure 2-2: Summary of the reforms within NZEI (1987-2009) 
 
In 1987, the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ) was established as a state 
owned enterprise (SOE) to operate as a commercial, profit-making organisation and was 
the sole provider of electricity generation, transmission and retail. Electricity was 
distributed through local electricity supply authorities, which were later corporatised 
into line companies. A subsidiary of ECNZ, TransPower, was specifically responsible 
for electricity transmission. In 1994, TransPower was separated from ECNZ and 
became an independent SOE. In 1996, ECNZ was further separated into two entities: 
ECNZ and Firm A (a SOE), and a wholesale market was established. In 1999, ECNZ 
was further split into three SOEs (Firms B, C, and E) and Firm A was privatised. As a 
result, many of the generation assets currently owned by these four generators (A, B, C 
and E) were inherited from the ECNZ.  
Coinciding with the break-up of the ECNZ, the Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 
required electricity companies to separate ownership of their line and supply businesses. 
Taking this opportunity, some generators (Firms A, B, C, D and E) acquired these retail 
businesses and became vertically integrated. By 2003, all these generators had 
completed their acquisition activities and became the five biggest electricity generators 
and retailers in the industry (Murray and Stevenson, 2004; Hogan and Meade, 2007). By 
2003, aggregately, these five generators comprised 91% of national electricity 
generation, and 95% of the retailing market share (Figure 2-3).  
Figure 2-3: Market share in the wholesale and electricity markets (2003)
Source: Murray and Stevenson, 2004
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after the industry failed to regulate itself (Evans and Meade, 2005). The role of the 
Electricity Commission is to monitor the electricity markets to ensure market 
participants comply with market rules and that the markets operate efficiently on a day-
to-day and long-term basis (EC, 2006).  
Electricity is produced at 40 generation plants in New Zealand, using mainly coal, gas, 
and hydro and to a lesser extent, wind and geothermal energy as fuels. Electricity 
generated is then transferred to the transmission network owned and operated by 
TransPower. The national grid transmits electricity from generation plants to the points 
of distribution (grid exit points), where it is reduced to a lower voltage and transmitted 
through distribution networks to consumers (EC, 2006). Distribution networks are 
owned and operated by around 28 line businesses throughout New Zealand. They 
largely sell their distribution services to retailers who in turn manage electricity supply 
contracts with end users or sell directly to large commercial and industrial consumers 
(EC, 2006). These 28 businesses are operated as trusts and, like TransPower, distribute 
power on a monopoly basis. Due to their monopolistic nature and the low carbon 
emission levels of transmission and distribution operations, both TransPower and the 
line businesses are not examined in this study.  
Consequently, between 1987 and 2003, NZEI has undergone significant structural and 
regulatory reforms. These reforms have resulted in an electricity industry characterised 
by generators having inherited assets from the ECNZ.  The generators have high market 
concentration and are vertically integrated through both the wholesale and the retail 
markets. Against this background, the GCCPs were proposed. As discussed in Section 
2.3.1, many of the GCCPs were designed to target the electricity generating sector 
directly. Thus although some of the GCCPs (e.g. the carbon tax and the ETS) were not 
enforced during the period of study (2002-2009), they still potentially affect generators 
as strategic decisions needed to be made as to how they were going to respond to 
planned regulatory/policy changes. The next section reviews practice-oriented literature 
to understand the potential impacts of the GCCPs on the electricity generators.  
2.3.3. Potential impacts of the GCCPs on generators’ operating 
environments (2002-2009) 
The GCCPs are likely to cause significant changes within generators’ internal and 
external operating environments. The impacts of GCCPs on the generators’ external 
environments include: uncertainty related to planned policy and regulatory change, 
changing fuel economics, carbon market fluctuations, and changes in societal pressures. 
Internally, the GCCPs impact on the generators’ emission profile through the direct 
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imposition of carbon emission and compliance costs. These GCCP impacts apply to the 
2002-2009 period, during which different GCCPs were being developed and modified. 
The implications of the GCCPs on the generators in the later period, from 2010, are 
outside the scope of this study and thus will not be examined. They, nevertheless, 
represent an interesting area for future research.  
Firstly, from an external environment perspective, the changes in GCCPs over a 
prolonged period potentially result in substantial policy and regulatory uncertainty for 
the generators. The uncertainty relates to policy shifts from a proposal for a carbon tax 
to the Original ETS and then to the Moderated ETS.  Summaries of the submissions to 
the Original ETS Bill by MED (2007) suggest that these policy shifts have led to fears 
of investments being undermined and thus could lead electricity generators to delay 
investment, especially in renewable energy. Additionally, generators are exposed to 
regulatory ambiguity relating to each GCCP. With a carbon tax, regulatory ambiguity 
relates primarily to the level of the tax to be imposed by the Government (Helm, 2005; 
Kerr, 2007). Conversely, an ETS increases the vulnerability of generators in relation to 
issues such as the entry point of the electricity sector into the ETS, the requirements and 
standards for monitoring, verifying and reporting of emissions and carbon credits, and 
whether there will be a cap on carbon price (PWC, 2008, 2009). However, such 
regulatory ambiguity/vulnerability only applies to thermal generators, because 
renewable generators do not emit carbon emissions from their production activities, and 
thus are not compliance entities under the GCCPs. 
Secondly, the GCCPs are likely to change the relative economics between alternative 
fuels for electricity generation (MED, 2007). As discussed above, many GCCPs are 
designed directly to encourage renewable investments. Similarly, modelling conducted 
by the Government suggests that pricing emissions will increase wholesale prices to the 
extent that they incentivise significant volumes of cost-competitive renewable 
generation (Parker, 2008a).  
Thirdly, under both the Original and Moderated ETS, electricity generators are exposed 
to carbon market fluctuations. Although there is a lack of certainty about future supply 
and demand in the international carbon markets, there is a high possibility that the price 
of carbon will rise and there will be substantial volatility in the market (MfE, 2005a; 
NZIER, 2007). Furthermore, there are project risks, contract risks and country risks 
associated with different types of carbon credits available on the international carbon 
markets (MfE, 2005a). Such variability and fluctuations in carbon markets impacts on 
compliance costs and influences return on investment (Kerr, 2007; Tyagi, 2009). 
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However, a preliminary analysis of the generators’ ETS obligations indicates that the 
level of exposure to the carbon market depends on whether a generator is a net seller or 
a net buyer of carbon credits. Most generators have some carbon credits awarded to 
their renewable projects under the PRE scheme in the 2003-2005 periods (MfE, 2009a). 
By deducting these carbon credits from their ETS obligations (under the Moderated 
ETS), renewable generators will be net sellers of carbon credits while thermal 
generators will be net buyers. As net sellers, renewable generators will gain from an 
increase in carbon prices. In contrast, as net buyers, thermal generators are likely to 
suffer a profitability loss when confronted with such a price increase.  
Fourthly, the planned GCCPs affect, and were affected by, changes in societal 
perceptions and pressures. From 2004 to 2005, a number of public campaigns were 
launched by the Government to build awareness of the effects of climate change and 
what New Zealanders can do to reduce GHG emissions (MfE, 2005b). Societal 
awareness of climate change has increased as a result. Moxie’s (2007) survey found that 
overall the concern for climate change has grown 22% from 2005 to 2007.  This 
concern was argued to correspond to the growing amount of media attention on the 
issue (Moxie, 2007). Similarly, a national online survey conducted by ShapeNZ (2009) 
revealed that a majority of New Zealanders believe that climate change is a problem and 
want the country to respond proactively to climate change. New Zealand society also 
generally believes that polluters should pay for their own emissions costs and supports 
an ETS as an economic instrument to make polluters pay (ShapeNZ, 2009). The 
increased awareness of climate change in turn has led to an increased pressure on 
generators, especially thermal ones, to take action and mitigate their carbon emissions 
(Greenpeace NZ, 2007).  
From an internal environment perspective, the planned GCCPs impose significant 
carbon and compliance costs on the generators. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, 
generators are likely to incur higher carbon costs than other organisations, under both a 
carbon tax and ETS, because electricity generation is an energy-intensive activity and 
requires long-term investment. Furthermore, carbon costs vary among the electricity 
generators due to differing emission profiles. IPENZ (2010) argues that the emission 
intensity of existing generation plants (i.e. amount of carbon emissions per unit of 
production) is dependent on the fuel type and the thermal efficiency of a particular 
generation technology. Hence, generators with higher emission intensity have higher 
total emissions and are thus exposed to higher carbon costs under the GCCPs 
(Emissions Trading Group, 2007).  
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The introduction of a GCCP will also increase compliance costs for electricity 
generators, as they will need to comply with emissions-related monitoring and reporting 
obligations under a carbon tax or an ETS (PWC, 2008, 2009). This is likely to cause 
additional costs, given that organisations have rarely reported such information before 
(Milne, Owen and Tilt, 2001; Milne, Tregidga and Walton, 2003). Compliance costs 
under a carbon tax are likely to be lower because organisations only report their 
emissions and emissions liabilities. Whereas, under an ETS, they also have to buy and 
record purchases of carbon credits, and are exposed to the volatility and complexity of 
the carbon markets (PWC, 2008).  
Overall, this section argues that changes in the GCCPs from 2002 to 2009 are likely to 
have resulted in significant changes in the generators’ external and internal operating 
environments. To ensure survival, generators need to adapt organisationally to these 
changing operating environments. Specifically, they would need to make strategic 
responses and corresponding MCS changes to effectively manage their emission profile 
and reduce their organisation’s exposure to the external volatilities and pressures 
associated with the GCCPs. The next section summarises suggestions from practice-
oriented literature on the required changes in organisational strategies and MCS to 
prepare for the GCCPs. 
2.4. Potential organisational strategic and MCS responses to the 
GCCPs 
Practice-oriented literature makes suggestions as to the possible strategic and MCS 
responses organisations can adopt in response to these GCCP-induced volatilities and 
pressures (NZBCSD, 2002; PWC, 2008, 2009; Brown, 2009; Tomkins, 2009). From a 
strategy perspective, NZBCSD (2002) presents case studies of how six New Zealand 
companies have formulated and implemented a climate change strategy in response to 
the Government’s Climate Change Policy Package announced in 2002. They argue that 
this strategy has helped these organisations to benefit in a number of areas including: 
provision of knowledge and services in renewable energy and carbon trading; energy 
efficiency and improved resource usage; new climate-friendly technology; and practices 
and access to new energy products and markets. Further, Brown (2009) and PWC 
(2009) recommend that organisations formulate a strategy to capture climate change 
opportunities and gain market competitiveness. Adopting sustainability strategies is also 
seen to be important in an environmentally-driven mode of business development and 
provide organisational flexibility to respond to challenges and opportunities presented 
by a carbon-constrained world (Jansson, Nilsson and Rapp 2000; Brown 2009). Deloitte 
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(2007) suggests that companies be creative within their strategy formulation in response 
to the challenges posed by climate change. They propose that companies can build 
internal capabilities around emerging carbon trading markets, which not only helps 
them understand and manage climate change threats, but also can be leveraged and 
turned into a competitive advantage (Deloitte, 2007).  
From a MCS viewpoint, compliance systems need to be put in place to ensure that 
organisations record, report, and surrender carbon credits on time and accurately to 
avoid expensive penalties from violating the GCCP requirements (Hunt and Auster, 
1990; PWC, 2008, 2009). Further, organisations need their MCS to monitor their 
emissions profile, and analyse and understand their carbon-related exposure (NZBCSD, 
2002; PWC, 2009; Brown, 2009). Appropriate MCS design and use will also enable 
organisations to monitor external carbon prices and appraise the impacts of price 
volatility on their operations and compliance costs, based on which emissions 
reductions initiatives can be identified and implemented (PWC, 2008). Through these 
MCS changes, organisations can monitor and manage their GCCP-related carbon and 
compliance costs.  
Appropriate MCS design and use can also help organisations maintain their reputation 
and effectively respond to expectations and pressures by external and internal 
stakeholders. Hunt and Auster (1990) argue that environmental problems can ruin image 
and strain relationships with stakeholders and suggest that such problems can be 
mitigated and prevented by establishing environmental management programmes and 
systems. The NZBCSD (2002) argues that accurate carbon accounting is important 
because it enables organisations to identify carbon or cost saving opportunities, 
demonstrate compliance with GCCP regulations and participate in carbon trading 
markets. Furthermore, Tomkins (2009) suggests that stakeholders are increasingly 
requesting companies to provide information regarding their carbon footprint. To ensure 
accurate reporting of such information, and avoid severe fines and damages to 
organisational reputation, Tomkins (2009) insists that organisations put in place 
appropriate controls and control systems to enable comprehensive understanding, 
measuring and reporting of the organisational carbon footprint.  
The practice-oriented literature above prescribes how environment-driven strategies and 
appropriate MCS can help organisations reduce compliance costs, maintain their 
reputation and respond to societal pressures. However, no empirical evidence has been 
provided that examines the extent such strategies and MCS have been implemented by 
generators in managing the impacts of the GCCPs and preparing organisationally for a 
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carbon-constrained world. This literature is also strongly focused on MCS for 
compliance purposes and lacks insights into the implications for organisational MCS to 
support and enable the strategic decisions made by generators in a GCCP context. 
Therefore, there is a need to investigate strategy and MCS changes within generators to 
understand how they have responded and plan to respond to the economic volatility and 
societal pressures imposed by the GCCPs. 
2.5. Practical motivations to this study and the Research Question  
The above sections have provided an overview of the changes in the GCCPs from 2002 
to 2009. It was emphasised that the electricity generating sector is critical to the 
achievement of GCCPs and this sector is, and will be, more significantly affected by the 
GCCPs than most other sectors in the economy. In addition to experiencing a prolonged 
period of GCCP changes, generators have been exposed to a number of energy-specific 
Government policies with a climate change objective. These GCCPs are likely to bring 
about volatilities in the generators’ external and internal operating environments. 
Externally, generators are likely to be exposed to policy and regulatory change, 
changing fuel economics, as well as carbon market fluctuations and increased societal 
pressures. Internally, generators will incur significant carbon and compliance costs 
depending on their organisational emission profile. In order to survive, generators need 
to change their environmental strategies and associated MCS to properly manage these 
GCCP-related economic volatility and societal pressures and reduce their impacts on 
organisational performance. 
The potential relationships between the planned GCCPs, the volatilities and changes in 
the external and internal environments, environmental strategies and organisational 
MCS of New Zealand electricity generators is illustrated in Figure 2-4, which 
summarises the arguments presented in this chapter.  
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Figure 2-4: A summary of the relationships between GCCPs, operating 
environments and generators’ environmental strategies and organisational MCS 
 
Note: Arrows do not indicate causal relationships 
Empirically examining the relationships between the GCCPs, organisational strategies 
and MCS as illustrated in Figure 2-4 is important for a number of practical reasons. 
Firstly, there is a need to identify the GCCP-related factors in the generators’ external 
and internal operating environments that drive generators’ decisions to change their 
environmental strategies. In doing so, insights can be generated regarding the role 
played by not only external drivers but also internal characteristics such as asset and 
technology base and emission profile in driving the strategy choices and MCS changes 
generators make in the GCCP-focused context. These insights help practitioners and 
managers understand and evaluate the sources and the impacts of various volatilities and 
pressures imposed by the GCCPs on their organisation.  
Secondly, this study is motivated by a potential to understand how the generators have 
responded, and adapted organisationally to the changing operating environments 
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associated with the planned GCCPs. This understanding gives practitioners, managers 
and related stakeholders an insight into what strategy choices organisations can make in 
order to survive in the changing economic and societal environments associated with the 
GCCPs. 
Thirdly, such an examination helps to assess the implications for organisational MCS so 
that it enables and supports the strategy choices generators make in relation to the 
GCCPs. An understanding of these MCS implications is important to accountants, 
managers and consultants in ensuring compliance with GCCP obligation requirements 
and preparing their organisations for a carbon-constrained economy. Furthermore, an 
assessment can be made regarding the extent that generators have changed their MCS to 
facilitate the uptake of climate-friendly and sustainable strategies. Based on this 
assessment, regulators and policy makers can evaluate the relative success of the 
GCCPs in achieving the objectives for which they were originally designed, i.e. more 
renewable investments and emissions reductions.  
Fourthly, practical insights can be gained into why generators made the strategic and 
MCS changes they did.  Accordingly, the objectives of GCCP-related strategy and MCS 
changes can be identified. Furthermore, the relative importance of these objectives for 
different generators can be ascertained in terms of whether the strategy and MCS 
changes are primarily made to reduce carbon and compliance costs, to maintain 
reputation and respond to stakeholders’ pressures, or to enhance market 
competitiveness. Hence, practitioners and policy-makers can determine whether 
organisations’ internal adaptations are driven by direct financial impacts of the GCCPs 
or related reputational and competitive concerns.  
Based on the practice-oriented literature reviewed in this chapter and these practical 
motivations, the following research question is formulated: 
 
To address this research question, in the next chapter, Chapter 3, the relevant literature 
in environmental management, strategies and MCS is reviewed. This review aims to 
gain an overview of the findings of prior studies regarding the possible environmental 
strategies and MCS adjustments that organisations make to respond to environmental 
issues and regulations.  In doing so, external and internal drivers of such strategies and 
What are the MCS implications arising from strategy choices New Zealand 
electricity generators make in managing economic and societal volatility and 
pressures resulting from a prolonged period of GCCP change? 
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MCS adaptations can also be identified. Further, it enables the development of the 
research framework in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3: Environmental strategies 
and MCS 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 suggests the GCCPs, with their accompanying legislations and regulations, 
are likely to affect the generators’ external and internal operating environments and 
have implications for their environmental strategies and MCS. Based on this, a  research 
question was presented that examines the implications for organisational MCS arising 
from the strategy choices generators make in response to the volatilities and pressures 
associated with GCCP changes. This chapter reviews the literature to determine what 
prior academic studies have found regarding the environmental strategies and MCS that 
organisations can adopt in managing their environment-related organisational 
performance. This chapter is separated into six sections. The next two sections review 
research related to the external and internal determinants of environmental strategies 
and MCS. The following section assesses prior literature to understand the types of 
environmental strategies that organisations can adopt to respond to environmental issues 
and regulations. Next, previous studies are examined to identify the design and use of 
the MCS to support the organisational environmental strategies and the objectives 
underpinning any environmental strategy-driven change to the MCS. Following this, an 
overall evaluation of the literature is presented, which highlights the existing gaps and 
outlines how this study is positioned to address some of these. Lastly, a summary of the 
chapter is provided. 
3.2. External drivers of environmental strategies and MCS 
3.2.1. Environmental regulation 
Environmental regulation is one of the most important drivers of organisations’ 
environmental strategy as environmental regulation imposes significant compliance 
costs on those organisations with high environmental-impacting operations (Garrod and 
Chadwick, 1996). An intention of this regulation, and the compliance costs it imposes, 
is to provide an incentive for organisations to adopt more environment-friendly 
activities and technologies (James et al., 1999; Doonan et al., 2005). However, most of 
the studies that examine environmental regulation have used an institutional framework. 
A survey by Garrod and Chadwick (1996) suggests that a shift to environmental 
concern by organisations is more likely in a regulatory context than in a voluntary one. 
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Clemens (1997) argues that environmental issues are considered more important and 
more institutionalised in those industries with extensive environmental regulation. In 
two surveys of UK top 400 companies, James et al. (1999) find evidence that legal 
requirements are the most significant driver of environmental policy formulation across 
sectors. Similarly, Doonan et al. (2005) and Berrone et al. (2007) suggest that 
government regulation presents the most significant factor in triggering and promoting 
organisations’ environmental innovation.  
The introduction of an environmental legislation or regulation enhances the visibility 
and urgency of environmental issues. When these issues become visible, they can lead 
to an outcry from a wide range of stakeholders and put the social legitimacy of 
organisations under threat. This, in turn, results in a need for organisations to respond 
promptly and make internal changes (Sobel, 1984). Empirically, Holmes (1976) 
indicates that managers view the seriousness of social issues as one of the key reasons 
for organisations to respond to social demands. Dutton and Ducan (1987) argue that 
organisational response to changing environmental conditions, such as the introduction 
of an environmental regulation, needs to be based on an assessment of the urgency of 
these conditions and the organisation’s capability to take action. Van Wassenhove and 
Corbett (1991) suggest that it is possible for a specific organisation to follow a mix of 
response patterns to different issues depending on their visibility.  
The accounting literature also suggests that regulatory pressures are among the most 
significant external factors that induce similar accounting responses among 
organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) argue that organisational structures and formal systems increasingly 
reflect rules institutionalised and legitimated by the state. In some cases, organisational 
adoption of particular MCS is a direct response to a government mandate, such as the 
implementation of a pollution control system to conform to environmental regulation 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Consequently, environmental regulation produces direct 
and indirect coercive pressures on organisations to adopt particular controls and control 
systems that are considered legitimate by the government.  
Environmental regulatory change is likely to bring about significant alterations in the 
economic and societal environments in which organisations operate. Therefore, the 
introduction of an environmental regulation to deal with climate change (GCCPs), 
similarly, can change the parameters that define the economic and societal environments 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). In turn, this can result in 
a need to make changes to organisational strategy and MCS. The next section reviews 
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prior literature to gain an insight into the impacts of other external economic factors on 
environmental strategy and MCS.  
3.2.2. External economic volatility 
The literature suggests that market-based economic uncertainty/volatility associated 
with environmental issues can influence the adoption of environmental strategies. 
Bowman and Haire (1975) suggest that corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
sustainability reporting are environmental/social strategies that help organisations to 
deal with, and reduce external uncertainty. These strategies provide a mechanism 
through which the organisations can cope with different, and even conflicting, demands 
from the external environments and, thus, it becomes "an appropriate posture in dealing 
with a multi-vectored, changing environment" (Bowman and Haire, 1975, p.54). In a 
similar vein, Azzone and Bertelè (1994) highlight that a proactive environmental 
strategy enables organisations to quickly adapt to changing environmental standards and 
regulations by providing flexibility and adaptability and an opportunity to gain green 
competitiveness. 
The prior literature provides empirical evidence of the impact of these external 
economic volatilities on organisational MCS. Hostility from intense competition is 
found to be associated with a strong focus on budgets, sophisticated production, and 
statistical controls (Khandwalla, 1972; review in Chenhall, 2003). In contrast, 
environmental complexity (related to suppliers and Government) is found to be 
associated with less focus on budgetary controls (Merchant, 1984). Additionally, prior 
MCS literature suggests strongly that external uncertainty has a significant impact on 
organisational MCS (review in Chenhall, 2003). Accordingly, organisations that operate 
in uncertain environments will adopt a broader-scope MCS and use externally-focused 
and non-financial MCS information more extensively. Some studies found a 
combination of tight controls and flexible, interactive controls in conditions of high 
external uncertainty (Ezzamel, 1990; Merchant, 1990). Simons (1991) argues that 
formal control systems, such as budgets, can be used interactively in conditions of high 
uncertainty to encourage new strategic initiatives. Using a different lens, Chapman 
(1998) suggests uncertainty requires frequent interaction between accountants and other 
departments/business units to cope with the changing conditions. However, there is little 
available empirical insight into how external changes associated with environmental 
regulation, such as the GCCPs, influence MCS design and use. Similarly, the literature 
has been silent on the impacts of market dynamism (i.e. the speed of changes in external 
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market conditions and the availability of opportunities) on organisational MCS 
(Chenhall, 2003).  
Economic volatilities are not the only external drivers of environmental strategies and 
MCS. Societal pressures also result in environmental strategy change, as discussed in 
the next section.  
3.2.3. External societal pressures  
External societal pressures pertain to the demands and expectations exerted by external 
entities (e.g. the Government, professional bodies, and industry groups) on 
organisations which lead them to make changes to their environmental strategies and 
associated MCS. These pressures, as examined in the literature, can be grouped into 
three categories: industry-related factors, stakeholder pressures, and peer and field 
pressures. Each category is discussed next.  
a. Industry-related societal pressures 
Institutional theory has been utilised by many management-based prior studies to 
investigate the impact of industry on an organisation’s propensity to adopt extensive 
environmental practices. An industry’s pollution profile is, in particular, relevant to the 
environmental strategies of its participating organisations. Industries involving 
chemicals, natural resources, and transportation are among those perceived by the 
public as environmental-damaging (Holmes, 1976; Brammer and Pavelin, 2004; 2006). 
These industries, due to the nature of their business operations, are also more likely to 
experience more environmental crises/incidents that, in turn, lead to stronger pressures 
from relevant stakeholder groups for improvement in environmental performance 
(Greening and Gray, 1994). Thus, externally-driven societal pressures are exerted on 
these industries to take environmental issues more seriously (Abouzeid and Weaver, 
1978; Shetty, 1979) and to take action to correct, or mitigate, negative public 
perceptions (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004; 2006). Empirically, most studies have found 
evidence that industry is a significant determinant of the type of environmental strategy 
adopted by an organisation, or its orientation/attitude towards environmental issues 
(Holmes, 1976; Sharma, 2000; Brammer and Pavelin, 2004). In the management 
literature, it has been suggested that organisations operating in the same sectors/fields 
adopt similar accounting practices and systems to achieve legitimacy (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Meyer, 1986; Richardson, 1987).  
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b. Stakeholder pressures 
The management literature also considers other external societal pressures, including 
those exerted by the media, stakeholders and community, to be strong factors 
influencing environmental strategy and responsiveness. Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) 
highlight that environmental plan formulation is positively influenced by customer, 
shareholder, government regulatory, neighbourhood, and community group pressures, 
but is negatively influenced by other lobby group pressures. In contrast, Bansal (2005) 
suggests that corporate sustainability development is positively correlated with media 
pressure and mimicry with competitors and other organisations in the field and that, 
over time, there is greater uptake of sustainability practices due to increased community 
concern for social and environmental issues. Céspedes-Lorente, Burgos-Jiménez, and 
Álvarez-Gil (2003) also indicate a positive correlation between the power of 
stakeholders and extensive environmental management practices. However, stakeholder 
pressures are not found to be a significant driver of environmental innovation in a study 
by Eiadat et al. (2008) of chemical companies in Jordan.  
c. Field and peer pressures 
Peer groups and other companies in the organisational field can provide additional 
pressure for organisations to adopt environmental practices. Goodstein’s (1994) study 
reveals that organisations are more likely to adopt a child care practice if other 
organisations in the same field/industry have already adopted this practice. Bansal and 
Roth (2000) argues that high field inter-connectedness reduces organisations’ attempts 
to stand out from others, resulting in less incentive to adopt product environmental 
lifecycle analysis.  Other studies suggest that membership of a particular field group 
exerts a significant impact on organisations’ environmental management. Álvarez-Gil et 
al. (2001)’s survey of Spanish hotel industry indicates organisations that are part of a 
hotel chain, or affiliation, are more likely to adopt formal and extensive environmental 
management practices. Collins et al (2007) survey finds that New Zealand organisations 
that participate in the Sustainable Business Network (SBN) are more likely to employ 
sustainability practices, than those that don’t.  However, Cole, Elliot and Shimamoto’s 
(2006) study of Japanese firms indicate that Keiretsu membership (a group with strict 
liquidity requirements) limits a firm’s ability to employ extensive environmental 
management practices.  
The link between external societal pressures and organisational MCS is examined in a 
few accounting studies. Brownell (1985) argues that organisations operating in complex 
environments use broad-scoped, externally-oriented MCS information to meet the 
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multiple demands from different stakeholders in their environments. Additionally, the 
accounting literature suggests that field and peer pressures are also the significant 
drivers of organisational MCS. Christensen (2005) argues that the adoption of accrual 
accounting in the public sector is driven by organisations mimicking successful peers, 
and that private sector accounting firms substantially influence the promotion and 
implementation of such accrual accounting. Qian and Burritt (2008) also find that 
organisations adopt similar environmental management accounting systems as peer 
organisations operating in the same field. The latter two studies use an IT-based 
framework to argue that organisations adopt particular MCSs in order to satisfy the 
dominant pressures and expectations within the organisational field and wider society 
and thus gain or enhance their legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
The prior literature above therefore suggests that environmental regulation (Section 
3.2.1), external economic volatilities (Section 3.2.2) and industry-related societal 
pressures, stakeholder pressures, peer and field pressures (Section 3.2.3) represent the 
externally-driven economic and societal factors that influence organisations’ 
environmental strategies and organisational MCS.  In addition to these external factors, 
internal factors are also important drivers of organisations’ environmental strategies. 
These factors are both human- and non-human-related, as reviewed in the next section. 
3.3. Internal drivers of environmental strategies: Internal 
capabilities and characteristics 
3.3.1 Organisational size  
Utilising IT, a number of studies have suggested organisational size influences how and 
when organisations respond to environmental issues. Bansal (1995) argues that large 
organisations are more visible and as they can be easily seen by relevant constituents, 
they are easily hurt by these constituents’ actions. Therefore, these organisations need to 
respond to constituents’ demands and pursue environmental responsiveness in order to 
maintain legitimacy (Oliver, 1991; Goodstein, 1994; Ingram and Simons, 1995). From a 
RBT perspective, Bowen (2000) suggests that high visibility gives large organisations a 
capacity to influence important constituents, such as the government, regulators, the 
media, and the community. As an example, electricity firms can use their visibility in 
the media to alert the public and the government to their opinions in relation to GCCPs 
and its impacts.  In doing so, they influence the public’s perceptions and potentially 
manipulate policy design to their advantages. Additionally, larger organisations have 
more resource availability and can afford a formal environmental plan, providing them 
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with a basis to undertake more extensive and advanced environmental management 
practices (Bowen, 2000; Álvarez Gil et al., 2001).  
Size is also a significant determinant in an organisation’s environment-related 
accounting policy and practices. Brammer and Pavelin (2008) suggest the quality of 
voluntary environmental disclosure is determined by an organisation’s size and the 
nature of its business activities. Specifically, high quality disclosure is found to be 
associated with larger organisations and those in sectors most closely related to 
environmental concerns. Similarly, Cole et al. (2006) examine environmental 
disclosure, as one of several environmental management practices, and find it to be 
positively associated with organisational size.  
All of the preceding studies indicate that larger organisations are exposed to high 
societal pressures due to visibility and have more resources. Both of these factors appear 
to lead organisations to adopt more active environmental strategies and undertake 
voluntary and extensive environmental disclosure. Additionally, the literature also 
suggests that technological and financial capabilities affect environmental strategies and 
associated organisational MCS.  
3.3.2. Technological and financial capabilities 
From a RBT perspective, technical and financial capabilities are critical to enabling an 
organisation’s environmental strategy. James et al. (1999) identify the key barriers to 
innovative environmental management practices as: costs of the practice; technological 
availability (particularly important for capital-intensive industries); and financial 
resource availability (particularly important for service and financial sectors). 
Consistent with findings by James et al. (1999), Tilley (1999) indicates that 
organisations resist eco-friendly practices for three reasons, including: i) low eco-
literacy of the owner-manager; ii) the perceived high cost of these practices, and iii) 
inadequate existing infrastructure. Similarly, Collins et al. (2007) provide evidence that 
the key barriers to adoption of sustainability practices include high costs and other 
priorities in resource allocation. Berrone et al. (2007) argue that while IT explains how 
environmental regulation can force organisations to develop environmental innovation, 
the extent of innovation depends on availability of organisational resources, capital and 
R&D intensity, and organisational slack. Therefore, these studies generally support the 
idea that innovative and sustainable environmental practices require high financial 
and/or technological availability. 
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3.3.3. Managerial factors  
Prior management literature contains much evidence regarding the importance of 
managerial factors to environmental strategy formulation and implementation. Holmes 
(1976) suggests that management interest in social and environmental issues is one of 
the key drivers to an organisation’s involvement in a corporate responsibility 
programme. Similarly, Hunt and Auster (1990) and Doonan et al. (2005) argue that 
managerial support and commitment enable an organisation to pursue an innovative 
environmental profile and achieve high environmental performance. Henriques and 
Sadorsky (1996) find that managerial perception of stakeholder pressures positively 
influences an organisation’s formulation of a formal environmental plan. Specifically, 
organisations whose managers consider these pressures to be high are more likely to 
have an environmental plan. James et al. (1999) similarly consider leadership as the top 
enabler/facilitator for the formulation of a formal environmental policy. Sharma (2000) 
suggests that managerial interpretation of environmental issues (as threats or 
opportunities) influences the choice of environmental strategy significantly. When 
managers perceive environmental issues as presenting more opportunities than threats, 
they are more likely to exercise strategic choice and adopt voluntary action for 
environmental protection. In contrast, when these issues are primarily considered as 
threats, a conformance strategy to the societal pressures associated with those policies is 
likely to be preferred (Sharma, 2000). In de Bakker, Fisscher and Brack (2002)’s study, 
managerial ability to identify and build required capabilities is found to be a key internal 
resource to enable a product-oriented environmental strategy. Additionally, Eiadat et al. 
(2008) argue that managers, who believe that environmental issues should be a top 
priority and possess environmental knowledge and skills, are the agents to trigger 
organisational adoption of an innovative environmental strategy. All of these studies, 
while varying in the choice of specific managerial and human factors to examine, agree 
that management support, commitment, knowledge, and capabilities are the key 
enablers of a voluntary and innovative environmental strategy.  
3.3.4. Prior experience, organisational learning, and organisational 
culture 
Prior studies suggest that organisational learning and prior experience in previous 
environmental projects and a supportive organisational culture are important internal 
capabilities that enable organisations to pursue an appropriate environmental strategy. 
For example, Marcus (1988) suggests that organisations with wider prior experience in 
different environmental activities have more discretion and flexibility in responding to 
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external pressures. Therefore, they can exercise autonomous choice in relation to their 
environmental strategy (Marcus, 1988). Sharma and Vredenberg’s (1998) comparative 
study of seven firms in the Canadian oil and gas industry suggests that continuous 
innovation and organisational learning through continuous knowledge exchange and 
formulisation enables the pursuit of innovative environmental strategy that can lead to 
competitive advantages. Céspedes-Lorente et al. (2003) survey 270 hotels in Spain and 
find that prior experience with environmental projects provides a foundation for 
organisations to undertake more extensive practices and initiatives. Claver et al. (2007), 
investigating a single organisation, find that an environmental strategy has a positive 
impact on organisational performance when it is supported by organisational learning 
gained through prior emissions-reduction focused projects. However, the literature has 
little evidence of the impact of organisational culture on environmental strategy, except 
for study by Henriques and Sadorsky (1996). Henriques and Sadorsky argue that 
organisations need a supportive organisational culture when pursuing an environmental 
strategy that focuses upon mitigating the organisation’s impacts on the environment.  
The preceding literature review suggests that external economic and societal drivers 
have different impacts on the environmental strategies chosen by organisations. 
Additionally, variations in internal characteristics and capabilities can lead to different 
types of environment-related strategic responses across different organisations. Hence, 
it is important to understand the types of environmental strategies that an organisation 
can adopt in managing its environmental performance and responding to these external 
and internal drivers. The next section reviews the literature to gain an insight into these 
types of environmental strategies.  
3.4. Types of environmental strategies 
Prior studies in the environmental management literature have proposed a number of 
ways to categorise environmental strategies. Most focus on identifying an organisation’s 
strategic posture/positioning in relation to environmental issues and environmental 
context. Dutton and Duncan (1987) suggest that organisations can adopt four different 
strategies in response to issues that have strategic implications for their organisational 
performance. These strategies include No response, Resistance, Opportunistic, and 
Strategic change. Hunt and Auster (1990) propose five different stages of development 
of an organisation’s environmental management system (EMS) that have different 
levels of impact on the reduction of environmental risks. These five stages are: Beginner 
(no protection); Fire fighter (minimal protection); Concerned citizen (moderate 
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protection); Pragmatist (comprehensive protection); and Proactivist (maximum 
protection). Steger (1993) presents a matrix view of environmental and market 
opportunities from which four strategies are derived: indifferent; defensive; offensive; 
and innovative. From a different perspective, Oliver (1991) suggests several possible 
strategic responses to environment-related societal pressures. These responses include: 
acquiescence or compliance; compromise or negotiating institutional demands; 
avoidance or decoupling parts of the firm; defiance or publicly demonstrating 
resistance; and manipulation or controlling the environment (Oliver, 1991). 
Other studies propose simpler categorisations of environmental strategies. Russo and 
Fouts (1997) use a dichotomy of environmental strategies: reactive and proactive. Hart 
(1995) provides three types of proactive environmental strategies organisations can 
employ to gain a green competitive advantage: pollution prevention, product 
stewardship and sustainable development. Jansson et al. (2000) divide environmental 
strategies into three types: reactive, active and proactive. Sharma (2000) uses a simpler 
categorisation that employs ‘compliance’ and ‘voluntary’ to describe organisational 
strategy in response to the perception of environment-related threats and opportunities. 
In contrast to other studies which focus on either the production or product development 
functions, Azzone and Bertelè (1994) consider the involvement of other organisational 
functions in the environmental strategy process. They suggest five corporate strategic 
responses matching with five environmental contexts: stable, reactive, anticipatory, 
proactive and creative.  
The categorising schemes proposed by the above studies vary in terms of the external 
and internal factors they take into account to derive the potential environmental strategic 
postures and responses. However, most categories deal with managerial interpretation of 
environmental issues as either threats/constraints, or opportunities. Further, they are 
significantly similar in the respect that they all rank environmental strategies along a 
continuum from no response, to reactive and to proactive. A no-response environmental 
strategy indicates that the organisation is doing nothing to control and reduce the impact 
of its activities and operations on the natural environment. It is also indicative of not 
reacting to environment-related pressures and legislation/regulation (Dutton and Ducan, 
1987). A reactive environmental strategy focuses on passively reacting to, and meeting 
the minimal requirements of environmental regulations (e.g. pollution control for 
compliance purposes). Such a strategy also involves taking action only after the 
legislation/regulation has been enforced (Hunt and Auster, 1990; Azzone and Bertelè, 
1994). Conversely, a proactive environmental strategy aims to monitor and reduce 
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environmental impacts beyond regulatory requirements and develop low-impact 
technologies in-house, or in cooperation with strategic partners (Dutton and Ducan, 
1987; Azzone and Bertelè, 1994). A proactive strategy requires organisations to 
anticipate and act early to respond to threats and/or take up opportunities offered by 
potential environmental legislation/regulation. Therefore, this would involve lobbying 
activities to delay or accelerate the introduction of environmental regulation, and 
product design and marketing initiatives to promote green products and enhance market 
competitiveness (Hart, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997). These types of environmental 
strategies, in turn, will have different implications for organisational MCS, as discussed 
in the next section. 
3.5. Organisational MCS  
Environmental management studies suggest that the organisational MCS plays a key 
role in promoting environmentally-driven business development (Jansson et al., 2000). 
Environment-focused MCS cannot lead a life of their own and therefore must be 
integrated with other internal control systems when implementing the environmental 
strategies chosen by the organisation (Willits and Giuntini, 1994). The literature 
provides theoretical and empirical evidence for different MCS design, use and 
objectives to support an organisation’s environmental strategies.  
3.5.1. Design of MCS to support environmental strategy 
Prior studies suggest that a number of MCS components are relevant when 
implementing environmental strategies: informational scope and budgetary controls; an 
environmental performance management system and environmental accounting; and, 
communication and coordination systems. Each MCS component and its relationship 
with environmental strategies are discussed below.  
a. Informational scope and budgetary controls 
The link between environmental strategies and organisational MCS has not been 
systematically examined in the management or accounting literature. However, the 
relationship between business strategy and MCS is a widely researched topic, as 
reviewed in Langfield-Smith (1997) and Chenhall (2003). Overall, the MCS literature 
suggests that organisations which follow a prospector, product differentiation strategy, 
adopt a more open and broader scoped MCS as well as use less rigid budgetary controls. 
Conversely, organisations that pursue a cost leadership, defender strategy use a formal 
MCS that incorporates goals, budgets, and budgetary controls. However, these findings 
have not been examined in the context of environmental issues and regulations. 
40 
 
Therefore, little is known about how environmental strategies influence the scope of 
MCS information and use of budgetary controls.  
b. Environmental performance management system and environmental 
accounting  
Some studies focus on the design of performance management and accounting systems 
to enable efficient and effective implementation of environmental strategies 
(Christopher, 1977; Hutchinson, 1996). Christopher (1977) describes the key 
performance management systems required for organisational success. He argues that 
such a system should include measures and monitoring systems for changes in the 
economic, social, political, and ecological environments and the audits of programmes 
implemented to respond to these environmental changes. Additionally, Hutchinson 
(1996) suggests that when accounting for environmental costs and savings, it is critical 
to integrate environmental policy into business strategy. Bebbington and Larrinaga-
Gonzalez (2008) discuss the potential performance impacts of climate change policies 
such as an ETS. They propose that to effectively manage performance, organisations 
need to change their accounting practices, and not only account for carbon costs, but 
also capture and monitor the potential market volatilities and opportunities associated 
with an ETS. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence regarding the extent that 
environmental accounting and environment-related MCS components are implemented 
by organisations in practice. In particular, little is understood regarding the degree to 
which an environmentally-informed MCS might influence an organisation’s ability to 
manage the impacts of environmental legislation/regulation.  
c. Communication and coordination systems 
Prior literature suggests a need for communication and coordination systems across 
functions and management levels to enable efficient implementation of environmental 
strategy (Gupta, 1995; Hart, 1995; Judge and Douglas, 1998). Gupta (1995) argues, 
theoretically, that the integration of environmental strategy into operations management 
is critical for a proactive approach to environmental management. Such integration 
requires a clear and direct link between the environmental planning process and senior 
management.  There is also a need for a formal channel through which the corporate 
environmental group can contribute to the strategic planning process associated with 
environmental management (Gupta, 1995). Different communication systems enable 
coordination and cooperation across functions and hierarchical levels, thus, improving 
cost efficiency in environmental management. Similarly, Hart (1995) argues that cross-
functional cooperation and management in green product design and development is 
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critical to the success of a product stewardship environmental strategy. Further, Judge 
and Douglas (1998) find empirical evidence that coordination between the 
environmental function and other functions is positively associated with the level of 
involvement of environmental personnel in the strategic process. This, in turn, drives 
improved environmental and financial performance. Nonetheless, while discussing the 
importance of communication and coordination systems, none of these studies 
empirically examines how the importance of such MCS components varies across 
organisations that have different environmental strategies and are exposed to differing 
external environment-related volatilities and pressures such as those related to the 
GCCPs. 
3.5.2. MCS use to enable environmental strategy 
In order to effectively implement chosen environmental strategies, organisations need to 
not only establish appropriate controls and control systems, but also use them in an 
appropriate manner (Langfield-Smith, 1997; Chenhall, 2003; Chapman, 2005). The 
literature provides evidence of different ways MCS can be used to support chosen 
environmental strategies. These uses range from the style of MCS use to the use of 
environmental information for internal decision making and external disclosure, as 
discussed below.  
a. Style of MCS use  
Simons (1991) suggests four types of formal control systems that are associated with 
strategy planning and control: belief system, boundary controls, diagnostic control 
systems and interactive control systems. Belief systems are used to define basic values, 
purposes and mission statements of the organisation and communicate them to lower 
organisational levels. Boundary controls specify the limits, practices and rules that need 
to be followed and the risks to be avoided. In contrast, diagnostic control systems are 
formal feedback systems used by managers to monitor organisational performance 
against the set targets and to undertake corrective action. Simons argues that any of 
these three types of control systems can be used interactively by top managers (i.e. 
interactive control systems) to engage with lower management decision-making 
processes and thereby encourage learning and dialogue that facilitates strategic renewal. 
Consistent with Simons (1991), the study by Abernethy and Brownell (1999) finds that 
hospitals which undergo strategic change and move to a more prospector type of 
strategy use budgets interactively to encourage dialogue and organisational learning. 
While being used extensively in the MCS literature, Simons’ (1991) framework has not 
been employed and tested in environmental management studies. 
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b. Use of environmental information for internal decision-making 
The use of environmental information for internal decision-making such as strategic 
planning, budgeting and performance evaluation is also an essential element in 
implementing environmental strategies. Bungay and Goold (1991) argue that 
organisations need to integrate non-financial performance measures and targets into 
strategic planning process in order to sustain a long-term competitive advantage. 
Similarly, Judge and Douglas (1998) and Sharma (2000) find that such integration is 
positively associated with organisational financial performance and the amount of 
resources allocated to environmental issues. Further, organisations need to incorporate 
environmental measures into budgeting so as to give line-managers adequate financial 
resources and support (Bungay and Goold, 1991). Environmental measures also need to 
be used in performance evaluation to motivate the consideration of environmental issues 
in managerial decision-making (Hutchinson, 1996). 
c. Use of environmental information in external disclosure  
The use of environmental information and measures in external reporting is another 
important element to ensure effective implementation of environmental strategy. 
Hutchinson (1996) indicates that, in order to integrate environmental policy into 
business strategy, organisations need to disclose environmental performance in annual 
reports. Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003) provide evidence that the adoption of CSR 
leads to improved financial performance when organisations disclose their CSR 
practices extensively and thus, communicate their social and environmental 
responsibility effectively to external stakeholders. Aerts and Cormier (2009) suggest 
organisations manage their environmental performance and public perception of such 
performance through media press releases and annual reports. Their study finds that 
perceived organisational legitimacy is positively affected by the extent and quality of 
the economic-based segments of environmental disclosures in annual reports and by 
reactive environmental press releases. Overall, these studies indicate that environmental 
disclosure helps organisations manage their environment-related reputation and 
contributes to the enhancement of organisational financial performance.  
3.5.3. Objectives of organisational MCS  
The literature suggests that organisational MCS can be used to achieve different 
objectives. The economic objectives of MCS include ensuring internal efficiency, 
enhancing competitiveness in the market place, and managing external uncertainty 
(Bowman and Haire, 1975; Hunt and Auster, 1990; Hart, 1995; Otley, 1999). 
Additionally, MCS can be used to legitimise and rationalise, or to serve political 
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purposes (Brunsson, 1989; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001). Prior studies also 
suggest that these objectives are, simultaneously, the motivations underlying the choice 
of environmental strategies (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Garriga and Melé, 2004; Barnett, 
2007). Each of these objectives, in relation to MCS design and use, is discussed next. 
a. Ensuring internal efficiency  
Most of the studies that examine technical uses of organisational MCS are based on 
contingency theory. Contingency theory suggests there needs to be a match between 
MCS and technical organisational contexts and work characteristics in order to 
maximise financial performance (Otley, 1980; 1999). Accordingly, organisational MCS 
is used to provide information to enable control of existing strategy, operations and 
activities and planning for future strategy and actions (see the review in Chenhall, 
2003). Control is achieved through the provision of past performance indicators which 
allow the existing strategy and performance to be evaluated and corrective actions to be 
taken where appropriate. Planning is achieved through control systems providing 
information to support rational resource allocation with an aim to achieve the 
organisations’ strategy objectives (Anthony, 1965; Burchell et al., 1980). In this respect, 
the role of an MCS is to ensure that an organisation’s strategies are implemented in the 
most efficient and effective manner. However, a common problem with studies that use 
contingency theory to explain MCS design and use is a failure to provide a theoretical 
underpinning to explain exactly through which mechanisms MCS can lead to 
improvement in organisational efficiency (Spekle, 2001).  
b. Enhancing market competitiveness 
An organisation’s MCS can be used to enable organisational learning and strategic 
renewal, thereby maintaining and enhancing market competitiveness (Simons, 1991). 
By monitoring and collecting information relating to environmental changes, 
organisational MCS helps managers evaluate and make decisions in relation to future 
strategy choices so as to gain and maintain market competitiveness (Simons, 1991). 
Furthermore, it is suggested that an appropriate MCS can promote communication and 
coordination between environmental functions and business units and increase 
environmental awareness or commitment throughout the organisation (Gupta, 1995; 
Hart, 1995). This, in turn, improves environmental performance, organisational 
reputation and brand image, and enables a green competitive advantage to be gained 
(Judge and Douglas, 1998). 
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c. Managing external uncertainty 
While contingency-based studies assume that the use of organisational MCS depends on 
the level of external uncertainty faced by an organisation, few have explicitly examined 
how MCS enables the management and reduction of uncertainty. Hunt and Auster 
(1990) suggest that by having control systems that monitor and assess vulnerabilities 
beyond government requirements, organisations can anticipate external uncertainty and 
formulate appropriate strategies accordingly. Bowman and Haire (1975) argue that CSR 
reporting can help manage external uncertainties by providing information that is likely 
to be relevant to all key organisational stakeholders. Taking an IT approach, DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) and Oliver (1991), among others, argue that in conditions of high 
uncertainty, such uncertainty is managed by organisations imitating each other. Such 
mimicking may result in organisations adopting similar accounting practices and MCS 
(Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Tsamenyi, Cullen, and González, 2006). 
d. Legitimising and rationalising 
Employing an IT perspective, researchers have found that organisational MCS, 
including accounting practices, have non-economic objectives. Accordingly, MCS 
could be seen as a ‘rational myth’ that maintains, and confers social legitimacy on the 
organisation and its participants’ actions. This is achieved by legitimising past actions 
and providing a frame for rationalising future decisions (Meyer and Rowan, 1991; 
Baxter and Chua, 2003). Burchell et al. (1980) argue that accounting is influenced by 
the way it is institutionalised in organisations, such as accounting departments and 
professional bodies, and by the objectification of accounting knowledge through books 
and training. Miller (1991) examines the use of discounted cash flow techniques in the 
UK public sector in the 1960s and finds that they provide the language to rationalise 
government policies and encourage organisations’ investment activities. Similarly, 
Covaleski, Dirsmith and Michelman (1993) demonstrate how different accounting 
systems were used as ceremonial systems to create a sense of order and meaning in the 
heavily institutionalised environments of US hospitals. Furthermore, accounting 
provides a record of activities in a way that is acceptable and reasonable to external 
constituents such as the government (Covaleski et al., 1993).   
e. Serving political purposes 
The literature also suggests that MCS can be used for political purposes. Burchell et al. 
(1980) suggest that where there are conflicts between values and interests of participants 
in the decision-making process, accounting arises as a mechanism through which 
different parties seek to promote their own concerns, interests
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with this argument, Brunsson (1989) argues that budgets have relatively loose links with 
actions and thus are seen more in terms of talks and decisions. This makes budgets “a 
good instrument for conducting politics and producing hypocrisy” (pp. 105-106). In 
support, Hopwood (1990) suggests that as a calculative practice, accounting can be used 
by organisations to enhance the salience and visibility of particular issues and modify 
public policies for organisational advantage. Similarly, Ogden (1997) finds that new 
forms of accounting, such as performance measures, can be used to link political 
objectives to organisational functioning. In doing so, accounting and associated MCS 
enable indirect control by the government over businesses. 
3.6. Evaluation of prior literature and identification of remaining 
gaps 
In summary, the body of literature on environmental management is strong theoretically 
and empirically regarding the impact of external and internal factors on the choice of 
environmental strategies. It is apparent from this literature that environmental regulation 
is a significant trigger of environmental management in addition to other economic 
volatilities. Prior studies also suggest that external institutional factors, such as 
stakeholder pressures, field and peer pressures, as well as internal capabilities and 
characteristics are important in making decisions about environmental strategies. Many 
types of environmental strategies are found in the literature, ranging from non-response 
to reactive and proactive approaches. Previous studies indicate the MCS required to 
support efficient and effective implementation of environmental strategies varies in 
design, use and objectives. Further, the body of literature on MCS, in general, contends 
that there are alternative uses of organisational MCS in addition to those that serve 
economic objectives.  Those alternative uses include managing external uncertainty, 
legitimising past actions and rationalising future decisions, and serving political 
purposes.  
However, there appear to be four major gaps in the reviewed literature. 
Gap 1: The literature has not considered environmental strategies in relation to, and 
in the event of the GCCPs, such as a carbon tax or an ETS. The consequence of this 
is we do not know whether the environmental strategies and the MCS choices 
organisations make in response to the GCCPs are similar, or different to those 
which are used in response to other types of environmental regulation. The 
potential wide-ranging economic, social, and political impacts of the GCCPs, as 
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discussed in Chapter 2, suggest that responses undertaken by organisations will be 
on a different scale and at a different level than what they traditionally would be.  
Gap 2: There is a lack of theoretical underpinnings to explain the mechanisms by 
which economic factors influence environmental strategy and MCS component 
choice. In other words, the literature does not provide sound theoretical economic 
explanations of how environmental regulations with strong economic impacts, such 
as the GCCPs, drive the choice of environmental strategy and MCS components. 
Further, examination is also required into how internal economic factors such as 
technology and infrastructure affect environmental strategy. Additionally, little 
understanding is available regarding how a particular choice of environmental 
strategy and MCS components enables the achievement of operational efficiency, 
and thus financial performance.  
Gap 3: The literature is predominantly cross-sectional and has considered different 
external and internal drivers to environmental management in parallel and in 
isolation from each other. Correspondingly, we know little about the impact of 
environmental regulation on organisations’ external environments (3a). 
Furthermore, little understanding exists in terms of the potential inter-relationships 
between external and internal drivers (3b) and the role of such inter-relationships in 
driving environmental strategies and organisational MCS (3c). For example, do 
internal characteristics and capabilities influence an organisation’s perceived 
exposure to external environment-related volatilities and pressures? Additionally, 
there is also a lack of insight into how a longitudinal period of environmental 
regulation changes such as the GCCPs, affect organisations’ environmental 
strategies and MCS (3d). 
Gap 4: The link between environmental strategies and organisational MCS has not 
been adequately explored. Previous studies examine the MCS design and use that 
are required to achieve a given environmental strategy at a particular point in time. 
However, no insight is available regarding the implications of a change in GCCP-
related environmental strategy for organisational MCS. In other words, do MCS 
design and use need to change to support the new strategy? Further, prior literature 
fails to identify what types of controls and control systems support strategy 
implementation and what types of controls and control systems enable strategy 
renewal. Thus, little is known about whether organisational MCS needs to fit with a 
given strategy, or serves to assist future strategy planning. Few insights are also 
available regarding the motivations and objectives underlying MCS design and use 
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under a GCCP context. For example, is the MCS used to fulfil all the objectives 
identified in the previous studies, or just some of them? Also, what drives one 
particular objective to be more important than others within the organisation?  
A summary of what has been found in the literature and what is yet to be explored in 
relation to environmental strategies and MCS is provided in Figure 3-1. 
Figure 3-1: Summary of findings and gaps from the prior literature  
 
Note: the arrows do not indicate cause and effect relationships 
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of environmental regulation, and related external and internal drivers for environmental 
strategies and organisational MCS. This chapter has also identified a number of 
remaining gaps in the existing literature, thereby providing the theoretical motivations 
to this study as outlined in Chapter 1. Specifically, this study contributes to addressing 
some of the above gaps by choosing the context of the GCCPs to understand the choice 
and change of environmental strategies under the impacts of environmental regulation 
(Gap 1). The study also seeks to develop an explanation regarding the influence of 
environmental regulations with strong economic impacts on strategy and MCS choice, 
through the application of appropriate economically-based theories in addition to those 
with an institutional focus (Gap 2). Placing this study in a GCCP context also enables 
insights to be gained about the potential impacts of the GCCPs on the economic and 
societal environments in which organisations operate (Gap 3a). Additionally, a basis for 
improved understanding of the potential interaction between external and internal 
drivers (Gap 3b) and the impact of such interaction on organisations’ environmental 
strategic and MCS responses (Gap 3c) is provided. Doing this, longitudinal insights into 
the influence of environmental regulatory change on environmental strategies and MCS 
can be gained (Gap 3d). There is also a potential to further understand the role of 
organisational MCS in relation to environmental strategies (Gap 4). This enables the 
identification of the implications of environmental strategies in response to the changing 
GCCPs for MCS design, use, and objectives. Furthermore, this study is motivated by a 
potential to develop a theoretical framework that explains how organisations internally 
adapt to external environmental regulatory changes. 
Based on these theoretical motivations, this study seeks to provide an answer to the 
following research question: 
 
In order to answer this research question, this study develops a research framework 
incorporating appropriate theories and the key external and internal drivers, 
environmental strategy and organisational MCS variables as identified in the literature 
presented in Chapter 3 above and in Chapter 2. This research framework is developed 
and presented next in Chapter 4.  
  
What are the MCS implications arising from strategy choices New Zealand 
electricity generators make in managing economic volatility and societal 
pressures resulting from a prolonged period of GCCP change? 
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Chapter 4: Research framework 
4.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 3 the existing research literature was examined in response to the research 
question identified in Chapter 2.  As a result of this examination, four gaps in the 
environmental strategy and MCS research, as it relates to this study, would appear to 
exist (refer to Figure 3-1). The purpose of this chapter is to develop a research 
framework that helps address the research question and narrows the existing gaps in the 
prior literature. This research framework integrates the external and internal drivers 
suggested by previous studies as well as the insights from relevant theories to examine 
the implications for organisational MCS arising from the strategy choices New Zealand 
generators make in response to the changing GCCPs.  
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section outlines the considerations made 
in choosing the applicable theory/theories and theoretical framework for this study. In 
developing the theoretical framework, the following section reviews transactional cost 
economics (TCE), institutional theory (IT) and resource-based theory (RBT) and 
discusses their inter-relationship and suitability for this study. The research design and 
framework based on these three theories and prior literature are outlined next. Finally, a 
summary of the chapter is presented. 
4.2. Considerations in choosing a theoretical framework 
A number of different theories can be employed in organisational research, including 
contingency theory, agency theory, critical perspectives-based theories, stakeholder 
theory, TCE, IT and RBT. However, the relationships central to the study and the 
operating setting within which these relationships exist should determine the choice of 
theory/theories. The preceding theories are now discussed in those terms in order to 
identify a framework suitable for this study.  
Contingency theory assumes that organisational effectiveness depends on the degree of 
matching between an organisation’s internal characteristics, including strategy and 
MCS, with contingencies that reflect the economic environments in which the 
organisation operates (Govindarajan, 1988; Donaldson, 2001; Chenhall, 2003). 
However, contingency theory does not provide an adequate economics-based 
explanation as to why organisations have to modify their strategy and MCS choices 
when external economic environments change. Additionally, where the change is 
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externally driven and affects multiple environments, e.g. economic, social and natural 
environments (which is potentially the case with the ETS), contingency theory does not 
provide a basis for explaining the interaction between multiple external sources of 
change as well as assessing the relative pressure that each source may exert on the 
organisation. Contingency theory views such change from the organisation’s 
perspective, i.e. looking from its internal operating environment out to its external 
business environment (Donaldson, 2001). This view is organisation-specific and thus 
will not necessarily capture the variations in transactional and other organisational costs, 
from one organisation to another, due to each particular source of pressure. Given that 
these generators differ in generation asset base and ownership structure (Chapter 2), it is 
expected that GCCP-driven change/pressure will affect each organisation differently. 
Since this study examines all of the significant generators within the NZEI, it requires a 
theory that allows a comparative examination of GCCP effects on different 
organisations and their strategic decision-making. For these reasons, contingency theory 
is not considered to provide an appropriate framework for this study. 
Agency theory explains the existence of MCS as part of an organisation’s strategies to 
monitor and bond the agent’s behaviour with shareholders’ interests (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; Yermack, 1995). However, it is not the objective of this study to 
investigate the changes in organisational MCS to mitigate agency problems. That is, this 
study is not about assessing the effectiveness of economic interventions, such as the 
ETS, in providing an incentive for emitters (e.g. generators) to reduce emissions and 
manage the wider environmental consequences of those emissions. This study examines 
the impact of regulation change in the form of GCCPs on the strategy choices of 
generators who are all likely to react differently. Hence, it is not considered to be an 
agency-constrained study and therefore an agency framework will not be applied here. 
Critical perspectives-based theories investigate the use of MCS information for 
exercising discipline and control over labour (Miller and O’Leary, 1987; Hopper and 
Amstrong, 1991), or the involvement of micro-politics and internal resistance to the 
roles of organisational MCS (Wickramasinghe, Hopper, and Rathnasiri, 2004). Labour 
control and internal politics, albeit important, are not the subject of this study since it 
investigates the changes in organisational MCS to respond to externally-imposed 
GCCP-related volatilities and pressures.  
Stakeholder theory is interested in identifying who an organisation’s key stakeholders 
are and how its MCS is used to simultaneously address the needs and demands of the 
different stakeholder groups (Jones, 1995; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). However, 
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this study seeks to examine how organisations modify their MCS to plan for and 
implement environmental strategies in a GCCP context, rather than to satisfy multiple 
stakeholder demands and needs. It is noted that stakeholder influences and expectations 
constitute the institutional environment examined as part of IT. Thus the potential 
impacts of different stakeholders on organisational MCS are integrated into the IT-
based analysis discussed below. 
To adequately address this study’s research question, the theoretical framework needs to 
capture the potential and multiple GCCP-driven economic and societal pressures and 
volatilities in the generators’ external and internal environments. The framework also 
needs to enable a comparative analysis of the differing organisational costs imposed by 
GCCP-driven changes and pressures on the generators. Further, due to the differences in 
internal characteristics, the generators are likely to respond to these changes differently, 
and their strategic and MCS responses may be motivated by different objectives. 
Nonetheless, a single theory is unlikely to be able to adequately explain the potential 
multiplicity and complexity in the GCCP-related external environments and their 
implications for generators’ organisational adaptation. Therefore, a multiple-theory 
framework is required for this study.  A multiple-theory framework also allows theory 
triangulation (Denzin, 2009), which enables an assessment of the relative importance of 
each change or pressure for an organisation, or the motivations underlying different 
strategic choices. 
Three theories, TCE, IT and RBT, are considered potentially suitable for this multiple-
theory framework.  The implications of changes in the economic environments on 
organisational costs and internal efficiency are best explained by TCE (Williamson, 
1991), while IT provides a basis for understanding GCCP-driven societal changes and 
pressures and how they affect strategy and MCS choices (Scott, 2001). Further, RBT 
enables the examination of the impacts of GCCP-driven competitive pressures and 
internal capabilities on the generators and how strategic choices are made to ensure 
competitiveness (Barney, 1991). The combined use of these three theories enables 
coverage of a wider range of GCCP-related economic and societal changes or pressures 
in the generators’ operating environments. It also helps understand how generators react 
strategically to GCCP-related environments and achieve technical efficiency and market 
competitiveness while being perceived as legitimate (Hart, 1995; Deephouse, 1999). 
The next section reviews the three theories and their inter-relationships in order to 
provide the basis for the development of a multiple-theory framework.  
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4.3. Developing a multiple-theory framework 
The multiple-theory framework developed in this chapter is designed to address the 
research question, using the different, but complementary, insights from TCE, IT and 
RBT. These theories are reviewed in the next three sub-sections. Their inter-
relationships and commonalities are examined next. This is followed by the 
combination of the three theories to identify the insights they potentially generate in 
relation to this study’s research question.  
4.3.1. Transactional cost economics (TCE) 
Transactional cost economics is an economic theory that argues economising 
transactional costs is the fundamental driver of organisations’ governance structure and 
associated MCS choice (Williamson, 1975). It explains the optimisation of commercial 
transactions is based on an assessment of transactions’ characteristics and institutional 
environments. Accordingly, such optimisation is achieved by selecting governance 
structures and MCSs that match the institutional environments and the characteristics of 
intra- and inter-organisational transactions.  
4.3.1.1. Transactional characteristics 
Transactions that are important in understanding governance and MCS decisions are (1) 
asset specificity, (2) the frequency with which the transactions occur, and (3) the 
uncertainty or disturbances to which these transactions are subject to. Identifying these 
different characteristics allows the evaluation of the efficiency of one, or a mixture of 
modes of governance and MCS types (Williamson, 1996). Furthermore, institutional 
environments are important considerations in TCE-based strategic and MCS decisions. 
Asset specificity  
Asset specificity refers to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative 
uses and by alternative users without loss of its productive value (Williamson, 1991). 
High asset specificity therefore refers to assets whose value will be significantly lost as 
a result of re-deployment. High specificity assets tend to be purpose built or customised 
to provide a specific range of benefits to an organisation, or a number of organisations 
operating in the same industry sector.  These types of assets are likely to have higher 
associated transactional costs due to them requiring a significant investment by the 
organisation in terms of their design and construction and a reasonably long lifespan. 
Additionally, the higher the asset specificity, the more likely the values of those assets 
are exposed to opportunistic expropriation by the parties involved in the transactions, 
thus causing higher transactional costs. This leads to the need for powerful safeguards 
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between the parties. These safeguards may include intensive use of selected inter-
organisational controls to promote bonding and coordination, and to monitor and 
prevent opportunism (Spekle, 2001). The use of such controls leads to an increase in 
transactional costs, but such an increase is more than offset by the avoidance/mitigation 
of the potential loss in asset value due to opportunism. Therefore, asset specificity is a 
key determinant in explaining the choice of MCS for economising purposes.  
Transactional frequency 
Transactional frequency refers to the intensity with which transactions recur 
(Williamson, 1985). The more frequently a transaction recurs in relation to an asset of 
high specificity, the higher the transactional costs incurred due to the increased potential 
opportunism between the parties involved. In this case, there is an incentive for 
organisations to adopt elaborate control systems, or internalise the transactions to curb 
opportunism and ensure smooth coordination in conducting their activities. A high 
frequency also makes it easier to recover the cost of such elaborate control systems 
(Williamson, 1985). For example, under an ETS, thermal generators are exposed to 
higher transactional costs because of the need to regularly measure and monitor 
generation emissions, and to buy carbon credits to meet ETS compliance obligations. 
This gives them an incentive to upgrade their emissions monitoring system and 
establish an in-house carbon trading function. In contrast, when transactions are 
occasional or idiosyncratic, transactional costs are lower and hence organisations are 
able to rely on simpler governance and control structures such as market mechanisms 
and bilateral/trilateral cooperation and trust to govern these transactions (Williamson, 
1985). This is potentially the case with some renewable generators who have gained 
PRE-related carbon credits, but do not have an ETS obligation. To sell these credits, 
they may use external consultants or brokers or simply utilise current market price 
systems. 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty can arise from different sources, including market dynamics and 
complexity, and task unfamiliarity and complexity. A GCCP, such as an ETS, may 
impose significant uncertainty on thermal generators due to the complexity associated 
with emissions measurement, monitoring and reporting. They might also experience 
increased uncertainty due to the lack of expertise if pressured to change from thermal to 
renewable-based assets. The level of uncertainty is also high for emerging domestic and 
international carbon markets in which carbon contracts require highly specialised 
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knowledge that market participants have not developed. Williamson (1991, 1996) 
suggests that two possibilities exist when uncertainty increases. The first possibility is 
that organisations will give up more complex and special design features for more 
standardised contracts, thereby allowing the continued reliance on market mechanisms, 
e.g. to monitor their carbon credit buying/selling activities. The second option is to put 
in place detailed MCS arrangements to enable organisational learning and adjustment 
to, say, an ETS-focused operating environment. Additionally, organisations can seek 
compensation from the Government to recover part of the transactional costs they incur 
as a result of changing their asset and technological base. This may particularly be the 
case given that the thermally-based generators inherited their thermal assets as part of 
the commercialisation reforms of the NZEI (Section 2.3). 
Institutional environment 
The institutional environment incorporates the “set of fundamental political, social and 
legal ground rules that establish the basis for production and distribution” (Williamson, 
1991, p.287). Williamson (1991) suggests that the institutional environment is a critical 
factor in economising decisions where the institutional environment dominates 
governance and controls choices. This suggests that under extreme political, social and 
economic conditions, efficiency-seeking decisions are not possible and are likely to be 
replaced with those that are deemed legitimate under the prevailing institutional 
environments (Roberts and Greenwood, 1997).  
Various researchers suggest that it is important to consider organisational MCS design 
and use within a changing institutional context (Williamson, 1991; Covaleski et al., 
2003). Market structures, expectations, rules of competition and forms of transactions 
become legitimate and require particular types of governance and control choices 
(Commons, 1934; Coase, 1937). Consequently, when institutional environments 
change, the definition of economic legitimacy shifts and necessitates appropriate 
adaptation in organisational MCS (Covaleski et al., 2003). Further, institutional change 
can lead to changes in transactional characteristics which in turn alters the comparative 
costs between alternative MCS structures (Williamson, 1991). Hence, under changes in 
institutional environments, the economic viability of the existing MCS is contested, 
leading to decisions to replace or modify such an MCS with a new one (Covaleski et al., 
2003).  
55 
 
4.3.1.2. TCE in environmental strategy and MCS literature 
As reviewed in Chapter 3 (3.2.1), no study explicitly uses TCE to explain the choice of 
environmental strategies and organisational MCS in the context of environmental 
regulation. However, several scholars have argued that TCE is a valuable theoretical 
tool in examining organisational strategies and MCS (Spicer and Ballew, 1983; 
Williamson, 1999; Spekle, 2001; Covaleski et al., 2003). TCE argues that economising 
transactional costs is crucial to achieving economic efficiency, a key condition for 
organisational survival (Spicer and Ballew, 1983; Spekle, 2001). Thus, a primary TCE 
theoretical question centres on whether transactions are controlled efficiently through 
the choice of appropriate strategies and MCS. Consequently, TCE provides a simple 
framework within which strengths and weaknesses of different strategies and MCS 
structures can be related and compared (Zimmerman, 1997; Walker, 1998). 
Additionally, TCE helps identify the key transactional factors that are likely to influence 
organisational strategy and MCS choices (Spicer and Ballew, 1983; Spekle, 2001). The 
adoption of TCE also mitigates the current focus of MCS literature on transactions 
within the organisations and allows a wider coverage of strategy and MCS decisions in 
both intra and inter-organisational contexts (Covaleski et al., 2003). Therefore, an 
understanding of how MCS is used to reduce opportunism and optimise efficiency in 
the transactions involving external organisations, (e.g. carbon credit purchases or 
partnerships in generation development projects), can be gained. 
4.3.1.3. The use of TCE to understand GCCP-related strategic and MCS change  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the GCCPs are likely to change the generators’ external 
economic environments, including changing market competition and fuel economics, 
and expose them to carbon market fluctuations and policy and regulatory change. 
Additionally, the GCCPs increase the production costs of thermal generators by 
imposing a carbon charge on their generation activities. Thermal generators will also 
incur substantial compliance costs associated with the required monitoring, reporting 
and verification of emissions and carbon credits. Hence, to sustain their existing levels 
of profitability, thermal generators have to find ways to minimise the production and 
transactional costs and mitigate the impacts of GCCPs on financial performance. They 
can do so by formulating appropriate strategies and/or modifying their strategic 
emphasis. Strategic emphasis refers to the level of importance placed on a particular 
environmental strategy and hence the amount of resources and personnel channelled 
into such a strategy to achieve the desired performance outcomes (Ittner and Larcker, 
1997). New environmental strategies and/or a strategic emphasis change will lead to 
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adaptations in organisational MCS, including the establishment of new control systems, 
or a change in the use of selected controls.  
Strategic and MCS change, in this sense, is the result of rational economic calculations 
to optimise production and transactional costs and internally adapt to changes in an 
organisation’s economically-focused institutional environments (Williamson, 1991). 
Furthermore, since this study investigates organisational MCS in a changing 
institutional environment (i.e. the planned introduction of a GCCP), TCE enables the 
examination of how existing MCSs remain viable or are changed for internal efficiency 
purposes (Covaleski et al., 2003). Transactional cost economics also provides a possible 
explanation to the impacts of GCCP-related transactional characteristics on MCS and 
strategic change. Consequently, TCE-based economic insights can be gained into the 
external and internal economic drivers of organisational strategies and associated MCS 
due to GCCP introduction.  However, TCE is not without its disadvantages. 
4.3.1.4. Disadvantages of TCE  
Despite TCE’s focus on efficiency-seeking and transactional optimisation, some 
researchers argue that cost control and internal efficiency are not always the prevailing 
concerns in strategy and MCS choices. Instead, organisations may be motivated to adopt 
controls to conform to institutional expectations (Scott, 2001), or to gain an advantage 
over their competitors (Porter, 1980; Barney, 1991). Although emphasising 
transactional characteristics and an economically-focused institutional environment, 
TCE researchers are criticised for failing to recognise the role of societal and associated 
institutional pressures on the design and use of organisational MCS (Preston, 1991). 
The need to respond to institutional pressures is particularly important in the context of 
the NZEI where the limited number of generators renders them highly sensitive to 
public scrutiny. Further, the GCCP changes are likely to lead to additional political, 
social and natural environmental pressures that supplement economic considerations in 
influencing managerial decisions to change environmental strategy and MCS. 
Furthermore, competitive electricity markets (Section 2.3.2) require generators to adopt 
strategies and MCS to maintain competitiveness, in addition to those pressures driven 
by efficiency-seeking criteria. Furthermore, TCE does not consider how internal 
resources may be reallocated to enable more effective change management, or how the 
availability of existing resources may assist some organisations to manage and control 
their operations better than others. 
Institutional theory and RBT allow theoretical explanations that can mitigate the 
limitations of TCE. Institutional theory potentially provides a means to capture the 
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potential impacts of political and social pressures on organisational strategy and its 
MCS. Resource-based theory is useful because it explains organisational ability to make 
use of their existing and potential internal resources to optimise internal efficiency, as 
well as enhance market competitiveness. The next two sections review IT and RBT, and 
discuss how these two theories add insights that help understand the changes in 
environmental strategy and MCS of electricity generators under the GCCP. 
4.3.2. Institutional theory (IT) 
There are a number of variants in IT, namely, new institutional (transactional) 
economics, old institutional economics (Selznick, 1957; Clark, 1960, 1972), and new 
institutional sociology (Carruthers, 1995). New institutional sociology emphasises 
legitimacy, the embeddedness of organisational fields, and formal rules, routines and 
scripts (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). These rules, 
routines, and scripts are considered institutions, or “social structures that have attained a 
high degree of resilience” (Scott, 2001, p.48). This differs from old institutional 
economics which focuses on issues of power, interests, coalitions and competing values 
and informal structures (Stinchcombe, 1997; Moll, Burns and Major, 2004). Recently 
scholars have converged insights from new institutional sociology with those of old 
institutional economics into neo-institutionalism (hereafter IT) to understand the role 
played by external institutions as well as intra-organisational routines and institutions in 
affecting organisational MCS choice and change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Scott, 
2001; Fowler, 2009).  
Institutional theory argues that organisations exist in a wider environment characterised 
by a system of societal and institutional values and expectations that shape social 
reality; commonly referred to as institutional pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Meyer et al., 1983). Generally, three types of institutional pressures are found at various 
times and in various combinations. Regulatory or coercive pressures originate from 
rules and regulations with associated enforcement mechanisms. Normative pressures 
come from the shared values or norms of a particular group that are internalised by 
group members and then imposed on others. Cultural-cognitive or mimetic pressures 
result from the taken-for-granted assumptions made by those within the institutional 
environment and can result in the mimicking of behaviour and practices that are 
considered legitimate (Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Scott, 2001; Fowler, 2009). In order 
to survive, organisations conform to these pressures by shaping their internal structures 
and systems accordingly, even though such conformity has little to do with 
organisational efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991).  
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Institutional theory is often conceptualised as a theory of stability rather than change 
(Brint and Karabel, 1991; DiMaggio, 1988; Hirsch, 1997). This conceptualisation 
results from a dominant research focus on the isomorphism commonly found between 
organisations exposed to strong institutional environments (Orru, Biggart, and 
Hamilton, 1991). However, other scholars argue that IT can be used to explain 
organisational change (Dougherty, 1994; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). An organisation is assumed to be embedded within its environment and 
its behaviour is sanctioned and made routine by the norms widely accepted and diffused 
in such an environment. This embeddedness leads to stability and inertia in 
organisational structures and arrangements (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). However, the 
more environmentally embedded an organisation is, the more uncertainty and instability 
it will experience when confronting external change, which in turn leads to the need to 
adapt internally (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 
Additionally, due to the need to maintain legitimacy with external stakeholders, 
organisations need to react when the wider institutional environment in which 
organisations are embedded, change (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991). Such a 
reaction is primarily realised in the form of adopting new systems and structures that 
reflect new accepted norms and values (Levi, 1990; Scott, 2001).  
4.3.2.1. Institutional theory in environmental strategy and MCS literature 
As reviewed in Chapter 3 (3.2), many prior studies use IT to explain the impacts of 
environmental regulation and societal pressures on environmental strategies and 
organisational MCS. Prior studies suggest that environmental regulation (Garrod and 
Chadwick, 1996; Clemens, 1997), industry-related societal pressures (Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2004; 2006), stakeholder groups (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Bansal, 
2005), and peer and field pressures (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Álvarez-Gil et al., 2001) 
are important drivers of environmental strategies. Further, wider societal expectations, 
field and peer pressures are found to induce similar accounting practices among 
different organisations (Meyer, 1986; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006).  
Accordingly, it is argued that organisations adopt the environmental strategies and 
related MCS that are consistent with institutional and wider societal expectations in 
order to gain the resources critical for organisational survival. By doing so, they 
demonstrate conformity to the institutionalised rules and expectations expressed by 
external constituents and hence gain social legitimacy (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983, 
1988; Covaleski et al., 1993). In this respect, the adoption of environmental strategies 
and particular MCSs serve legitimacy purposes rather than organisational efficiency 
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purposes (Meyer, 1986; Greening and Gray, 1994). The legitimacy gained from 
adoption of these strategies and MCS leads to organisational survival, independent of 
economic performance or internal attributes (Scott, 2001).   
In some cases, IT suggests that an organisation’s MCS serves a symbolic role. That is, 
the MCS exists only to signal to external parties and stakeholders organisational 
legitimacy, and thus adds little to organisational performance improvement (Carruthers, 
1995). As the MCS has been adopted to meet institutional expectations without 
significantly altering the technical processes at the core of the organisation (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977), the MCS will become decoupled with actual work activities (Scott, 
2001). However, in other cases, MCS changes can be undertaken to gain legitimacy 
with external stakeholders and to enhance internal efficiency, thereby improving 
organisational performance (Fernández-Alles and Valle-Cabrera, 2006). Conforming to 
institutional pressures and expectations and achieving internal efficiency simultaneously 
are critical requirements for organisations operating in an external environment that is 
characterised by both institutional and technical elements (Scott, 2001). This is the case 
with the GCCP-focused environment which exerts strong institutional and economic 
pressures on generators (Chapter 2).  
4.3.2.2. The use of IT to understand GCCP-related strategic and MCS change 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (2.3.3), the introduction of the GCCPs is likely to result in 
significant changes in the generators’ institutional environments. Institutional theory 
predicts that these changes are likely to pose challenges for generators’ legitimacy. To 
remain legitimate, generators should respond to these changes and make choices 
regarding their environmental strategies and organisational MCS so as to satisfy the 
GCCP-related societal expectations and demands. Using IT, five possible strategic and 
MCS responses the generators can use to achieve legitimacy are: acquiescence or 
compliance; avoidance; compromise or negotiation; defiance; and manipulation or 
controlling the environment (Oliver, 1991; Scott 2001).  
Institutional theory predicts that a conformance strategy is preferred when organisations 
perceive that the adoption of a particular environmental strategy and associated MCS 
results in both legitimacy gains and internal cost reductions (Oliver, 1991; Goodstein, 
1994). In other cases, organisations may perceive the adoption of particular practices 
has significant costs, but results in few economic benefits to the organisation (Meyer et 
al., 1983; Goodstein, 1994). Therefore, organisations may undertake an avoidance 
strategy, for example, adopting environmental strategies and related MCS ceremonially 
and within a limited scope. A compromise or negotiation strategy allows a balance to be 
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achieved between the elements required by the stakeholders and society and those 
adopted by organisations (Oliver, 1991). Accounting numbers could be used to support 
a compromise strategy (Burchell et al., 1980). Another possible strategy is that of 
defiance where the organisation publicly resists society-imposed institutional pressures 
(Oliver, 1991). The last potential strategy is one of manipulation where the 
organisations attain a position of power and are able to manipulate societal expectations 
and therefore shape what is considered legitimate (Oliver, 1991). Consistent with this, 
organisations can use accounting to influence and modify public policies and promote 
their political interests (Hopwood, 1990). However, these different strategic responses 
have not been subjected to significant empirical testing in institutional research (Poole 
and Van de Ven, 2004). 
4.3.2.3. Disadvantages of IT 
Institutional theory is subjected to a number of criticisms. One of the shortcomings of 
IT is its limited analysis of the process of institutionalisation (Phillips, Lawrence and 
Hardy, 2004). That is, the process during which routines, scripts and structures become 
institutions (Scott, 2001). Additionally, most studies have been cross-sectional, 
measuring isomorphism as outcomes rather than processes (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). 
Further, IT has limited capacity to explain incremental change and the co-existence of 
multiple organisational forms within a field (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Fligstein, 1997). 
Institutional theory-based studies are also criticised as emphasising the channels through 
which practices are diffused, while underplaying variations in the levels of 
institutionalisation (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996).  
Additionally, while being predominantly focused on social legitimacy, IT-based studies 
underplay the importance of internal efficiency and external market competitiveness 
which drive financial performance. Similar to social legitimacy and internal efficiency, 
market competitiveness is one of the most critical requirements for organisational 
survival (Hart, 1995; Deephouse, 1996; Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008). Resource-
based theory (RBT) explains how organisations can achieve such market 
competitiveness. It suggests competitiveness is gained through strategic differentiation, 
which is acquired by possessing and developing strategic resources which are not easily 
copied or obtainable by other competing organisations (Porter, 1980; Barney, 1991; 
Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). The next section reviews RBT.  
4.3.3. Resource-based theory (RBT) 
Transactional cost economics explains how organisations choose their environmental 
strategies and resultant MCS to optimise internal efficiency and cost control, while IT 
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emphasises the role of MCS in legitimising organisational operations and activities to 
the social and political environments in which they operate. However, neither theory 
considers the need for organisations to stay competitive in their markets as a critical 
requirement for survival. RBT fills this gap and explains how organisations can 
maintain and enhance their competitiveness through the appropriate utilisation of their 
internal resources.  
RBT emerges from the concern that a focus on either TCE-based internal efficiency or 
IT-based social legitimacy is not sufficient to secure sustainable organisational 
competitiveness. Instead, organisations need to develop resources that are hard to copy 
or are not easily obtainable by other organisations and adopt isolating mechanisms to 
create barriers to copying by others (Barney, 1991; 2001). The conditions under which 
an organisation’s resources become competitive capabilities are twofold: 
• The first condition is when an organisation nurtures internal competencies and 
applies them in an appropriate external environment (Barney, 1991). For example, 
generators can develop staff expertise in renewable energy before an ETS is 
introduced, and then implement a large-scale renewable investment programme. By 
doing so, generators build an internal capability that enables them to take advantage 
of the favourable economics of renewables over fossil fuels. 
• The second condition is where existing resources allow an organisation to “exploit 
opportunities and neutralize threats” in the external environments (Barney, 1991, 
p.106). For example, a generator with 100% renewable-based generation assets can 
take advantage of the opportunities available in a carbon-constrained economy due 
to its clean and green image.  
Therefore, RBT emphasises the fit between what the organisation has the ability to do 
(internal resources) and what it has the opportunity to do (external environment 
conditions) (Russo and Fouts, 1997). As discussed in Chapter 2, the GCCPs are likely to 
create new environmental conditions for generators, such as changing retail competition 
and changing fuel economics. Based on RBT, it can be argued that generators’ 
competitiveness will depend on whether their existing resources match the new 
conditions, or whether they can develop appropriate capabilities to respond to changing 
market conditions.  
4.3.3.1. RBT in environmental strategy and MCS literature 
As reviewed in Chapter 3 (3.3), many previous studies have used RBT to examine the 
importance of organisational internal resources and capabilities for environmental 
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strategies. These studies indicate that size (Bowen, 1999, 2000; Álvarez Gil et al., 2001) 
and technological capabilities (James et al., 1999; Collins et al., 2007) are the key non-
human factors that enable extensive and innovative environmental strategies. Further, 
human factors are important drivers of the choice and implementation of appropriate 
environmental strategies. These factors include: prior experience in emissions reduction 
and other environmental projects (Goodstein, 1994; Marcus, 1988; Céspedes-Lorente et 
al., 2003), organisational learning (Sharma and Vredenberg, 1998), managerial factors 
(Hunt and Auster, 1990; Sharma, 2000; de Bakker et al., 2002) and corporate culture 
(Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996). However, no prior studies appear to use RBT to 
explain the design and use of organisational MCS, in relation to environmental 
strategies.  
4.3.3.2. The use of RBT to understand GCCP-related strategic change 
Resource-based theory is relevant in this study because generators operate in an 
environment characterised not only by strong institutional pressures, but also by intense 
competition. In order to ensure their long term survival, organisations need to have a 
competitive advantage over others in the marketplace (Porter, 1980). Such a competitive 
advantage is derived from a differentiation strategy that is developed from internal 
resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; 2001). Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985) suggest 
that in regulated and changing industries (such as the NZEI), organisations adopt a 
differentiated strategic choice. Thus, organisational strategies are chosen based on 
available organisational resources, but they still conform to external institutional and 
economic expectations and pressures. Environmental strategies and MCS are considered 
key mechanisms through which organisations create a competitive advantage while 
maintaining their external (social) legitimacy and reputation (Westley and Vrendenburg, 
1991; Hart, 1995). Hence, organisations, such as the generators, can maximise their 
revenue flows through competitive differentiation while still being perceived as 
environmentally responsible by their key stakeholders and the wider community 
(Deephouse, 1999).  
The use of RBT allows the examination of the role played by organisational resources in 
the choice of environmental strategies and MCS in response to the planned GCCPs. In 
other words, RBT provides a theoretical base to explain why different generators, with 
varying resource capacity, may employ different environmental strategies which, in 
turn, have different implications for organisational MCS.  
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4.3.3.3. Disadvantages of RBT 
Like the other theories, RBT has its disadvantages. It argues that differences in 
performance are caused by variations in resources and capabilities across organisations. 
Thus, RBT is criticised for ignoring industry factors that can have important impacts on 
organisational performance (Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen, 2010). Priem and 
Butler (2001) argue that sustainable competitive advantage can be turned into a 
weakness when external environmental conditions change. Others suggest that changing 
external environments require organisations to develop dynamic capabilities in order to 
gain a competitive advantage (e.g. Fiol, 2001; Helfat et al., 2007). Connor (2002) 
contends that RBT applies only to large organisations with significant market power 
that can rely on stable resources to maintain competitive advantage. In contrast, smaller 
organisations have to use dynamic resources. Resource-based theory is also criticised 
for not making a clear distinction between the resources that are inputs to organisations 
and the capabilities that enable organisations to deploy and utilise those inputs. 
Additionally, RBT does not address how different types of resources (for example, 
tangible versus intangible resources, or physical versus human capital) contribute 
differently to an organisation’s competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Barney and Clark, 
2007). Kraaijenbrink et al (2010) suggest that these critiques of RBT can be addressed 
by the development of RBT to incorporate the concept of dynamic resources and to 
distinguish between different types of resources and their impacts on organisations’ 
competitive advantage.  
4.3.4. The relationships between TCE, IT and RBT 
In the preceding sections, an overview of TCE, IT and RBT and how their use enables 
an understanding of environmental strategies and MCS change inside generators in 
response to GCCPs, has been provided. This section discusses the relationships between 
the three theories. 
4.3.4.1. Relationship between TCE and IT  
Institutional theory and TCE are inter-related in a number of ways. Firstly, both theories 
are interested in institutions and institutional change (Burns and Scapens, 2000). While 
institutional environments are the key consideration in IT, the importance of social-
political dimensions in the institutional environments is implicitly recognised by TCE 
(Covaleski et al., 2003). Furthermore, many researchers argue that the examination of 
control choices in an institutional-change context requires the use of TCE and IT 
perspectives (Williamson, 1991; Oliver, 1991; Goodrick and Salancik, 1996; Covaleski 
et al., 2003). Institutional change leads to new economic uncertainties and shifts in the 
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comparative transactional costs between alternative control choices, thus requiring 
modifications in organisational MCS in order to maintain efficiency (Williamson, 1991; 
Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). Institutional change can also generate new social 
pressures and expectations which demand organisations to adopt appropriate controls 
and control systems to maintain legitimacy, thus requiring an IT-based explanation 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Thus, by employing TCE and IT simultaneously, there 
is a potential to differentiate the economic versus social significance of MCS change in 
a GCCP context. Furthermore, it allows the relationship between the GCCPs’ economic 
impacts and societal demands and pressures to be assessed. For example, an assessment 
can be made as to what extent the desire to achieve a cleaner and lower-emission 
atmosphere has led society to accept potential electricity price increases due to an ETS. 
Secondly, researchers suggest that efficiency and legitimacy are not mutually exclusive, 
that is, they are two intertwined organisational objectives underlying strategy choice 
(Fernández-Alles and Valle-Cabrera, 2006) and MCS design and use (Covaleski et al., 
2003). In pursuing efficiency, organisations may adopt strategies and practices which, 
over time, can be diffused to other organisations and businesses and thus gradually 
become institutionalised and gain legitimacy. Conversely, in seeking legitimacy, 
organisations undertake strategies that improve trust and relationships with key 
organisations, thereby facilitating the conduct of their business operations and 
improving organisational efficiency (Fernández-Alles and Valle-Cabrera, 2006).  
Thirdly, while governing/controlling transactions is an economically driven activity, the 
choice of strategies and MCSs is inevitably constrained by organisations’ existing 
routines, habits and culture as well as the pressures imposed by external institutional 
environments (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Covaleski et al., 2003). This view is consistent 
with TCE which suggests that decision makers will choose MCS to achieve the best 
possible organisational efficiency within institutional, organisational and human 
constraints, a choice later referred to as constrained efficiency by Roberts and 
Greenwood (1997). Roberts and Greenwood (1997) argue that organisations are biased 
towards types of governance and control that are considered legitimate in the 
institutional environments, but are not rational from an economic perspective.  
Consequently, the dual use of TCE and IT in this study is possible because both theories 
recognise the importance of institutional environments and they provide insights into 
the relationships between GCCPs’ economic impacts and societal pressures/demands 
within an institutional change context. Furthermore, this use allows the examination of 
the interaction between legitimacy and efficiency needs and how environmental 
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strategies and MCS are established and used to balance these needs. Additionally, 
potential insights can be gained regarding the impacts of institutional factors and 
environments on cost-focused economising strategic and MCS decisions.  
4.3.4.2. Relationship between RBT and IT  
The interface between RBT and IT has been well recognised in the literature. Many 
researchers suggest that in formulating strategies, corporate management recognises that 
competitive advantage must be created within a broader scope of social legitimacy 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hart, 1995). This dualism in strategy formulation enables 
organisations to execute a strategy within the legitimate bounds of their institutional 
environments. Consequently, the environmental strategies undertaken by organisations 
are likely to conform to the expectations and pressures of external stakeholders, while 
being sufficiently differentiated to maintain/gain market competitiveness. This approach 
is referred to as legitimate differentiation (Deephouse, 1996; 1999). Institutional change 
potentially modifies the comparative competitiveness between industries and 
organisations and reduces the strategic discretion available to organisational 
management (Oliver, 1991; Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). Furthermore, it can be 
argued that existing resources and capabilities influence the extent to which an 
organisation achieves social legitimacy (Barney, 1991; 2001). For example, it is easier 
for a renewable generator to comply with GCCP-focused public pressures for emissions 
reductions and thus gain social legitimacy than for a thermal-based generator which has 
substantial generation-related carbon emissions.  
4.3.4.3. Relationship between RBT and TCE 
The link between RBT and TCE is less well recognised in the literature. Williamson 
(1999) suggests that TCE can be integrated into strategic management by investigating 
how organisations, with pre-existing strengths and competencies, organise particular 
transactions and achieve internal efficiency. This suggestion recognises the role of 
resource-based concepts in explaining cost-focused strategic decisions and choices of 
organisational MCS. For example, large generators, with stronger financial and human 
resource capabilities, are more likely to establish an internal carbon trading team to 
manage carbon costs. The activities of this team could then be monitored and organised 
using an extensive MCS containing performance measurement, internal reporting and 
training systems. Furthermore, existing resources and capabilities can help organisations 
to achieve organisational efficiency (Barney, 2001). For example, expertise in previous 
emissions-reduction projects could help generators reduce their emission level and thus 
lower their carbon-related compliance costs. Similarly, prior investments in wind 
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development may help generators gain access to favourable wind sites or low-cost 
suppliers of wind turbines.  Both options can reduce production costs. Therefore, it can 
be argued that RBT potentially explains why some organisations have lower 
transactional costs, or can control their production and transactional costs more 
effectively than others, although they are exposed to a similar external economic 
environment.  
In a GCCP context, TCE supplements RBT by providing an economic dimension to 
strategic choices that result in a change in internal capabilities and resources. For 
instance, a thermal generator that decides to develop renewable assets as a result of the 
GCCPs is likely to experience a shift in transactional costs. While both renewable and 
thermal assets may have high asset specificity, the move to renewable assets represents 
reduced GCCP-related compliance costs and relatively lower short-term costs of 
renewable generation. However, the thermal generator may simultaneously incur 
increased adaptation and learning costs due to its lack of prior experience in renewable 
energy. Thus, a RBT-based change in internal capabilities and resources will have 
economic implications which can be explained from a TCE perspective. 
4.3.5. Commonalities between TCE, IT and RBT  
The above discussion highlights that despite having different assumptions about the 
objectives underlying the choice of organisational strategies and/or MCS, the three 
theories, TCE, IT and RBT, share some key commonalities. Firstly, the three theories 
are concerned with different aspects of organisational performance, whether it is 
internal efficiency (related to transactional and production costs), competitiveness or 
social legitimacy. Managing these different aspects of organisational performance is 
considered critical for organisational survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Williamson, 1991; Barney, 1991).  
Secondly, all the three theories consider the importance of institutional environments in 
strategic and MCS decisions. Transactional cost economics suggests that strategy and 
MCS choices need to fit the prevailing social, political and legal environments that 
provide the basis for production and distribution by organisations (Williamson, 1991; 
Covaleski et al., 2003). Transactional cost economics also recognises that strategy and 
MCS decisions for organising purposes are likely to be constrained by institutional 
factors, such as, existing routines, practices and norms internal to the organisation 
(Spekle, 2001). Similarly, RBT-based researchers increasingly suggest that 
competitiveness needs to be created within the legitimate norms of institutional 
environments (Hart, 1995; Deephouse, 1996). Further, RBT recognises that change in 
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institutional environments can change the level of relative competitiveness among 
organisations, leading to a need for strategy and MCS adaptations (Oliver, 1991; 
Goodrick and Salancik, 1996).  
Thirdly, the importance of internal resources is recognised by all the three theories, 
though in different ways. Resource-based theory contributes resource-based 
explanations to how organisations can optimise internal efficiency (from a TCE 
perspective) and achieve social legitimacy (from an IT view). Transactional cost 
economics considers that by having different pre-existing strengths and competencies 
(internal resources), organisations govern and control transactions differently 
(Williamson, 1999). Additionally, as argued in the previous section, differing resource 
bases can lead to variations in the level of internal efficiency achieved by different 
organisations (Williamson, 1999). In a similar manner, some organisations are better at 
maintaining their social legitimacy than others due to existing internal resources 
(Barney, 2001). Further, IT contends that organisations need to conform to institutional 
norms and expectations so that they can maintain/gain access to the resources critical 
for organisational survival (Meyer et al., 1983; Scott, 2001). 
The above discussion highlights that the three theories overlap in three areas: i) 
organisational performance, ii) institutional environments, and iii) internal resources. 
However, there are differences between them. In explaining strategy and MCS choices, 
TCE emphasises transactional cost optimisation and thus internal efficiency as the 
underlying objective (Section 4.3.1), IT focuses on social legitimacy (Section 4.3.2) 
while market competitiveness is the key concern in RBT (Section 4.3.3). Further, the 
three theories differ in the range of factors considered when investigating the drivers of 
strategy and MCS choice. While the focus of TCE is on transactional characteristics and 
economic environments, IT captures social and political factors in organisations’ 
external and internal environments and RBT considers that resources and resource 
availability are the key explanatory factors. Figure 4-1 summarises the overlapping 
areas of the three theories and highlights their commonalities and differences. 
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Figure 4-1: Inter-relationships between TCE, IT and RBT, and their 
commonalities and differences 
 
 
Consequently, it can be argued organisations’ strategy and MCS decision-making need 
to take into consideration the availability of existing internal resources, transactional 
characteristics and the prevailing conditions and expectations in the economic and 
institutional environments. Doing this enables organisations to achieve internal 
efficiency, competitiveness and/or social legitimacy and thus effectively manage 
organisational performance and ensure survival. 
Due to their commonalities and differences, this study adopts TCE, RBT and IT to 
examine and explain the changes in environmental strategies and organisational MCS to 
manage the economic and institutional impacts of the GCCPs. The next section 
discusses this in detail. 
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4.3.6. Integrating TCE, IT and RBT to examine generators’ GCCP-related 
environmental strategies and organisational MCS 
There are several benefits obtained from integrating TCE, IT and RBT to examine the 
changes in environmental strategies and organisational MCS generators make in 
response to the GCCPs. Firstly, like any other business organisation, generators exist 
within economic and institutional environments. The economic environment exerts 
technical or competitive pressures, while the institutional environment comprises the 
wider societal norms, values and requirements which organisations have to conform to 
in order to be seen as legitimate (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Granlund and Lukka, 1998; 
Scapens, 2006). The combined use of TCE, RBT and IT ensures that majority of the 
different economic, political and social elements in the internal and external operating 
environments of generators are taken into consideration when answering the research 
question. Chapter 2 highlights that GCCPs are likely to change the generators’ external 
environments, which will have consequences for their market competitiveness and 
social reputation. Additionally, the generators’ emission profile may lead to high carbon 
and compliance costs which threaten their internal efficiency. These factors are both 
economic and societal in nature, and therefore the combined use of TCE, IT and RBT 
will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the GCCP-related changes in the 
generators’ environments.  
Secondly, from an environmental strategy and MCS viewpoint, the integration of these 
theories allows an examination of the implications of GCCP-related impacts for 
generators’ environmental strategy and MCS choice. Transactional cost economics 
provides an economic-based explanation of how generators may change their 
environmental strategies and choose appropriate MCSs in order to minimise 
transactional costs and optimise internal efficiency. Institutional theory suggests that 
some generators may choose to undertake particular strategies and MCS decisions in 
order to secure or enhance their social legitimacy. Resource-based theory indicates that 
a change in environmental strategies and MCS may be motivated by a need to maintain 
market competitiveness in a carbon-constrained environment. Resource-based theory 
also allows an examination of how organisational resources and capabilities influence 
the ability of a generator to attain internal efficiency (TCE), social legitimacy (IT) and 
market competitiveness (RBT) in a GCCP context.  
Thirdly, by integrating the theoretical insights provided by TCE, IT and RBT, 
comprehensive coverage of the potential drivers of change in environmental strategy 
and MCS in a GCCP-focused context can be obtained. Transactional cost economics 
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highlights how transactional characteristics influence efficiency-driven strategy and 
MCS change. Institutional theory emphasises the impact of GCCP-related societal and 
institutional factors on generators’ discretion in changing their environmental strategies 
and MCS. Resource-based theory examines how the choice of appropriate 
environmental strategy and MCS is constrained, or enabled, by the generators’ internal 
resources and capabilities. Further, the combined use of TCE, RBT and IT provides an 
opportunity to examine the relative importance of these economic and institutional 
drivers in environmental strategy and MCS change decisions throughout a longitudinal 
period of GCCP change.  
Fourthly, using the three theories in conjunction provides an opportunity for theory 
triangulation. Triangulating the results between TCE, IT and RBT can explain the 
impact of GCCP-related volatilities and pressures on each generator. Consequently, an 
assessment can be made as to whether such volatilities and pressures influence internal 
efficiency, social legitimacy or market competitiveness of different generators. 
Theoretical triangulation also enables the identification of the primary motivations for 
each generator’s change in environmental strategies. The use of the three theories helps 
identify the key objectives underlying GCCP-related MCS design and use and explains 
why such objectives may vary across generators, e.g. why some generators primarily 
use MCS to focus on enhancing competitiveness while others select MCS mostly to 
optimise internal efficiency. Therefore, integrating the three theories allows the 
investigation of how generators seek to balance internal efficiency, social legitimacy 
and competitiveness needs through strategy and MCS choice (Westley and 
Vrendenburg, 1991; Hart, 1995; Deephouse, 1999). In doing so, an economic basis for 
explaining strategic and MCS change can be gained in addition to institutional theory-
focused insights.  
In summary, the above sections argue that the three theories, TCE, IT and RBT, are 
inter-related and compatible with each other. Additionally, their simultaneous use 
enables a comprehensive coverage of the economic and social factors in the GCCP-
related environments, and the assessment of such factors’ impacts on the generators’ 
environmental strategies and MCS. A basis for theory triangulation is also provided to 
assess the primary perceived impacts of the GCCPs on each generator and the key 
objectives underlying their GCCP-related strategy and MCS change. Based on TCE, IT 
and RBT, and the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, the next section outlines the 
research design and framework of this study.  
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4.4. Research Design and Framework 
This section first discusses the research design, which incorporates the constructs of the 
external and internal drivers of environmental strategies, the types of environmental 
strategies, and organisational MCS. Following the research design, a research 
framework is presented. Reference to the research gaps presented in Figure 3-5 are 
made to indicate how this study addresses this gap. 
4.4.1. GCCP-related external drivers  
In Chapter 2, it was argued that the planned GCCPs impose additional economic 
volatilities and societal pressures within generators’ external environments. The external 
volatilities and pressures identified are policy and regulatory change, changing fuel 
economics, carbon market fluctuations, and increased societal pressures (Figure 2-4). 
These volatilities and pressures are consistent with the theoretical insights of TCE, IT 
and RBT discussed above. Institutional theory and TCE assist in explaining the impact 
of policy and regulatory change on environmental uncertainty, and the resulting 
strategic discretion available to organisations in terms of organisational learning and 
adaptation costs. Transactional cost economics also provides a basis for explaining the 
implications of changing fuel economics for both internal production costs and 
transactional costs relating to fuel monitoring and decision-making. Additionally, RBT 
suggests that changing fuel economics will modify the relative competitiveness between 
the generators. Further, carbon market fluctuations impose volatilities on carbon and 
transactional costs for thermal generators (a TCE perspective), and provide potential 
revenue increases for generators that are net sellers of carbon credits (an RBT 
perspective). Societal pressures can be viewed from either an IT or RBT viewpoint. 
While IT indicates that societal pressures affect the generators’ social legitimacy, RBT 
suggests these pressures also affect the relative competitiveness of generators due to the 
variations in reputation associated with their generation asset and technology base. 
Based on a review of the prior literature, Chapter 3 suggests further external factors, 
including environmental regulation, external economic uncertainty, industry-related 
societal pressures, stakeholder pressures, and field and peer pressures (Figure 3-5). 
These have all been found by previous studies to be significant drivers of change in 
environmental strategies or organisational MCS. The impacts of these external factors 
on strategy and MCS can be explained from a TCE or IT perspective. The introduction 
of environmental regulation imposes additional compliance costs (TCE) and/or 
increases the visibility of environmental issues and hence threatens an organisation’s 
social legitimacy (IT). Environmental regulation may also place direct pressure on 
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organisations with regard to adopting environmental strategies and MCS that are 
considered legitimate by regulators (IT). External economic uncertainty causes volatility 
in organisational costs (TCE) or market competitiveness (RBT). Such uncertainty is 
captured by the external factors discussed in the preceding paragraph; policy and 
regulatory change, changing fuel economics, and carbon market fluctuations. 
Additionally, organisations operating in some industries may experience stronger 
societal pressures and thus higher environment-related legitimacy threats than others 
due to the nature of their business (IT). In order to preserve their social legitimacy (IT), 
organisations need to also respond to stakeholder, field and peer pressures by changing 
their environmental strategies and MCS.  
To ensure the comprehensiveness of analysis, this study combines the external factors 
identified in both Chapters 2 and 3 and discussed above in the research design. 
Therefore the following external drivers of environmental strategies will be examined: 
the GCCPs as environmental regulation, policy and regulatory change, changing fuel 
economics, carbon market fluctuations, increased societal pressures (containing 
industry-related societal pressures3), field and peer pressures and stakeholder pressures. 
The examination of these external drivers provides an insight into changes in 
generators’ environmental strategies in a GCCP context (Gap 1). Furthermore, the 
impacts of GCCP changes on generators’ economic and social environments can be 
assessed (Gap 3a, Figure 3-1).  
4.4.2. GCCP-related internal characteristics and capabilities 
Insights from Chapters 2 and 3 and from the past research application of TCE, IT and 
RBT are used to identify the internal factors that potentially influence generators’ 
environmental strategies and MCS choice in a GCCP-focused context. Chapter 2 argues 
that the emission profile associated with asset and technology base is likely to drive 
each generator’s carbon and compliance costs (Figure 2-4), consistent with the TCE 
predictions. The impact of an emission profile on environmental strategies can also be 
viewed from an IT perspective. For example, generators with a higher emission profile 
will be exposed to greater societal criticisms, thereby threatening their social legitimacy. 
Thus, they are more likely to change their environmental strategies and associated MCS 
to manage emissions.  
                                               
3
 Since this study examines organisations operating in a single industry, there are no inter-industry 
differences in societal pressures. Thus, societal pressures by default include public pressures exerted on 
all the studied organisations due to the nature of their industry (electricity).  
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Furthermore, based on TCE, this study argues that transactional characteristics 
determine the level of transactional costs, which in turn require the appropriate 
environmental strategies and MCS to manage them. Consequently, three transactional 
characteristics will be examined: asset specificity; transactional frequency; and 
transactional uncertainty (Section 4.3.1). The transactions analysed will be those 
relating to the measurement, monitoring, reporting, and verifying of emissions, and the 
buying and selling of carbon credits to satisfy GCCP obligations, or to generate 
revenue. 
The literature in Chapter 3 further suggests that organisational size, technological and 
financial capabilities, managerial factors, prior experience and organisational learning, 
and organisational culture (Figure 3-1) are the internal capabilities and characteristics 
that drive environmental strategies. Except for organisational size, all the other factors 
can be explained from an RBT perspective, as organisations can utilise particular 
combinations of these internal capabilities to pursue particular environmental strategies 
and gain a competitive advantage. Organisational size can be viewed from either an IT 
or RBT perspective. Institutional theory suggests that the larger a generator is, the more 
likely it is to be exposed to political and public pressures to demonstrate its 
environmental responsibility. Alternatively, RBT suggests that larger organisations have 
the financial and human resources available to pursue the extensive and wider scope 
environmental practices that are required to manage the organisational impacts of 
GCCPs.  
In combination, this study will examine the following potential internal drivers of 
organisational environmental strategies and MCS choice: emission profile; transactional 
characteristics; organisational size; technological and financial capabilities; managerial 
factors; prior experience and organisational learning; and organisational culture. The 
inclusion of these internal drivers provides an insight into their impacts on 
organisational decisions to change their environmental strategies and MCS in response 
to GCCP changes. Furthermore, the potential interaction and inter-relationships between 
internal and external drivers in driving environmental strategic changes can be 
examined (Gap 3b, Figure 3-1). 
4.4.3. Impacts of external and internal drivers on the generators 
As discussed, the above external and internal drivers are likely to have significant 
impacts on the generators which in turn trigger strategic and MCS change. These 
impacts are reflected in the implications for organisational carbon and transactional 
costs, market competitiveness and social legitimacy. Organisational costs, the 
74 
 
management of which is the basis for internal efficiency, are influenced by external 
drivers including policy and regulatory change, changing fuel economics, and carbon 
market fluctuations (TCE). Internal drivers including emission profile and transactional 
characteristics also affect organisational costs (TCE). Understanding these impacts of 
external and internal drivers on costs provides an economic basis for explaining 
strategic and MCS change (Gap 2, Figure 3-1). Additionally, generators’ market 
competitiveness is likely to be affected by external drivers including changing fuel 
economics and carbon market fluctuations, and societal pressures. The internal 
capabilities identified in Section 4.4.3 (organisational size, technological and financial 
capabilities, and managerial factors) also enable generators to gain a competitive 
advantage (RBT). External institutional drivers including increased societal pressures, 
field and peer pressures, and stakeholder pressures, have implications for generators’ 
social legitimacy (IT). Further, organisational size and a high emission profile expose 
generators to strong societal pressures and legitimacy threats (IT). Thus, not only the 
influence of individual drivers on generators can be assessed, but the potential 
combined impact and relationships between external and internal drivers in determining 
these impacts, can also be identified (Gap 3b, Figure 3-1).  
4.4.4. Change in environmental strategies  
To address the impacts of GCCP-related external and internal drivers on organisational 
costs, market competitiveness and/or social legitimacy, generators will need to change 
their environmental strategies. The degree of these impacts will drive the extent that 
generators change their environmental strategies. For example, a generator exposed to 
high potential competitiveness loss due to GCCP-related changing fuel economics is 
more likely to change their environmental strategies significantly. Similarly, a generator 
having a high degree of internal capabilities, such as renewable expertise and assets, and 
hence a strong potential to enhance GCCP-related competitiveness is more likely to 
make substantial changes to its environmental strategies. Additionally, the combined 
impact of external and internal drivers on the extent of environmental strategic change 
can be determined (Gap 3c, Figure 3-1). For example, an assessment can be made 
concerning whether a generator, being exposed to positive environmental conditions 
and having supporting internal capabilities, modifies its environmental strategies more 
extensively.  
As reviewed in Section 3.4, previous studies suggest a variety of ways to classify 
environmental strategies, but these classifications are significantly overlapping. Overall, 
environmental strategic changes/responses vary along a continuum from no response, to 
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reactive, and to proactive, and thus organisations pursue differing levels of 
proactiveness in responding to environmental issues and regulations. Therefore, the first 
dimension of change in environmental strategy examined in this study is the level of 
strategy proactiveness. For the purpose of this study, the level of strategy proactiveness 
is represented by the scope of the initiatives undertaken as part of environmental 
strategies, the number of organisational functions involved in implementing such 
initiatives and the amount of financial provision made for them, and the extent such 
initiatives are undertaken prior to the announcement and/or introduction of a particular 
GCCP. Thus, strategy proactiveness determines how early generators establish or 
change their environmental strategies, and how broad such strategic changes are.  
Alternatively, in response to the economic and institutional impacts associated with 
GCCP changes, generators may not adopt new environmental strategies. Instead, they 
may choose to place different degrees of strategic emphasis on existing strategies. For 
example, the implementation of an emissions management strategy prior to the ETS 
announcement may represent an operational concern. However, after the announcement, 
this strategy may be assigned strategic importance because its effective implementation 
is critical to the mitigation of potential ETS compliance costs. Therefore, strategic 
emphasis is the second dimension of change employed in examining generators’ 
environmental strategies. For the purpose of this study, strategic emphasis is determined 
by the level of attention that top management places on a particular environmental 
strategy. Such attention is reflected in the amount of information required and discussed 
at top management levels regarding the performance of an environmental strategy and 
its associated initiatives.  
Consequently, this study examines strategy proactiveness and strategic emphasis as the 
two dimensions for the change in environmental change made by generators in response 
to the GCCPs. Doing this enables longitudinal insights into how generators’ 
environmental strategies are modified throughout a prolonged period of GCCP change 
(Gap 3d, Figure 3-1).   
4.4.5. Change in organisational MCS 
To implement change in environmental strategies, generators need to modify their 
organisational MCS. The literature suggests that an organisation’s MCS is driven by the 
choice of its strategies. However, no prior study could be identified that has empirically 
examined the impact of environmental strategy proactiveness on MCS design, use and 
objectives. Since strategy proactiveness concerns the scope of initiatives and the number 
of functions involved in strategy implementation, this study argues that more proactive 
76 
 
environmental strategies require the selection and use of a higher number of and more 
broader-scoped controls and control systems. Additionally, consistent with prior studies 
(Simons, 1990, 1991; Abernethy and Brownell, 1999), strategic emphasis can be argued 
to drive MCS use. Environmental strategies with a strategic emphasis will require an 
interactive use of selected controls and control systems. An interactive use enables top 
management engagement and supervision and thus ensures that such strategies are 
effectively planned and implemented. The analysis of the impact of environmental 
strategy proactiveness and strategic emphasis on organisational MCS provides an 
enhanced insight into the role of MCS within the strategy implementation and planning 
process (Gap 4, Figure 3-5). 
MCS is defined in this study as: 
a system of organisational information seeking and gathering, accountability 
and   feedback designed to ensure that the enterprise adapts to changes in its 
substantive environment and that the work behaviour of its employees is 
measured by reference  to a set of operational sub-goals (which conform to 
overall objectives) so that the discrepancy between the two can be reconciled 
and corrected for. (Lowe, 1971, p. 5) 
This definition is adopted because it provides a holistic view of organisational MCS and 
focuses particularly on organisational adaptation to a changing environment (Kloot, 
1997).  It captures both strategic issues, i.e. the interaction between the organisation and 
its environments, and the formulation of strategic plans, and operational issues (the 
implementation of strategic plans). The definition also emphasises the need for synergy 
between the organisation and its environments. It further highlights that MCS are 
designed and used to influence behaviour to ensure cooperation and goal congruence for 
the achievement of organisational objectives (Flamholtz, Das and Tsui, 1985).  
For the purpose of this study, MCS comprises both controls and control systems. 
Controls include formal controls such as rules, standards, operating procedures and 
budgets, and informal controls, which emerge from, or reflect organisational culture 
(Anthony, 1965; Ouchi, 1979). Control systems are information systems which 
measure, monitor, and report external and internal information and provide such 
information to managers to assist their decision-making. Control systems also include 
communication and feedback systems to enable coordination, organisational learning 
and change (Otley, 1999). The collection of controls and control systems and their use 
by managers to ensure the adaptation of organisations to the environments and the 
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achievement of organisational objectives constitutes the organisational MCS (Otley, 
Broadbent and Berry, 1995).  
Three aspects of organisational MCS is examined in this study; design, use, and 
objectives. In terms of MCS design, the MCS literature suggests that consideration of: i) 
informational scope and budgetary controls; ii) environmental performance 
management system and environmental accounting; and iii) communication and 
coordination systems, are required within an MCS to support environmental strategies 
(Section 3.5). However, this list of controls and control systems is limited and may not 
capture the full range of MCS components that generators can adopt in relation to their 
environmental strategies. Thus, to provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
generators’ MCS design, this study utilises Simons’ (1991) four broad types of MCS 
components: belief systems; boundary controls; diagnostic control systems; and 
interactive control systems (Section 3.5.2).  
To capture MCS use, this study examines the degree of use of particular controls and 
control systems, or MCS component types, by management level and frequency of use. 
Thus, a higher degree of use indicates regular use of a particular control, control system, 
or MCS type at a top management level. More detail on how MCS use is ranked in this 
study is provided in Chapter 5 (5.7.2.4). 
Additionally, the prior literature suggests that organisational MCS serves different 
distinct objectives, namely: ensuring internal efficiency; enhancing market 
competitiveness; managing external uncertainty; legitimising or rationalising; and 
serving political purposes (Section 3.5.3). These objectives will be examined as the 
third and last aspect of generators’ MCS. 
4.4.6. Proposed research framework 
A research framework, based on the components/constructs identified above and the 
potential relationships between the GCCPs, external and internal drivers, environmental 
strategies and MCS, is developed. This framework (Figure 4-2) integrates the factors 
found in the literature reviews in Chapters 2 and 3, and theoretical insights from TCE, 
IT and RBT as discussed in this chapter, in order to examine the implications for 
organisational MCS due to the strategic changes generators make in response to GCCP-
related volatilities and pressures.  
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Figure 4-2: Proposed research framework 
 
Note: Arrows do not indicate causal relationships 
From this framework and the discussion above, four broad propositions are identified to 
provide a basis for this study’s empirical analysis: 
P1:  External GCCP-related economic and institutional drivers impact on generators’ 
competitiveness, costs and legitimacy; 
P2:  Internal GCCP-related characteristics and capabilities impact on generators’ 
competitiveness, costs and legitimacy; 
P3:  The impacts of GCCP-related external and internal drivers in turn lead to a 
change in environmental strategies; and 
P4:  The change in environmental strategies requires corresponding modifications in 
organisational MCS.  
Change in the GCCPs  
(Environmental regulation) (TCE, IT) 
(2002 – 2009) 
Internal drivers  
Internal characteristics and capabilities 
(4.4.2; Chapt. 2 and 3)  
• Emission profile (TCE, IT) 
• Transactional characteristics (added from TCE) 
• Organisational size (IT, RBT) 
• Technological and financial capabilities (RBT) 
• Managerial factors (RBT) 
• Prior experience and organisational learning  (RBT) 
• Organisational culture (RBT) 
 
External drivers 
External economic and institutional drivers  
(4.4.1; Chapt. 2 and 3) 
• Policy and regulatory change (IT, TCE) 
• Changing fuel economics (TCE, RBT) 
• Carbon market fluctuations (TCE, RBT) 
• Increased societal pressures (IT, RBT) 
• Field and peer pressures  (IT) 
• Stakeholder pressures (IT) 
Change in Environmental strategies  
(4.4.4; 3.4) 
Strategy proactiveness  
Strategic emphasis 
Change in Organisational MCS  
(4.4.5, 3.5) 
Design 
Use 
Objectives 
 
P3 
P2 
P4 
P1 
Impacts on generators (4.4.3) 
Organisational costs (TCE) 
Market competitiveness (RBT) 
Social legitimacy (IT) 
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Assessing these four propositions will enable the research question to be addressed. 
This allows the identification of the implications for organisational MCS arising from 
strategic choices the New Zealand electricity generators make in managing GCCP-
related economic and social volatility and pressures resulting from a prolonged period 
of GCCP change.  
4.5. Summary 
This chapter has developed a research framework that will be used to guide the process 
of data collection and analysis. The framework is built from the theoretical insights 
suggested by TCE, IT and RBT as well as findings from prior literature. The framework 
and associated propositions argue that GCCP changes influence generators’ external 
environments, which in turn affects organisational costs, market competitiveness, and 
social legitimacy. Additionally, generators’ internal characteristics and capabilities have 
the potential to influence their organisational costs, competitiveness and legitimacy in a 
GCCP context. In response to these externally and internally-driven impacts, generators 
will need to change their environmental strategies, which are operationalised through 
two dimensions; strategy proactiveness and strategic emphasis. The change in 
generators’ environmental strategies in turn will have different implications for MCS 
design, use and objectives. The next chapter outlines the research methodology and 
discusses the tools and techniques used in data collection and analysis. 
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Chapter 5: Research methodology 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 outlined how this study examines the implications for organisational MCS 
arising from the strategy choices electricity generators make in response to the volatility 
and pressures associated with GCCPs. The study period was from 2000 to 2009 during 
which several GCCPs were planned and changed. To guide this study, Chapter 4 
developed a research framework and four propositions relating to generators’ strategic 
and MCS change in a GCCP-focused context. This chapter identifies the data types 
required to assess the framework and resultant propositions and explains the tools and 
techniques that will be used to collect and analyse those data.  
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section justifies the main methodology 
employed in this study, a longitudinal multiple-case study approach. Then, the choice of 
cases and study period is explained. The following two sections discuss the use of 
reflection and triangulation methods in order to increase the rigour and reliability of this 
study’s results. In the next two sections, specific techniques for data collection and data 
analysis are outlined. The last section summarises the chapter. 
5.2. A longitudinal multiple-case study approach (LMC) 
5.2.1. An overview of a case study approach 
This study positions itself in a case study research tradition. A case study approach is 
defined as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 2003). The 
adoption of a case study approach allows accounting practices, such as MCS, to be 
investigated within the organisational context in which they operate (Hofstede, 1968; 
Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978). Further, a case study approach is appropriate because 
this study examines a contemporary event, the planned GCCPs, which have prolonged 
impacts on generators (Yin, 2003). A case study approach can also reveal rich detail 
about the complexity and dynamics of organisational strategies, processes, and 
characteristics (Lillis and Mundy, 2005). In particular, a multiple-case analysis enables 
the researcher to understand the impacts of important field- and industry-level 
contextual factors on an organisation’s strategies and MCS over time (Hopper, Otley 
and Scapens, 2001).  
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The qualitative research method used in this study is a longitudinal multiple-case study 
(LMC) approach (Yin, 2003; Lillis and Mundy, 2005). Accordingly, it involves a ten-
year study (from 2000 to 2009) of strategic and MCS changes within multiple cases in a 
single industry, i.e. five generators within the NZEI. This approach has less depth but 
more breadth than a single case study approach (Yin, 2003). 
5.2.2. The applicability and benefits of LMC to this study 
An LMC approach is adopted in this study for three reasons. First, since the research 
question focuses on MCS implications throughout a prolonged period of GCCP change, 
a longitudinal approach is required. Second, a single case study is not appropriate 
because there are five generators in the NZEI with different organisational histories and 
characteristics and hence potentially varying strategic and MCS responses to GCCP 
change. Third, these five generators represent more than 90% of the industry in 
generation and sales activity (Section 2.3.2).  
A LMC approach has a number of advantages over a single in-depth case study and 
cross-sectional survey approaches. Although an in-depth single case study can provide 
rich details on the internal organisational factors and mechanisms, it cannot provide 
cross-case patterns that potentially enhance the external and internal validity of the 
study (Lillis and Mundy, 2005). Further, although in-depth single case study places 
strong importance on the historical, cultural and situational nature of organisational 
strategies and MCS, it has limited generalisability to other organisations and industries 
due to the single-case examination (Armstrong, 1985; Miller, 1998; Wallander, 1999). 
Therefore, a single case study is not appropriate for this study which examines change 
in environmental strategies and MCS within multiple generators which have different 
organisational characteristics (2.3.2).  
In contrast, a cross-sectional survey approach provides patterns of relationships between 
the investigated factors and insights into the impacts of external factors such as industry 
and regulation. However, it allows research only at a particular point in time and cannot 
provide contextual explanations due to multiple respondents (Lillis and Mundy, 2005). 
Since a cross-sectional survey does not capture the impact of change over time, it is not 
suitable for this study which investigates implications for organisational MCS over a 
prolonged period.  
The LMC approach overcomes the limitations of the single-case and cross-sectional 
survey approaches. It allows some depth of insight into the internal mechanisms and 
factors influencing the choice of environmental strategies and associated organisational 
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MCS. Further, the LMC approach enables the exploration of the impact of external and 
contextual factors on such choices and how such impact changes over time (Hopper, 
Otley, and Scapens, 2001). It also provides a longitudinal understanding of MCS change 
in multiple cases (i.e. electricity generators) throughout a ten-year period (Yin, 2003; 
Lillis and Mundy, 2005). By adopting a LMC approach, this study has less depth than a 
single case study but more breadth due to its multi-case analysis. In contrast, it has more 
depth but is more limited in breadth than a broad-based survey (Lillis and Mundy, 
2005). The trade-off between depth and breadth is a conscious choice based on a 
judgment of the LMC approach’s appropriateness for this study’s research question.  
5.2.3. Mitigating the potential limitations of qualitative research 
Despite its benefits, the case study approach as a method of qualitative research is often 
criticised as having limited generalisability, validity, and reliability due to a failure to 
follow research protocols originally designed within an economics-based quantitative-
focused paradigm (Zimmerman, 2001; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). In response to 
these criticisms, scholars suggest that case study researchers need to demonstrate they 
have been rigorous and unbiased in their research by employing verification strategies 
throughout the enquiry process (Ahrens and Dent, 1998; Morse et al., 2002; Lillis, 
2006).  
By adopting the LMC approach, this study mitigates the potential limitations of 
qualitative research. First, through the choice of multiple cases that represent the 
population (NZEI), this study achieves a degree of generalisability and external validity 
(Lillis and Mundy, 2005). To add further rigour to the research process and findings, 
this study adopts a number of verification strategies as suggested by Morse et al. (2002). 
These strategies include replication logic in choosing cases (Section 5.3.1), concurrent 
data collection and analysis (as part of reflection strategies in Section 5.4), and audit 
trails (Section 5.7.1). Additionally, results are verified using data and theoretical 
triangulation (Section 5.5).  
Consistent with the LMC approach, this study examines the environmental strategies 
and MCS of five generators in the NZEI over a ten-year period of GCCP change. The 
next section justifies and discusses, in more detail, the choice of cases and study period.  
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5.3. Choice of cases and study period 
5.3.1. Choice of cases 
Prior research (Arnold, 1970; Yin, 2003; Lillis and Mundy, 2005) suggests that a 
multiple-case study approach should employ replication logic in choosing its cases. 
Replication logic involves a non-random and purposive choice of cases to reflect 
different outcomes argued by theory (Yin, 2003). Further, researchers are advised to 
choose cases with contrasting organisational-level characteristics (Eckstein, 1975; 
Hammersley, 1992; Yin, 2003) as it helps validate the chosen theories and any 
associated propositions, such as those outlined in Chapter 4.  
Accordingly, this study will choose cases based on their differences in key 
organisational-level variables so as to maximise case diversity (Merchant, 1985). 
Consequently, all the five major generators mentioned in Chapter 2 are selected. As 
outlined in Chapter 2, these generators are major generators and retailers in the NZEI. In 
aggregate, they make up 91% and 95% of New Zealand wholesale and retail electricity 
market share respectively. This choice of cases ensures that almost the whole generating 
and retailing sectors are covered. In doing so, it minimises the potential for selection 
bias and optimises the assessment of the validity of the research framework. The other 
generators and retailers in the NZEI generating and retail sectors are significantly 
smaller in size and are not vertically integrated. Therefore, by focusing on the largest 
five generators, this study controls for the impact of industry and the nature of the 
organisation’s business on environmental strategies and MCS.  
To maintain interview confidentiality, these generators are referred to as Firm A, B, C, 
D and E. These generators differ from each other across a number of dimensions, 
including generation capacity, ownership structure, and the level of wholesale activity. 
The differing organisational characteristics potentially lead to variations in the external 
volatilities and pressures each generator perceives in relation to a GCCP, and thus have 
different implications for environmental strategies and organisational MCS. Therefore, 
an assessment can be made regarding the drivers of the similarities and differences 
among these generators in regards to the environmental strategic changes they make in a 
GCCP-focused context. In turn, this assessment provides a basis for determining the 
potential impact on each generator’s MCS. From this, general patterns relating to 
change in the generators’ environmental strategies and MCS in response to GCCPs can 
be found, enabling the research question to be answered and the propositions assessed. 
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5.3.2. Choice of external stakeholders  
In order to supplement and support the multiple-case approach, this study also examines 
the perceptions and perspectives held by external stakeholders related to the electricity 
industry and GCCP processes and any pressures exerted by them on the generators. 
These external perceptions and perspectives will primarily be used to verify the data 
provided and/or generated by the generators and, secondarily, in some cases, to provide 
additional insights regarding the GCCPs and the strategic responses adopted by 
generators. Following replication logic (Merchant, 1985; Lillis and Mundy, 2005), this 
study will choose external stakeholders based on two dimensions: 
• Variations in their involvement in generators’ carbon-focused projects and 
strategy choice and change process; 
• Variations in the role played by these organisations in relation to the GCCPs 
processes. 
This study targets a number of key external stakeholder groups. Firstly, the 
Government, other political parties, regulators and government agencies, and an 
accounting professional body are chosen because they are the policy makers and 
standard setters whose actions and decisions represent coercive and regulatory pressures 
that organisations have to monitor and respond to (Scott, 2001; Fowler, 2009). 
Secondly, accounting and law firms and carbon trading specialists are important 
because organisations are likely to rely on their advice while evaluating the impacts of 
government policy and implementing environmental strategy and MCS changes in 
response (Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Scott, 2001).  
Thirdly, industry associations, networks and lobby groups are targeted as they provide 
key mechanisms through which organisations voice their concerns regarding 
government policy (Masters and Keim, 1985; Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004). These 
groups also provide a forum for knowledge dissemination among organisations, which 
potentially influences the organisational strategic and MCS responses (Barreto, Baden-
Fuller and de Cima, 2006). Fourthly, this study is interested in the opinions of key 
journalists (e.g. who write on the electricity industry and GCCP-related topics) because 
their articles represent direct media pressure on organisations to alter their 
environmental strategies (and associated MCS) to maintain organisational reputation 
and social legitimacy (Sharma and Nguan, 1999; Bansal, 2005). Finally, major research 
institutes are included because their research findings potentially influence government 
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policy design, and help organisations better understand their exposure under a given 
policy (e.g. a GCCP) and to formulate their strategies accordingly.  
Forty external stakeholders were identified as being the most active in relation to GCCP 
processes and the generators’ potential environmental strategies. All forty organisations 
were contacted and asked to participate in the study. Twenty eight agreed, representing 
a 70% response rate.  
5.3.3. Choice of study period 
To gain a longitudinal view of organisational responses in relation to change in GCCPs, 
this study collects and analyses interview and documentary data for a ten-year period 
from January 2000 to October 2009. Chapter 2 (Figure 2-2) outlines the key events and 
changes in the GCCPs over this period. This period is further separated into five 
periods, around transition points that determine GCCP change (Phillips, 2002):  
• From January 2000 to March 2002 before any GCCPs were announced (to allow 
for identification of changes in environmental strategies and MCS prior to, and 
post, any GCCP proposal);  
• From April 2002 when the planned carbon tax was announced to December 
2005 when the plan was cancelled;  
• From January 2006 to September 2007 when there was no explicit GCCP but the 
draft NZES indicated a preference for an ETS;  
• From October 2007 when the Original ETS was announced until September 
2008 when the Climate Change Act (2008) was passed;  
• From October 2008 when there was a change of government which led to a 
select committee review of the Original ETS and proposed legislative changes to 
the ETS, up until October 2009 when the Moderated ETS Bill was introduced.  
Data are analysed based on the periods outlined above. Accordingly, evidence regarding 
the environmental strategies and MCS employed will be presented in a chronological 
order (i.e. during relevant periods) so that strategic and MCS changes over time in 
response to the planned GCCPs within each generator can be identified (Chapter 6). The 
results are then analysed across the five generators to gain longitudinal and comparative 
insights into GCCP-related external and internal drivers and change in environmental 
strategies (Chapter 7) and change in organisational MCS (Chapter 8).  
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In order to enhance the rigour of the research process and the richness of this study’s 
results, reflection and triangulation methods are employed. Each of these is discussed 
below. 
5.4. Reflection methods  
Reflection is a flexible and ongoing process in which different stages of the qualitative 
enquiry, including defining the research problem, choosing (an) appropriate theory(ies), 
and collecting and analysing data interact and influence each other so as to find a 
possible fit between the research problem, theory and data (Ahrens and Chapman, 
2006). Reflection is employed in this study not only within the processes of data 
collection and analysis, but also to establish and check the linkages between these and 
the research framework.  
This study adopts an interactive pattern in its research process where the preliminary 
findings inform decisions about future data collection (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; 
Miller et al., 2004). Data collection is divided into three phases to enable the reflectivity 
and interaction between data collection and other steps in the research process. The first 
phase is where data are collected to gain a general understanding of the field and to help 
inform the identification of the research question. This phase informs the research 
context and the establishment of the research question as highlighted in Chapter 2. The 
second phase focuses upon collecting data related to one generator (Firm A) and 
changes in its environmental strategies and implications for organisational MCS in the 
five time periods outlined above. Data from this phase are analysed to discern key 
trends and patterns, and to evaluate their correspondence to the proposed theories and 
research framework (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). The 
analysis of Firm A’s evidence provides insights into the most significant or interesting 
issues for field participants, which are then used to revise later interview questions and 
the choice of archival documents (Ahrens and Dent, 1998). The revised interview 
questions and document choice are applied to the third and final stage, where data 
relating to the remaining four generators (Firms B, C, D and E) and external 
stakeholders are collected and analysed.  
Reflection is also utilised within each step of data collection. Specifically, within each 
case, opinions and perspectives gained from earlier interviews and archival data are 
directly communicated to later interviewees who are asked to comment and reflect on 
those opinions/perceptions from their own organisational perspectives (Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1988). The purpose of this reflection strategy is twofold. Firstly, direct 
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reflection is used to cross-check and validate ideas and tentative findings from earlier 
data collection/analysis (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988). Secondly, comparing and 
validating internal versus external participants’ views provides an assessment of the 
validity of different theories in explaining environmental strategies and MCS change 
(theory triangulation, Section 4.3.6) (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006).  
Consequently, the use of reflection methods potentially enables research framework 
validation, verifies the research findings, and provides additional insights and richness 
to the understanding of environmental strategies and MCS under a GCCP-related 
context (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990; Ahrens and Dent, 1998). Another method, 
triangulation, is also used to increase the validity and reliability of this study’s results, 
as discussed next.  
5.5. Triangulation methods 
Triangulation is defined by Flick, Kardorff and Steinke (2004) as ‘observation of 
research from (at least) two different points’ (p.178).  The primary benefits of 
triangulation are in validating the findings and increasing the richness of descriptions 
and insights about the subjects under study (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Denzin, 2009). 
Any single method or theory can only explain one aspect of empirical reality and 
therefore it cannot rule out rival explanations (Denzin, 2009). Triangulation enables the 
assessment of these rival explanations and thus can increase the validity of 
interpretation (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Marginson, 1999). Additionally, 
triangulation can capture a more holistic and contextual picture of the units under study 
(Jick, 1979).  
Triangulating findings gained across different methods, data, theories or researchers can 
reveal additional insights that may be neglected by a single method, data source, theory 
or researcher (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Hence, there are four types of triangulation: 
methodological triangulation, researcher triangulation, theoretical triangulation, and 
data triangulation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; Denzin, 2009). These types of 
triangulation can be used separately or in conjunction with each other. Denzin (2009) 
suggests that ‘multiple strategies of triangulation are proposed to be the preferred line of 
action’ (p.313)  Hence, multiple methods, theories and data sources and researchers can 
be combined in one study to enhance the credibility of the explanations and to better 
capture the richness and complexity of the social phenomena (Denzin, 2009). 
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Methodological triangulation is the combination of multiple methods in a study, and 
involves ‘a complex process of playing each method off against the other so as to 
maximise the validity of field efforts’ (Denzin, 2009, p.304). Since this study follows a 
case study approach, methodological triangulation is not employed. Researcher 
triangulation involves two or more researchers who are directly involved in collecting 
and interpreting data. The purpose of this is to limit, reduce and balance out the 
potential subjectivity of an individual investigator (Flick et al., 2004). Researcher 
triangulation is not adopted as the PhD dissertation is sole authored by necessity. 
Theoretical triangulation refers to the use of multiple theories and perspectives in an 
empirical analysis (Flick, 1992). Using this method, new and additional meanings and 
definitions attached to the events, actions, or behaviour can be identified, and thus a 
more holistic understanding of the social phenomena under study can be gained 
(Denzin, 2009, p.227). This study employs theoretical triangulation between three 
theories, TCE, RBT and IT, as explained in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.6). 
Data triangulation draws on data from different sources at different times, from different 
places and from different people (Flick, 1992). This is first to discern consistent patterns 
and instances across different data sets and to confirm the validity or trustworthiness of 
a particular explanation, theory, or argument. The second use of data triangulation is to 
provide a richer and more in-depth story about a particular event, people, context or 
community (Flick et al., 2004). Data triangulation is operationalised in this study by 
drawing upon multiple internal and external sources of data and comparing the results 
between these sources.  
The primary sources of data to be collected are interviews, archival and electronic 
documents from the New Zealand generators and relevant external organisations. 
Interviews are conducted with internal managers of these generators and representatives 
from external stakeholders to gain both internal and external views about the GCCP-
related changes made by the generators. The insights of internal and external 
participants are then compared and contrasted for cross-validation purposes.  
Documents produced by the generators and by external stakeholders are also collected. 
Generator-related documents include annual reports, environmental/sustainability 
reports and media releases which are publicly available. Externally-generated 
documents including news and media coverage relating to generators, and financial 
reviews by the relevant government agencies or ministers are also obtained. These 
internal and external documentary data sets are compared to identify similarities and 
90 
 
differences that help verify results and validate the research framework (Miller et al., 
2004). 
The interview data and documentary data are then triangulated against each other. 
Documents can confirm and/or disprove interview results (Ferreira and Merchant, 1992; 
Yin, 2003). Thus, convergence or divergence in the results between different data 
sources enables an assessment of the research framework’s validity and increases the 
confidence in the results (Hopper and Hoque, 2006). The next section describes the data 
sources and methods of data collection used in the data triangulation. 
5.6. Data collection 
As mentioned, the two primary sources of data used are interviews and documents. 
Reliance on interview data supplemented by extensive analysis of documents is a 
popular and recommended practice in case study research (Yin, 2003). Specific methods 
employed to recruit interviewees and conduct interviews, as well as methods used to 
select and collect archival and electronic documents are discussed in this section. This is 
followed by the presentation of the data demographics. 
5.6.1. Methods of data collection 
5.6.1.1. Interviews 
This study identifies potential interviewees by scoping the groups of respondents that 
are relevant to the study area/ context. The scoping is done by reviewing prior literature 
and then performing a preliminary analysis of publicly available documents related to 
the NZEI, and topics of climate change, sustainability and emissions trading. The 
following groups are identified as relevant: five generators (5.3.1) and forty external 
stakeholders (5.3.1). About half of these targeted organisations are approached using 
personal connections and the snow-balling technique (Arksey and Knight, 2002; Flick, 
2009). Personal contacts are used to ensure that the person who is contacted will be 
willing to talk to the researcher (Arksey and Knight, 2002). The snow-balling technique 
is where the initial respondent subsequent to the interview will suggest further contacts, 
personally introduce the researcher to them or just allow their names to be mentioned in 
invitation letters sent to these contacts. The remaining half are contacted based on 
emails which include an invitation letter and a brief research proposal (Appendix A). 
The letter is customised so that it appeals to the person contacted. These strategies 
provide access to the organisations and individuals that are the most relevant to the 
study (Weiss, 1994; Warren, 2002).  
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The study adopts a semi-structured method in conducting the interviews (Yin, 2003; 
Denzin, 2009). In semi-structured interviews, questions are specified, but the 
interviewee is free to move beyond these questions to elaborate on their own 
experiences and perceptions regarding a particular issue or past event relevant to the 
questions (Schram and Steen, 2001). Therefore, a semi-structured interview method 
allows more flexibility for the interviewees, as opposed to the standardised answers 
permitted by the structured interviews (May, 2001). This method also allows the 
interviewer to understand the interview context, which, in itself, is an important source 
of information to explain the statements made and views expressed by the interviewee 
(May, 2001).  
The interviews were conducted in an informal manner and interviewees were given 
opportunities to focus on issues that interested them most, rather than being pressured to 
comment on every single item (Warren, 2002). For this reason, in most cases, there 
were common questions that were presented to all groups and customised questions that 
were only intended for one particular group. Customised questions were designed to fit 
with the specific roles, functions and areas of interest in relation to the generators and 
the GCCP processes. The questions were initially formulated based on the prior 
literature, with the aim to understand the factors and relationships captured in the four 
propositions. Then, following the reflection strategies described in Section 5.4, the 
questions are continuously updated to reflect new understanding and insights gained 
from the analysis of prior interviews. A list of sample semi-structured interview 
questions is provided in Appendix B. 
5.6.1.2. Documents 
As discussed in Section 5.5, this study uses data triangulation and thus collects 
documents from a variety of sources for the period from January 2000 to October 2009. 
Most of the relevant documents are available electronically and were downloaded from 
the websites of the generators, external organisations, New Zealand Parliament and 
media companies. Other documents not available through electronic sources were 
acquired using techniques including attendance at public hearings, and making formal 
requests to relevant organisations and government authorities. However, the researcher 
did not have access to internal and/or confidential documents relating to the generators 
such as meeting minutes and memos, due to the limited access allowed by top 
management of these generators. 
Further, to gain insights into the changes in economic environments in which the 
generators operate, information on wholesale and retail market prices, emissions 
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inventory of the electricity industry, and the economics of alternative fuels for 
electricity generation, were collected. To acquire an understanding of the regulatory and 
political environments, the documents obtained included the various reports issued by 
government agencies, statements made by ministers and officials, related parliamentary 
debate and the positions of different political parties on the planned GCCPs. Documents 
produced by external stakeholders, such as submissions to the planned GCCPs, 
discussion papers, reports, newsletters, media releases and public commentaries in 
relation to GCCPs and electricity-related issues, and disclosures relating to the 
involvement of generators in carbon-related projects were also collected. These 
documents provide an understanding of the wider social and political environments 
which were likely to influence generators’ decisions to change their environmental 
strategies and MCS in a GCCP-focused context.  
5.6.2. Demographics of data collected  
5.6.2.1. The five cases 
All five generators were invited to participate in this study and all agreed, with varying 
levels of access granted. In most cases, the researcher was introduced to one or two top 
managers or directors. The exception is Firm C in which the researcher was able to 
access both top and middle management levels.  
As mentioned (5.3.1), the five generators examined differ from each other in a number 
of dimensions: generation bases; ownership structure; and the nature of their wholesale 
activity. The variations in these organisational characteristics between generators are 
summarised in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Variations in organisation-level characteristics of electricity generators 
Cases 
Primary fuel source Ownership type Level of wholesale activity 
Renewable-
based 
Thermal-
based 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned Net seller Net buyer 
A   (63%)     
B   (67%)     
C  (100%)      
D  (100%)      
E  (87%)      
Two generators have more than 50% thermal-based generation and are therefore 
labelled as thermal generators (A and B). The other three generators are predominantly 
renewable-based (more than 80% of generation capacity coming from renewable 
sources) and thus will be referred to as renewable generators (C, D and E). Three 
generators are state-owned (B, C and E) and the remaining two (A and D) are privately 
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owned and listed on the New Zealand stock exchange. Additionally, four generators 
have generation output exceeding their retailing commitments and thus they sell the rest 
on the wholesale market as net sellers. Only one generator (D) is a net buyer in the 
respect that its retailing commitment exceeds the electricity supplied from its generation 
assets, and thus has to purchase the rest of the required electricity from the wholesale 
market. 
5.6.2.2. Interviews 
Based on the agreement reached with the five generators, the researcher conducted 
thirteen interviews primarily with directors and senior managers. Interviewing at this 
organisational level has three benefits. First, these interviewees are the organisational 
policy makers and strategic planners and thus have the most knowledge about the 
impacts that the GCCPs will have on their organisations. Secondly, in understanding 
these impacts, directors and managers are likely to make decisions regarding strategy 
choices and associated MCS changes, required in response to the GCCPs. Thirdly, the 
senior managers interviewed are those with direct responsibility for ETS or carbon-
related strategies within these generators. Additionally, in Firm C, two middle managers 
directly involved in the implementation of GCCP-related strategies were interviewed.  
Data collection took place from April to October 2009 when there was a high level of 
sensitivity and publicity about emissions and carbon trading issues due to the ETS 
review and potential ETS changes (Chapter 2). This sensitivity is the reason for the 
limited number of interviews that were able to be conducted with each generator. 
However, this limitation was offset by the extensive amount of publicly available 
documents and the interviews conducted with external stakeholders. Further, there is a 
difference in the number of interviewees participating from the five generators. Figure 
5-1 provides a break-down of interviewees by generators.  
Figure 5-1: Interviewees participating from generators
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Figure 5-2: Break-down of interviewees 
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Figure 5-3: Breakdown of collected documents by target group
Documents related to the electricity industry (in general) accounted for 22% of the total 
documentary dataset and generator
documents were generated by external stakeholders, of which industry lobby groups, 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
#
 o
f 
d
o
cu
m
e
n
ts
 
-ended questions was sent to the interviewee at least 
people were interviewed together so as to supplement 
, that the collective opinions of the two 
 
total of 736 documents. A break-down of these documents is 
-specific documents, 36.8%. The remaining 
the checking of 
-to-one basis, 
 
 
41.2% of 
96 
 
accounting firms, and the media represent the largest numbers of documents (52.8%). 
This is attributable to two factors: i) the large number of organisations involved in each 
of these broad groups, and ii) the level of activity and responsiveness being displayed 
by these stakeholders during the debate around climate change and the ETS. 
5.7. Data analysis 
This study uses qualitative and quantitative techniques to interpret the collected 
interview and documentary data. To facilitate this interpretation, the study develops a 
coding system to classify the whole dataset into the categories (themes) relevant to the 
research question and propositions. This section discusses the procedures and 
techniques to be used for data coding and analysis. 
5.7.1. Data coding  
A coding tree is established in Nvivo8, to systematically identify and group recurrent 
patterns of particular instances, whether it is word, phrase, or large unit of some 
“meaning”, across the data set (Neuendorf, 2002; Silverman, 2004). A qualitative 
coding software, such as Nvivo8, is valuable in enabling detailed analysis of text, as it 
enhances data retrieval and maintains an audit trail through data coding, summation and 
interpretation (Fielding and Lee, 1991). This audit trail can be replicated in other 
studies, which helps verify this study’s results (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Seal, 1999).  
The instances used for coding were firstly developed based on existing theory and prior 
literature (Malina and Selto, 2001). These instances relate to the study’s subjects of 
interest, for example, different types of environmental strategies, external and internal 
drivers of strategy change, and MCS design, use and objectives. Each instance was 
coded as a node in Nvivo8. This coding is based on the identification of key words or 
phrases and the reading and interpretation of the underlying meanings of each sentence 
or paragraph of the interview transcripts and documents. During the coding process, 
additional nodes for the patterns suggested from the reflection process were established 
(Section 5.4). Simultaneously with being coded to the relevant nodes, data were also 
classified into different generators and time periods to facilitate longitudinal analysis of 
the individual cases, as well as inter-generator examination.  
5.7.2. Data analysis 
Once the data were coded and classified, they were analysed using qualitative and 
quantitative techniques. Qualitative content presents itself as quotations or sentences 
that were coded in NVivo nodes. The qualitative analysis focuses on interpreting the 
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text (i.e. the coded content) to discern the meanings and thinking that underlie the 
opinions and statements given by particular individuals or organisations, and through 
which, theoretical explanations can be achieved (May, 2001; Silverman, 2006). 
Accordingly, qualitative analysis was undertaken in three steps. Firstly, for each 
generator, coded data were analysed to understand the patterns of, and relationship 
between, GCCP-related drivers and strategic and MCS changes that occured within each 
period. Secondly, results were then compared across the five periods to identify 
potential dynamics and change in such patterns/relationships over time. Thirdly, the 
patterns and relationships found in one generator (Firm A) were compared to those in 
other generators (B, C, D and E) to gain insights into inter-generator variations and 
potential drivers of such variations. 
In contrast, the quantitative analysis is based on indicators, which were acquired in two 
ways. Firstly, some indicators were readily available through the interviews and 
documents, such as generators’ emission profiles, generation volume, retail bases, total 
assets, employee numbers, and the number of carbon credits owned. These factors were 
used to assess the GCCP-related exposure of each generator (and how such exposure 
changed over time) and the availability of organisational resources. Secondly, the 
factors identified from the qualitative interpretation of interview data and supported by 
documentary evidence were assigned quantitative values (i.e. measurement); for 
example, impact of external and internal drivers on each generator, level of strategy 
proactiveness, and degree of MCS design and use. These values were also coded to 
relevant nodes in Nvivo8. Quantitative measurement and analysis are discussed in more 
detail in Sections 5.7.2.2 to 5.7.2.4. Further, using matrix data displays, quantitative 
analysis is combined with qualitative analysis, as discussed next.  
5.7.2.1. Matrix data displays 
The combination between quantitative and qualitative analyses has the potential to 
enhance analysis of the issues/factors being studied and yield richer insights (Lillis and 
Mundy, 2005). This combination is achieved by using matrix data displays, in which 
data are displayed in terms of both indicators (quantitative) and quotes (qualitative) 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994). There are various schemes of data 
classification in data matrix displays, including classifying by case or organisation 
studied (case-ordered), by time period (time-ordered), or by pattern or theme (theme-
ordered). To enable both longitudinal and between-firm comparative insights, this study 
employs all the three schemes of classification: case-ordered, time-ordered, and theme-
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ordered. Tables 5-2 to 5-6 provide extracts from the data matrix displays to be used for 
data analysis. 
Table 5-2: Matrix data display for GCCP-related external drivers 
  Major GCCP-related external volatilities or pressures 
 Time 
period 
Jan00 – Mar02 Apr02 - Dec05   Jan06 – Sep07 Oct07 – Sep08 Oct08 – Oct09 
Firm Theme Indicator Quote Indicator Quote Indicator Quote Indicator Quote Indicator Quote 
Firm A Policy and 
regulatory 
change 
1  1  2  3  3  
 
Changing fuel 
economics 
1  1  2  3  3  
 Total impact X          
Firm B Policy and 
regulatory 
change 
1  1  1  2  2  
 
 Changing fuel 
economics 
0  3  3  3  3  
Key: 0: not relevant/applicable; 1: low (operational) impact; 2: medium impact; 3: high (strategic) impact 
Table 5-3: Matrix data display for GCCP-related internal characteristics 
 Major GCCP-related internal characteristics 
 Time 
period 
Jan00 – Mar02 Apr02 - Dec05   Jan06 – Sep07 Oct07 – Sep08 Oct08 – Oct09 
Firm Theme Indicator Quote Indicator Quote Indicator Quote Indicator Quote Indicator Quote 
Firm A Emission 
profile 
1  1  2  2  3  
 
Organisational 
size 
1  1  2  2  2  
 
Financial 
constraints 
          
 Total impact x          
Firm B Emission 
profile 
3  1  1  2  2  
 
 Organisational 
size 
1  1  1  1  1  
Key: 0: not relevant/applicable; 1: low (operational) impact; 2: medium impact; 3: high (strategic) impact 
Table 5-4: Matrix data display for internal capabilities 
  Major GCCP-related internal capabilities 
 Time 
period 
Jan00 – Mar02 Apr02 - Dec05   Jan06 – Sep07 Oct07 – Sep08 Oct08 – Oct09 
Firm Theme Indicators Quotes Indicators Quotes Indicators Quotes Indicators Quotes Indicators Quotes 
Firm A Technological 
and financial 
capabilities  
0  1  2  3  3  
 
Managerial 
factors 
1  1  2  3  3  
 
Total 
capabilities 
x          
Firm B Technological 
and financial 
capabilities  
1  1  1  2  2  
 
 Managerial 
factors 
1  3  3  3  3  
Key: 0: not perceived/ not available, 1: limited capability; 2: some/moderate capability; 3: strong 
capability  
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Table 5-5: Matrix data display for strategy proactiveness 
  Proactiveness of environmental strategies 
 Time period Jan00 – Mar02 Apr02 - Dec05   Jan06 – Sep07 Oct07 – Sep08 Oct08 – Oct09 
Firm Theme Indicator Quote Indicator Quote Indicator Quote Indicator Quote Indicator Quote 
Firm 
A 
Environmental 
policy 
1  1  2      
 Generation 
strategy 
2  2  1      
 Total strategy 
proactiveness 
x  y  z      
Firm 
B 
Environmental 
policy 
          
 
Generation 
strategy 
          
Key: 0: no response; 1: reactive; 2: moderately proactive; 3: very proactive 
Table 5-6: Matrix data display for MCS use 
  Degree of use of controls and control systems 
 Time period Jan00 – Mar02 Apr02 - Dec05   Jan06 – Sep07 Oct07 – Sep08 Oct08 – Oct09 
Firm 
A 
Budgetary 
controls 
  1  2      
 
Emissions-related 
disclosure 
1  2  2      
 Total MCS use  x  y  Z      
Firm 
B 
Budgetary 
controls 
          
 
Emissions-related 
disclosure 
          
Key: 1: some operational use; 2: used regularly at operational levels with some attention at senior levels;  
3: strategic use by top management  
The quantitative indicators and qualitative content coded in Nvivo8 will be exported to 
Excel to enable data display. The use of matrix data displays facilitates the presentation 
and examination of the factors and relationships between the factors in the cases and 
across time periods, and thus promotes analysis ‘completeness’ (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). The matrix data displays also help determine the total impact of external and 
internal drivers on each generator and identifies the degree of change in environmental 
strategies and organisational MCS design and use, across all the five periods. This in 
turn allows the research question and the four propositions (P1, P2, P3, P4; Figure 4-2) 
to be assessed. The measurement associated with each of the factors presented in the 
matrices (Tables 5-2 to 5-6), is explained next.  
5.7.2.2. Measurement of GCCP-related external and internal drivers 
Prior studies (reviewed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3) use a variety of scales to evaluate the 
impacts of external and internal factors on organisations or environmental strategy 
formulation and implementation, such as, a 5-point scale (James et al., 1999; Eiadat et 
al., 2008) or a 7-point scale (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996). Since it is the researcher 
rather than the respondent who quantifies the factors in this study, it is more appropriate 
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to adopt a simpler ranking scale. Applying a similar ranking system to the one 
recommended by AS/NZS 4360:2004 for risk factor impact (Standards Australia and 
Standards New Zealand, 2004), a scale from 0 to 3 is used to evaluate the degree of 
perceived impact for each GCCP-related external volatility/pressure on each generator - 
0: not relevant/applicable, 1: low (operational) impact, 2: medium impact, 3: high 
(strategic) impact (P1) (Table 5-2). Using the same scale, internal characteristics are 
quantified based on the degree of their perceived impact on each generator during each 
period of GCCP change (Table 5-3). In contrast, for each time period, internal 
capabilities are assigned a value from 0 to 3, depending on their availability and 
strength as perceived by managers (P2): as 0 (not perceived or not available), 1 (limited 
capability), 2 (some/moderate capability), or 3 (strong capability) (Table 5-4). These 
quantitative values can also be summed to gain an assessment of the total impact of all 
the GCCP-related external volatilities and pressures, the total impact of all the internal 
characteristics, and the change in such impact over time (P1, P2). A basis is therefore 
provided to understand the extent generators change environmental strategies in 
response to these impacts (P3). The summation also provides an indication of the total 
GCCP-related capabilities possessed by each generator during each time period and 
their implications for the generators’ costs, competitiveness, and legitimacy, and hence 
their environmental strategies (P2, P3).  
5.7.2.3. Measurement of change in environmental strategies 
Change in environmental strategies is captured by two proxies: strategy proactiveness 
and strategic emphasis (Section 4.4.4). The literature in Chapter 3 highlights that 
environmental strategies are ranked along a continuum from no response, reactive, to 
proactive. However, there is a need to discern the change in the level of strategy 
proactiveness within a given strategy type. Hence, a proactive strategy can be further 
divided into moderately proactive and very proactive. The resultant scale for 
quantifying strategy proactiveness used in this study is therefore: 0 (no response); 1 
(reactive), 2 (moderately proactive), and 3 (very proactive) (Table 5-5). The assigned 
quantitative values are also summed up across all environmental strategies to gain an 
aggregate value for the total strategy proactiveness of a generator within a time period. 
This summation facilitates a quantitative-based analysis of the potential association 
between a change in total strategy proactiveness and a change in total impact exerted by 
GCCP-related external and internal drivers, across generators and over time (P3).  
While strategy proactiveness is quantified, strategic emphasis is assessed qualitatively 
to enable the identification of the primary environmental strategies that receive top 
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management attention within a generator during a particular time period. This allows 
the potential linkages between change in strategic emphasis and the variations in the 
impacts of GCCP-related external and internal drivers, across different time periods, to 
be analysed qualitatively (P3).  
5.7.2.4. Measurement of change in organisational MCS  
From an MCS perspective, previous studies in environment-related MCS (reviewed in 
Chapter 3) are mostly qualitative and do not rank the design and use of MCS 
systematically. However, it is necessary to quantify MCS in this study so as to discern 
the total degree of change in organisational MCS across different GCCP periods (P4). 
Accordingly, the design and use of MCS are quantified in two steps. First, all the 
controls and control systems identified from interview data and documentary evidence 
are listed. Then, to represent MCS design within each generator, each control and 
control system is classified as i) available, i.e. already established (value = 1), or ii) not 
available or applicable (value = 0).  
MCS use is only evaluated for those controls and control systems that are available in 
the generators. Therefore, depending on the level and frequency of use, the use of a 
control or control system is quantified as 1 (used occasionally or on an ad hoc basis), 2 
(used frequently at operational levels and has some attention at senior levels), or 3 
(regular and strategic use by top management) (Table 5-6). Additionally, where 
applicable, the controls and control systems are classified into relevant MCS component 
types, following Simons’ (1991) four categories. New classifications will be set up for 
any controls and control systems that do not fit these categories. The assigned values of 
use will then be summed up across the controls and control systems comprising a MCS 
component type in order to get the total degree of use of that MCS type within each 
generator during each time period. This allows both inter-firm and longitudinal 
comparison of change in the use of different MCS component types. Furthermore, it 
enables analysis of the potential impacts of strategy proactiveness and strategic 
emphasis on such change in MCS use over time (P4).  
In contrast to MCS design and use, MCS objectives are analysed qualitatively as they 
represent separate categories rather than a continuum (Section 4.4.5). This enables a 
qualitative assessment of the impacts of a change in generators’ environmental 
strategies on MCS objectives (P4).  
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5.8. Summary 
The study adopts a LMC approach to examine the changes in environmental strategies 
and associated MCS of generators from 2000 to 2009. The resultant sample includes 
five generator cases, representing 91% of the electricity generation sector (by market 
share), and 28 external stakeholders. Interviews were conducted with key people in 
these generators (13 interviewees) and external stakeholders (32 interviewees). More 
than 700 documents were collected from electronic and archival sources to supplement 
the interview data. Interview data and documents are coded in Nvivo8 and analysed 
using qualitative and quantitative techniques and Excel-based matrix data displays. 
Reflection and triangulation strategies are used throughout the processes of sample 
selection, data collection and analysis to validate findings and enhance their richness 
and comprehensiveness.  
Applying these different research approaches and techniques, a longitudinal and across-
firm comparative analysis of changes in generators’ environmental strategies and 
associated MCS as well as GCCP-related drivers of such changes, will be conducted. 
The next chapter, Chapter 6, presents the case-based evidence regarding the change in 
environmental strategies and MCS that each generator made in response to various 
GCCPs announced from 2000 to 2009. The subsequent chapters, Chapters 7 and 8 will 
present the results from the inter-firm comparative analysis of the evidence in order to 
understand the impacts of GCCP changes on generators’ environmental strategies and 
organisational MCS.   
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Chapter 6 – Firm-based evidence of 
environmental strategies and 
organisational MCS (2000 – 2009) 
6.1. Introduction 
In chapter 5 the methods for data collection and analysis were discussed. This chapter 
provides evidence of the longitudinal changes that occurred in each generator’s 
environmental strategies and MCS in response to the GCCP changes in each of the five 
periods identified in Chapter 5. These are: Jan2000-Mar2002 (no GCCP); Apr2002-
Dec2005 (plan for carbon tax); Jan2006-Sep2007 (the ETS under development); 
Oct2007-Sep2008 (the ETS introduced and legislated); and Oct2008-Oct2009 (the ETS 
review). For each generator, evidence is presented relating to the GCCP implications for 
existing environmental strategies such as their generation investment, retail and political 
strategies, as well as new strategies formulated specifically in response to the GCCPs, 
such as emissions-related disclosure, internal and customer energy efficiency, and 
carbon credit strategies. Further, for each generator and within each time period, 
evidence relating to changes in the design and use of organisational MCSs to implement 
these environmental strategies are presented. Such strategy and MCS-related evidence 
will contribute to the answering of the research question and provide the validation for 
the four propositions:  
P1: External GCCP-related economic and institutional drivers impact on generators’ 
competitiveness, costs and legitimacy. 
P2: Internal GCCP-related characteristics and capabilities impact on generators’ 
competitiveness, costs and legitimacy. 
P3:  The impacts of GCCP-related external and internal drivers in turn lead to a 
change in environmental strategies. 
P4: The change in environmental strategies requires corresponding modifications in 
organisational MCS.   
Throughout this chapter, a reference to these propositions, where relevant, will be made, 
in short form as P1, P2, P3 and P4.  
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The classification of each generator as either thermal or renewable generator depends on 
their historical generation asset base as at January 2002 (the start of the study period). 
Accordingly, generators with more than 60% of their generation volume coming from 
fossil fuels such as coal and gas are considered thermal generators, whereas renewable 
generators are those producing more than 80% of their electricity output from renewable 
sources, such as wind, water and geothermal.4 Following these criteria, Firms A and B 
are classified as thermal generators whereas Firms C, D and E are renewable generators. 
Further, the italics in this chapter represent quotes from either publicly available 
documents or interview data. The need to maintain anonymity for some evidence 
necessitates that in those cases, the source of the quote is not disclosed. The next section 
presents the evidence relating to Firm A - one of the two thermal generators. 
6.2. Firm A: a thermal generator 
Firm A was established as an independent state-owned-enterprise (SOE) in 1996, 
privatised in 1999 and is now a publicly listed firm on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange. At its establishment in 1996, the generator had some of the oldest and least 
efficient thermal-based assets in the industry. In 2002, 63% of its generation capacity 
came from thermal sources (gas). Since then, its strategy has been to invest in 
geothermal development and gas peaker5 projects. These efforts have resulted in a more 
balanced portfolio between thermal and renewable sources and reduced its level of 
carbon emissions, thus mitigating Firm A’s exposure to the GCCPs. During the 1999-
2003 period, the generator acquired a number of retail businesses and became one of the 
largest integrated electricity generators in New Zealand, with a 30% and 28% market 
share in the wholesale and retail markets respectively. Firm A’s generation plants are 
located on the North Island, but its retail business covers both North Island and South 
Island. Evidence relating to the environmental strategies and the MCS implications in 
each of the five time periods from January 2000 to October 2009 is presented below. 
6.2.1. January 2000 to March 2002 
Prior to 2002, the generator’s environmental policy was characterised by a primary 
focus on compliance with the requirements of the Resource Management Act (RMA) 
(P3). The installation of an environmental management system (EMS) for generation 
                                               
4
 It is noted that geothermal energy is a renewable source (and considered to be so in this study), but it 
also discharges carbon emissions, though to a smaller degree than fossil fuels. 
5
 A gas peaker is a gas-fired generation plant that runs only when there is a high electricity demand. 
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plants contributed to the minimisation of non-compliance incidents (P4). 
Simultaneously, Firm A’s management claimed that these efforts amounted to 
environmental improvement above and beyond specific RMA requirements. The 
generator did not have a separate environmental report, except for the disclosure of its 
environmental policy. In its annual reports (ARs), total emissions from generation 
activities were reported and qualitative descriptions of other environmental impacts 
from the thermal and renewable plants were provided (P4).  
6.2.2. April 2002 to December 2005 
When the Government signalled the intention to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, the 
generator recognised the importance of monitoring and mitigating the level of its 
generation-related carbon emissions in order to manage its social legitimacy (P2). In 
one of the ARs, Firm A highlighted that it:  
[…] is committed to ongoing consideration of options to reduce or avoid the 
emissions of greenhouse gases from our generating plants, to help meet 
Protocol obligations. 
Additionally, it engaged in discussions with policy makers and politicians regarding the 
design and implementation of GCCPs (P3). The generator also entered into the NGA, a 
low cost government-directed initiative to improve energy efficiency around different 
generation sites (P1, P3). However, in contrast to other generators, it did not enter the 
PRE scheme to receive carbon credits to support its renewable investments. The focus 
of Firm A’s generation investment strategy remained with fossil fuels, but it began to 
investigate the economic viability of wind energy (P3). Consistent with this generation 
strategy, the generator argued in its political activity that thermal fuels remained a key 
part of New Zealand’s future energy mix. In 2004, Firm A lobbied against a carbon tax 
on the grounds that the uncertainties and costs of guessing the wrong charge would lead 
energy firms to delay generation investments (P1, P3). 
Due to the uncertainty surrounding New Zealand’s Kyoto obligations and the nature of 
the proposed carbon tax, the generator did not consider the implications of a future 
carbon price or its associated costs in its investment decisions (P1, P3). Instead, the 
focus of its climate change actions was to “encourage our employees to seek new 
opportunities to improve energy use and assist customers with demand-side 
management”.” (Annual Report 2003). From 2003, the generator implemented, on a 
trial basis, a number of energy efficiency initiatives which included energy audits and 
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offering energy efficient products to its customers. Further, in 2004, an energy 
efficiency strategy was adopted with significant enhancement to the energy efficiency-
related advisory services provided to business customers (P3). Interviews with 
managers revealed this strategy was driven by pressures associated with initiatives from 
a government agency, the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA), 
rather than short-term internal efficiency needs (P1).  
An environmental policy was adopted in 2002 which highlighted the generator’s focus 
on ensuring compliance with the RMA resource consent requirements (P4). From 2003, 
the environmental objectives and targets set were adopted as an additional measure to 
improve environmental compliance (P4). It also streamlined its environmental 
management function, improved its EMS and achieved certification under ISO 14000 
(P4). The emissions monitoring system was also updated in order to ensure compliance 
with the complex conditions of the generator’s resource consents (P4). Additionally, in 
an attempt to show its efforts in reducing emissions, the generator began to monitor and 
measure the total generation emissions intensity and disclose it externally (P4). 
Environmental performance was also disclosed in separate Annual Environmental 
Reports rather than the ARs (P4). However, the environmental policy was reviewed in 
2005, resulting in no environmental report being produced between 2005 and 2006 (P4).  
6.2.3. January 2006 to September 2007 
In June 2006, the generator joined the Sustainable Business Network. The SBN seeks to 
promote environmental quality, social equity, economic prosperity and ethics in 
business. This participation signalled that the generator was responsible and concerned 
about the social and environmental impacts of its operations. Simultaneously, SBN 
membership placed more pressures on the generator to revise the way it conducted 
business and reported its performance (P1). As a result, from 2007, the generator 
produced its first Sustainability Report in accordance with the guidelines of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI)6 (P4). This Sustainability Report followed a triple bottom 
line reporting format, which incorporates three aspects of the generator’s performance: 
economic, social and environmental.  
After the Government cancelled the carbon tax, a shift in policy was signalled relating 
to the development of an ETS (P1). This resulted in the generator adopting more 
                                               
6
 GRI reporting is a network-based organisation that develops and disseminates a reporting framework 
and guidelines based on which organisations can report their sustainability performance 
(www.globalreporting.org) 
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definitive measures to respond to climate change and reduce its emissions. A Climate 
Change Action Plan (the Plan) was announced, including not only efforts to promote 
internal and customer energy efficiency but also changes to its generation strategy, an 
active political strategy and increased disclosure of emissions (P3). Customer energy 
efficiency and internal energy efficiency (as discussed in Section 6.2.2) took on 
renewed importance in this Plan. In particular, the generator stated a serious intention to 
pursue improvements in internal energy efficiency by establishing a separate team and 
making a senior manager responsible for implementing energy efficiency plans (P4). To 
ensure effective implementation of the Plan, formal reporting systems and cross-
functional coordination systems relating to internal energy efficiency were intensively 
used at operational and strategic levels (P4). The generator also identified “climate 
change risks and opportunities” (interview with a senior manager) and integrated them 
into the company-wide risk register (P4).  
The most significant difference in the generator’s climate change action plan, when 
compared to its previous environmental policy (prior to 2006), was the change in 
generation strategy (P3). The generator publicly announced its launch of a renewable 
investment programme, with a billion-dollar capital commitment in February 2007. This 
announcement marked a strategic move from thermal-based generation to the pursuit of 
renewables (primarily geothermal) for new generation. This was stated as its primary 
strategy to reduce emissions from electricity generation. However, interviews with 
senior managers suggest this strategy shift was facilitated by a change in CEO in 2006, 
with the new CEO strongly supporting geothermal development (P2). Another driver 
was the anticipation of changing fuel economics as a result of the planned GCCPs (P1):  
If you don’t go down that direction the government may come and regulate you. 
Then some of our plants will be uneconomic because government will come 
along and say “you knew about this problem and you did nothing about this, you 
built a carbon emitting plant. It’s too bad that you’re going to make a loss on 
them (because of the new policy)”. (A Senior Manager) 
The managers interviewed also revealed a number of internal capabilities that enabled 
the generator to implement its environmental strategies effectively (P2). These 
capabilities included “relationship and cooperation with the majority shareholder”, 
“corporate culture” and “pressures related to the capital markets”.” (interview with the 
wholesale manager). The majority shareholder had “a lot of expertise, good thinking and 
good management capability” (interview with the a senior manager) which has been 
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shared and transferred to the generator through various cooperation projects (P2). The 
generator also had a corporate culture that was strongly focused on cost control (“every 
dollar matters”) and high performance (“everybody asks whether it adds value to the 
firm”) (P2).interviews with several senior managers) (P2). Having a private ownership 
structure led to a potentially different approach to generation investment in comparison 
to the other generators. The stock market continuous disclosure requirements resulted in 
“a great deal of focus on the company” but were “a tremendous way of discipline” on 
the generator’s approach to generation investment (P2).interview with a senior 
manager) (P2). As commented by a senior manager: 
The tendency in SOEs will be to undertake investments all the way down to 
investments that have a value that is close to the cost of capital. But we will only 
do investments that we believe have a margin on the cost of capital. 
To implement its new renewable-based generation strategy, the generator modified its 
external fuel monitoring system to focus on exploring resource sites for geothermal 
development, as opposed to the concern with gas supply in previous periods (P4). 
Strategy meetings were held and internal newsletters distributed to build awareness of 
the new strategy throughout the organisation. The generator also pursued an active 
political strategy to support its generation strategy (P3). Policy changes were monitored 
intensively and discussed at top management levels to formulate appropriate strategic 
and political responses (P4). Accordingly, the generator strongly supported an ETS and 
the government’s making of renewable investments a priority in the NZEI. In its 
submission to the draft NZES issued in December 2006, the generator challenged the 
whole industry to an ambitious emissions reduction target and strongly supported the 
90% renewable target in the NZES. It recommended that the Government consider 
geothermal as a strategic energy option instead of wind due to the wind’s unreliability. 
Accounting-based analysis was employed in its submission to provide support to these 
recommendations (P4).  
Further, the generator also indicated its intention to “take a lead” in seeking “green” 
business opportunities (Annual Report 2006) (P1). Accordingly, it launched a number 
of retail campaigns to promote the use of energy savings products and won a number of 
awards for these campaigns (P3). These initiatives enhanced the generator’s reputation 
and competitiveness:  
It’s all small stuff but for those customers it is great. They are advocate 
customers who go out there and say our firm is the nicest thing that happens to 
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them, like, they did this for my business and saved me this much money… They 
are ultimately the customers that you want because there’s nothing more 
convincing in selling a product than a customer going “Ah, these guys are 
brilliant!”. (A Senior Manager) 
Despite the competitive benefits, Firm A’s managersit was insisted that these strategies 
were driven by ‘a genuine concern about climate change and a perceived need to do 
something about it’. (interviews with two senior managers). Additionally, they 
contended that the generator needs to behave ethically by responding to climate change 
challenges, so as maintain credibility with staff and customers (P1). 
Compared to the previous periods, emissions management to prepare for future ETS-
related compliance was accorded a primary focus in the organisational MCS (P4).  
Compliance with RMA resource consents took on a more subordinate focus. This is 
partly because improvements undertaken in the last period, to maintain the ISO 14001 
accreditation, had enabled the generator to achieve a high level of environmental 
compliance. Furthermore, updates in organisational MCS, such as the emissions 
monitoring system, were needed to minimise the potential inaccuracies in emissions 
monitoring and measurements and to reduce emissions levels (P4). While generation 
emissions had always been monitored to satisfy RMA requirements, the economic 
implications of the ETS associated with Firm A’s generation emission profile meant that 
emissions monitoring needed to be more accurate (P1, P2): 
Under the RMA, these things were not resolved and did not result in money 
going out of the door. So you just have to get accurate enough to satisfy local 
bodies. Whereas with money going out of the door [under an ETS], tens or 
hundreds of millions of dollars going, that requires a totally different kind of 
focus. (A Senior Manager) 
6.2.4. October 2007 to September 2008 
In 2008, while the ETS was being considered in the Parliamentary legislative process, 
the generator announced a new environmental policy with an explicit focus on 
mitigating environmental risks, including those associated with generation emissions 
(P2, P4). One manager interviewed suggested that this new policy reflected the 
increased importance being placed on emissions management, as Firm A recognised its 
potential ETS-related carbon costs (P3). The sustainability reports continued to include 
measures of total emissions and emissions intensity, along with the disclosure of other 
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environmental performance measures (P4). The generator’s non-generation related 
activities were certified as carbon-neutral for the period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, 
and thus, total emissions from non-generation activities were not disclosed (P3, P4). 
Carbon neutrality certification, titled CarboNZero, is awarded by the LandCare 
Research Institute to organisations that take measures to reduce their carbon emissions 
and buy carbon credits to offset remaining emissions. The move to carbon neutrality 
was perceived by external interviewees as a marketing tool in the face of increasing 
consumer environmental concern (P1): 
If you just decide that you will become carbon neutral, what does that mean? No 
one knows who you are! But there is recognition of CarboNZero; it sees itself as 
a premium brand. For companies, that [gaining the CarboNZero certification] 
means they will be able to market themselves as green and carbon and hence 
can gain extra price and revenue. (An External Consultant) 
Internally, managers held different opinions regarding the purpose of pursuing a carbon 
neutrality programme (P3). While a marketing and brand manager claimed that carbon 
neutrality would bring customer benefits, a wholesale manager considered it important 
to maintain its reputation to existing and prospective employees (P1):  
Most customers either don’t care, or don’t care enough to pay extra for it. The 
ones that do care are probably buying from [renewables generators] anyway. 
What really matters to me is [carbon neutrality] helps get people on board. I 
had one experience where a prospective staff said “look, you are wasteful, I 
don’t want to work for you”. That was an eye-opener. I realised that if we don’t 
change ourselves, we can’t get the most talented people.  
Consistent with its new environmental policy, the generator implemented the billion 
dollar renewable investment programme and publicly announced its cancellation of a 
thermal generation project due to problems in obtaining resource consents and the 
economic implications of the ETS (P3). Within its renewable investment programme, 
geothermal energy is the strategic priority, as the combination of access to resource site 
(e.g. resource consent), technological opportunities and available internal expertise 
made geothermal generation efficient (P1, P2):  
We’ve got the expertise in geothermal area. There’s new technology coming 
through in that area which really opens up that prospect. It is even cheaper than 
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wind. We also have the process of securing resource access to some geothermal 
fields well underway. (A Wholesale Manager)  
The ETS legislation strengthened the geothermal priority by providing the guarantee 
that geothermal investments would remain attractive despite future fluctuations in the 
supply of fossil fuels. This is because ETS-driven carbon costs will change the relative 
economics between alternative fuels and make renewable generation more efficient. The 
potential increase in wholesale electricity prices due to the ETS will thus bring a 
windfall gain to renewable assets (P1). A senior manager explained:  
Probably what the ETS does is it removes a risk in a sense that if the gas market 
was to become fuller through new discoveries or reworking of existing fields, 
[geothermal development] is still worth a go. The ETS is not the driver but is the 
second layer which reinforces and makes it happen.  
Interestingly, the generator also invested in gas peakers and gas storage facilities (P3). 
By building thermal back-ups, the generator could take advantage of price premiums 
caused by supply shortages when there are low lake levels or little wind (P1). 
Additionally, the generator had generation sites that are “close to the gas storage and 
close to water” and very suitable for developing thermal peakers (Annual Report 2007) 
(P2). A senior manager saw this as “a unique opportunity” that they could invest in to 
bring “a competitive advantage that would be extremely difficult for competitors to 
replicate”. Accordingly, carbon-related information began to be incorporated into 
generation investment decisions through an assessment of the impact of the carbon 
charge on electricity prices, and thus resulting potential gains/losses from the 
generator’s renewable and thermal peaking assets (P4).  
Similar to the last period, the generator’s political strategy focused upon supporting an 
ETS, the renewable target and early entry of the energy sector into the ETS (P3). It 
advocated an opt-in for gas purchasers to directly manage their emissions liabilities, but 
opposed the proposed thermal ban, arguing that such intervention distorts incentives to 
invest in peaking plants. Accounting was used in its governmental submissions to 
support the arguments presented (P4). Its retail strategy was also modified. In addition 
to maintaining the customer energy efficiency initiatives from the last period, the 
generator started to develop energy efficiency products and services for commercial 
purposes (P3). Thus, the system used for product planning was modified to incorporate 
and monitor information on customer demands and feedback on these products and 
services (P4). This new business was “quite a success” and helped improve the 
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generator’s reputation in the market place. Internally, a corporate-wide waste 
management strategy was adopted that focused on minimising total paper usage and 
resultant waste in all offices and generation plants (P3). Accordingly, measures of total 
waste and waste reduction were reported in the sustainability report (P4).  
The level of disclosure relating to the generator’s emissions levels and GCCP-related 
environmental strategies significantly increased (P4). The senior managers interviewed 
insisted this increased disclosure was not due to increased public concerns and 
pressures, but reflected a genuine belief in climate change and the need to respond 
proactively. However, this claim was received with criticisms by the external 
interviewees who suggested that such disclosure was to reduce customers’ resistance 
when the generator increases its retail prices to recover the ETS carbon costs (P1).  
Consumers are going to pay more for their electricity. Particularly appalling, 
the electricity price has increased 70% in the last 10 years. That’s about to go 
up again, about another 5 to 10% due to the ETS. So it’s more and absolutely 
important that the generators communicate their climate change responsibility 
and ETS liabilities otherwise people will blame individual firms and their 
market share will suffer. (An Industry Expert) (emphasis by the interviewee) 
6.2.5. October 2008 to October 2009 
Due to the change of Government in October 2008, the Original ETS was put on hold 
and the Moderated ETS Bill was released for public consultation. Firm A made a 
submission that in general opposed the reduced carbon price and the 50% obligations, 
arguing these concessions delayed changes in economic investments and the adoption of 
low-emitting technologies (P1, P3). However, it recognised these concessions would 
give policy certainty and provide time for businesses to learn how to reduce their 
emissions liabilities. (Submission to Moderated ETS Bill, 2009). While geothermal 
remained the priority in its generation strategy, the uncertainty around the ETS reduced 
the rate of its generation development and put some projects on hold (P3): 
We currently hold consents to construct a number of geothermal plants. The 
sequencing and timing of these projects are dependent on a number of factors, 
including the carbon policies. So we won’t make the decisions on these projects 
until these policies are finalised. (A Senior Manager)  
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Additionally, the generator decided to further diversify its fuel options and generation 
portfolio, by continuing the gas peaker and gas storage projects and starting to 
investigate potential hydro projects (Annual Report 2009) (P3). Management believed 
that hydro investment would be the preferred fuel option to meet medium to long term 
energy needs, especially in the context of increasing climate change concerns.  
Interviews with senior managers revealed the internal organisational characteristics that 
may increase Firm A’s ETS-related carbon costs. Accordingly, they were concerned 
about the lack of internal expertise in carbon trading (P2) and were also worried about 
not having access to good quality and reasonably-priced carbon credits to meet their 
ETS liabilities (P2). As a result, the generator’s carbon credit strategy was to tap into 
the carbon trading book of its majority shareholder, which due to the size of its carbon-
related liabilities, would be able to undertake projects (e.g. forestry) that generate their 
own carbon credits  (P2, P3). By doing this, the generator incurs a lower carbon cost in 
meeting its ETS obligations than by buying on the international market (P2). Firm A did 
not plan to buy carbon credits early because its managers believed carbon prices could 
fall in the future and that there were significant uncertainties around the ETS as a result 
of the change of Government (P1). Although not buying carbon credits, the generator 
was building internal carbon trading skills, based around valuing the risks attached to 
carbon contracts (P3).  
The main thing is that you need to make sure you have competitive tension in the 
market that you potentially purchase from. You don’t need to be an expert in a 
carbon market and all the details that are going on in the market – they will 
come to you via those suppliers and the tips that they offer. All you really need is 
expertise in valuing risks of the contracts they offer. (AWholesale Manager) 
Further, the impact of the ETS on retail competition was perceived to be small. Firm A 
believed there was only a small proportion of its customers who are ‘deeply concerned 
about the environmental issues enough to switch suppliers’ and the difference in 
branding between itself and renewable-based generators was ‘not a significant risk’ 
(two senior managers) (P3). However, the managers interviewed agreed that not all 
customers are aware of the wholesale market operations and therefore could be misled 
by green marketing campaigns run by renewable generators (P1).  
ManagersInterview data revealed many MCS changes, some already implemented and 
others planned, within the generator to prepare for meeting its ETS obligations and the 
management of carbon-related compliance costs (P3). First, the level of volatility 
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associated with the generation emissions was entered into the risk register for regular 
measuring and monitoring (P4). The generator planned to base carbon credit purchases 
on its assessment of the volatilities in its emissions levels (P4): 
We will try to match our purchase book as much as possible to the volatilities 
that we’re expecting. For a peaking plant we might have a stock of carbon 
credits sitting there, or just buy when and as we expect the plant to run. Whereas 
for the combined cycle for which we know we’re going to run at a reasonably 
high level, we’ll try to buy two or three years in advance. (A Wholesale 
Manager) 
Firm A started to measure and account for the carbon trading risk and determine the 
exposure limits of its carbon trading transactions (Annual Report 2008) (P4). A separate 
budget for buying and selling carbon credits was established, based on which cost 
targets could be set and variances tracked (P4). One manager revealed that the actual 
measurement of emissions was still the responsibility of environmental managers. 
Further, a separation of duties was implemented where the responsibility for managing 
carbon trading risk fell on the trading and wholesale team (P4). However, the financial 
measurement and reporting of carbon trading risk was the CFO’s responsibility. In order 
to better manage these risks, the generator planned to integrate measures of emissions 
and carbon costs into managers’ performance evaluation, based on the principle of 
controllability (P4). 
Additionally, interview data indicate that in order to enable coordination between 
different functions in monitoring, reporting and managing emissions and carbon trading 
risks, existing cross-functional information systems and links were extensively used 
(P4). Accordingly, the trading team started to have access to all other databases, 
including that of environmental managers (P4). The treasury and accounting staff were 
able to tap into the trading team’s database to enable monitoring and reporting. The 
treasury and accounting function assigned a dedicated employee to be responsible for 
“measuring and reporting how much risk is in the carbon book and whether (the 
traders) are trading within boundaries”.” (interview with the Wholesale Manager). 
From 2009, this employee shared office space with the trading people in the trading 
room. The interviewed managers indicated the purpose of this was to enable timely and 
accurate reporting of carbon-related risk, while simultaneously ensuring adequate 
independence and effective monitoring of trading activities (P4). 
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Disclosure of energy efficiency initiatives and emissions was significantly improved, 
with the reporting of both generation and non-generation emissions (Sustainability 
Report 2009) (P4). Non-generation emissions were broken down by office and by 
scope, consistent with the LandCare research’s measurement methodology. 
Furthermore, the CarboNZero certification was maintained for non-generation activities 
for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009. However, this certification was 
discontinued for 2009/10 period (P4).  
6.2.6. Summary 
In summary, in response to the various GCCPs introduced, Firm A changed its 
environmental strategies and organisational MCS from 2000 to 2009. Table 6-1 
summarises the amount of Firm A-specific evidence that supports the different 
propositions, as presented in sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.5. It is noted that this table reflects the 
degree that evidence supports a particular proposition through the count of pieces of 
evidence. Thus, this count does not necessarily capture the perceived impact exerted by 
GCCP-related drivers on environmental strategies and organisational MCS. 
Table 6-1: Count of Firm A-related evidence availability  
 Jan00 – Mar02 Apr02 – Dec05 Jan06 –  Sep07 Oct07 – Sep08 Oct08 – Oct09 
P1:  
Economic drivers 
1 2 4 5 3 
Institutional drivers 1 2 2 3 0 
P2:  
Internal characteristics 
and capabilities 
1 1 5 2 3 
P3: Change in 
environmental 
strategies 
1 6 5 7 7 
P4: Change in MCS 2 7 7 8 11 
The table suggests that Firm A perceived multiple economic drivers associated with an 
ETS from January 2006 (P1). These drivers, including changing fuel economics, carbon 
market fluctuations and changing retail competition, had implications for Firm A’s 
competitiveness and costs. Additionally, Firm A was exposed to a number of additional 
institutional drivers, such as government pressures for energy efficiency, and societal 
and customer pressures for environmental responsibility, during the middle periods 
(Apr2002 - Sep2008). During the ETS development period (Jan2006 – Sep2007), Firm 
A started to recognise that it had many internal characteristics and capabilities that 
could potentially provide a market advantage or facilitate effective carbon cost 
management under an ETS. These include geothermal experience and expertise, 
possession of suitable generation sites, and a close relationship with the majority 
shareholder (P2). In response to the GCCP-related drivers, from April 2002 to October 
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2009, Firm A made many strategic changes (P3) and modified its organisational MCS 
(P4). Firm A changed its generation investment strategy, adopted a carbon credit 
strategy, and implemented internal energy efficiency and carbon neutrality strategies. 
To support the chosen environmental strategies, significant changes to organisational 
MCS were made, such as the establishment of an emissions monitoring system, and 
carbon trading systems, and a carbon neutrality certification process. From October 
2008, as Firm A prepared for the upcoming ETS, it implemented the highest number of 
MCS changes (P4). These MCS changes ensured that Firm A could control its ETS-
related compliance carbon costs as well as maintain its competitiveness and social 
legitimacy.  
6.3. Firm B: A thermal generator 
Firm B was established as a SOE in 1999 and remains state-owned. At establishment, 
the generator’s generation portfolio was driven by fossil fuels. In 2002, its thermal 
sources (gas and coal) accounted for 67% of its total generation capacity and hydro 
generation accounted for the other 33%. The unreliability of gas supply and low rain 
levels in recent years, resulted in increased reliance on coal for its generation. 
Consequently, compared to the other generators, Firm B had a high carbon emissions 
profile. Since establishment, the generator has focused its strategy on growing its 
thermal generation assets. Recently, however, it has started to investigate potential 
renewable development projects. Firm B is vertically integrated with a substantial share 
in both the wholesale and retail markets (19% and 25% respectively in 2003). Both its 
generation plants and retail business are based in the North Island. Evidence related to 
the changes in environmental strategies and organisational MCS in Firm B in response 
to the GCCPs in each of the time periods from January 2000 to October 2009 is 
presented below. 
6.3.1. January 2000 to March 2002 
During this period, with no announced GCCP, the primary focus of Firm B’s 
environmental policy was on compliance with the RMA and resource consent 
requirements (P1, P3). To improve its environmental compliance, the generator installed 
a number of EMSs in its generation plants, including an emissions monitoring system 
(Annual Report 2000) (P4). Additionally, the generator undertook a number of 
cooperative initiatives with community groups so as to mitigate its environmental 
impacts and improve environmental conditions in the areas that its plants were located 
(P3). In a number of public documents, Firm B acknowledged the aim of these 
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initiatives was to increase the local community’s acceptance of its generation operations 
and enhance its ability to extend existing resource consents and apply for the new ones 
(Annual Reports 2001 and 2002) (P1, P3). 
Firm B’s generation strategy was focused on thermals and they commenced building of 
a major efficient gas-fired plant. Additionally, management did not recognise the 
influence of  potential GCCPs on its choice of generation projects (P3). Therefore the 
impacts of carbon costs or carbon prices were not integrated into its investment 
planning decisions: 
We asked what influence a carbon tax or carbon trading would have on the 
company’s behaviour. The [generator’s] chairman said it would not influence 
its behaviour, but agreed that it would result in electricity prices increasing. (a 
senior officer in a government authority (2001/2002 Financial Review by the 
Commerce Commission) 
Environment-related MCS in this period was predominantly compliance-focused (P4). 
The generator’s EMS design was broadly aligned with the ISO 14001 standards. As part 
of the EMS, the resource consent database was upgraded to ensure compliance with 
relevant environmental regulations and resource consents (Annual Report 2002) (P4). 
Environmental reporting was integrated as a section in the ARs, in which carbon 
emissions from the thermal plants were measured and reported to comply with RMA 
resource consent requirements (P4).  
6.3.2. April 2002 to December 2005 
Once the Government announced the carbon tax in April 2002, Firm B recognised a 
need to reduce emissions from thermal plants in order to manage its potential carbon 
costs (P1, P2). A strategic diagnosis was undertaken to identify the “risks and 
opportunities” brought about by climate change. (Annual Report 2003). Consequently, 
“climate change risks and opportunities” were assessed and entered into the company-
wide risk management system (P4), as noted in an interview with a Senior Manager. 
One key risk associated with the carbon tax was the significant carbon costs Firm B 
would incur due to its high emission profile, thereby threatening organisational 
profitability (P2). Therefore, in 2004, continuous emissions monitoring system units 
were installed in all the thermal plants to provide real-time measures for different types 
of emissions, including carbon emissions (Annual Report 2005) (P4). Additionally, 
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senior management was briefed regularly on total carbon emissions from generation 
activities, with a focus on coal-fired plants (P4). However, these generation emissions 
were not disclosed externally (P4). A Director recalled: 
We had total emissions reported monthly in the Board papers, for quite a while, 
to understand and monitor the implications of a carbon tax on the firm. 
However, we didn’t talk about carbon emissions publicly and the emissions 
numbers were not disclosed in detail to the public. There was insufficient public 
demand for such reporting at that time. 
Furthermore, Firm B recognised that traditional means of ensuring efficiency gains at 
generation plants were not sufficient to reduce GHG emissions and associated carbon 
costs and thus, started to look for more innovative approaches. Accordingly, carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) technology was investigated as a potential solution (Annual 
Report 2004) (P3). Further, while keeping the focus on thermal generation, the 
generator started to investigate potential renewable investment projects (P3). From 2003 
to 2004, the generator received more than 330,000 Kyoto carbon credits for its proposed 
renewable projects under the PRE scheme (MfE, 2009d) (P3). The granting of these 
carbon credits was a direct subsidy from the Government to enhance the economic 
viability of renewable projects (P1). Further, the generator participated in the local and 
national policy processes to argue for changes in RMA processes to facilitate new 
renewable investments (Annual Reports 2003 and 2004) (P3). These changes would 
enable Firm B to change its generation infrastructure to a stronger renewable base with 
lower carbon costs.  
Energy efficiency was recognised as important in meeting future energy needs and 
reducing carbon emissions. From 2004, under EECA energy efficiency pressures, the 
generator provided advice to small business customers on conserving energy (P1, P3). 
As indicated by a senior manager, “we understand the responsibility we have 
in encouraging our customers, stakeholders and staff to use energy and resources 
wisely” (P1). Simultaneously, the economic downsides of such customer energy 
efficiency initiatives were recognised:  
You can only lead customers so far, by giving them advice. If anybody does not 
want to turn lights off or insulate their hot water, not any amount of persuasion 
will make them do it. Furthermore, if we try to persuade people to use less 
power, obviously it means less revenue [for us]. (A Senior Manager) 
119 
 
Internally, Firm B developed guidelines and trialled some measures to improve waste 
management and energy efficiency practices (P4). From 2004, a whole-of-company 
structure was established to allocate responsibilities for internal emissions reduction 
initiatives, and specific financial provision was assigned for each initiative (Annual 
Report 2004) (P4). Non-generation emission monitoring systems were established to 
measure and report emissions from non-generation activities (P4). Similar to the 
previous period, emission reporting was integrated into the AR. However, a difference 
was that the environmental section featured a discussion on climate change and 
highlighted the actions taken by the generator to reduce its generation and non-
generation emissions (P4). 
Firm B was also exposed to increasing Government and societal pressures regarding its 
generation emission profile (P1). Therefore, in 2005, with approval from the board, 
management began to adopt a more proactive approach to climate change and GCCPs 
(Annual Report 2005 and interview with a director). An internal strategic planning 
process for responses to climate change was initiated, following a participative approach 
between the different levels of management. As commented by one Director (P4):  
The senior managers were involved in the planning process. And they report to 
the Board on what’s happening. It’s a top down approach but also bottom-up in 
terms of the staff coming up with ideas for non-generation carbon savings. It is 
really another component that has been added to many people’s jobs. 
Consequently, a climate change plan was announced around mid-2005 (P3). This plan 
incorporated areas of generation emissions management, climate change policy 
oversight, customer energy efficiency, internal waste and energy efficiency, and 
emissions monitoring and reporting (Annual Report 2006). As part of this plan, 
previous initiatives in customer and internal energy efficiency were emphasised as part 
of Firm B’s response to climate change. Generation emissions management was 
considered critical because of the generator’s high emission profile and thus the 
associated carbon cost implications were of prime importance. Further, the generator 
believed substantial experience in emissions reduction developed in the past due to 
RMA carbon-related compliance would enable it to manage carbon costs effectively 
(P2). Further, emissions monitoring and reporting was assigned high importance, 
because it allowed management to monitor emissions-reduction initiatives and 
demonstrate the generator’s responsibility in managing its emissions to the public 
(interviews with senior managers and directors) (P4).  
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However, the most significant component in Firm B’s environmental strategy was a 
shift in focus relating to generation investments (P3). Management increasingly 
recognised that continued reliance on coal-fired generation would result in significant 
emission levels and compliance costs under the carbon tax (interview with a director) 
(P2). Instead, to effectively reduce its generation emissions and carbon costs, Firm B 
needed to develop renewable-based plants to replace thermal ones. Consequently, the 
generator announced its intention to increase its renewables portfolio in almost all 
commercialisable sources, including wind, geothermal, hydro and tidal energy (Annual 
Report 2006). It also began to incorporate the expected value of the avoided carbon 
costs in assessments of potential renewable investment projects (P4). Simultaneously 
with increasing renewable investments, the generator started a thermal peaking plant 
project. Interview data and publicly available documents suggest this dual investment 
strategy created the operational and strategic flexibility required to respond to 
volatilities arising from GCCP changes (A media release by Firm B in 2005) (P1). 
Furthermore, this thermal investment was possible because the generator had a 
relatively secure fuel supply, due to its shareholding interests in a number of gas 
exploration projects (interview with a Senior Manager) (P2).  
6.3.3. January 2006 to September 2007 
Once the carbon tax was cancelled in December 2005 and the Government began to 
develop an ETS, senior management was updated regularly on its generation emissions 
level and carbon prices on international markets (interview with a director) (P4). Due to 
this information, Firm B recognised the substantial impacts that an ETS would have on 
the costs and profits of existing generation, as well as the viability of its thermal projects 
(P1). In response to the draft NZES (issued in December 2006), it argued against the 
proposed thermal ban and considered the 90% renewable target “unaffordable” (P3). 
Using accounting-based methods, Firm B quantified the impacts of the proposed NZES 
emissions reduction model and argued this model would lead to high price increases and 
threaten SoS (P4). Thus, the NZES would result in “extremely high costs to the 
electricity system and consumers” (Submission to the draft NZES, February 2007). 
Additionally, the generator emphasised the importance of fossil fuels in NZ energy 
future and argued for more recognition of CCS technology and its role in future 
emissions reduction. This would protect Firm B’s current thermal assets and CCS 
investments in the face of Government preference for renewable energy (P1).  
121 
 
In this period, Firm B began to implement the climate change plan announced in mid-
2005. While continuing previous initiatives relating to customer and stakeholder energy 
efficiency, it also sought to differentiate itself from other generators (P3). Instead of 
developing emissions calculators, Firm B chose to focus on educational tools such as an 
on-line game that taught children about sustainability. Furthermore, to achieve its 
internal energy efficiency objectives, a whole-of-company structure was set up; the 
CEO was named “the Climate Change Champion” and cross-functional teams were 
formed to implement emissions reduction initiatives (Annual Reports 2006 and 2007) 
(P3). Each initiative was given a financial provision but required no additional 
personnel and a company-wide emission calculator was used to keep track of non-
generation emissions (P4). 
Measuring and reporting emissions was accorded a high level of importance in this 
period, as it formed one of the five key pillars of Firm B’s climate change plan (P3). 
Therefore, Firm B implemented real-time monitoring of generation emissions and 
adopted an emission intensity measure as the key performance indicator used to monitor 
the performance of the emissions management strategy (Annual Report 2007) (P4). 
Targets were also set for generation and non-generation emissions reductions and a 
framework for emissions reporting was established (Annual Report 2007) (P4).  
Despite the adoption of the emission intensity measure, the Board continued to place 
emphasis on total emissions levels (P4). Interviews with managers suggested the 
emission intensity indicator served to demonstrate the generator’s environmental 
responsibility and thus was merely considered a response to increasing societal 
pressures (P1). Total emission levels remained “the key driver” of Firm B’s future 
compliance costs and thus a priority from the senior management perspective (comment 
by a senior manager) (P2). In its external reporting, Firm B disclosed total emissions 
and emission intensity levels, from generation and non-generation activities (P4). 
Furthermore, in alignment with increasing governmental and societal focus on 
sustainability (P1), the generator prepared a corporate social responsibility (CSR) report 
in 2006 and a sustainability report in 2007 and included them in its ARs (P4). Its 2007 
sustainability report was reviewed for completeness and materiality by an external 
consultancy company, demonstrating a further effort to gain legitimation (P4).  
6.3.4. October 2007 to September 2008 
As the ETS was passed into law, Firm B for the first time publicly acknowledged that 
"the impact of climate change is one of the foremost strategic challenges facing the 
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company" (Annual Report 2008) (P1). An internal estimate of Firm B’s ETS position 
(i.e. potential carbon costs) led the generator to review the 2005 climate change plan 
and divide it into a CSR Strategy and a Carbon Strategy (Annual Report 2008) (P3). 
The CSR Strategy dealt with the voluntary aspects of the climate change plan, including 
those initiatives previously under the internal and customer energy efficiency areas (P3). 
In contrast, the Carbon Strategy’s aim was to manage the generator’s carbon-related 
obligations and compliance costs in the short and long term (P3). In the long-term, the 
generator would reduce its emissions by increasing renewable investments and 
integrating the CCS technology into generation activities (P3). However, in the short 
term, its strategy was to buy carbon credits early to meet its ETS obligations. Interviews 
with managers suggest that the separate Carbon Strategy was a move to prioritise 
organisational resources into managing the carbon costs associated with the generator’s 
prospective ETS obligations (P3). This was a necessary strategic choice because Firm B 
had the highest emissions level in the industry and needed to manage its emission levels 
and carbon costs effectively in order to remain profitable (P2). 
To implement the Carbon Strategy, a budget for carbon trading was established (P4) and 
executives were sent overseas to buy “large lumps” of carbon credits “as they become 
available through forward contracts” (Annual Report 2008) (P3). This strategy was 
facilitated by the appointment of a carbon manager and the establishment of a carbon 
trading team, a carbon price monitoring system and carbon-related spending limits (P4). 
The team conducted intensive training for senior and middle management about how the 
ETS would operate and its economic impacts on organisational performance. A Director 
recalled: 
We had some training... we spent a couple of days where we looked specifically 
at carbon trading, carbon unit pricing, and that sort of thing, which I 
understand, at that stage no other electricity firm’s board has done. We have a 
number of carbon traders who understand the system and we don’t need 
consultants to explain that to us.  
Firm B’s political efforts focused on making a submission to the ETS Bill. Its 
submission was the longest of all submissions, and was supported by extensive scenario 
analysis highlighting the impacts and consequences of the Original ETS on future 
electricity prices and generation investments (P4). In particular, it was contended that 
the Original ETS would result in a ‘disproportionate loss’ for Firm B compared to 
renewable generators (P1). Firm B argued strongly for an allocation of free carbon 
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credits and a price cap to compensate for this loss. This indicated an attempt by the 
generator to externalise the emission reduction responsibility and carbon-related costs to 
the Government instead of managing them internally through technological and 
infrastructure change (P3).  
Firm B reported its generation emissions in total and by intensity levels. Additionally, 
for the first time, in 2008, Firm B prepared its sustainability report using the GRI 
reporting guidelines (P4). One interviewee noted an increase in managerial emphasis on 
emissions-related disclosure during this period (P4), and explained that such increase 
was driven by societal pressures (P1): 
Why more reporting of bad numbers? I don’t know that such disclosure brings 
any benefit. I think it is just a public expectation that we report our 
environmental performance, and in particular, our generation emissions. (A 
Director) 
Firm B claimed to achieve carbon neutrality status for its non-generation activities in 
2008, but this status was not externally verified (Annual Report 2008) (P4). An 
examination of archival data revealed little reduction in non-generation emissions 
through internal efficiency initiatives. Instead, carbon credits were purchased to cover 
most of these carbon emissions (P3). Further, cross-functional teams for internal energy 
efficiency were disbanded in 2008 due to a perception by top management that these 
teams had failed to motivate significant behavioural changes (Annual Report 2008) 
(P4).  
6.3.5. October 2008 to October 2009 
Due to the change of Government in September 2008, there was substantial uncertainty 
relating to the future of the ETS, coupled with strong Government pressures on the 
SOEs to deliver a higher rate of return (P1). In its submission, Firm B supported the 
changes in the Moderated ETS Bill, especially the proposed carbon price cap and the 
50% obligation, since these ETS changes potentially halved its carbon costs (P1, P3). 
However, Firm B argued strongly that carbon costs may not be passed fully through to 
electricity prices and formally acknowledged that due to its high emission levels, it was 
“the company in the electricity sector most challenged by changes in the energy market 
place” (Submission to the Moderated ETS Bill, October 2009) (P1, P2). An estimate of 
its ETS carbon liability of a few hundred million NZ dollars per annum was disclosed in 
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this submission (P4). A Director explained the “huge business challenge” faced by 
Firm B:  
The main impact is on the balance sheet, because of the sheer dollar value of 
carbon credits that will have to be bought. You’ve got hundred million dollars in 
carbon costs and at the same time the minister of the SOEs said he wants a 
better return out of the power generators. So it is a challenge. If you suddenly 
have that huge chunk of costs, what do you do, would you put the prices up and 
lose customers to other power companies? 
An interview with a Senior Manager revealed that emissions management was difficult, 
because of the growth in electricity demand (P2, P3):  
One of the things we find with New Zealand is that, the demand volumes are 
becoming less and less seasonal by season, which put the pressures on all of our 
thermal plants. There is a little bit of opportunity to back off from coal and 
favour gas, but it’s not quite as much choice as you might think. (A Senior 
Manager) 
Further, the generator publicly admitted its concerns with “losing its acceptability to 
society” due to its thermal generation plants and associated emissions (P2). One 
Director expressed their frustration with the negative publicity the generator had 
received regarding its generation activities (P1):  
We are only generating power because people are running appliances, 
businesses, and factories. But the newspapers are saying that the generator is a 
dreadful company because it’s generating an awful lot of carbon emissions. 
Well, we are only doing that because people want to use power to do stuff. 
Firm B decided to use the PRE carbon credits to offset its ETS surrendering obligations, 
with “the difference being sourced from domestic and international markets” (Annual 
Report 2009) (P2, P3). This strategy would enable the generator to manage its ETS 
compliance costs as well as reduce its exposure to carbon market fluctuations. 
Furthermore, in anticipation of the loss under the ETS, the generator wrote off a few 
hundred million dollars from its thermal plants’ asset value, which led to an overall loss 
for the 2009 year (Annual Report 2009) (P4). However, a past senior manager revealed 
that it was a “smart strategic move” to mitigate the costs associated with future asset 
transformation from thermal to renewable-based. Additionally, this “Big Bath” helps 
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satisfy the Government’s return requirements and protects managers’ bonus interests in 
the future:  
With this write-off, the firm effectively depreciated almost all the historical cost 
of its thermal plants. The running of these plants in the future will deliver net 
revenue since there will be no depreciation expenses and wholesale prices only 
have to cover short run marginal costs such as the carbon charge and the cost of 
fossil fuels. (a retired Director)  
Additionally, to further avoid carbon costs, Firm B decided to put some of its thermal 
plants into early retirement, arguing that “it is not our responsibility to provide SoS 
without adequate commercial compensation” (Annual Report 2009) (P3). Accordingly, 
its organisational mission statement was changed to emphasise the importance of 
making an adequate return for the shareholders (P4). Its generation investment strategy 
was further revised; renewables became the new focus and the renewable development 
programme was accelerated (P3). Management emphasised that "where it makes 
economic sense, renewables have to be the preferred option for new generation". This 
strategy change was motivated not only by the need to significantly reduce the 
generator’s emissions profile and thus ETS liabilities, but also by a prospect of "gaining 
greater social acceptance as an operating entity" (Annual Report 2009) (P3). 
Consistent with this, estimated carbon costs became one of the most important 
considerations in all investment decisions (interviews with Senior Managers) (P4).  
The delay in the ETS announced in October 2008 gave Firm B time for “learning-by-
doing” and for re-evaluating its strategic position (Submission to the Moderated ETS, 
October 2009). To address the business challenges it was facing, a sustainable business 
model was adopted as an underlying principle to guide Firm B’s business decisions 
(P3). Company-wide sustainability objectives, one of which was to respond to climate 
change, were established with an aim to move sustainability from being just an add-on 
to being integrated in core business (Annual Report 2009) (P4). These objectives were 
to be reviewed annually as part of the business strategy planning process. Internal waste 
and energy efficiency initiatives were also incorporated into the new sustainability 
objectives and maintained on an on-going basis (P4). 
The new sustainability objectives led to a number of MCS changes. Energy audits were 
conducted for both direct and indirect energy use across all offices and operations. This 
led to energy consumption being measured, monitored and reported regularly to top 
management levels (interview with a senior manager) (P4). An environmental 
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management framework was established to create a holistic approach to environmental 
management, including the monitoring and management of emissions (Annual Report 
2009) (P4). For the first time, in 2009, Firm B had the sustainability content of its AR 
externally verified by one of the Big 4 accounting firms. Its managers believed that 
external verification would add further credibility to the generator’s claimed 
commitment to sustainability (P4).  
However, governmental pressures on SOEs to improve financial performance (P1) led 
to an internal restructuring (interviews with senior managers) (P3). A strategic review 
was undertaken for all of the generator’s environmental strategies and as a result, 
financial performance became the predominant objective and assessment criteria for 
these strategies (P3). Therefore, internal cost control was tightened to improve 
operational efficiency, including a stronger use of budgetary controls (P4). As fewer 
resources were allocated to internal energy efficiency initiatives (P2, P3), related MCS 
such as non-generation emissions monitoring system received less strategic and 
operational emphasis (interview data) (P4). Simultaneously, despite the tight cost 
control, externally-oriented MCS such as emissions-related disclosure and AR 
verification were maintained since they were considered critical to mitigating the 
negative public perception associated with Firm B’s emissions profile (P4). 
6.3.6. Summary 
In summary, the evidence presented above indicates that Firm B changed its 
environmental strategies and MCS significantly in accordance with its recognition of 
the impacts of the GCCPs on its business.   
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Table 6-2 provides the count of evidence from 6.3.1 to 6.3.5 that supports the four 
propositions.  
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Table 6-2: Count of Firm B-related evidence availability 
 Jan00 – Mar02 Apr02 – Dec05 Jan06 –  Sep07 Oct07 – Sep08 Oct08 – Oct09 
P1: Economic drivers 0 3 1 2 4 
      Institutional drivers 2 3 3 1 3 
P2: Internal 
characteristics and 
capabilities 
0 4 1 2 3 
P3: Change in 
environmental strategies 3 7 4 6 7 
P4: Change in MCS 3 9 6 7 10 
The table suggests that Firm B recognised GCCP-related economic drivers most 
strongly in two periods: Apr2002-Dec2005 and Oct2008-Oct2009, when the preference 
for a GCCP (the carbon tax or the ETS) was clear. These drivers, including changing 
fuel economic and carbon market fluctuations, affected Firm B’s competitiveness, and 
production and carbon costs (P1). It is also during these two periods that the 
implications of internal characteristics and capabilities were the most evident (P2). 
Accordingly, Firm B recognised that its high emission profile would lead to a 
significant amount of carbon costs. However, it also realised that its internal capabilities 
such as PRE carbon credits and experience in emissions reductions would enable the 
management of such costs (P2). Additionally, Firm B was exposed to many institutional 
pressures, such as Government pressures for energy efficiency and increasing societal 
pressures, primarily due to its high emission profile, during the middle periods 
(Apr2002-Sep2007) and the last period (Oct2008-Oct2009).  
Table 6-2 also indicates that Firm B undertook many strategic changes during the 
periods with a defined GCCP presence (Apr2002-Dec2005 and Oct2007-Oct2009) (P3). 
In particular, it changed its generation investment strategy, adopted an active political 
strategy, and pursued emissions management and carbon credit strategies. Significant 
MCS modifications were implemented to support these strategic changes (P4). The 
highest number of MCS changes was observed from Oct2008 to Oct2009, as Firm B 
prepared for its compliance obligations under a prospective ETS. Hence, most of its 
MCS changes were to enable the building of internal capabilities for carbon cost 
management (P4). Additionally, some MCS changes were aimed at maintaining its 
competitiveness or responding to institutional pressures (P4).  
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6.4. Firm C: A renewable generator 
Firm C was one of the three state-owned generators established from the split of the 
ECNZ in 1999 and until now has remained state-owned. At establishment, the inherited 
generation assets were 100% renewable-based. Its generation investment strategy has 
remained renewable-focused since, moving from hydro projects in the 2000-2005 
period to wind farms in later years. This focus led to the building of strong internal 
expertise in wind development. Additionally, a renewable-only generation portfolio 
results in no carbon costs under either a carbon tax or an ETS. Firm C is a vertically 
integrated generator, accounting for about 13% of the retail market and 29% of the 
wholesale market as at 2003. Its generation plants and retail business are based in both 
the North Island and South Island. The changes in Firm C’s environmental strategies 
and MCS in response to GCCP changes from 2000 to 2009 are summarised below. 
6.4.1. January 2000 to March 2002 
Before any GCCP was introduced, Firm C was the first electricity firm to recognise the 
importance of climate change issues and New Zealand’s potential obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol in its annual reports. Its generation strategy was to optimise the 
operation of the hydro plants and wind farms inherited from the ECNZ’s split-up 
(Annual Reports 2001 and 2002) (P3). Internally, it focused on staff training to increase 
staff awareness of environmental issues. In 2001, it joined the NZBCSD, an 
organisation set up by the Government to encourage sustainability practices (P1). This 
led to the adoption of a sustainability policy which emphasised a responsible use of 
natural resources and RMA compliance (P4). Consistent with its sustainability policy, 
the generator became the first in the NZEI to measure and reports its non-generation 
emissions (P4).  
6.4.2. April 2002 to December 2005 
This was a period of significant strategic reorientation in Firm C’s generation 
investment strategy. Due to the announcement of the carbon tax in April 2002, it 
decided not to invest in coal (Annual Report 2003) (P3), because of the potential carbon 
tax implications of coal-fired generation (P1) and a lack of internal expertise (P2) 
(interview with a retired Director). During late 2002, it applied for resource consents for 
a major hydro project while simultaneously investigating possibilities for wind farms 
and peaking gas-fired plants to hedge the risk of hydro generation. In 2004, the hydro 
project was cancelled due to increasing unforeseen costs and the uncertainty associated 
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with access rights to water. Consequently, Firm C’s generation investment focus shifted 
to wind, because wind-based generation has low operating costs and no carbon 
emissions (P1, P3). Furthermore, wind was considered complementary to hydro and 
thus helped to manage the risk of a supply shortage in dry years (P3). A Project 
Manager recalled:  
In 2004 when the [hydro] project was closed down, there was a reshuffle of our 
directorates and the Generation and Development directorate was set up to 
commercialise wind. By that stage, the core opportunity was with wind and the 
corporate and development arm felt that we are in for a much bigger proposal 
for wind.  
In 2005, a strategic decision was made to exclusively focus upon renewables for 
generation investments (P3). Prior to this, senior management believed it was imprudent 
to focus only on renewables due to the unreliability of their supply. However, the Board 
took an active role in the planning process and convinced senior managers that investing 
100% in renewable generation could create a green brand and enhance organisational 
market competitiveness and differentiation (P2). Furthermore, they foresaw the cost of 
carbon coming into future electricity prices which would make renewable investments 
economic (P1). A retired Director revealed: 
We were always aware, in our planning as the Board, that the cost of carbon as 
a margin will be inevitable, through some mechanism, be it an ETS, or the 
carbon tax.  
The decision to commit totally to renewable resources also reflected the internal 
awareness of climate change and “the need to do something about it”, while 
simultaneously improving Firm C’s social reputation in the face of increasing societal 
concerns regarding carbon emissions (interview with a retired Director) (P1). More 
importantly, it represented managerial recognition of the potential market advantage 
arising from a 100% renewable asset base (P2):  
Being 100% renewable from the start was good positioning. Not everyone in the 
market can claim themselves as green, even though they could have invested in 
renewable generation quite a lot. (A Senior Manager) 
As perceived by a senior manager, the combination of external and internal factors 
leading to this strategic decision is “a beautiful synergy” since it provided a distinctive 
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opportunity for Firm C to gain a “green” competitive advantage (interview with a 
retired Director). Consequently, it started to pursue a green branding retail strategy (P3). 
Simultaneously, internal initiatives were implemented to encourage energy efficiency 
behaviour (P3). In response to the EECA pressures, Firm C developed tools and 
provided advice on energy efficiency for corporate and industrial customers and 
promoted sustainability practices among its partners and suppliers (P1, P3).   
As part of its renewable-only generation investment strategy, Firm C initiated various 
wind development projects in New Zealand and Australia. In 2003 and 2004, under the 
PRE scheme, it was awarded over one million carbon credits for the potential reduction 
and avoidance of carbon emissions due to its proposed renewable projects (MfE, 2009d) 
(P3). These carbon credits bring additional income and enhance the viability of the 
proposed investments (P2). To further support this generation strategy, Firm C’s 
political activities focused upon emphasising the importance of renewables for future 
energy needs and lobbying for improvements in RMA processes to facilitate renewable 
investments (Annual Reports 2003 and 2004) (P3).  
Interview data suggest that the organisational MCS was modified to fit the renewable-
focused environmental strategies. Top management used the HR system interactively to 
develop internal expertise in wind development (P4). A revision of the sustainability 
policy was undertaken to incorporate social and economic responsibility as opposed to 
the sole focus on environmental issues in the previous period (P4). Consequently, 
internal training and cross-functional communication systems were used extensively to 
promote staff awareness of sustainability issues and ensure the cooperation between 
different business units during the policy implementation (P4). The EMS was updated 
to enable the monitoring of both environmental compliance and environmental 
improvement initiatives (P4). Sustainability-related disclosure was initially incorporated 
as a separate section in the ARs. However, in 2005, sustainability became a guiding 
principle in preparing the AR (P4).  
The scope of non-generation emissions monitoring and measurement was extended to 
include emissions from its subsidiary companies (P4). Thus, Firm C was the first 
generator to set emission reduction targets on a whole-of-company basis (P4). An 
interview with a middle manager revealed that these measures and targets were driven 
by climate change concerns and an internal need to control the increase in operational 
costs and emission levels due to rapid organisational growth (P2). Total non-generation 
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emissions were also reported regularly to the Board and executive team, but not on a 
comparative basis with other generators (P4): 
The emissions were in totals, but not on a comparative basis though. I would not 
be able to tell you how the non-generation assets were performing relative to 
compatible entities. That was possibly due to no other firm having 
published/disclosed the information at that time. We would be among the first to 
account for and measure that sort of thing. (a Director) 
Although monitoring and reporting internal emissions, Firm C did not put an emphasis 
on the external disclosure of such data (P4). Its carbon footprint only had been 
published in the ARs since 2004. This was attributed to the lack of public and 
community demand at that time for emissions-related reporting (P1).  
6.4.3. January 2006 to September 2007 
With the cancellation of the Government’s proposed carbon tax, Firm C acknowledged 
that the uncertainty relating to the GCCP presented “one of the major threats” to its 
business (P1). However, the international regulatory environment was becoming 
positive for renewable investments. To take advantage of this, Firm C decided to pursue 
a global energy generation strategy with a focus on wind development (P3). Large 
investments in renewable investments in the previous periods were seen as the enablers 
of this strategy (P2):  
The scale of our investment in wind generation, and our continuing commitment 
to wind energy has given us a substantial market strength and allowed us to 
negotiate very favourable supply and equipment guarantees. (A Project 
Manager) 
These investments and the renewable-only inheritance assets allowed the generator to 
develop a strong expertise in renewable development, putting it in “a powerful position 
in the market” (interview with a senior manager) (P2). Further, external technological 
advances had also reduced the unit cost of renewable generation, thus making it an 
economic choice compared to thermal projects (P1). Consistent with this generation 
strategy, Firm C lobbied the Government to price carbon through an ETS and provide 
further incentives for renewable investments (Submission to draft NZES, February 
2007) (P3).  
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From a MCS perspective, a Climate Change Framework for Action was developed (P4). 
Initially this was independent of the sustainability policy. A climate change team was 
established in parallel with this Framework and had “a short term mission to integrate 
into the business the capacity to identify and respond to risks and opportunities of 
climate change” (interview with climate change manager). However, one of the team’s 
tasks was to incorporate climate change issues into the broader sustainability principles. 
Consequently, the sustainability policy from 2001 was replaced in 2006 with a new 
sustainable development policy that emphasised “a commitment to being carbon 
neutral and to being a leader in climate change” (interview with climate change 
manager) (P4). The climate change team became the sustainability group and was in 
charge of implementing and monitoring energy efficiency initiatives and achieving 
carbon neutrality for the operations and activities across the organisation (P4).  
Firm C became the first energy company in New Zealand to gain the CarboNZero 
certification (P3). This certification was consistent with Firm C’s renewable-generation 
focus and reinforced its green brand. Managers considered certification to be “a more 
tangible recognition than the renewable attributes” (interview with a senior manager). 
Thus, the CarboNZero certification was extensively advertised and integrated in the 
generator’s retail strategy (P3). Additionally, in order to “transform customer 
experience” and tap into the increasing customer appetite for energy efficiency products 
(P1), a separate subsidiary was established to accumulate knowledge and develop 
products and services based on smart metering technology (Annual Report 2007) (P3). 
Energy efficiency advice was provided to residential customers and corporate/industrial 
customers. Firm C also extended the scope of its sustainability policy by developing 
sustainability guidelines for its partners and suppliers (P4).  
This strategic and operational focus on sustainability was enabled by a strong concern 
for climate change amongst staff and an “entrepreneurial corporate culture” (interviews 
with managers) (P2): 
There’s genuine thinking about how to play our part in moving NZ to a low 
carbon future... People felt like they were part of something that was making a 
difference, which distinguishes us from other New Zealand corporates. (A 
Senior Manager) 
That translates into their corporate culture being very committed to goals and to 
achieving success for the company. People who have worked for the company or 
have been involved with it have a lot of praise for it... It has this track record of 
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doing stuff first, and well, and differently. Carbon neutrality is part of that on-
going innovation. (a retired Director)   
Interview data suggest that the process of pursuing certification developed internal 
experience in emissions accounting and management in advance of an ETS (P4). 
Emissions were measured and reported to senior management quarterly (P4). Emissions 
intensity was adopted internally as a key performance indicator to manage and reduce 
emissions as part of CarboNZero certification process (P4). The generator disclosed the 
direct and indirect emissions for the core businesses (generation and retailing activities) 
following LandCare Research’s methodology. In response to growing societal concerns 
(P1), the environmental section in its ARs featured a separate section highlighting the 
“risks” and “opportunities” associated with climate change and the GCCPs and the 
generator’s actions to address them (interview with climate change manager) (P4). 
Additionally, the emissions disclosure often used words such as “sustainability”, 
“commitment”, “renewable energy”, “emissions reductions”, which were terms also 
used by the Labour Government in its policy documents and speeches (Annual Report 
2007) (P4). 
6.4.4. October 2007 to September 2008 
In October 2007, subsequent to the announcement of an ETS by the Government, Firm 
C undertook a strategic assessment of climate change opportunities (interview with a 
senior manager). As a result, management recognised that climate change would bring 
about an opportunity to develop and deliver energy efficiency and carbon abatement 
products and solutions (P1). Further, an ETS was perceived to make renewable 
generation as efficient as, or even more efficient, than thermal generation (P1). The ETS 
also provided the context for Firm C to take advantage of its renewable-focused 
capabilities and increase its market competitiveness (P2):  
The ETS is simply a symptom of what we have already tapped into which is 
generally greater awareness of environmental concerns and the ability to have, 
quite honestly, sold ourselves as the renewable generator and the ETS is just 
going to help us further in this area. The ETS provides us the context but we 
already have the core assets to enable that. (a Senior Manager) 
To capture these opportunities, the generation investment strategy was extended beyond 
hydro and wind to investigating other potential technologies such as solar energy 
(Annual Report 2008) (P3). In its ARs, Firm C emphasised how its renewable 
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generation strategy contributed to emissions reductions and thus was consistent with the 
goals of the planned ETS (P4). A green-brand marketing campaign was launched to 
reinforce its commitment to renewable energy (various media releases and television 
and online advertising materials) (P3). Additionally, Firm C started to sell efficient 
heating boilers in overseas markets, considering these boilers an innovative product that 
helped users to avoid or reduce carbon emissions while meeting increasing energy needs 
(Annual Report 2008) (P1, P3). In its political activities, to protect its renewable-based 
interests, Firm C strongly supported the ETS and urged the Government to provide 
further incentives for renewable investments so as to achieve a low-carbon energy mix 
in the future (Submission to the Original ETS Bill, February 2008) (P3).  
As part of its vision to become a climate change leader, Firm C launched a trial online 
auction of carbon credits and participated in the development of New Zealand’s first 
carbon credit trading platform (Annual Report 2008) (P3). Managers identified that the 
purpose of these initiatives was to gain experience in carbon trading and raise public 
awareness of climate change issues, which enhanced its organisational reputation and 
green competitiveness (interviews with managers). Additionally, Firm C successfully 
re-certified its electricity production and retail activities as carbon neutral under the 
CarboNZero programme (P3). Management saw carbon neutrality as reinforcing the 
credibility of its renewable energy commitment and as a way to retain and attract 
customers, especially with increasing retail competition (Disclosure of CarboNZero 
certification, 2007/2008) (P1). The Climate Change Manager summarised the benefits 
of carbon neutrality: 
We integrate our retail strategies with CarboNZero branding. Every year when 
we think about renewing our certification, we ask ourselves whether our 
customers value this brand. Some of our customers do really value it. Many of 
our customers go for CarboNZero themselves and having a carbon neutral 
electricity company means that the emissions related to their purchased 
electricity are taken care of. We see the certification as a way to increase 
customer loyalty thing, say, trying to persuade customers from switching to 
other retailers. But we also want more people to switch to us. As more people 
become concerned to do something themselves for the environment they will 
potentially see switching to us as part of the solution.  
A primary opportunity Firm C perceived with an ETS was the potential to enhance its 
profitability if electricity prices increased to reflect the cost of carbon (interview with 
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managers) (P1). However, this windfall gain came at a cost. Public documents and 
interviews indicated there were “significant adverse public reactions” to its windfall 
gains, and the resulting pressures on it to return such gains to the consumers, without 
the recognition that Firm C had “responded to the environmental responsibility quite a 
bit earlier than anyone else” (climate change manager) (P1). Further, management was 
concerned that it would face intense competition from thermal generators in relation to 
carbon trading, thereby reducing its retail competitiveness (P1). As stated by the 
Climate Change Manager:  
Our thermal competitors have an obligation under the ETS, and thus they have a 
stronger incentive to invest in carbon trading expertise. They are already quite 
active in this space. We see a threat of them developing that expertise and 
potentially taking away some of our customers due to their ability to offer advice 
and services related to carbon trading to help customers manage their ETS 
obligations and costs. 
In realising its vision to become a climate change leader, a number of MCS changes 
were made (P4). The generator began to integrate climate change issues such as 
emission levels into the “business-as-usual” decision-making process (Annual Report 
2008). To enable this, emission monitoring was conducted throughout the organisation 
and reported quarterly to the executive team and the Board (P4). Hard targets of 
emission reductions were set and soft initiatives were specified to support these target 
achievements (P4). In contrast to the previous period, emissions reduction targets were 
set in terms of emissions intensity rather than total emissions, as reducing total emission 
levels was considered not achievable due to organisational growth (interview data and 
Annual report 2008) (P2, P4). The generator had an overall budget for internal energy 
efficiency and CarboNZero certification programme, but not for specific emissions-
reduction initiatives (P4). There were plans for setting up a “visual carbon budget” for 
each department/business unit so that unit managers could be held responsible for that 
budget and emission reduction targets (interview with the climate change manager) 
(P4). Emissions measures were also used extensively for staff training (P4):  
We have a pretty good internal communications system on issues related to 
climate change and emissions. We have pages on our intranet. Our senior 
managers sometimes do talks around the business about this. We have online 
learning modules: Carbon 101 and Carbon 102. We do many training courses 
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for the new employees, talking about why it’s important and how we do it. (A 
Climate Change Manager) 
Separation of duties and formal cross-functional reporting were important MCS aspects 
in implementing the internal energy efficiency initiatives and CarboNZero certification 
programme (P4). Emissions data were collected by the procurement team and then 
submitted to the accounting team, where an accountant was in charge of developing the 
GHG inventories for the purpose of CarboNZero certification. These inventories were in 
turn submitted to the Climate Change Manager for sign-off who in turn submitted it to 
the executive team for review. The Climate Change Manager was also responsible for 
the certification budget and the sale and purchase of carbon credits.  
There was “a single risk and opportunity document” for the whole organisation which 
identified the risks and opportunities of climate change. However, climate change risks 
and opportunities were monitored separately, through an opportunity register and a risk 
register for climate change (a Senior Manager) (P4). The latter fed into the company-
wide risk management system. As part of the CarboNZero certification process, 
emissions management plans were implemented by environmental managers and staff 
through the use of reduction targets and an emissions monitoring system. Information 
on actual non-generation emissions was transmitted to the financial management system 
where the accountants would use this information to calculate the organisation’s carbon-
related exposure (interview data) (P4). In contrast, the opportunity register was part of a 
carbon-business development system that ensured opportunities were monitored and 
responded to by the business development team. Additionally, this team maintained a 
carbon market monitoring system to facilitate decision making related to carbon credit 
sales and purchases (interview data) (P4). 
The method for measuring emissions was changed as part of the CarboNZero 
certification process. While previously this measurement only included air travel and 
the vehicle fleet, it was extended in this period to cover a wider scope of non-generation 
emissions (Annual Report 2008) (P4). Emissions measures started to be integrated into 
the company-wide balanced scorecard and linked to managerial compensation. 
Nevertheless, while using emissions intensity measures for its reduction targets, Firm C 
only disclosed total emissions in its ARs. It also started using GRI Sustainability 
Reporting guidelines to prepare the ARs but did not get the sustainability content of 
these ARs externally verified (P4).  
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6.4.5. October 2008 to October 2009 
From October 2008 to early 2009, before the Original ETS was suspended, Firm C 
continued the same environmental strategies as in the previous period. It acquired 
CarboNZero certification for the whole group (the organisation and its subsidiaries) for 
the third time in 2009 (P3). Further, the emissions of the whole electricity product 
lifecycle were accounted for, including shipping of wind turbines, construction of 
generation plants, purchased electricity on the wholesale market, and travel and fuel use 
by subcontractors (Disclosure of CarboNZero certification, 2008/2009) (P4). Total 
emissions and emissions intensity were measured and externally reported for the whole 
group (P4), and the emissions inventory was externally verified for the first time in 
2009 (P4).  
This comprehensive approach to accounting for emissions was seen by its managers as 
evidence of Firm C’s commitment to and leadership in the climate change area which 
drove its ETS-related competitive advantage (interviews with managers) (P4). 
Additionally, the experience and learning gained from the ongoing certification process 
enabled the generator to become independent of external consultants: 
For our first GHG inventory, [one Big 4 accounting firm] did it. The second 
time they helped us do it. The third time they advised us on a couple of logical 
issues. And this time round we did it all ourselves. (A Climate Change Manager) 
From February 2009, in response to the ETS delay and proposed changes, Firm C 
undertook a comprehensive assessment of its organisational exposure to the ETS. It 
recognised that these ETS changes would dilute the potential ETS-driven cost efficiency 
of renewable generation and reduce the potential margins it could gain on the wholesale 
market (interview data) (P1). However, the proposed price cap was anticipated by its 
management:   
Fortunately for us our carbon price forecasting has been pretty good, pretty 
accurate. We foresaw the cap and things. You’ll recall the reaction earlier in the 
year to electricity price rises; it was absolute resistance even though that’s 
what’s necessary to enable the new renewable investments. So with the 
difference between where the carbon market might go and the political 
pressures to depress retail price rises, the cap seems inevitable. (A Senior 
Manager) 
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Expecting such changes to the ETS, Firm C reduced its involvement in ETS policy 
processes and maintained a policy oversight function instead (interview data) (P3). It 
also reconfirmed its commitment to renewable-only generation investments in mid-2009 
(Annual Report 2009). However, the uncertainty associated with the lack of agreement 
between the two major political parties (Labour and National) over the ETS design was 
recognised as a significant barrier in making long-term investment decisions (P1). 
Consequently, later in 2009, Firm C announced a delay in the issue of renewable notes 
to finance its planned renewable projects (P3). A senior manager revealed why they had 
postponed making decisions on some renewable projects:  
Our decisions are made based on the policy provided by the Government of the 
day. But electricity generation investments are long-term assets, spanning 20 to 
30 years. Not providing long term policy certainty results in substantial 
difficulty for us in making our investment decisions. (A Senior Manager) 
From mid-2009, the Government put significant pressures on SOEs to increase their 
financial performance (P1). In his letter to all the SOEs’ board chairpersons, the 
Minister of SOEs Simon Powell, stated: 
The relatively poor (and declining) financial performance of SOEs, coupled with 
the challenging economic conditions, has brought us to the conclusion that 
change in the SOE portfolio is urgent and essential. [...] I think shareholders 
representing $24 billion of taxpayers' money have an obligation to make sure 
entities are obtaining a decent financial return. (Trevett and Bradley, 2009) 
In response, Firm C reviewed its strategic thinking and market positioning, the result of 
which was to focus on the core business of electricity generation and retailing and 
prioritise economic sustainability over environmental sustainability (P3). One Manager 
commented: 
We are unwavering in our commitment to sustainability but looking at it in 
broader terms than just renewable generation and just emission management. It 
is about the fact that we need to ensure the sustainability of our business going 
forward. It is more about competitive positioning now. 
Additionally, this strategic review led to a change in the sustainable development 
framework, with economic sustainability becoming the overriding objective for climate 
change initiatives (P3): 
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One of the pillars of our strategy is to sustainably improve our earnings. It 
underlies the operational efficiencies that we get from reducing emissions and 
embracing energy efficiency. It’s also the purpose why we want to attract 
customers who buy carbon zero certified electricity. (A Senior Manager) 
From mid-2009, internal restructuring was initiated in an attempt to improve operational 
efficiency and thus lift the generator’s financial performance (P3). The organisation’s 
MCS was changed to focus upon internal cost control rather than on reducing emissions 
or implementing climate change initiatives (P4). Consequently, the role and importance 
of the climate change team changed: 
Because we’re supposed to focus on the core business and we don’t have a 
compliance obligation under ETS at the moment, the management decided that 
we’ve got excess experts in carbon and climate change and we just don’t need 
them. (A Climate Change Manager) 
From September/October 2009, the financial resources allocated to climate change 
initiatives substantially reduced (P2). Consequently, the climate change team was 
disestablished, with existing team members being moved to different business units. 
Instead of having people specialised in carbon neutrality and carbon trading, these 
responsibilities became “just one attribute the person who does the mainstream function 
needs to have” (interview with the Climate Change Manager) (P3).  
With these strategic and operational changes, a number of controls and control systems 
related to climate change initiatives were cancelled or used less (P4), including: the link 
of emissions measures into senior managers’ compensation structure; the budget for 
carbon trading; and, emissions monitoring and reporting (interview data). Furthermore, 
the generator’s 2009 AR focused on discussing economic sustainability, financial 
performance, productivity and survivability, which are the policy themes of the National 
Government (P4). This contrasted with the generator’ predominant use of words such as 
“emissions reduction”, “leader in climate change” in its AR disclosure in the previous 
periods under the Labour Government.  
6.4.6. Summary 
Evidence suggests that over the ten year period from 2000 to 2009, Firm C underwent 
significant changes in its environmental strategies and MCS to respond to the changes 
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in the GCCPs. Table 6-3 provides the count of evidence for Firm C that support the four 
propositions as presented from 6.4.1 to 6.4.5.  
Table 6-3: Count of Firm C-related evidence availability  
 Jan00 – Mar02 Apr02 – Dec05 Jan06 –  Sep07 Oct07 – Sep08 Oct08 – Oct09 
P1: Economic drivers 0 4 2 6 2 
     Institutional drivers 1 3 2 1 1 
P2: Internal 
characteristics and 
capabilities 
0 4 3 1 1 
P3: Change in 
environmental 
strategies 
1 7 5 6 6 
P4: Change in MCS 2 8 8 11 8 
The highest number of economic drivers (P1) was recognised during two periods of 
high GCCP certainty, Apr2002 - Dec2005 (the carbon tax) and Oct2007 - Sep2008 (the 
ETS). These drivers, including regulatory uncertainty, changing fuel economics, and 
carbon market fluctuations, affected Firm C’s competitiveness. During the early period 
(Apr2002 - Dec2005), Firm C was exposed strongly to additional institutional pressures, 
such as government pressures for energy efficiency, and societal and employee 
pressures for environmental responsibility (P1). Further, Firm C recognised early on 
(during Apr2002-Sep2007) that its renewable-focused internal capabilities resulted in a 
significant GCCP-related market advantage (P2) Hence, since April 2002, Firm C has 
changed its environmental strategies significantly in the areas related to generation 
investment, carbon neutrality, internal energy efficiency and emissions-related 
disclosure (P3). These strategic changes were supported by a corresponding high 
number of MCS modifications from April 2002 (P4). Organisational MCS was changed 
most substantially from Oct2007 to Sep2008, when the ETS was announced and 
legislated and its significant economic implications were recognised (P4). The MCS 
modifications enhanced Firm C’s green-focused competitiveness as well as improved its 
social legitimacy (P4). 
6.5. Firm D: a renewable generator 
Firm D is, and always has been a privately owned company. It became a publicly-listed 
company on the New Zealand Stock Exchange in the mid-1990s. Its traditional 
generation portfolio is 100% renewable-based with a predominance of hydro 
generation. From 2002 to 2009, a renewable-only generation investment strategy was 
pursued, focusing particularly on wind development and hence it has developed strong 
internal expertise in renewable technology. Firm D’s business is vertically integrated 
between generation and retailing bases, accounting for 5% and 16% of the wholesale 
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and retail market share in 2003. The generation plants and retailing business are located 
in both the North Island and South Island. In contrast to the other generators, Firm D is 
a net buyer, i.e. its retailing commitments exceed its generation capacity and thus it has 
high exposure to wholesale market fluctuations. Presented below is a summary of the 
changes in Firm D’s environmental strategies and MCS associated with the changes in 
the GCCPs from 2002 to 2009. Due to a lack of data from publicly available sources 
and the interviews with managers, the period from 2000 to 2002 is not covered.  
6.5.1. April 2002 to December 2005 
Consistent with its renewable-based infrastructure, Firm D was a strong advocate of the 
carbon tax when it was announced in April 2002 (P3). It was acknowledged that the tax 
would have a positive impact on its decisions to proceed with renewable projects (P1). 
However, the generator considered the tax as only “the first step down the path to a 
market driven reduction of greenhouse gas emissions”, and indicated its support of 
carbon pricing, i.e. an ETS, in the longer term (interview with a Senior Manager).  
With a history of renewable-only generation and strong top management commitment to 
renewable development, Firm D started to investigate various renewable investment 
opportunities in New Zealand and Australia (P2; P3). They intended to proceed with 
these investments when they “meet or exceed its strict minimum rate of return criteria” 
(Annual Report 2004). The strategic focus was on wind development, since internal 
expertise in managing “wind project risks” provided a competitive advantage over 
other generators (P2). Based on the potential emission reductions from its proposed 
renewable projects, Firm D was granted over one million carbon credits by the 
Government under the PRE scheme (MfE, 2009d). Management revealed this grant had 
enhanced these projects’ economic viability (P2). Additionally, some internal and 
customer energy efficiency initiatives were undertaken in response to the EECA 
pressures (Annual Reports 2002 to 2005) (P1, P3). However, these initiatives were 
limited in scope and received minimal top management attention (interview data). 
As a net buyer on the wholesale market, Firm D was strongly exposed to wholesale 
price fluctuations (P1). Being a privately-owned generator also required in a higher rate 
of return on investment than state-owned ones (P2). Consequently, in 2003, Firm D 
exited some residential markets where there were an incumbent SOE retailer with a 
lower acceptable margin, to focus on “higher socio-economic market segments” 
(Annual Report 2004) (P3). This strategic shift also reduced the difference between its 
generation and retail bases and thus helped mitigate organisational wholesale exposure.  
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Firm D recognised that its generation operations had the potential to significantly affect 
the environment and therefore a comprehensive EMS was developed with the ambition 
to “set a new industry standard in environmental excellence” (Annual Report 2004) 
(P4). A new environmental policy was developed in 2005 incorporating the concept of 
sustainability (P4). Accordingly, energy audits were conducted from early 2005, starting 
at head office and gradually rolling out to other offices and sites (P4).  
Environmental measures were mostly qualitative in this period (annual reports and 
interview data) (P4). Due to its 100% renewable-based generation, Firm D was not 
required under its RMA resource consents to disclose carbon emissions. However, to 
enhance its reputation, the generator disclosed the emissions avoided with its proposed 
wind development projects. From 2002 to 2004, the generator did not produce a 
separate sustainability report. Instead it disclosed its environmental performance as part 
of the ARs. When the new environmental policy was released in 2005, a sustainability 
report was incorporated in the AR, but included the same sub-sections of social, 
environmental and economic performance as in previous years (P4).  
6.5.2. January 2006 to September 2007 
Significant GCCP changes were announced in this period, including the cancellation of 
the carbon tax plan and the termination of the PRE scheme. Firm D perceived these 
changes as a “double blow” to its renewable generation (Annual Report 2007) (P1). 
Further, no guidance from the Government on future GCCPs made it “difficult for many 
generation development proposals currently under consideration to be progressed” 
(Annual Report 2007) (P1). While Firm D had sufficient funding for these projects, it 
was concerned that the regulatory environment did not give a positive enough signal for 
them to proceed (interview with a senior manager). Additionally, the cost of imported 
wind turbines and hydro plants quickly escalated in this period mainly due to foreign 
exchange rate volatility, which altered fuel economics (P1). In response to these 
regulatory and economic factors, Firm D chose to be flexible in its strategic direction 
and continued to identify new potential investment projects and progress them to a point 
where “a commitment to construction can be quickly made when the current 
Government and regulatory uncertainties have been resolved” (Annual Report 2007) 
(P3). In Australia, where the regulatory environment was relatively more positive (P1), 
the generator continued its wind farm development and was granted renewable energy 
credits for its wind projects (P2, P3).  
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Firm D began to publicly acknowledge the opportunities related to the GCCPs (Annual 
Report 2007) (P1). Management assessed that due to the 100% renewable focus in its 
generation development, it would be “in an excellent position to take advantage of the 
opportunities that a carbon constrained economy will bring” (interview with a senior 
manager) (P2). Firm D also developed carbon trading skills and expertise by entering 
into a number of contracts to sell its PRE carbon credits (Press release, November 2007) 
(P3, P2). Additionally, its renewable development projects were registered to gain other 
types of carbon credits (verified emissions reductions - VERs) that could be sold to 
voluntary markets (Annual Report 2007) (P2).  
An active political strategy was also pursued to support its renewable investments. In its 
submission to the draft NZES, Firm D strongly advocated for NZES’s focus on 
emissions reductions and urged the Government to develop policies to ensure that the 
cost of carbon was reflected in electricity prices (P3). Furthermore, the generator 
submitted to the Government a proposal that required thermal generators to surrender 
carbon credits to renewable generators to support the latter’s new renewable projects 
(P3). Unsurprisingly, this proposal was strongly opposed by thermal generators 
(Submissions to draft NZES by thermal generators). 
From a MCS perspective, a carbon market monitoring system was implemented to 
monitor carbon prices for carbon selling contracts (P4). Due to the uncertainty about 
GCCP direction, the generator did not assess and integrate potential impacts of a GCCP 
into its investment planning (interview data). However, the potential changes in the 
GCCPs were monitored regularly and accounting-based analyses were used extensively 
by top management as they actively lobbied over the design of a future GCCP 
(interview data) (P4). Furthermore, the EMS was updated and appropriate personnel put 
in place to improve compliance with increasing resource consent requirements (Annual 
Report 2007) (P4).  
Internally, the generator acknowledged that energy efficiency was increasingly 
becoming an integral part of an effective response to climate change (P3), rather than 
being merely a response to EECA pressures (P1). However, there was no company-wide 
monitoring system for non-generation emissions and no concrete targets to reduce these 
emissions (interview data) (P4). Further, its internal energy initiatives were limited in 
scope and only focused on electricity usage (P3). An energy efficiency guide was issued 
to encourage its customers to manage their electricity consumption (Annual Report 
2007) (P4). Externally, there was cursory discussion of internal and customer energy 
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efficiency as part of the sustainability report. However, the generator did not disclose 
the level of non-generation emissions nor the specific initiatives undertaken to mitigate 
such emissions (P4).  
6.5.3. October 2007 to September 2008 
Firm D strongly supported proposals for an ETS and the ten year moratorium on 
thermal generation (the thermal ban) when these GCCPs were announced in October 
2007 (P3). Managers perceived that these GCCPs would bring about a positive 
regulatory environment for its renewable-only investment programme (P1, P2). To 
further its reputation, the generator stated publicly that its investment programme was 
designed “to help meet the sustainability targets set by Government, but, at the same 
time provide our present and future customers with a secure electricity supply” (Annual 
Report 2008). However, interviews with its managers and external industry experts 
revealed that the pursuit of these investment projects was driven primarily by the 
economic impacts of the renewable-favouring GCCPs (P1). Such GCCPs included the 
Government’s financial assistance through the granted PRE carbon credits and the 
imposition of a carbon cost on fossil fuels which made renewables a competitive fuel 
choice for electricity generation (P1). 
With the introduction and subsequent enactment of the ETS, Firm D recognised the 
opportunity for “green branding”, which aligned with its renewable-only generation 
assets (interview with a senior manager) (P1). It achieved CarboNZero certification for 
the first time in 2007. In 2008, this certification was extended to include some 
subsidiaries (P3). The motivation underlying the pursuit of the CarboNZero certification 
was that “certification provided the methodology and framework we felt was required 
to measure, understand and mitigate our emissions” (Disclosure of CarboNZero 
certification 2007/2008). More importantly, the generator considered that carbon 
neutrality was “a driver of shareholder value” by providing a competitive advantage in 
a carbon-constrained market (interview with a senior manager) (P3). Its management 
recognised that carbon-neutral electricity would attract corporate and industrial 
customers who also wanted to certify their businesses as carbon neutral (changing retail 
competition) (P1). Furthermore, the generator could sell the VERs received for its 
renewable projects to customers to help the latter offset emissions and achieve their 
climate change goals (Annual Report 2008) (P2).  
To support the CarboNZero certification process, an emissions management plan was 
developed which established specific reduction targets in the five areas identified as the 
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biggest contributors to the generator’s total non-generation emissions (P4). These were 
fleet vehicle petrol and diesel, domestic air travel, international air travel, electricity, 
and waste to landfill (Disclosure of CarboNZero certification 2007/2008). Despite these 
efforts, there was a significant increase of 40% in emissions from domestic and 
international air travel, and electricity use, between 2007 and 2008 (Annual Report 
2008). To achieve carbon neutrality certification, these emissions were offset using 
carbon credits generated from its own renewable projects (P2, P3). Additionally, a 
carbon trading system was established in the Trading and Risk Department to monitor 
carbon credit inventory and carbon market fluctuations (P4). The use of the carbon-
trading MCS helped develop carbon trading skills and provided information for 
decision-making relating to the sales of carbon credits (interview with a senior 
manager).  
The sustainability policy was revised to reflect climate change issues and expand 
beyond environmental compliance to sustainability and economic objectives (Annual 
Report 2008) (P4). Consistent with the new sustainability policy, there was an increase 
in the disclosure of initiatives related to “sustainability” and “climate change action 
plan” in the ARs (P4). The generator claimed that the sustainability content in its ARs 
was prepared in accordance with GRI guidelines. However, a closer examination 
reveals this claim to be unsubstantiated since many measures reported were purely 
descriptive, and there were no quantitative measures for total non-generation emissions 
or waste, staff travel, and electricity use (P4).  
6.5.4. October 2008 to October 2009 
During this period there was a less positive environment for renewable investments due 
to the change of Government, the Original ETS review and the proposed carbon price 
cap (P1). Management perceived such environmental changes “influenced the timing of 
new investments and increased the difficulties and costs associated with bringing our 
investments to completion” (Annual Report 2009) (P3). A Senior Manager explained 
the impact of these ETS changes on the generator’s investment strategy (P3): 
We remain committed to 100% renewable generation investment. Therefore, we 
would only change our position when circumstances dictate that there is no 
other viable option. But we want to be flexible in relation to future regulatory 
changes. Due to the current policy and regulatory uncertainty, we have to delay 
making decisions on some of our renewable projects. 
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Interviews with managers revealed that they expected changes to the ETS to occur. 
Consequently, they decided not to invest resources in ETS-related lobbying activities 
and instead shifted their focus to internal operations and activities in order to “enhance 
the long-term value of our company, and deliver improved returns to our stakeholders” 
(Annual Report 2009) (P3). To increase organisational profitability, the organisational 
MCS focused on internal cost control and revenue management in the wholesale and 
retail markets (P4). However, a policy oversight system was maintained to monitor and 
provide information on the legislative and regulatory changes to the ETS (interview 
with a senior manager) (P4). This information was reported to the executive team who 
would consider the implications of such information for the generator’s environmental 
strategies (P4).  
Additionally, Firm D perceived a change in retail competition due to “customers 
increasingly insisting that companies actually “walk the talk” in terms of claims about 
sustainability and eco-friendliness” (interview with a senior manager) (P1). Further, 
management recognised that Firm D had a significant market advantage associated with 
its assets and internal capabilities (P2): 
I think our competitiveness lies in the ability to support customers’ sustainability 
initiatives. We have gained a lot of voluntary carbon credits such as VERs from 
our renewable development. These credits can be sold to our existing corporate 
customers to help them achieve their carbon neutrality objectives. We also have 
significant knowledge in carbon trading, which we can share with our 
customers. (A Senior Manager) 
Consequently, a marketing campaign was launched to reinforce its green brand and 
commitment with a purpose to enhance its carbon-related competitiveness (Various 
advertising materials) (P3). This campaign was believed by management to have 
attracted new corporate customers to the generator. 
However, despite its announced commitment to sustainability, Firm D did not disclose 
the specific energy efficiency initiatives undertaken in this period (Annual Report 2009) 
(P4). It also failed to renew its CarboNZero certification for 2009 (P3). Furthermore, 
customer energy efficiency initiatives were reduced since management perceived that 
these initiatives had reduced Firm D’s sales volume and exerted a negative impact on its 
short-term profitability (interview with a senior manager) (P3). The primary measure for 
the generator’s environmental sustainability continued to be the level of compliance 
with RMA resource consents (Annual report and interview data) (P4). Similarly to the 
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previous period, while claiming to follow GRI reporting guidelines, Firm D provided 
only superficial and descriptive discussion of its environmental performance (P4). It 
also failed to establish a company-wide emissions monitoring and reporting system in 
order to achieve the emissions reduction targets which were set as part of 2008 
CarboNZero certification process (interview data) (P4). Therefore, Firm D’s climate 
change initiatives were limited and narrow in scope, which contrasts with the climate 
change practices undertaken by Firm C which also claimed a commitment to 
sustainability. An interview with one internal manager suggests that this is partly due to 
Firm D’s small size, which led its management to perceive a low exposure to 
institutional pressures and thus little need to employ extensive climate change initiatives 
to maintain social legitimacy. 
6.5.5. Summary 
In summary, the evidence presented from 6.5.1 to 6.5.4 above suggests that Firm D 
changed its environmental strategies and organisational MCS in response to GCCP 
changes. Table 6-4 provides the count of evidence related to Firm D that supports the 
four propositions.  
Table 6-4: Count of Firm D-related evidence availability 
 Apr02 – Dec05 Jan06 –  Sep07 Oct07 – Sep08 Oct08 – Oct09 
P1: Economic drivers 2 4 5 2 
  Institutional drivers 1 1 0 0 
P2: Internal characteristics 
and capabilities 3 4 3 1 
P3: Change in 
environmental strategies 4 6 4 6 
P4: Change in MCS 4 6 5 6 
The table shows that Firm D perceived strong GCCP-related economic drivers from 
Jan2006 to Sep2008, when the ETS was developed and legislated. These drivers, 
including regulatory uncertainty, changing fuel economics, and international regulatory 
environment, had implications for its competitiveness (P1). In contrast, Firm D had 
limited exposure to institutional pressures throughout the whole period, possibly due to 
its small size and private ownership structure (2000-2009) (P1). Firm D also recognised 
early (from Jan2002) that it had a strong market advantage under the GCCPs because of 
its renewable-focused internal capabilities (P2). Consequently, since 2002, Firm D has 
made many changes to its environmental strategies and organisational MCS to reflect 
this advantage (P3, P4). Its environmental strategies were modified in areas relating to 
generation investment, retail, carbon neutrality and internal energy efficiency (P4). 
From a MCS perspective, to implement the strategic changes, Firm D integrated carbon 
149 
 
cost in its generation investment decisions and set up control systems to facilitate 
carbon trading, to maximise its competitiveness. However, its emissions-related external 
disclosure was limited, corresponding to the low exposure to institutional pressures.  
6.6. Firm E: a renewable generator 
Firm E was one of the three SOEs established as the result of the separation of the 
ECNZ’s generation assets in 1999 and currently is in state ownership. The generator 
inherited hydro and geothermal assets of which renewable-based generation accounted 
for 87% of its total capacity in 2000. Therefore, it has a lower level of carbon emissions 
and associated carbon-related costs under the GCCPs than thermal generators (A and 
B), but more than other renewable generators (C and D). It acquired various retailing 
businesses between 1999 and 2001 and became vertically integrated, accounting for 
15% of the total wholesale and retail electricity market share in 2003. Its generation 
plants are located in the North Island but its retail bases are in both the North Island and 
South Island. At establishment, generation development efforts were focused on hydro 
schemes. However, from 2002, it began to diversify into other fuels, including 
geothermal, gas and wind. Later on, Firm E refocused its generation investment strategy 
on geothermal energy only. The changes in its environmental strategies and 
organisational MCS in association with the changes in the GCCPS are presented below. 
6.6.1. January 2000 to March 2002 
During this period, before any GCCP was introduced, Firm E focused on hydro 
generation. Top management decided that in the future, its competitive advantage would 
be in renewable development (geothermal, small hydro and other renewable energy) 
(interview with a past manager) (P3). Additionally, Firm E was one of the first in the 
industry to discuss climate change and its impacts on electricity generation operations 
(Annual Report 2002). The generator emphasised that its current hydro-focused 
generation strategy was consistent with the Government’s probable Kyoto position and 
that its planned renewable investments would provide significant climate change 
benefits.  
The generator took a lead in encouraging customer energy efficiency in response to the 
energy shortage in winter 2001 (P3). It was the only retailer that offered customers 
payment for their reductions in energy consumption (Media release 18 December 2001). 
This is because its managers recognised that “energy efficiency benefits both Mighty 
River and the customer – they save money on their power bill and we conserve water for 
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later use” (Stakeholder Newsletter, December 2001). However, no initiatives were 
undertaken to encourage energy efficiency internally (P3).  
Initially, Firm E’s sustainability policy had a strong focus on RMA compliance and 
there was no consideration of climate change issues in this policy (P4). However, the 
generator joined the NZBCSD, which exerted pressures on participants to adopt a 
sustainability-oriented business model (P1). As a result, Firm E reviewed its 
sustainability policy and sought ways to integrate sustainability into business decisions 
(P4). Further, it considered that  “it is no longer appropriate to confine the picture of 
ourselves to just financial or economic performance” and that the company needs to be 
viewed from “across the spectrum of issues that impact on the way we do all our 
business” (Sustainability Report 2001). Sustainable development was seen as the key to 
“hold the community’s license to operate” (Annual Report 2002). Environmental 
performance standards were set internally but not disclosed externally, as the company 
was in the process of consulting with different stakeholders on the appropriateness of 
the different performance measures that align with its sustainability reporting 
(Sustainability Report 2001). Instead, Firm E chose to disclose overall compliance with 
environmental regulation as the key indicator of its environmental performance (P4).  
6.6.2. April 2002 to December 2005 
With the announcement of the carbon tax in April 2002, Firm E undertook a strategic 
diagnosis of “climate change risks and opportunities”, focusing predominantly on the 
opportunities (Annual Report 2003) (P1). It was stated:  
We identified a number of opportunities with climate change, including green 
branding, renewable resource use, niche generation, innovative energy solutions 
and, further into the future, prospects such as the hydrogen economy, where our 
hydro generation plant provides immediate real advantages. (Annual Report 
2003) 
Firm E took advantage of the PRE scheme to lever its renewable investment (P1, P3). It 
was granted an entitlement to over one million carbon credits for its geothermal projects 
from 2003 to 2004 (MfE, 2009d). Similar to other renewable generators, the potential 
revenue from the sale of these credits enhanced the financial viability of its geothermal 
projects (P2). Further, to gain a competitive advantage in geothermal energy, the 
generator invested heavily in developing geothermal-related human and resource 
capabilities (P2). It recognised that “geothermal, as the only reliable source of 
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renewable power, is crucial to offsetting the weather related risks associated with hydro 
and wind generation” (Annual Report, 2002). Thus, the bottom line of this strategic 
choice was to optimise the efficiency of generation plants and thus minimise 
organisational exposure to wholesale market volatility (P3). However, this strategy was 
enabled by firm-level capabilities, as evidenced by the following quote: 
With long experience in geothermal generation, its recent creation of a world-
class team of geothermal specialists, and its healthy profits, it is confident that 
there  is no company better placed to successfully undertake this exploration in 
New Zealand. (Financial Review 2003/2004) 
Firm E also began to investigate wind and small hydro possibilities from 2005. 
Simultaneously, it pursued thermal projects to diversify its fuel choices and thus 
“manage the supply shortage risks associated with renewable generation” (P3). The 
generator entered a joint venture for gas exploration and decided to apply for resource 
consent to re-commission a coal-fired plant (P3). Despite enormous opposition from the 
public, it defended this decision on the grounds of the need for security of supply, the 
availability of coal reserves and cheap operating costs due to plant already existing (P2) 
(Financial Review 2003/2004). One manager interviewed indicated that the economic 
impact of the carbon tax was considered when making thermal investment decisions 
(P1).  
Rather than merely conforming to EECA’s pressures for energy efficiency, Firm E 
considered this a market opportunity and undertook industry-leading initiatives in the 
customer energy efficiency area (P3). Accordingly, a substantial budget was committed 
to developing and marketing smart metering and energy efficiency products (P4). 
Furthermore, supported by top management commitment to sustainability, the 
environmental policy was changed to reflect an aim “to become a leader in sustainable 
development” (Sustainability Report 2004) (P2; P4). Managers suggested this new 
policy enabled the generator to realise a “green branding” market opportunity and 
distinguish itself from other electricity firms (Interview with a senior manager). 
However, this policy was not delegated down to the business unit level, where each unit 
maintained a separate environmental policy. Consistent with its sustainability policy, 
Firm E’s political strategy focused on discussing and proposing further sustainability 
initiatives (Submissions to various draft regulations and bills) (P3). To protect its 
thermal interests, the generator also argued that fossil fuels were still needed to ensure a 
reliable electricity supply (P3). 
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Interview data with internal managers suggest that Firm E’s MCS was modified to 
support its environmental strategies. To realise its environmental policy to become a 
leader in sustainable development, the generator decided to set an industry standard for 
the internal EMS. Therefore, the Enviro-Mark Standard was used to design the EMS 
and associated environmental measures which enabled environmental performance to be 
managed (P4). Top management used the human resource management system 
interactively to identify and develop internal human skills and expertise related to 
sustainable development (P4). Furthermore, the generator developed a comprehensive 
MCS for managing internal energy efficiency and non-generation emissions. Cross-
functional teams were established to set environmental measures and manage 
environmental performance for each department/business unit (P4). Reduction targets 
were set for resource consumption in the component areas (i.e. waste and staff travel) 
that made up non-generation emissions, but no target was specifically determined for 
total non-generation emission levels (P4). Further, an environmental intranet was 
established to communicate non-generation emissions levels at an organisationally-wide 
level and monitor the achievement of the reduction targets (P4). This intranet was also 
used extensively to raise climate change awareness and encourage behaviour change 
(P4). These energy efficiency initiatives and MCS changes resulted in the generator 
receiving a number of external environmental awards (P4), as well as reinforcing an 
organisational culture of environmental responsibility (P2). The receipt of these awards 
and the environmentally-focused culture were heavily advertised by Firm E, thus 
enhancing its market reputation.  
Between 2002 and 2005, there was a significant increase in emissions-related disclosure 
and a move from a compliance-focused environmental reporting to voluntary reporting 
of non-generation emissions. Additionally, Firm E was among the first in the industry to 
disclose its generation and non-generation emission levels in detail (Annual Reports 
2004 and 2005). Generation carbon emissions were disclosed in the ARs as totals and 
by type and plant, while non-generation emissions were disclosed for the retail business, 
in total and broken down into the separate activity areas (P4).  
6.6.3. January 2006 to September 2007 
From early January to December 2006, due to the cancellation the carbon tax, Firm E 
decided to pursue a diversification generation strategy. Hence, it expanded its 
generation development activities across a wide range of fuel sources, both renewable 
and thermal-based. However, due to its internal geothermal expertise, geothermal 
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development remained the “core strength” and strategic focus of its generation portfolio 
(Financial Review 2006/2007) (P2, P3).  
From early 2007, as it became increasingly clear that the Government was developing 
an ETS, Firm E decided to narrow its strategic focus. It reduced gas exploration and 
wind development activities, discontinued the coal-fired project, and focused its 
investment programme on geothermal energy (P3). The scale-back of gas exploration 
was caused by the low probability of finding gas to support the generator’s gas-fired 
plants (P2), while the delay in its wind development projects was associated with high 
increases in wind turbine prices (P1) (interview data and Annual Report 2007). 
However, the cancellation of the coal-fired project was potentially not driven by a pure-
cost rationale. A Greenpeace New Zealand interviewee indicated that a possible reason 
for cancellation was strong public opposition to coal-fired generation (P1). Firm E itself 
acknowledged that “climate change implications have made coal an undesirable source 
of generation” (Annual Report 2007). However, it defended it decision on an economic 
basis: 
Since that decision [apply for resource consent of the coal-fired plant] was 
made, we have commissioned additional geothermal capacity and successfully 
consented and begun construction on other projects... As a result of this work 
and other developments within the industry we no longer see scenarios where 
Marsden B will be cost effective in the next decade or so. (Media Release 7 
March 2007) 
]Following this coal-fired plant cancellation, the generator placed increased importance 
on carbon footprint considerations when evaluating future investment projects (P1) 
(interview with a senior manager). Therefore, in subsequent governmental submissions 
and public documents, it emphasised that its emissions management strategy was to 
develop renewable power stations (P3). This strategy was also undertaken because the 
company perceived little discretion in controlling the emission levels from its existing 
generation plants: 
The aggregate level of emissions  is a function of demand and hydrology.  If 
there is an extended dry or calm (wet or windy) spell, emissions from our gas 
fired station will increase (decrease).  Our other stations with lower emission 
intensity run baseload and are unaffected by the weather.  As Mighty River 
Power does not control the weather we are unable to affect changes in gas fired 
station emissions. (Financial Review Questionnaire 2006/2007) 
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Firm E’s political activity during 2006-2007 focused around the draft NZES. It lobbied 
strongly against the NZES sole focus on emission reductions and argued it was unfair to 
place the burden of emissions reduction only on the electricity sector (P3). Using 
accounting-based analysis, the generator cautioned that the Government’s ambitious 
emissions reduction target would require impossible achievements in renewable 
generation development and would put security of supply at risk (Submission to draft 
NZES) (P4). Additionally, the generator gave conflicting messages to the Government 
regarding a possible change in its retail strategy as a result of a potential ETS (P3). In its 
response to Financial Review Questionnaire 2006/2007, it underplayed the impact of 
carbon charge on the retail prices, stating that “we will only set prices sufficient to 
support our investments”. However, in its submission to the draft NZES, the generator 
admitted that an ETS would significantly influence its price setting decisions, but did 
not provide a quantitative estimate of the influence (P1).  
Interviews with managers indicate that organisational MCS underwent significant 
changes internally. To ensure compliance with complex resource consent conditions, 
Firm E installed a continuous generation emissions monitoring and reporting system as 
part of the EMS (P4). A new measure, generation emissions intensity, was adopted to 
monitor the carbon footprint of generation plants using different fuel types (P4). 
However, no targets or specific initiatives were implemented to reduce generation 
emissions or emissions intensity. For non-generation emissions, a new whole-of-
company environmental policy was developed to replace the individual environmental 
policies of each business unit (P4). Consequently, a central team was established to 
replace the previous cross-functional teams and non-generation emissions were 
monitored across the whole company (P4). A budget was assigned to support the 
implementation of climate change initiatives (P4). Additionally, the EMS in all business 
units attained Diamond status for the Enviro-Mark Standard, making Firm E the only 
New Zealand energy company to have the whole organisation certified to this high 
standard by an external agency (P4). The achievement of this certification was heavily 
advertised as the evidence of its commitment to environmental excellence.  
Externally, environmental disclosure was integrated in the ARs and gained a new label, 
"Climate change, energy efficiency and renewables", which aligned with the dominating 
themes of the Labour Government’s GCCP at that time (P4). However, the level of 
external disclosure related to generation emissions decreased compared to the previous 
period (P4). A Senior Manager explained that its low emission profile drove this 
reduction (P2): 
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Compared with the other thermal generators, we have a lot lower emission 
level. So we feel that we are exposed to low public pressures with respect to 
managing and disclosing generation emissions. On top of that, we choose to 
focus efforts on increasing renewable generation, rather than managing existing 
emissions… 
6.6.4. October 2007 to September 2008 
Once the Original ETS Bill was released for public consultation in December 2007, 
Firm E undertook further active lobbying activities (P3). In its submission, the generator 
supported the ETS and the opt-in flexibility for gas and coal purchasers to directly 
manage their emissions, but opposed the thermal ban. Using accounting-based analysis, 
it also argued for the exclusion of emissions from geothermal fields, thus reducing its 
potential ETS liabilities and compliance costs (P3, P4). These arguments were primarily 
economically–driven, based on its ownership of both renewable and thermal generation 
assets (P2). Its generation investment strategy remained focused on geothermal 
development (P3). Additionally, it increased its stake in a wind turbine company as 
wind generation had become more economic due to the ETS’s carbon charge on fossil 
fuels (P1, P3).  
Building upon its previous experience in customer energy efficiency (P2), Firm E 
established a separate smart metering business and launched a multi-million dollar retail 
campaign to promote smart meters (Annual Report 2008) (P3). This was acknowledged 
as a strategic move to capture the market opportunities associated with increasing 
demand from domestic customers for products that monitored consumption and allowed 
them to manage their energy costs (P1). Internally, energy efficiency initiatives 
undertaken in previous periods were continued, with a particular focus on encouraging 
recycling and reducing waste to landfills (Interview data) (P3). In contrast to the thermal 
generators, Firm E did not plan to purchase carbon credits to prepare for its future ETS 
compliance obligations (P3). Analysis of public documents indicates that the 
generator’s carbon credits granted under the PRE scheme were more than those needed 
to satisfy its ETS obligations (due to its low level of generation emissions) (P2). 
Additionally, managers perceived that managing existing generation emissions was 
difficult because the use of thermal plants and associated emissions levels were driven 
by uncontrollable factors, e.g. external weather conditions (P2, P3). A calculation of the 
emissions intensity disclosed in annual reports indicates Firm E’s generation emissions 
intensity fluctuated significantly because of year-to-year changes in hydro levels. 
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Consequently, the measure of generation emissions intensity adopted in the previous 
period was dropped in 2008 (P4). Instead, top management focused on measures of total 
emissions and the carbon cost avoided from new renewable development (Interview 
data) (P4). 
Interviews with managers also suggest that carbon prices and external fuel economics 
were monitored and integrated in investment planning systems (P4). As a result, the 
plan for an ETS had discouraged thermal investments, even though the ETS had not 
been introduced (Submission to Original ETS Bill) (P3). Firm E also established a 
database to monitor changes in customer demand and expectations and used this 
database extensively to enable coordination between different functions in 
implementing its smart-metering retail campaign (Interview data) (P4).  
In contrast to the other generators, Firm E decided not to pursue CarboNZero 
certification (P3). Interviews and documents suggest that top management considered 
such certification programmes as “snake oil”, a tool to avoid responsibility without 
direct and open consultation and engagement with external stakeholders and wider 
community to solve the real problems. Instead, the generator announced its commitment 
to sustainability was born by “many years of maintaining the highest status of the 
Enviro-Mark external accreditation” for its EMS and environmental initiatives (Annual 
Report 2008) (P4). Furthermore, emissions-related external disclosure improved, with 
total emissions being reported publicly for both generation and non-generation activities 
(P4).  
6.6.5. October 2008 to October 2009 
The change of Government in late 2008 delayed the introduction of the Original ETS. 
Management foresaw this delay and other proposed changes to the ETS, for example, 
the carbon price cap (Interview data) (P1). As a result, Firm E’s political activity was 
substantially curtailed and it chose not to participate in the policy process related to the 
Moderated ETS (P3). Senior managers perceived that the lack of political consensus 
between the two main political parties would be a disincentive to carbon management 
activity and renewable generation investments (Interview data) (P1). However, the 
generator did not place on hold its investments in renewables. In contrast, it established 
a global geothermal strategy and committed a substantial budget to the expansion of its 
geothermal business overseas (Media Release 19 November 2008) (P3, P4). This 
strategy was timed to capture the market opportunities brought about by changing 
international regulatory environments in favour of renewable energy (P1). Further, the 
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strategy was feasible, as Firm E was a market leader in geothermal energy because of 
prior geothermal investments and the previous development of human capabilities and 
expertise in this area (P2). One Manager commented: 
The extensive geothermal development programme is supported by significant 
investment decisions in exploration we made years before... It is a courageous 
approach, but one that we have the people, expertise, experience and foresight 
to make… In total, our people have worldwide experience in more than 30 
developed geothermal fields across 10 countries and more than 100 exploration 
projects. This experience and geothermal know-how is invaluable and 
underlines our commitment as New Zealand’s number one geothermal operator. 
It was revealed that Firm E’s exposure to future carbon emissions costs was “limited” 
due to the “90% renewable portfolio” (Annual Report 2009) (P2). A carbon credit 
strategy was established in which the PRE carbon credits would be used for both 
compliance and trading purposes (P2). This strategy also focused on building internal 
capabilities in carbon trading to enable effective management of ETS carbon-related 
costs and revenue (P3). Its retail strategy in this period continued to focus on customer 
energy efficiency and smart metering products and services (P3).  
Interview data indicate that to support its global geothermal strategy, top management 
used the HRM system more interactively to expand the geothermal expertise and skill 
base among the employees (P4). Consistent with its carbon credit strategy, formal 
controls and control systems were established to measure, assess and manage its ETS 
compliance costs and exposure (P4). Additionally, Firm E planned to reduce and 
mitigate its carbon costs through technological innovation, changing management 
practices, and accumulating carbon credits (P3). To implement this plan, internal carbon 
trading human and non-human capabilities were developed (P3). The generator also 
decided to outsource carbon trading transactions that required complex knowledge and 
expertise that was not available among existing staff (P3). A carbon trading information 
system was set up to monitor changes in carbon price to assess the impact of such 
changes on the generator’s ETS emissions costs (P4). The emissions monitoring system 
was assigned more importance as it provided information for monitoring emissions 
levels and the initiatives undertaken to reduce and offset emissions (P4). Further, a 
climate change risk register was established in which carbon-related risks and 
opportunities were identified, and their impacts evaluated and monitored (P4). The 
monitoring of these risks and opportunities was assigned to the existing trading 
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platforms and associated systems that were part of the wholesale trading department. 
Additionally, inter-system linkages were established between the databases of different 
functions and departments to ensure that managers could acquire relevant carbon-related 
information for their decision-making needs (P4). 
Under performance pressures from the Government (P1), Firm E restructured internally 
to achieve efficiency gains in its operations and activities (P3). Interview data indicate 
that this restructuring resulted in less financial resources being dedicated to internal 
energy efficiency areas (P2). Consequently, organisational MCS related to internal 
energy efficiency, such as the non-generation emissions monitoring system and 
environmental intranet, was used less at strategic and operational levels (P4). 
Nonetheless, due to the need to prepare for the upcoming ETS enforcement, the 
emphasis on generation emissions monitoring and carbon trading activities was not 
reduced (P4). 
In this period, there was an increase in the amount of emissions-related disclosure, as 
Firm E’s waste and electricity use began to be measured and reported (P4). However, it 
divided external disclosure between the AR and the company website (P4). The 2009 
AR included the aggregate measures of generation and non-generation emission, while 
the website listed the break-down of generation measures by fuel type and of non-
generation measures by activity (P4). Firm E also claimed to follow the GRI guidelines 
in preparing the sustainability content in its 2009 AR (P4). 
6.6.6. Summary 
In summary, the evidence presented above suggests that Firm E’s environmental 
strategies and organisational MCS changed from 2000 to 2009 in accordance with 
GCCP changes. Table 6-5 summarises the count of evidence related to Firm E that 
support the four propositions.  
Table 6-5: Count of Firm E-related evidence availability 
 Jan00 – Mar02 Apr02 – Dec05 Jan06 –  Sep07 Oct07 – Sep08 Oct08 – Oct09 
P1:  
Economic drivers 0 3 3 2 3 
Institutional drivers 1 1 1 0 1 
P2:  
Internal characteristics 
and capabilities 
0 3 3 4 4 
P3: Change in 
environmental 
strategies  
3 6 5 7 8 
P4: Change in MCS 3 10 9 8 12 
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The table suggests that Firm E perceived little institutional pressures from the GCCPs. 
Those that did exist were predominantly societal pressures due to its generation 
emission profile (P1, P2). However, Firm E recognised the potential implications of 
GCCP-related external economic drivers as early as Apr2002, when the carbon tax was 
announced (P1). These drivers, including changing fuel economics, regulatory 
uncertainty, and international regulatory environment, affected Firm E’s 
competitiveness and carbon costs. Simultaneously, Firm E realised that its renewable-
focused internal capabilities would enable it to gain a competitive advantage under the 
GCCPs (P2). Consequently, since 2002, Firm E has made consistent changes to its 
environmental strategies to match the changing environment (P3). The key strategic 
changes included a modification in its generation investment and retail strategies, and 
the adoption of customer and internal energy efficiency initiatives (P3). Many 
organisational MCS changes were also made from 2002, primarily to support these 
competitiveness-driven environmental strategies (P4). The highest number of MCS 
changes was implemented from Oct2008 to Oct2009, as Firm E prepared for the 
management of its carbon costs under the upcoming ETS (P4).  
6.7. Summary 
To summarise, this chapter has provided case-based evidence of changes in 
environmental strategies and organisational MCS made within the five electricity 
generators in response to GCCP changes. Where applicable, support for P1, P2, P3 and 
P4 has been indicated. Figure 6-1 summarises the evidence for the four propositions 
across the five generators as presented from sections 6.2 to 6.6 above. It should be noted 
that the numbers illustrated in this figure represent the count of evidence relating to the 
propositions, rather than the degree of impact exerted by external and internal drivers or 
the scope or extent that strategic and MCS changes were undertaken, which are to be 
analysed and discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. Additionally, the count of evidence 
indicates the number of new external and internal drivers recognised by a generator in a 
given period (compared to the previous period), the number of environmental strategy 
changes and MCS changes made in response to these new drivers. 
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Figure 6-1: Count of evidence of change across the five generators 
 
In the absence of any GCCP, there was little recognition of potential climate change-
related impacts from January 2000 to March 2002, leading to few changes in 
environmental strategies and organisational MCS. The five generators perceived the 
highest number of new institutional pressures during the carbon tax period from April 
2002 to December 2005, as the society started to become aware of climate change 
issues7. In contrast, these generators recognised an increasing number of additional 
economic drivers between the carbon tax period (Apr2002-Dec2005) and the Original 
ETS development and legislation period (Jan2006-Sep2008), as the diagnosis was 
undertaken within these organisations to understand the potential economic impacts of 
the GCCPs. However, the number of changes in external economic drivers decreased 
between October 2008 and October 2009, mostly due to the policy and regulatory 
uncertainty associated with the ETS review (P1). Additionally, since the carbon tax 
announcement, generators recognised that internal characteristics and capabilities had 
implications for their organisational exposure to the GCCPs, which in turn affected the 
choice of their environmental strategies (P2, P3).  
                                               
7
 A lower count of evidence related to institutional pressures in the subsequent periods does not indicate 
that generators perceived less exposure to institutional pressures. Instead, the count only highlights that 
generators perceived a lower number of new types/sources of institutional pressures. The pressures 
recognised in the previous periods might still apply, and the degree of their impacts on the generators 
might increase over time, e.g. the case with societal pressures associated with emission reductions. 
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The generators made the most changes to their environmental strategies during the 
periods of certainty in the GCCPs, Apr2002-Dec2005 and Oct2007-Oct2009 (P3). This 
is potentially because the impacts of external GCCP-related drivers on the organisation 
were clear during these periods and hence required appropriate strategic responses. To 
implement these strategic changes, the generators made many modifications to their 
organisational MCS within the same periods (P4). The highest number of changes to 
MCS design and use were observed during the last period (Oct2008-Oct2009), as the 
generators prepared organisationally for the upcoming ETS enforcement (P4). 
The next chapter analyses the longitudinal evidence presented above to understand the 
impacts of the GCCP-related external and internal drivers on environmental strategies 
across the five generators and the variations in strategy proactiveness and strategic 
emphasis pursued by these generators in response to the GCCPs (P1, P2, and P3). 
Following this, Chapter 8 will analyse the evidence related to organisational MCS 
change to gain insights into the modifications in MCS design, use, and objectives across 
the five generators to support the environmental strategic changes (P4).  
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Chapter 7: GCCP-related external and 
internal drivers and their impacts on 
environmental strategies  
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 6 provided the evidence regarding the changes in environmental strategies and 
associated organisational MCS within each of the five generators from 2000 to 2009. It 
also highlighted how such evidence supports the four propositions on an individual case 
basis. The main aim of Chapter 7 is to provide a cross-case empirical analysis in order 
to validate the first three propositions that relate to GCCP-related external and internal 
drivers and environmental strategies (P1, P2, and P3). Where applicable, it will draw 
out new insights that are not captured in the propositions or the research framework. 
Accordingly, this chapter analyses the evidence presented in Chapter 6, identifies the 
possible impacts of the GCCP-related external and internal drivers on the generators and 
examined how they changed their environmental strategies in response. The results 
presented in this chapter are gained from a comparative analysis of the qualitative 
evidence presented in Chapter 6 and other relevant interview and documentary data, the 
coding and analysis of which is discussed in Chapter 5. The tables and figures (i.e. 
charts) provided are derived from Excel-based data matrix displays (5.7.2).8 Where 
applicable, a reference to a section in Chapter 6 will be made to highlight the source of 
evidence that supports a key argument or finding (e.g. 6.2.1).  
The rest of the chapter is organised into six sections. The next section provides an 
overview of the five generators’ characteristics and the types of environmental 
strategies adopted in response to the GCCPs. The external volatilities and pressures and 
their impacts on environmental strategies are identified and examined next. Following 
this, results related to the influence of GCCP-related internal characteristics and 
capabilities on environmental strategies by different generators are presented. The 
results to changes in environmental strategies, as reflected by the level of strategy 
proactiveness and strategic emphasis, are discussed next. This is followed by the 
analysis of the objectives motivating such environmental strategic change. The chapter 
is concluded with a summary.  
                                               
8
 These matrix displays are available on request provided they do not breach the confidentiality 
agreements with the interviewees 
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7.2. Overview of the five generators and the types of 
environmental strategies 
Table 7-1 provides a comparative overview of the key internal characteristics of the five 
generators using data from publicly available documents. This table confirms that there 
is significant diversity and variation in the internal characteristics of the five generators, 
which will be examined in more detail in section 7.4. Understanding these internal 
characteristics facilitates the explanation of the drivers of the change in generators’ 
environmental strategies in a GCCP-focused context. 
Table 7-1: Demographics of the five generators 
  Thermal generators Renewable generators 
FIRM-LEVEL 
CHARCTERISTICS Firm A Firm B Firm C Firm D Firm E 
Ownership structure Publicly-
listed 
State-owned State-owned Publicly-
listed 
State-owned 
Generation      
Plant location NI NI NI + SI NI + SI NI 
Generation sources (2002)* Thermal: 
63%  
Renewable: 
36% 
Thermal 
67% 
Renewable 
33% 
Renewable: 
100% 
Renewable: 
100% 
Renewable: 
87% 
Thermal  
13% 
Integration between 
generation and retail bases 
Net seller Net seller Net seller Net buyer Net seller 
Retail       
Retail areas NI + SI NI NI + SI NI + SI NI + SI 
Retail market share 
(customer number) (2003)** 
26% 25% 13% 16% 15%* 
Emissions profile (2008)      
Generation emissions 
(ktonnes) 
2100 3500 0 0 591 
Non-generation emissions  
(ktonnes) 
3.5 1.0 5.8 2.8 1.6 
Organisational size (2008) 
     
Number of employees  1,000 534 568 455 752 
Total assets (mil NZ$)  5,203 2,707 7,197 2,351 4,058 
Wholesale market share 
(Gwh) (2003) 
23% 19% 29% 5% 15%** 
Key: NI: North Island; SI: South Island 
*:  to preserve anonymity of the case generators, it is considered appropriate not to disclose the exact 
proportions of the different types of fuels that make up a generator’s total generation capacity.  
**: the market shares of the five generators do not add up to 100%. There are other small generators and 
retailers which make up 9% and 5% of the generation and retailing market shares respectively. 
Further, the analysis of the evidence from Chapter 6 suggests that eleven different 
environmental strategies were used by the generators to respond to the GCCPs. Some of 
these strategies were already adopted before any GCCPs, such as the generation 
(investment) strategy, retail strategy, political strategy, environmental/sustainability 
policy, and these were modified when the GCCPs were announced or introduced. Other 
environmental strategies were formulated specifically to respond to the volatilities and 
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pressures associated with the GCCPs. They include internal energy efficiency, customer 
energy efficiency, carbon credit, carbon neutrality, emissions management and 
emissions-related disclosure strategies and internal restructuring. The eleven 
environmental strategies are influenced to varying degrees by the GCCP-related 
external and internal drivers identified through the interviews and documentary data 
related to the five generators (Chapter 6). The eleven strategies are listed and coded in 
Table 7-2.  
Table 7-2: Coding for environmental strategies 
GI Generation (investment) strategy EP Environmental/sustainability policy 
RS Retail strategy EM Emissions management strategy 
IEE Internal energy efficiency ED Emissions-related disclosure strategy 
CEE Customer energy efficiency CN Carbon neutrality strategy 
CC Carbon credit strategy PS Political strategy 
IR Internal restructuring   
7.3. External GCCP-related drivers 
This section addresses P1 & P3 by presenting the findings related to the external 
volatilities and pressures associated with the various GCCP changes from 2000 to 2009. 
Specifically, how each GCCP-related external volatility and pressure (driver) was 
applied to or perceived by each generator and how it influenced generators’ 
environmental strategies are examined. Then, all the drivers are combined and 
quantified in a matrix data display to represent the degree of total external exposure of 
each generator to the GCCPs. For the purpose of this study, the degree of total external 
exposure represents the aggregate degree of impacts exerted by all the GCCP-related 
external drivers on each generator.  
Most of the external volatilities and pressures are related to all the GCCPs, including the 
carbon tax, the PRE scheme, the proposed thermal ban, and the ETS. However, some 
emerged from a specific GCCP, as indicated by the brackets ( ) in Tables 7-3 and 7-4. 
To enhance the clarity of the analysis, the volatilities and pressures are separated into 
Economic and Institutional ones. External economic volatilities and their impacts on the 
generators’ environmental strategies are analysed first.  
7.3.1. Economic volatilities 
External GCCP-related economic volatilities and pressures are classified into four 
categories: policy and regulatory change, changing fuel economics, carbon market 
fluctuations, and changing competition, as summarised in Table 7-3. The first three 
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categories are consistent with economic drivers in the Research Framework presented in 
Figure 4-2 while the last group - changing competition is an additional group identified 
through the analysis of interview and documentary data. 
Table 7-3: External economic volatilities and their impacts on environmental 
strategies (P1, P3) 
External economic volatilities  
Apply in  
generator 
Influence on 
strategy 
Policy and 
regulatory 
change 
Regulatory uncertainty and political instability  All GI, PS 
ETS delay and cap on carbon price (ETS) All PS 
A, C, D GI 
International regulatory environment C, D, E GI 
Changing 
fuel 
economics 
  
Renewable investment encouragement (PRE) B, C, D, E CC, GI 
Increase in wholesale prices (ETS) All GI 
External technological development A, C, E GI 
Carbon 
market 
fluctuations 
Carbon price fluctuations (ETS) All CC 
Development of carbon trading expertise based 
on PRE carbon credits (PRE) B, C, D, E CC, RS 
Changing 
competition 
Changing retail competition (green branding) All RS, CN 
Carbon trading competition from thermal 
generators C, D CC 
Energy efficiency market opportunities A, B, C, E CEE, RS 
 
Policy and regulatory change 
Regulatory uncertainty surrounding various changes in the GCCPs and political 
instability due to the lack of consensus between the two major parties (National and 
Labour) on GCCPs from 2002 to 2009, represented major external pressures for all 
generators. Such uncertainty and political instability were perceived to indicate a lack of 
a long-term commitment to a carbon charge by the Government. This in turn creates 
ambiguity about the level of carbon-related costs generators would incur under a given 
GCCP. Furthermore, the GCCP changes led to uncertainty about the viability of 
alternative fuels and thus the competitiveness of the generators that strategically focused 
on a particular fuel type (renewables or thermals). Consequently, such uncertainty 
resulted in delays or disruptions to new generation investment decisions (e.g. 6.2.5 & 
6.4.5). Many generators undertook a political strategy to participate actively in the 
GCCP policy processes (e.g. 6.2.4 & 6.3.4). This participation not only helped them 
understand potential policy and regulatory changes but also allowed them to potentially 
influence policy design to maintain their own organisational advantages.  
The ETS delay and the National Government’s decision to put a cap on carbon prices in 
2008/2009 were perceived to reduce the attractiveness of renewable sources and hence 
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affect the competitiveness of different generators. In turn, such policy changes 
significantly influenced the generators’ generation investment and political strategies. 
Three generators (A, C, D) proceeded either cautiously with their renewable 
investments, or put them on hold (e.g. 6.2.5 & 6.4.5). Nonetheless, because all 
generators had anticipated these ETS changes before they were announced, they 
reduced their political activity in response.9   
Renewable-based Firms C, D and E also perceived opportunities within the international 
regulatory environment which increasingly supports renewable generation since such 
environment had the potential to enhance these generators’ competitiveness (6.4.2, 6.5.2 
& 6.6.5). Furthermore, these generators had substantial expertise and economies of 
scale in a specialised type of renewable energy (wind and geothermal) which enabled 
them to expand their renewable investments overseas to take advantage of this changing 
international regulatory environment.  
Changing fuel economics 
Changes in the relative economics between alternative fuels for electricity generation 
were perceived as one of the most significant external volatilities for all generators. 
These changes were caused by three factors: i) renewable investment encouragement 
through the PRE scheme (2003-2005), ii) increase in wholesale electricity prices due to 
the ETS (from September 2007), and iii) external technological development. These 
factors had implications for generators’ production costs and revenue (competitiveness). 
All generators, except Firm A (thermal, privately-owned), utilised the Government’s 
PRE scheme to gain carbon credits associated with their proposed renewable 
investments10. The potential revenue from selling these carbon credits enhanced the 
financial viability of renewable projects, making them as desirable as, or even more 
attractive, than thermal projects. The PRE scheme thus contributed to a shift in the 
generators’ generation strategy towards renewable sources. 
Impacts of an increase in wholesale prices due to the ETS were also perceived by all 
five generators (e.g. 6.2.3, 6.4.4., & 6.5.3). Within the New Zealand electricity markets, 
all generators are paid (every half an hour) the same wholesale price set by the most 
expensive generation. Under an ETS, the wholesale prices will therefore reflect the 
carbon costs of thermal generators, thus leading to significant windfall gains for 
                                               
9
 See Sections 6.2.5; 6.3.5, 6.4.5, 6.5.4, and 6.6.5. 
10
 Firm A perceived significant uncertainty with carbon pricing and potential carbon revenue and thus did 
not participate in the PRE scheme to gain carbon credits (6.2.2).  
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renewable generators. Additionally, since such wholesale price increase will make 
renewable generation relatively more efficient than thermal generation, all five 
generators revised their investment strategies to put a stronger focus on renewables.  
Furthermore, external technological development was perceived by three generators (A, 
C and E) as an incentive to large-scale renewable investments (e.g. 6.4.3). 
Technological developments have improved the operational efficiency of renewable 
plants, reducing their production costs, and therefore enhancing the viability of 
renewable investments.  
Carbon market fluctuations 
Fluctuations in carbon prices are also a significant external volatility for all the 
generators. For generators who sold the carbon credits gained from the PRE scheme and 
voluntary emissions reduction standards (C, D, and E), interview data suggests such 
fluctuations affected their ability to sell carbon credits at premium prices or find 
appropriate buyers, thus influencing their competitiveness. Generators that need to 
acquire carbon credits to meet their ETS obligations (A, B, and E) will be exposed to 
variations in the credibility of carbon credit contracts and increases in carbon prices 
which would make their purchases more costly (6.2.5). 
Furthermore, for some generators (B, C, D and E), owning PRE-related carbon credits 
enabled them to take part in carbon markets to develop carbon trading skills ahead of 
the ETS (e.g. 6.4.4). They can use these skills to reduce their compliance carbon costs 
when the ETS comes into force, or to maximise revenue from carbon credit sales 
(carbon credit strategy). The generators also believed they can deploy these skills to 
assist industrial and business customers in meeting the latter’s ETS compliance 
obligations or sustainability objectives (6.5.4). By doing so, generators’ retail 
competitiveness is improved.  
Changing competition 
All generators also recognised that greening consumer expectations and public pressures 
associated with the GCCPs were changing retail competition within the electricity 
markets. To take advantage of this changing competitive environment, two 100% 
renewable-based generators (C and D) extensively marketed and differentiated 
themselves as “clean and green” electricity suppliers (6.3.3 & 6.5.4). The green 
branding and marketing campaigns undertaken by these renewable generators, to some 
extent, damaged the thermal generators’ reputation (A, B and E) and reduced their 
market competitiveness. Furthermore, due to the cost of carbon, thermal generators 
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might not be able to set retail charges at a competitive level (6.2.4). Thus, the changing 
retail market was perceived to affect the relative competitiveness between the five 
generators and thus the retail strategies they pursued. Changing retail competition also 
motivated some generators (A, C, D) to pursue carbon neutrality programmes to 
demonstrate their environmental responsibility in a GCCP-focused environment (6.2.4; 
6.4.3; 6.5.3).  
Additionally, two renewable generators (C and D) experienced a different kind of 
competitive pressures. They do not have a compliance obligation under the ETS and 
thus have less incentive and capacity to develop carbon trading expertise. Consequently, 
they were concerned that the thermal generators would be able to offer better carbon-
related skills and services and potentially take away some of their customers, thus 
reducing their market competitiveness (6.4.5).  
The emerging market for energy efficiency products due to increasing climate change 
concerns and the GCCPs provided another opportunity for the generators to enhance 
their revenue and competitiveness. In response, most generators (A, B, C, and E) 
invested substantial resources to develop and deliver energy efficiency products, 
particularly those based on smart metering technology (e.g. 6.2.5; 6.4.4; 6.6.5). By 
doing so, customer energy efficiency products become increasingly important in the 
generators’ retail strategy. 
In summary, this section has discussed the economic volatilities perceived by the 
generators in relation to the GCCPs and their impacts on the environmental strategies 
undertaken by these generators. Supporting P1, results suggest that policy and 
regulatory change and changing competition had implications for generators’ 
competitiveness, while changing fuel economics and carbon market fluctuations 
affected their organisational (carbon and production) costs and hence, competitiveness. 
In turn, these external volatilities-related impacts predominantly drove changes in 
generation (investment), carbon credit and retail strategies. These results further provide 
support for P3, in that the impacts of these external drivers led to change in 
environmental strategies. The next section presents results related to the institutional 
pressures associated with the GCCPs.  
7.3.2. Institutional pressures 
The institutional pressures perceived by generators and their impacts on environmental 
strategies are presented in Table 7-4. These pressures can be classified into three 
categories that are broadly consistent with the institutional drivers proposed in the 
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Research Framework (Figure 4-2): societal pressures; stakeholder pressures; and field 
and peer pressures. Additionally, a new category of institutional pressures is identified, 
namely: regulatory and government pressures. 
Table 7-4: External institutional pressures and their impacts on environmental 
strategies (P1, P3) 
Institutional volatilities and pressures Apply to generator 
Influence on 
strategy 
Regulatory 
and 
government 
pressures 
RMA/ Government pressures for energy 
efficiency and emissions reductions  All 
EP, CEE, 
EM, ED 
Government preference for renewable 
investment All GI, EM 
Societal 
pressures 
Associated with generation emissions A, B, E GI, ED 
Associated with non-generation emissions  A, B, C, E IEE, CN, ED 
Negative perception of windfall gains (ETS) C ED 
Stakeholder 
pressures  
Shareholder pressures All GI, IR 
Greening consumer expectations A, C, E CN, EP, RS 
Employee pressures A, C, E CN, IEE 
Field and 
peer 
pressures  
Pressures from other generators A, B, E RS 
Sustainability industry groups A, C, E EP, CN 
External consultants All IEE, ED, CN, EM 
Regulatory and government pressures 
The RMA as a form of environmental regulation had significant implications for the 
operations and development activities of all generators. Environmental compliance was 
a key component of all their environmental policies across all time periods. Interview 
data further indicate that governmental pressures for energy efficiency in the earlier 
periods (2000- 2005) were seen by four generators (A, B, C, D) as negative since 
customer energy efficiency initiatives resulted in short-term revenue decreases. 
Nonetheless, these generators adopted customer energy efficiency strategies primarily to 
comply with these government pressures. Furthermore, government pressure to reduce 
emissions was one of the key drivers for generators to establish emissions management 
and emissions-related disclosure strategies, since doing so ensured that the generators 
were perceived legitimate by the Government, thus gaining them governmental 
legitimacy.  
Although not identified in the Research Framework, the interviewees argued that the 
Labour Government’s preference for renewable generation investments was evident 
through GCCPs such as the PRE scheme, the NZES and the ban on thermal investment. 
In response to this preference, all generators announced they planned to increase 
renewable investments as the key strategy to manage and reduce generation-related 
emissions (6.2.3; 6.6.3). However, once the thermal ban was removed by the National 
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Government in late 2008, the institutional pressures for renewable investments reduced 
to some extent. However, it is not clear from the data whether such reduction in 
pressure led to generators putting less focus on renewables investment.  
Societal pressures 
The three generators with thermal generation (A, B and E) were exposed to increasing 
public pressures related to their generation emissions. Thermal-based Firms A and B 
gained a negative reputation due to the high carbon emission levels from their 
generation activities. This negative reputation contributed to these two generators’ 
decisions to focus on renewable generation development, from 2007 for Firm A (6.2.4) 
and from 2009 for Firm B (6.3.5). Additionally, documentary data suggests that Firm E, 
a renewable generator with some thermal assets, was publicly criticised for its proposed 
thermal development which had the potential to increase total emissions significantly. In 
response to strong public criticism, Firm E cancelled its planned thermal project (6.6.3). 
All three generators (A, B, E) also increased the level of disclosure relating to emissions 
and emissions reduction initiatives so as to manage their social legitimacy in face of 
these adverse societal perceptions.  
Furthermore, four generators (A, B, C, E) perceived societal pressures for non-
generation emission reduction. The generators considered that managing non-generation 
emissions was critical in maintaining their social legitimacy. This motivated them to 
undertake internal energy efficiency initiatives and achieve carbon neutrality for their 
non-generation activities in some years (e.g. 6.2.3; 6.42; 6.6.2). These generators also 
increased the scope and quality of their emissions-related disclosure to demonstrate 
their environmental responsibility to the wider public.  
Firm C (renewable, state-owned) was also exposed to negative public perception related 
to its potential windfall gains under an ETS (6.4.4). This gain would come from having 
no carbon cost and a high electricity generation volume, allowing the generator to 
enhance its income significantly when wholesale prices increased. To mitigate these 
public perceptions, Firm C undertook extensive disclosure to highlight that such 
windfall gains originated from its proactive preparation for the GCCPs and climate 
change leadership in the earlier periods.  
Stakeholder pressures 
All generators were exposed to different shareholder pressures related to their financial 
performance. Privately-owned generators (A and D) operate in capital markets which 
require a higher rate of return from generation investments (e.g. 6.2.3). In contrast, from 
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October 2008, state-owned Firms B, C and E were exposed to direct pressures from the 
Government, as their shareholder, to increase their financial performance (e.g. 6.3.5; 
6.4.5). This resulted in these generators restructuring internally in order to improve 
internal efficiency and thus, maintain their legitimacy to the Government. 
Furthermore, three generators (A, C, and E) perceived increasingly greening consumer 
expectations and employee pressures. These were considered the key drivers to their 
pursuit of a carbon neutrality programme in Firms A and C, since doing so was believed 
to increase the organisation’s reputation and help attract and retain customers and 
talented staff (6.2.4; 6.4.3). Firms C and E adopted sustainability policies and undertook 
green-focused retail campaigns to respond to greening consumer expectations and 
reinforce their green brand. Additionally, environmentally-aware employees motivated 
all three generators to undertake extensive internal energy efficiency initiatives (e.g. 
6.4.3; 6.6.2). 
Field and peer pressures 
Field and peer pressures were significant triggers for change in generators’ 
environmental strategies. Competitive pressures resulting from the green branding 
campaigns undertaken by the two renewable generators (C and D) led to changes in 
retail strategies of other generators (A, B and E). For example, in their retail 
advertisement, these latter generators started to publicise their initiatives to encourage 
customer energy efficiency and promote internal energy efficiency. Additionally, 
membership in sustainability industry groups such as the SBN and NZBCSD brought 
about pressures on Firms A, C, E to formulate a sustainability policy and pursue a 
carbon neutrality programme (6.2.3; 6.4.1; 6.6.1). However, these pressures were not 
particularly strong or consistent across the different generators and different time 
periods.  
Conversely, the impacts exerted by external consultants were evident in all generators. 
Landcare Research, the primary verifier and certifier of the CarboNZero programme, 
was an active agent in promoting particular internal energy efficiency, emissions 
measurement and disclosure practices and carbon neutrality strategies among the 
generators. Some generators also relied on advice from accounting firms to assess their 
potential ETS liabilities and exposure, and to formulate appropriate emissions 
management strategies. However, as all generators have now invested significantly in 
developing in-house skills and competencies to prepare for an ETS and voluntary 
emissions-related initiatives, the importance of external consultants is decreasing (e.g. 
6.4.5).  
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In summary, this section has discussed the GCCP-related external institutional pressures 
and identified how they affect the generators’ environmental strategies. In addition to 
the institutional drivers suggested in the Research Framework, the results suggest a new 
category, namely regulatory and government pressures. In relation to P1, the 
institutional pressures primarily had implications for the generators’ legitimacy, either 
to the Government, society, or particular stakeholder groups. However, pressures from 
other generators affected organisational competitiveness. To respond to these pressures, 
the generators employed predominantly carbon neutrality and emissions-related 
disclosure strategies. Nonetheless, the institutional pressures presented in this section 
and the economic volatilities presented in Section 7.3.1 did not influence all five 
generators equally. The next section analyses differences between the generators in 
terms of the total impacts exerted by GCCP-related external volatilities and pressures 
over time.  
7.3.3. Degree of total external volatility and pressure exposure 
The drivers identified in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 are combined to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the total external volatility and pressure exposure of the five generators to the 
GCCPs. Consistent with the scoring system outlined in Section 5.7.2.2, the impact of 
each volatility or pressure on each generator within a time period was assigned a value 
from 0 to 3, where 0 is not relevant/applicable, 1 is low/operational impact, 2 is medium 
impact, and 3 is high or strategic impact. The impacts were then summed across all the 
external volatilities and pressures in order to obtain the degree of total external exposure 
of a generator to the GCCPs during a particular time period. This summation was 
undertaken for all five generators across the five periods from 2000 to 2009. The results 
are illustrated in Figure 7-1.  
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Figure 7-1: Total GCCP external exposure of the five generators (2000-2009)  
 
Figure 7-1 indicates that over the investigated period, the degree of exposure of the 
generators to the external volatilities and pressures associated with the GCCPs 
consistently increased. However, there are differences in the degree of exposure across 
the generators within each time period. From January 2000 to March 2002 when there 
were no GCCPs, all the generators perceived a similar and low degree of external 
exposure. During 2002-2006, renewable-based Firms C and E were the first generators 
to recognise the opportunities associated with the planned carbon tax and the PRE 
scheme (6.4.2; 6.6.2), resulting in higher external exposure than other three generators. 
Due to more extensive diagnosis of GCCP-related impacts during 2006-2007, Firm C 
recognised an increase in the external exposure while Firm E’s perceived external 
exposure remained unchanged. Thermal-based Firms A and B had similar degree of 
external exposure from 2000 to 2007, because the GCCPs were not a strategic concern 
in either generators (6.2.1 to 6.2.3; 6.3.1 to 6.3.3). Due to its small size (especially in 
terms of wholesale market share), Firm D’s top management perceived little pressure or 
volatility associated with the GCCPs from 2002 to 2007 (6.6.4), resulting in the lowest 
level of exposure among the five generators.  
Since October 2007, with the proposal for the Original ETS, there was a sharp increase 
in the external volatility and pressure exposure perceived by Firm B (thermal, state-
owned) and Firm D (renewable, privately-owned). With the proposal of an ETS in 2007, 
Firm B recognised that its high carbon emission profile would not only cause significant 
carbon costs, but also expose the generator to a high level of multiple ETS-related 
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economic and institutional pressures (6.3.4). In contrast, the significant increase in Firm 
D’s external exposure is attributed to the strategic diagnosis of ETS-related impacts 
undertaken in 2007 which led Firm D to identify the many external market opportunities 
it could capture based on its renewable portfolio and expertise (6.5.3).  
From October 2007 to October 2009, Firms C and B had the highest degree of external 
exposure while the external exposure of Firms A, D and E converged. Firm C’s high 
GCCP exposure primarily relates to the positive impacts associated with its renewable 
asset advantages, which led to the decision to respond to the GCCP-related volatilities 
and pressures proactively and earlier than most other generators (6.3.2). Conversely, 
Firm B’s GCCP exposure was dominated by the potential negative impacts related to its 
generation emissions profile (6.3.5). In contrast, while being a thermal generator 
historically, Firm A did not recognise a high degree of external exposure due to its 
efforts in the previous period to commit to a large-scale renewable investment 
programme and heavily publicise its commitment (6.2.4). This mitigated some of the 
thermal-related negative impacts it would otherwise have been exposed to. Firms D and 
E, although also being renewable generators, perceived a lower degree of external 
exposure than Firm C, mostly due to their lower wholesale market shares (Table 7-1). 
Further, the evaluation of GCCP-related volatilities and pressures undertaken by Firms 
D and E was potentially not as comprehensive and broad in scope as that of Firm C, 
resulting in fewer positive impacts being recognised. Figure 7-1 also indicates that the 
three state-owned generators (C, B and E) had a higher degree of external exposure than 
privately-owned A and D (2007-2009). This could potentially be due to a higher level of 
social responsibilities being perceived by the state-owned generators because of the 
nature of their ownership structure.  
7.3.4. Discussion: external volatilities and pressures 
Overall, the analysis reveals that the five generators were exposed to four broad 
categories of external economic volatilities and pressures, including policy and 
regulatory change, changing fuel economics, carbon market fluctuations, and changing 
competition. Additionally, the five generators perceived four broad categories of 
institutional volatilities and pressures associated with the GCCPs, including regulatory 
and government pressures, increased societal pressures, stakeholder pressures, and field 
and peer pressures. Therefore, empirical support for the six categories of economic and 
institutional volatilities and pressures suggested in the Research Framework was 
provided and evidence for two additional groups: changing competition; regulatory and 
government pressures, were found. Further, the results indicate that some volatilities 
176 
 
and pressures were perceived by all five generators, while the others were recognised by 
some generators. Generally, these results suggest that the five generators are exposed to 
relatively homogenous GCCP-related external economic and institutional environments. 
External economic volatilities were found to have implications impact on generators’ 
competitiveness, and production and carbon costs, while the institutional pressures 
primarily affected the generators’ social legitimacy. These results provide empirical 
support for P1, that GCCP-related external drivers impact on generators’ 
competitiveness, costs, and social legitimacy. Consistent with P3, these impacts were 
found to drive the different environmental strategies adopted by the generators. Of the 
different strategies, generation (investment), carbon credit and retail strategies were the 
most influenced by GCCP-related external economic volatilities. This is in response to 
the primary impacts of such volatilities on generators’ competitiveness and costs. In 
contrast, due to their impacts on generators’ legitimacy, institutional drivers led the 
generators to primarily utilise carbon neutrality and emissions-related disclosure 
strategies in response.  
Further, longitudinal analysis indicates that all generators experienced an increase in the 
degree of total external volatility and pressure exposure from 2000 to 2009. However, 
the degree of exposure varied among the generators within each time period. Two 
renewable state-owned generators recognised the highest exposure in the earlier periods 
while one thermal and one renewable generator ranked the highest in the later periods. 
Among these latter two, the exposure of the renewable generator was primarily 
associated with the advantages related to its renewable asset base, while the exposure of 
the thermal generator was driven by negative impacts associated with its generation 
emission profile. Results also indicate a higher degree of external exposure in the three 
state-owned generators than the two privately-owned towards the end of 2009, possibly 
because of their higher societal responsibilities from being state-owned.  
The variations between the generators in the degree of total external exposure suggest 
that this exposure is not driven solely by the homogenous external environments. The 
differing internal characteristics and capabilities such as emissions profile and 
ownership structure may also have an impact. The next section presents the results 
regarding internal characteristics and capabilities and examines how they influenced 
generators and their environmental strategies.  
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7.4. Internal GCCP-related drivers 
This section addresses P2 and P3 by presenting findings related to the impacts of 
internal drivers on the generators and their associated environmental strategies. Based 
on the interpretation of Chapter 6-based evidence, these internal drivers can be 
classified into two groups. The first group (7.4.1 and 7.4.2) is comprised of the internal 
characteristics that increase the negative impacts of the GCCPs on the generators. The 
second group (7.4.3 and 7.44) relates to the internal capabilities that result in positive 
impacts by the GCCPs on generators and enhance the generators’ ability to undertake 
environmental strategies.  
7.4.1. Internal characteristics  
Table 7-5 lists the internal characteristics that result in negative impacts from the 
GCCPs on the generators and identifies the environmental strategies that were driven by 
these characteristics. All characteristics can be broadly grouped into the categories 
proposed by the Research Framework, namely: emissions profile, transactional 
characteristics, and organisational size. However, the third category is renamed as 
organisational size and growth in order to include an additional internal driver, i.e. 
organisational growth. A new category is also found and named technological and 
financial constraints, to reflect their GCCP-related negative impacts on the generators 
and to distinguish from technological capabilities which have positive organisational 
impacts (7.4.3). Each category of internal characteristic is discussed next. 
Table 7-5: Internal characteristics and their impacts on environmental strategies 
(P2, P3) 
Internal characteristic  Apply in firms 
Influence 
strategy 
Emissions profile 
  
Generation emissions  A, B, E EM, GI, CC, ED, PS 
Non-generation emissions  
All IEE, ED 
A, C, D CN 
Transactional 
characteristics  
Generation emissions measurement and monitoring A, B, E EM 
Non-generation emissions measurement and 
monitoring  All  IEE, ED 
Carbon trading transactions  A, B, E CC 
Carbon-related cross functional coordination  All EM, CC, IEE, CN 
Organisational 
size and growth 
Organisational size D IEE, ED 
Organisational growth  All IEE, CN 
Technological and 
financial 
constraints 
Technological difficulty in reducing generation 
emissions A, B, E EM, GI 
Financial constraints B, C, E  IEE, CC 
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Emissions profile 
As expected, generation emissions were a major concern for all the generators with 
thermal assets (A, B and E) (Table 7-1). The level of generation emissions determines 
the degree of emissions liabilities and costs under the ETS or a carbon tax. Generation 
emissions were found to drive emissions management strategy within Firms A, B and E. 
Firm B initially focused on managing the fuel use within its thermal plants to reduce 
generation emissions (6.3.2) while Firms A and E increased renewable investments to 
replace its existing thermal plants (6.2.3; 6.6.4). However, due to strong societal 
pressures, Firm B decided to shift to a renewable-focused generation strategy from 
October 2008 (6.3.5). Furthermore, these generators set up internal carbon trading 
functions to ensure effective management of carbon credit purchases and sales and 
hence, the management of their ETS compliance costs (6.2.5; 6.3.4; 6.6.5). These three 
generators (A, B and E) also adopted appropriate emissions-related disclosure to 
demonstrate their environmental responsibility and mitigate adverse public reputation 
related to their emission profile (e.g. 6.2.5; 6.3.3). Having a high emission profile 
motivated these generators to participate in the policy processes with an aim to reduce 
their potential obligations under the GCCPs (e.g. 6.6.4).  
A different story is gained in relation to non-generation emissions. While non-
generation emissions do not contribute to a generator’s carbon tax/ ETS liabilities, they 
were perceived by all generators to contribute to the public perception of organisational 
climate change responsibility and hence were related to societal pressures for emissions 
reductions. Consequently, the five generators undertook various internal energy 
efficiency initiatives to reduce their non-generation emissions. As well, they disclosed 
these initiatives publicly to maintain social legitimacy (e.g. 6.4.3; 6.6.4). Furthermore, 
due to their high levels of non-generation emissions (Table 7-1), Firms A, C and D 
incurred high costs because of the need to pay for carbon offsets when pursuing their 
carbon neutrality certification.  
Transactional characteristics 
The three generators with thermal generation (A, B and E) experienced difficulties in 
measuring emissions. These generators need to monitor and report their emissions for 
compliance purposes under an ETS. However, the rate of fossil fuel use for generation 
varies not only across seasons or months, but also across hours and days and generation 
plants. This results in varying levels of generation-related carbon emissions which made 
accurate measurement and monitoring difficult (representing high transactional costs), 
which in turn affects the emissions management strategy of these generators.  
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Non-generation emissions, for all the generators, were also hard to measure and 
monitor, because such emissions are associated with a wide range of operational 
activities and functions that occur throughout the organisation. This results in high 
transactional complexity which in turn hinders the generators’ ability to implement their 
internal energy efficiency strategies effectively (high transactional costs). Interview 
data indicate this complexity contributed to some generators (A, B, D) not being able to 
disclose their non-generation emissions on at an organisationally-wide or detailed level 
(6.3.4; 6.5.2).  
Further, the three generators with ETS compliance obligations (A, B, E) perceived a 
high level of volatility associated with carbon trading transactions. These generators 
were concerned about their lack of expertise in trading carbon credits and evaluating the 
risks inherent in carbon contracts. Carbon trading thus involves both specialised 
knowledge (high asset specificity) and a high level of market volatility (transactional 
uncertainty), which led to high transactional costs for generators participating in carbon 
markets for compliance or trading purposes (e.g. 6.6.5). To manage this lack of 
expertise, these generators begun to develop their internal carbon trading capability, for 
example, through establishing a carbon trading function (6.4.3). 
All the generators experienced difficulties with carbon-related cross-functional 
coordination. To meet their compliance obligations under the ETS, Firms A, B and E 
need input and coordination from multiple organisational functions. Specifically, 
coordination is required between the environmental management function which 
monitors and manages generation emissions, the trading function which buys and sells 
carbon credits, and the accounting function which records the carbon credits inventory 
and reports the organisational financial exposure given the current emission levels and 
carbon prices (e.g. 6.2.5). These generators (A, B and E) also perceived a need for 
cross-functional coordination to achieve organisation-wide measurement, monitoring 
and the reduction of non-generation emissions (internal energy efficiency strategy). For 
the renewable generators C and D, it is essential for the accounting function to keep a 
record of existing carbon credits (i.e. gained from PRE scheme), for the trading function 
to sell these credits, for each operational or non-operational function to monitor and 
report their non-generation emissions, and for the sustainability function to offset total 
organisational emissions to achieve carbon neutrality certification (6.4.4). 
Consequently, such complex internal coordination results in high transactional costs 
when implementing the various environmental strategies pursued by the generators. 
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Organisational size and growth 
Organisational size also influences a generator’ exposure to the GCCP-related external 
volatilities and pressures. Firm D is smaller than other generators (Table 7-1). Because 
of its smaller size (and being 100% renewable), Firm D is not as “visible” as other 
generators in the public arena and thus, was exposed to a lower level of societal and 
governmental pressures for emissions reductions. This explains why Firm D’s internal 
energy efficiency initiatives and emissions-related disclosure were of a more limited 
scope and received less managerial attention, than in other generators (6.5.4). 
Additionally, all generators experienced organisational growth (to varying degrees) over 
time, which resulted in increases in non-generation emissions. For example, an increase 
in customer numbers required additional staff travel to service and maintain customers; 
or the construction or commissioning of a new generation plant led to recruitment of 
new employees, resulting in increased use of electricity and paper use, and waste. Such 
organisational growth led to increasing operating costs associated with the additional 
resource requirements (e.g. 6.4.2). Furthermore, interview data indicates that the 
resultant increase in total non-generation emissions put pressure on the internal energy 
efficiency strategy of all generators and required higher offset payments for those 
emissions in order to gain carbon neutrality certification (Firms A, C and D). 
Technological and financial constraints 
The technological constraints inherent in thermal generation assets represented a 
significant pressure for three generators (A, B and E). Firms A and E’s plants either had 
a low emissions level (gas-fired) or had a fixed fuel use, resulting in significant 
difficulties in reducing generation emissions. In contrast, the technology in Firm B’s 
thermal plants allowed it to switch from coal to gas to reduce the level of carbon 
emissions. However, Firm B was constrained by growing electricity demand and the 
need to operate all of its thermal plants to meet supply shortages caused by low hydro 
levels in dry years (6.3.5). This demand/supply constraint led Firm B to increase its 
reliance on coal and thus substantially curtailed its ability to switch between fuels to 
reduce generation emissions. Overall, these technological constraints represent high 
asset specificity and resulted in high transactional costs, which drove all three 
generators to change their emissions management strategy and generation strategy 
towards a preference for renewable investments.  
This study did not find any evidence that the generators experienced any financial 
constraints when implementing their environmental strategies in the earlier periods. 
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This could be explained by the fact that most generators are large firms (Table 7-1) and 
thus have sufficient financial resources to support organisational changes in response to 
the GCCPs. However, from October 2008 to October 2009, under performance 
pressures from Government, the state-owned generators (B, C and E) experienced a 
substantial reduction in spending discretion and thus were forced to decrease the scope 
of their internal energy efficiency initiatives in an attempt to cut costs (6.3.5; 6.4.5; 
6.6.5). Government-imposed financial constraints also resulted in Firm C moving away 
from developing a carbon trading business to focus on its core operations (electricity 
generation and retailing) (6.4.5).  
To summarise, the above analysis indicates both similarities and differences between 
the generators’ internal characteristics. Some internal characteristics were perceived by 
all five generators as driving their GCCP exposure and influencing their environmental 
strategies. Other internal characteristics were experienced by some or only one 
generator. Supporting P2, results indicate that the generators’ emission profile and 
organisational size had implications for organisational carbon and operating costs and 
legitimacy, while transactional characteristics, organisational growth, and technological 
and financial constraints influenced transactional and operating costs. These internal 
characteristic-driven impacts predominantly affected emissions management, internal 
energy efficiency, carbon credit and emissions-related disclosure strategies (P3). 
Furthermore, these results indicate that internal characteristics including emissions 
profile (generation and non-generation related) and organisational size increase the 
generators’ exposure to external economic and institutional drivers, such as carbon 
market fluctuations and societal and Governmental pressures and hence, affect their 
social legitimacy. In this respect, internal characteristics moderated generators’ 
exposure to external drivers by increasing the negative impacts of such drivers on the 
organisation. This is a new insight not available from the prior literature. 
7.4.2. Total impact exerted by internal characteristics 
Following the scoring system outlined in Chapter 5 (5.7.2.2), the degree of impact 
exerted by the internal characteristics (identified in 7.4.1) on the generators’ exposure to 
the GCCPs was assigned a value from 0 to 3: 0: not relevant/applicable, 1: 
low/operational impact, 2: medium impact, 3: high/strategic impact. In a data matrix 
display, the scores were then totaled to obtain the degree of total impact exerted by 
internal characteristics, on each generator within each time period. Figure 7-2 shows 
this impact across the five generators from 2000 to 2009.  
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Figure 7-2: Total impact of internal characteristics (2000-2009) 
 
In 2000, most of the generators had a similar and low level of impact from the internal 
characteristics. From April 2002 to December 2005, the state-owned generators (B, C, 
and E) experienced relatively similar increases which are higher than privately-owned A 
and D. This is possibly due to a higher need of the state-owned generators to maintain 
legitimate to the Government and society through the undertaking of climate change 
initiatives, a process that led them to recognise a stronger influence by internal 
characteristics on organisational costs and legitimacy. Firm E experienced the highest 
level of impact due to the complexity associated with the early initiatives to improve its 
environmental management system and its focus on internal energy efficiency to 
achieve the external Enviro-mark certification (6.6.2). Firm B had the second highest 
level, which is potentially attributable to the emissions management and internal energy 
efficiency initiatives it undertook to demonstrate its climate change responsibility 
(6.3.2). Firm C conducted an extensive internal energy efficiency programme, to show 
its leadership in climate change issues (6.4.2). In contrast, consistent with their private 
ownership structure, Firms A and D were not exposed to strong institutional pressures 
during the early period. Consequently, they did not undertake many climate change 
initiatives and thus, perceived a lower level of impact associated with internal 
characteristics during the implementation of these initiatives.  
From January 2006, the impact exerted by internal characteristics on Firms C and E 
stabilised, while that of the thermal generators (A and B) and renewable-based Firm D 
continued to increase. By October 2009, due to their higher emission profiles and 
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resultant carbon costs, Firm A and B experienced the highest degree of impact. This is 
because both generators perceived the technological difficulties associated with 
reducing generation emissions and the complex internal coordination required to enable 
emissions monitoring, and carbon credit purchases to meet ETS compliance 
requirements. The other three generators had either no ETS compliance obligations 
(Firms C and D), or a low level of emissions liabilities (Firm E). Therefore they 
experienced a lower degree of impact associated with the internal characteristics.  
The generators differed from each other not only in terms of internal characteristics’ 
impact but also in relation to impact of internal capabilities. The next section discusses 
the key internal capabilities possessed by the different generators and their impacts on 
the generators (P2) and implications for their environmental strategies (P3). 
7.4.3. Internal capabilities 
The evidence presented in Chapter 6 suggests that various internal capabilities were 
perceived by the managers of different generators as being critical in the management of 
the organisation’s exposure to GCCP-related volatilities and pressures. In particular, 
possessing these capabilities increased the advantages that the generators could gain 
under the GCCPs. These capabilities also influenced the generators’ ability to pursue 
and implement environmental strategies. They can be classified into the broad 
categories suggested in the Research Framework: technological capabilities, managerial 
factors, prior experience and organisational learning, and organisational culture. Data 
analysis also indicates a new category: ownership-related capabilities. Table 7-6 lists 
these categories of internal capabilities, specifies which generators they applied to, and 
identifies the environmental strategies they influenced. Each category of internal 
capability is discussed below. 
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Table 7-6: Internal capabilities and their impacts on environmental strategies (P2, 
P3) 
Internal capabilities Apply in firms 
Influence 
strategy 
Technological 
capabilities 
Possession of carbon credits B, C, D, E CC 
Net generation volume  
A, B, C, E RS 
D GI, RS 
Access to renewable resource sites A, C, D, E GI 
Availability of fuel supply B, E GI 
Economies of scale in renewable development A, C, D, E GI 
Inheritance assets  C, D  RS, PS 
Managerial 
factors 
Top management support of renewables A, C, D GI 
Top management commitment to sustainability C, E EP, IEE 
Board involvement C GI 
Management  recognition of external volatilities 
and pressures  
B 
EM, ED 
 
C, E RS, GI, CEE 
Prior 
experience and 
organisational 
learning 
Experience in emissions reduction B EP, EM 
Renewable expertise A, C, D, E GI, PS 
Experience in customer energy efficiency E CEE, RS 
Organisational 
culture Environmental/climate change awareness C, E IEE, GI 
Ownership-
related 
capabilities 
Risk appetite and cost consciousness A, D GI, EM, IEE, CC 
Relationship with majority shareholder A CC, GI 
Technological capabilities 
Different technological capabilities were found in the five generators. Four generators 
(except Firm A) participated in the Government’s PRE scheme and were granted carbon 
credits, which allowed them to develop early carbon trading skills and gain carbon 
revenue (e.g. 6.3.4; 6.4.3). Firms B and E planned to use these carbon credits to offset 
their future ETS obligations, thus reducing their exposure to carbon market fluctuations 
(e.g. 6.6.5).  
Net generation volume (i.e. the difference between total generation volume and retailing 
commitments) is a capability that enabled four generators (A, B, C and E) to benefit 
from a probable increase in wholesale electricity prices due to the ETS (Table 7-1). Due 
to their net generation volume, these generators are able to undertake retail campaigns 
to attract and service more customers. However, Firm D is a net buyer, and therefore a 
wholesale price increase is perceived as a negative impact. To reduce its exposure to 
wholesale market fluctuations, Firm D sought to increase its generation-retail balance 
by developing further generation capacity and reducing its retail customer base where 
possible (6.5.1).  
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Further, access to resource sites, for example, a geothermal field, was considered by 
four generators (A, C, D, E) as critical to their ability to take advantage of GCCP-
related changing fuel economics and build additional generation capacity. Accordingly, 
these generators focused their generation investments in areas where they already had 
secure access to, for example, through a resource consent (e.g. 6.2.4). In contrast, the 
availability of (fossil) fuel supply was an important consideration for the generators 
pursuing thermal investments (B, E). These generators were involved in gas exploration 
activities and thus earned the entitlements to future gas supply that would ensure 
operational efficiency of their proposed thermal plants (6.3.2; 6.6.2).  
Economies of scale in renewable development helped most generators (except Firm B) 
to respond positively to the changing fuel economics under the GCCPs. Such economies 
of scale enabled these generators to pursue further renewable investments at a lower 
cost. For example, these generators were able to negotiate favourable deals with 
suppliers to reduce the costs of generation equipment, such as wind turbines (6.4.3). 
Furthermore, economies of scale improved operational efficiency, which in turn 
potentially reduces production costs (e.g. 6.4.3). Additionally, renewable-only 
inheritance assets were a significant advantage for Firms C and D since these assets 
enhanced these generators’ reputation and enabled them to undertake green-branding 
retail strategies and enhance their market competitiveness, in a changing competitive 
environment. The renewable asset base also exposed these generators to less pressures 
from society to reduce emissions, compared to thermal-based ones. This inherited 
renewable asset base also provides an incentive for Firms C and D to strongly support 
the ETS and even recommend additional policies to maximise potential gains from their 
assets at the expense of thermal generators (6.4.4.; 6.5.2).  
Managerial factors 
Top management support for renewable development was an internal capability in three 
generators (Firms A, C, D). Firm A was historically a thermal generator but in recent 
years has focused its generation investments on renewable sources (6.2.3). In contrast, 
top management support had always been a key driver of Firms C and D’s renewable-
only generation strategy and thus their development of renewable-focused competitive 
advantage (e.g. 6.5.1). Furthermore, top management commitment to sustainability 
enabled Firm C and E to adopt a sustainability policy early on and undertake wider 
scope internal energy efficiency initiatives (e.g. 6.6.2). Additionally, active board 
involvement in the strategic planning process was considered an important driver of 
Firm C’s decision to pursue a renewable-only generation (investment) strategy (6.4.2).  
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Management recognition of external volatilities and pressures are also important drivers 
of environmental strategies in three generators (Firms B, C and E). Firm B’s managers 
perceived negative impacts from GCCP-related volatilities and pressures. Consequently, 
its environmental strategies were aimed primarily at mitigating these impacts, i.e. 
reducing generation carbon emissions, and adopting environmental disclosure to 
respond to the societal pressures (6.3.3). In contrast, Firm C’s top management 
interpreted external volatilities and pressures as primarily opportunities and thus more 
proactive strategies were pursued, i.e. green marketing and branding, and early 
investments in renewable assets (6.4.2). Similarly, top management in Firm E also 
recognised the opportunities associated with emerging energy efficiency markets early 
and thus undertook customer energy efficiency initiatives as part of its retail strategy 
(6.6.2).  
Prior experience and organisational learning 
Due to its experience in emissions reduction, Firm B was able to integrate emissions 
management as a key objective in its environmental policy (6.3.2) and reduce its 
generation emissions and thus carbon costs more effectively than Firms A and E. In 
contrast, prior experience in renewable energy provided a substantial advantage for the 
other four generators (A, C, D, E) since it enhanced their competitiveness in a GCCP 
operating environment which incentivises renewable investments. Thus, these 
generators were able to effectively respond to GCCP-related changing fuel economics 
and follow a differentiation strategy in generation investment.11 Renewable expertise 
also motivated these generators to politically support the ETS and the Government’s 
preference for renewable energy. In particular, Firms A and E who have compliance 
obligations under the ETS lobbied the Government to reduce their potential carbon-
related compliance liabilities (for example, by suggesting the exclusion of geothermal 
emissions from the ETS) (6.6.4). Additionally, Firm E’s early experience in customer 
energy efficiency enabled it to develop innovative energy efficiency services and 
products (6.6.3), based on which its retail competitiveness was enhanced, especially in 
an emerging energy efficiency market.  
Organisational culture 
Organisational culture was considered an important internal capability for some 
generators. Firm C had a corporate culture built around internal innovation, 
entrepreneurship and high environmental awareness (6.4.3). Similarly, Firm E 
                                               
11
 Firm A, while being historically a thermal generator, invested heavily in geothermal projects and 
developed substantial geothermal expertise. 
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developed a strong culture associated with environmental responsibility (6.6.2). In both 
generators, such environmentally-focused culture provided significant support and 
motivation for the pursuit of extensive internal energy efficiency initiatives and large-
scale renewable investments. A supportive corporate culture also increased the 
effectiveness with which Firms C and E deployed other internal capabilities, such as 
prior experience in renewable energy and energy efficiency, in implementing their 
environmental strategies. Additionally, the environmentally-focused organisational 
culture was well publicised (e.g. 6.6.2) and thus contributed to an enhancement of these 
generators’ social legitimacy.  
Ownership-related capabilities 
In addition to the drivers proposed in the Research Framework, this study found that the 
generators’ ownership structure had implications for their environmental strategies. The 
privately-owned generators (A and D) had a different risk appetite from that of state-
owned ones, as the privately-owned generators require a higher rate of return on 
generation investments (6.2.3; 6.5.1). Furthermore, there was higher cost consciousness 
among their managers and employees because of strong performance pressures 
associated with the capital markets. As a result, their environmental strategies 
(emissions management, internal energy efficiency and carbon credit strategies) 
featured strong cost control components. Additionally, the close relationship with a 
majority shareholder enabled Firm A to access this organisation’s expertise and 
resources in carbon trading and generation development (6.2.5). Such access allowed 
Firm A to pursue lower-cost carbon credit and generation strategies, as well as facilitate 
organisational learning and adaptation to changes in external carbon trading and 
investment environments (i.e. reducing transactional cost). It also reduced Firm A’s 
exposure to carbon market fluctuations when sourcing the credits required to meet its 
ETS compliance obligations.  
Overall, the results from analysing generators’ internal capabilities provide support for 
the drivers suggested in the Research Framework. However, a new category is found, 
ownership-related capabilities. The four generators with large renewable investment 
programmes (A, C, D, and E) share a number of similar internal capabilities, including 
access to renewable resource sites, top management support or commitment, and 
renewable expertise. Other capabilities were only relevant to either one, two or three 
generators. In support of P2, the analysis suggests that the internal capabilities identified 
impact on the generators’ competitiveness, costs, and legitimacy. Specifically, 
technological capabilities and prior experience and organisational learning improved 
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generators’ competitiveness or enabled them to control organisational costs. Managerial 
factors primarily had implications for generators’ competitiveness, while organisational 
culture enhanced their social legitimacy. In contrast, ownership-related capabilities led 
to more effective cost control. In response, the generators formulated and modified 
environmental strategies to take advantage of their internal capabilities (P3). The most 
predominant GCCP-related environmental strategies affected by internal capabilities 
were generation investment and retail strategies.  
Furthermore, the results suggest that a number of these internal capabilities moderated 
the generators’ exposure to external drivers. For example, possession of carbon credits 
and a relationship with a majority shareholder enabled some generators with ETS 
compliance obligations to be less vulnerable to carbon market volatility. Renewable-
based inheritance assets reduce some generators’ exposure to societal pressures and 
improve their organisational reputation, while prior experience enabled them to gain a 
competitive advantage from changing fuel economics and the emerging energy 
efficiency market. Consequently, possessing internal capabilities enhanced the positive 
impacts of external drivers on the generators. This moderating impact of internal 
capabilities is a new insight that is not available from the prior literature. 
7.4.4. Degree of total internal capabilities 
Using an Excel-based matrix data display, each of the internal capabilities identified in 
7.4.3 were quantified based on the degree of their availability and strength within each 
generator (from 0: not perceived or not available; to 3: strong capability) (5.7.2.2). The 
degree of total internal capabilities implies the total availability and strength of GCCP-
related internal resources possessed by a generator within a particular time period. The 
degree of total capabilities possessed by the five generators from 2000 to 2009 is 
illustrated in Figure 7-3.   
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Figure 7-3: Change in total internal capabilities (2000-2009) 
 
From January 2000 to September 2007, there was clear distinction in the degree of total 
internal capabilities between renewable generators (C, D, E) and thermal ones (A, B) 
with the renewable generators having a higher degree of total capabilities. Among the 
renewable generators, Firm C had the highest degree of internal capabilities because it 
had the strongest internal capabilities including: early managerial recognition of GCCP-
related external volatilities and pressures; active board involvement in strategy planning 
process; renewable assets and expertise; and top management support and commitment 
(6.4.2). The degree of internal capabilities within Firms D and E was also higher than 
the thermal generators because they were developing significant renewable expertise 
and had top management support and commitment to renewable investment. Between 
January 2000 and December 2005, Firms A and B had a similar degree of internal 
capabilities, reflected by their net generation volume, inheritance assets, experience in 
emission reduction (B), and some renewable expertise (A). Since during that time, they 
were still highly thermal-focused, Firms A and B did not develop the same degree of 
renewable-based GCCP-related internal capabilities as the renewable generators.  
Interestingly, from January 2006 to October 2009, the degree of total capabilities 
possessed by Firm A increased at a high rate, and reached almost the same level as that 
of Firm D. This increase is associated with the change in generation strategy of Firm A 
in 2007 to focus on large-scale geothermal development (6.2.4). The result was the 
channelling of organisational resources to develop strategic renewable-related 
capabilities. In this period, Firm E also experienced a large increase in its internal 
capabilities. This is potentially attributed to its strategic decision to adopt renewable-
focused generation investment and retail strategies in order to take advantage of GCCP-
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related market opportunities (6.6.4; 6.6.5). The degree of total capabilities in Firms C 
and D increased during Jan2006-Sep2007 to support their renewable-only generation 
strategy, but stabilised from October 2007 to October 2009. This is because these two 
generators had developed all of their available internal capabilities to a strong level 
during the previous periods, and thus any incremental change in the strength of each 
capability during 2007-2009 was not shown.  
By October 2009, there was a degree of convergence between Firms A, C, D and E in 
the degree of their total internal capabilities. These capabilities primarily enabled these 
four generators to enhance their competitiveness and pursue renewable-focused 
environmental strategies. In contrast, Firm B ranked the lowest because it was still 
strongly thermal-based throughout the period and thus, had few renewable-related 
capabilities to build on. However, it did develop other capabilities, including increasing 
generation volume, obtaining PRE carbon credits, possessing a secure fossil fuel supply, 
and gaining experience in emissions reduction. These capabilities primarily enabled 
Firm B to manage the carbon and production costs associated with the implementation 
of its environmental strategies.  
7.4.5. Discussion: internal characteristics and capabilities 
The above sections have analysed the impacts of internal characteristics and internal 
capabilities on the generators and their environmental strategies. The results provide 
broad support for all the internal drivers identified in the Research Framework. 
Additionally, the results suggest a number of new drivers that have not been examined 
in the prior literature or the Research Framework. They are organisational growth and 
financial and technological constraints (as internal characteristics), and ownership-
related capabilities (as internal capabilities).  
The results suggest that the generators’ internal characteristics impact on their costs and 
legitimacy, but not competitiveness. All internal characteristics affect generators’ 
organisational costs, except for emissions profile and organisational size, both of which 
had implications for organisational costs and social legitimacy. In contrast, internal 
capabilities enhance the generators’ competitiveness and legitimacy as well as enabling 
better cost control. Consequently, these results suggest that the internal drivers affect the 
generators’ competitiveness, costs, and legitimacy, thereby largely supporting P2. 
Consistent with P3, the impacts exerted by internal drivers led to changes in the 
generators’ environmental strategies. Due to their influence on organisational costs and 
social legitimacy, internal characteristics predominantly affected emissions 
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management, internal energy efficiency, carbon credit and emissions-related disclosure 
strategies. In contrast, the predominant strategies affected by internal capabilities were 
generation investment and retail strategies, because such capabilities had a strong 
impact on generators’ competitiveness (alongside costs and legitimacy).  
In addition to the support found for propositions and the Research Framework, new 
insights are found. Internal characteristics and capabilities moderate the generators’ 
exposure to the external GCCP-related drivers. Internal characteristics increase the 
negative impacts of the external drivers by exposing the generators to external economic 
and institutional drivers and hence imposing higher costs and/or threatening their 
legitimacy. In contrast, internal capabilities enhance the positive impacts of the external 
drivers on the generators by enabling them to take advantage of these external drivers to 
improve their competitiveness, legitimacy, or reduce costs more effectively.  
Furthermore, the differences found in the set of internal characteristics and capabilities 
(drivers) that characterised the different generators suggest that the generators were 
operating in relatively heterogeneous internal environments (Tables 7-5 & 7-6), as 
opposed to the relatively homogenous GCCP-related external environments (Tables 7-3 
& 7-4). The results also indicate that from 2000 to 2009 all generators perceived an 
increasing degree of total external exposure and impact by external volatilities and 
pressures, as well a growing level of total capabilities. Additionally, the thermal 
generators (A, B) were found to have the highest degree of GCCP-related exposure 
driven by their internal characteristics, while the renewable generators (C, D) 
experienced lower exposure. Further, a higher degree of total internal capabilities was 
found in generators with renewable expertise and assets (A, C, D, and E), than that in 
thermal-based Firm B. In response to such variations in external and internal drivers 
over time and across generators, the generators changed their environmental strategies 
differently, as reflected by the level of strategy proactiveness and changes in strategic 
emphasis, as discussed in the next section.  
7.5. Change in environmental strategies 
It is clear from the preceding sections that the five generators changed their 
environmental strategies in response to the GCCP-related external and internal drivers. 
To further understand the process of change in environmental strategies, this section 
analyses the dynamics and variations in the way strategic changes were employed and 
implemented across the different generators over time. Doing so also provides a further 
basis to examine the association between environmental strategies and the impacts of 
192 
 
external and internal drivers (P3). As outlined in Section 4.4.4, this study analyses 
change in environmental strategies from two aspects: strategy proactiveness and 
strategic emphasis. Firstly, to assess how early (timing) environmental strategies were 
formulated and how broadly (scope) they were implemented within the organisation, the 
level of strategy proactiveness is investigated. Secondly, changes in strategic emphasis 
are examined to understand how much top management attention was assigned to 
environmental strategies within each generator and whether this attention changed over 
time. Thus, these two aspects of change in environmental strategies indicate i) how 
proactive the change was, and ii) how much attention management paid to such a 
change.  
7.5.1. Strategy proactiveness 
To facilitate the analysis of strategy proactiveness, a high level of environmental 
strategy proactiveness is considered to capture three characteristics: 
i. the strategy was formulated to respond to GCCP-related volatilities and 
pressures early and ahead of the introduction of any GCCP-associated 
regulations,  
ii. the initiatives undertaken were extensive and substantial financial provision was 
made for them; and,  
iii. multiple organisational functions were involved in implementing these 
initiatives.  
In contrast, a low level of proactiveness (i.e. a reactive environmental strategy) implies 
mere conformance to existing environmental regulations and other institutional 
pressures that prevail in the existing operating environments, and involves narrow-
scoped initiatives and few organisational functions. In a data matrix display, each of the 
eleven environmental strategies listed in Table 7-2 was assigned a score of 0, 1, 2 or 3, 
depending on the perceived level of proactiveness during each time period (5.7.2.3). 
The scores were then added across the eleven environmental strategies to obtain a total 
strategy proactiveness value for each generator in each time period. For each generator, 
the trend of change in this value over time was then analysed in relation to the change in 
the degree of total external volatility and pressure exposure, degree of total impact by 
internal characteristics, and degree of total capabilities (P3).  
The analysis did not find any direct association between a change in total strategy 
proactiveness and a change in total impact of internal characteristics over time. This is 
unexpected, given that internal characteristics were found to affect individual 
environmental strategies (Table 7
relationship to confirm whether an association between the total impact of internal 
characteristics and strategy proactiveness exists. 
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Figure 7-4 indicates that for the period April 2002 – September 2008 the strategy 
proactiveness of all generators increased. However, strategy proactiveness of Firms A, 
C and D decreased from October 2008 to October 2009, despite overall increases in 
both the external volatility and pressure exposure and degree of internal capabilities. 
This can be explained by the presence of the external regulatory uncertainty and less 
positive environment for renewable investment associated with the ETS delay and 
review (7.3.1). In contrast, during this period Firm E decided to pursue a global 
geothermal strategy, drawing upon its prior experience to tap into favourable 
international regulatory environments (6.6.5). Therefore its level of proactiveness 
increased. Further, due to its substantial potential ETS liabilities, from October 2008, 
Firm B decided to switch to renewable-only generation investments to radically reduce 
its emissions (6.3.5), thereby increasing its level of proactiveness.  
Further, Figure 7-4 indicates that in the earlier periods (Apr2002-Sep2007), a rise in 
strategy proactiveness was broadly consistent with increasing internal capabilities in all 
the generators. In the later periods (Oct2007-Oct2009), the association between internal 
capabilities and strategy proactiveness was only evident within Firms B and E where 
more proactive environmental strategies were accompanied by a higher degree of 
internal capabilities. In contrast, while strategy proactiveness decreased in Firms A, C 
and D, the degree of their internal capabilities stabilised.  This is because despite having 
a high level of internal capabilities, these generators chose to reduce their strategy 
proactiveness to respond to regulatory uncertainty.  
Additionally, qualitative analysis of interview data supports a two-way relationship 
between strategy proactiveness and internal capabilities. In some cases, generators 
possessed existing internal capabilities (e.g. top management support of renewables) 
which enabled the pursuit of proactive environmental strategies (e.g. renewable-only 
generation strategy). In turn, the choice of proactive environmental strategies facilitated 
the development of further internal capabilities, i.e. renewable expertise built through 
the implementation of large-scale renewable investment programmes. This result is 
consistent with the graphs in Figure 7-4 and explains why most generators experienced 
an increase in the level of total capabilities, when they adopted more proactive GCCP-
related environmental strategies.  
Therefore, in support of P3, the generators increased the level of environmental strategy 
proactiveness to respond to an increase in external volatility and pressure exposure 
associated with the GCCPs. Additionally, the results suggest that a high level of strategy 
proactiveness appears to both enable and be enabled by a higher level of total internal 
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capabilities (a RBT view) and that the impact of external exposure and internal 
capabilities on strategy proactiveness varied across generators and across different time 
periods. These insights are not captured in the Research Framework or P3. Figure 7-5 
provides more detail on the variations in strategy proactiveness between the five 
generators over the five time periods from 2000 to 2009 and supports the analysis 
presented above.  
Figure 7-5: Change in strategy proactiveness (2000-2009) 
 
Additionally, Figure 7-5 suggests key differences exist between the generators in the 
degree of strategy proactiveness pursued within each period. From January 2000 to 
September 2008, there were two separate clusters in terms of strategy proactiveness, one 
comprising Firms C and E and the other including Firms A, B and D. Strategy 
proactiveness levels within Firms C and E were higher than within the other three 
generators because both perceived a high degree of GCCP-related external exposure and 
possessed strong internal capabilities in these earlier periods. From October 2008 to 
October 2009, Figure 7-5 highlights that there were major changes in strategy 
proactiveness within all five generators (Firms B and E increasing their proactiveness 
while the other three generators adopting more reactive strategies). As mentioned, this 
change coincides with the associated regulatory uncertainty surrounding the ETS.  
Overall, all five generators perceived they were increasingly exposed to GCCP-related 
volatilities and pressures from 2000 to 2008. Accordingly, in response, they adopted 
more proactive strategies that were supported by the generators’ internal capabilities. 
However, during the 2008-2009 period, as regulatory uncertainty dominated, the 
generators with significant renewable investments (A, C, D) undertook more reactive 
strategies. These results support P3 in that the impacts of GCCP-related external drivers, 
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as reflected in the degree of external volatility and pressure exposure, lead to a change 
in the level of strategy proactiveness. Proposition 3 is further supported because the 
results suggest that inter-generator differences in strategy proactiveness are related to 
variations in internal capabilities, i.e. stronger capabilities enabled a generator to 
implement more proactive environmental strategies. This is because internal capabilities 
enhance generators’ competitiveness, legitimacy and cost control under the GCCPs 
(7.4.3). However, as mentioned, P3 is not supported in that the internal characteristics 
appear to have no impact on strategy proactiveness. However, internal characteristics 
seem to affect strategic emphasis, as discussed next.  
7.5.2. Strategic emphasis 
Tables 7-3 and 7-4 highlight that the five generators adopted a range of different 
environmental strategies to respond to the GCCP-related volatilities and pressures. 
However, based on the qualitative analysis of NVivo-coded data (including evidence as 
presented in Chapter 6), this study found that not all these environmental strategies 
received equal strategic attention (or emphasis) at top management levels across 
different the time periods and different generators. Table 7-7 illustrates that the strategic 
emphasis within the five generators and how it changed from January 2000 to October 
2009. Specifically, for each period, the major environmental strategies that received 
strategic emphasis within each generator are listed. Since the previous section (7.5.1) 
has highlighted and explained inter-generator differences in strategy proactiveness 
levels, the discussion of Table 7-7 focuses only on the key changes in strategic 
emphasis across the five generators over time.  
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Table 7-7: Change in strategic emphasis of five generators (2000-2009) (P3) 
 Jan00 - 
Mar02 
Apr02 - Dec05 Jan06 - Sep07 Oct07 - Sep08 Oct08 - Oct09 
Key 
GCCP 
RMA but 
no GCCP 
Carbon tax 
proposal, PRE 
scheme 
Draft NZES Original ETS proposal 
and legislation 
ETS delayed and 
modified 
Firm A Operational 
emphasis 
Political 
strategy 
Political strategy, 
Generation strategy, 
Emissions disclosure 
Political strategy, 
Generation strategy, 
Emissions disclosure 
Carbon credit strategy 
Emissions disclosure 
Firm B Operational 
emphasis 
Political 
strategy, 
Generation 
strategy 
Political strategy, 
Generation strategy, 
Emissions 
management, 
Emissions disclosure  
Political strategy, 
Generation strategy, 
Carbon credit strategy, 
Emissions disclosure 
Generation strategy, 
Internal restructuring, 
Carbon credit strategy, 
Emissions disclosure 
Firm C Operational 
emphasis 
Political 
strategy, 
Generation 
strategy 
Political strategy, 
Generation strategy, 
Retail strategy, 
Carbon neutrality 
strategy, 
Carbon credit strategy 
Emissions disclosure 
Political strategy, 
Generation strategy, 
Retail strategy, 
Carbon neutrality 
strategy, 
Carbon credit strategy 
Emissions disclosure 
Internal restructuring, 
Retail strategy, 
Emissions disclosure 
Firm D  Political 
strategy, 
Generation 
strategy 
Political strategy, 
Generation strategy 
 
Political strategy, 
Generation strategy, 
Carbon neutrality 
strategy 
Retail strategy 
Retail strategy, 
Carbon credit strategy 
 
Firm E Operational 
emphasis 
Political 
strategy, 
Generation 
strategy, 
Customer 
energy  
efficiency 
Political strategy, 
Generation strategy, 
Customer energy  
efficiency,  
Internal energy 
efficiency, 
Retail strategy, 
Emissions disclosure 
Political strategy, 
Generation strategy, 
Customer energy 
efficiency, 
Internal energy 
efficiency, 
Retail strategy, 
Emissions disclosure 
Generation strategy, 
Internal restructuring, 
Carbon credit strategy 
Retail strategy, 
Customer energy 
efficiency, 
Emissions disclosure 
 
It is apparent from Table 7-7 that there was an increase in the number of environmental 
strategies receiving management attention from January 2000 to 2008. However, from 
2008 to 2009, the number of environmental strategies emphasised reduced in Firms A, 
C, D, and E, but not in Firm B.  
From January 2000 to March 2002, since the key external pressures came from RMA 
resource consent requirements, all the generators focused upon complying with these 
requirements to manage environmental compliance costs. However, the focus was 
operational and no attention was required at the top management level.  
From April 2002 to September 2008, through different phases of GCCP changes (from 
the carbon tax to the Original ETS), all generators took part in the lobbying process 
(political strategy) to seek to protect or enhance their economic interests. Lobbying was 
particularly strong from October 2007 to September 2008 when the Original ETS was 
proposed and legislated, as this legislation had significant implications for fuel 
economics and thus generators’ competitiveness and production costs. Further, most 
generators (except Firm A) also participated in the PRE scheme to gain the carbon 
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credits to assist their renewable investments (generation strategy) during the 2002-2005 
period. Generation strategy continued to be the strategic focus in all five generators 
from 2006 to 2008. In response to such drivers as changing fuel economics, 
governmental and societal pressures associated with the ETS and organisational 
generation emission profiles, all generators had plans to pursue larger scale renewable 
investments (Tables 7-3 to 7-5). These investments were also enabled by multiple 
internal capabilities (Table 7-6). 
Among the two thermal generators, Firms A had lower emissions and carbon costs and 
thus, decided to reduce its generation emissions by increasing its investment in 
renewable generation. In contrast, due to its high emissions profile and potential high 
carbon costs, Firm B’s strategic focus was on emissions management within existing 
thermal plants in 2006/2007 and then it changed to buying carbon credits to prepare for 
future ETS compliance obligations in 2007/2008. Furthermore, to manage their social 
legitimacy in the face of high societal pressures associated with their generation 
emissions from 2006 to 2008, both generators placed strategic importance on 
appropriate emissions-related disclosure to manage their reputation.  
In contrast, the three renewable generators emphasised different environmental 
strategies. From 2006, Firm C launched a green branding retail campaign and pursued 
CarboNZero certification to take advantage of its renewable-only assets and hence, 
enhancing its competitiveness. It also began trading its carbon credits to develop carbon 
management expertise. From 2007, Firm D followed Firm C and undertook 
CarboNZero certification and thus integrated carbon neutrality into its green-focused 
retail strategy. Firm E’s management paid strategic attention to customer energy 
efficiency very early on (2002), developing this area with a vision to make it one of the 
generator’s key competitive advantages. From 2006, based on its prior experience in 
customer energy efficiency, Firm E improved its internal energy efficiency performance 
to the highest industry standard and marketed its environmental responsibility. Firms C 
and E also employed extensive emissions-related disclosure, considering it critical to the 
legitimacy of their green brand. In contrast, due to its smaller size when compared to 
other renewable generators and little exposure to societal pressures, Firm D did not 
perceive emissions-related disclosure to be strategically important. 
From October 2008 to October 2009, having anticipated the potential ETS changes, 
most generators reduced political activity and Firm D ceased to participate in the policy 
processes totally (6.5.4). Due to the less positive incentives proposed in the Moderated 
ETS and thus a reduced potential to enhance their competitiveness, three generators (A, 
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C, D) progressed their renewable investments with caution. In contrast, Firms B and E 
underwent significant changes in their generation strategy in this period. As mentioned 
previously, to manage its carbon costs, Firm B shifted towards a renewable preference 
in its generation strategy and wrote off the value of its thermal assets (6.4.5). Firm E 
decided to pursue a global geothermal strategy to take advantage of its geothermal 
expertise and favourable international regulatory environments (6.6.5). Simultaneously, 
in response to the National Government’s financial performance pressures, state-owned 
generators (B, C and E) undertook internal restructuring to improve operational 
efficiency. Additionally, the generators with ETS obligations (A, B, E) started to pay 
more attention to building carbon trading expertise to manage future compliance cost 
(carbon credit strategy). Despite the proposed ETS changes, the renewable generators 
(C, D, E) still placed emphasis on a green-focused retail strategy in order to take 
advantage of their renewable-focused capabilities. Firm D differentiated itself by selling 
carbon credits to customers and thus enhancing its competitiveness. Additionally, Firm 
E continued to promote its customer energy efficiency products and services as part of 
its retail strategy. Similar to the previous period, emissions-related disclosure was 
considered important in most generators (except for Firm D), as they needed to respond 
to the increasing societal pressures so as to maintain their organisational legitimacy. 
In summary, strategic emphasis within all the five generators changed over time. This is 
to respond to the varying impacts of external volatilities and pressures emerging from 
GCCP changes and the generators’ internal characteristics and capabilities on 
organisational costs, competitiveness and legitimacy within each time period. This 
provides further support for P3 in that the impacts of GCCP-related external and 
internal drivers lead to changes in generators’ environmental strategies. Additionally, 
such change in environmental strategies is motivated by a number of objectives, as 
discussed in the next section.  
7.6. Objectives of change in environmental strategies 
The results of analysing interview and documentary data using matrix data display 
indicate that there were multiple objectives underlying the change in the eleven 
environmental strategies found within the five generators. These objectives can be 
classified into three groups: competitiveness, cost control, and legitimacy. This analysis 
further suggests that among the eleven environmental strategies identified in Table 7-2, 
some were driven primarily by competitiveness, while others were driven by legitimacy 
or cost control objectives. Table 7-8 lists these eleven different environmental 
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strategies, categorising them by the primary objective that underlie the changes in them. 
For each strategy, the external volatilities and pressures (Table 7-3), internal 
characteristics (Table 7-5), and internal capabilities (Table 7-6) found to drive it are also 
listed. This categorisation of environmental strategies and the inclusion of the external 
and internal drivers indicate why some strategies were revised to achieve particular 
objectives when the others were not. It is also noted that changes to generation 
investment and carbon credit strategies are aimed at two objectives simultaneously: cost 
control and competitiveness.  
The analysis of strategy objectives also helps understand the relationships between the 
external and internal drivers and change in environmental strategies through the 
theoretical perspectives of TCE, IT and RBT as suggested in Chapter 4. Additionally, an 
understanding of these objectives explain why external and internal drivers impacted on 
the generators’ competitiveness, costs, and legitimacy (P1, P2) and thus why changes to 
environmental strategies were made in response (P3).  
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Table 7-8: Strategy objectives and strategy’s external and internal drivers 
 External volatilities and pressures 
(institutional ones are in italics) 
Internal characteristic  Internal capability  
Strategic change driven by competitiveness 
Generation 
strategy 
Regulatory uncertainty and political instability  
ETS delay  
Cap on carbon price  
International regulatory environment 
Renewable investment encouragement  
Increase in wholesale prices due to the ETS 
Government preference for renewable investment 
Societal pressures associated with generation 
emissions 
Shareholder pressures 
 Net generation volume 
Access to renewable resource sites  
Top management support of renewables 
Board involvement 
Managerial recognition of external 
volatilities and pressures 
Renewable expertise 
Environmental/climate change awareness 
Political 
strategy 
Regulatory uncertainty and political instability  
ETS delay  
Generation emissions Inheritance assets 
Renewable expertise 
Retail strategy Development of carbon trading expertise based 
on PRE carbon credits  
Changing retail competition  
Carbon trading competition from thermal 
generators 
Energy efficiency market opportunities 
Pressures from other generators 
Greening consumer expectations 
 Net generation volume 
Inheritance assets  
Management recognition of external 
volatilities and pressures 
Experience in customer energy efficiency 
Carbon credit 
strategy  
Renewable investment encouragement (PRE) 
Carbon price fluctuations 
Development of carbon trading expertise based 
on PRE carbon credits  
Financial constraints 
 
Possession of carbon credits 
Key theoretical insight: RBT  IT: competitiveness within institutional norms and resource availability 
Strategic change driven by legitimacy 
Customer 
energy 
efficiency 
Energy efficiency market opportunities  
RMA/ Government pressures for energy 
efficiency and emissions reductions 
 Prior experience in customer energy 
efficiency  
Environmental 
policy 
RMA/ Government pressures for energy 
efficiency and emissions reductions  
Greening consumer expectation 
Sustainability industry groups 
 Top management commitment  to 
sustainability 
Organisational culture 
Carbon 
neutrality 
strategy 
Changing retail competition 
Societal pressures associated with non-
generation emissions) 
Greening consumer expectations 
Employee pressures 
Sustainability industry groups 
External consultants 
Non-generation emissions 
Organisational growth 
Carbon-related cross functional 
coordination 
 
Emissions-
related 
disclosure  
RMA/ Government pressures for energy 
efficiency and emissions reductions  
Societal pressures associated with generation 
and non generation emissions 
Negative perception of windfall gains (ETS)  
External consultants 
Generation emissions 
Non-generation emissions 
Management  recognition of external 
volatilities and pressures 
Key theoretical insight: IT  RBT: legitimacy within resource availability 
Strategic change driven by cost control 
Emissions 
management 
strategy 
RMA/ Government pressures for energy 
efficiency and emissions reductions  
Government preference for renewable investment 
External consultants 
Generation emissions 
Generation emission 
measurement and monitoring 
Carbon-related cross functional 
coordination 
Technological difficulty in 
reducing generation emissions 
Experience in emissions reduction 
Internal energy 
efficiency 
Societal pressures associated with non-
generation emissions 
Employee pressures 
External consultants 
Non-generation emissions 
Non-generation emission 
measurement and monitoring 
Organisational size 
Organisational growth 
Financial constraints  
Organisational culture 
Top management commitment to 
sustainability 
Internal 
restructuring 
Shareholder pressures   
Generation 
strategy 
Increase in wholesale prices due to the ETS 
External technological development 
Generation emissions 
Technological difficulty in 
reducing generation emissions 
Risk appetite and cost consciousness 
Relationship with majority shareholder 
Availability of fuel supply 
Economies of scale in renewable 
development 
Carbon credit 
strategy 
Carbon price fluctuations 
Development of carbon trading expertise based 
on PRE carbon credits 
Carbon-related cross functional 
coordination 
Possession of carbon credits 
Relationship with majority shareholder 
 Key theoretical insight: TCE  IT & RBT: cost control within resource availability and/or institutional norms 
TCE: cost control driven by external economic volatilities 
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7.6.1. Strategic changes driven by competitiveness 
Changes in generation strategy, political strategy, retail strategy and carbon credit 
strategy are designed to enhance market advantages emerging from the GCCPs or to 
protect the generators’ existing economic interests from these policies’ negative impact. 
The data indicate that the focus of the generation, retail and political strategies were 
either on electricity products and services or generation investments that form the core 
components of their revenue and profits. The trading of carbon credits received for 
renewable generation could also create significant revenues (carbon credit strategy).  
As evident from Table 7-8, the majority of the external drivers of changes in these 
strategies were economic volatilities, which, as discussed in Section 7.3.1, primarily had 
strategic implications for generators’ competitiveness (in addition to costs). Therefore, it 
is unsurprising that these four strategies had the objective of enhancing or protecting 
generators’ existing competitive advantages under the GCCP-focused environments. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 7.4.3, these strategies were enabled by many 
different internal capabilities, while being affected by only few internal characteristics. 
This partially supports a RBT view that the choice and implementation of 
competitiveness-driven environmental strategies are supported primarily by the internal 
capabilities because the deployment of such capabilities can result in a market 
advantage for the generators.  
However, as shown in Table 7-8, these strategic changes were simultaneously 
influenced by a number of institutional pressures, especially in relation to generation 
strategies. This indicates that while pursuing strategies for competitiveness, generators 
also took into consideration the impacts exerted by institutional environment, i.e. the 
norms and expectations by organisational stakeholders such as the Government, the 
society and employees. Accordingly, generators were aware that their competitiveness 
needs to be generated and maintained within the boundaries as defined acceptable by 
the environmentally-concerned institutional environment. This result supports a 
combined RBT and IT view suggested in Section 4.3.4.2 that generators undertook 
differentiation strategies within a broader scope of social legitimacy to achieve and 
protect their competitiveness.  
7.6.2. Strategic changes driven by legitimacy 
Changes in customer energy efficiency, environmental/sustainability policy, carbon 
neutrality and emissions-related disclosure strategies were primarily motivated by 
legitimacy needs. As evident from Table 7-8, the majority of the external volatilities and 
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pressures that drove these strategies were institutional. They include pressures from the 
Government, the society, employees, sustainability industry groups, and external 
consultants. In order to remain legitimate, the generators needed to satisfy and conform 
to the expectations and pressures of these stakeholder groups.  
Therefore, the different environmental strategies were revised and changed by 
generators with the primary purpose to legitimise themselves to these stakeholder 
groups. Customer energy efficiency initiatives did not help the generators reduce costs 
or increase their revenue in the short term, though there were suggestions that they may 
enhance long-term organisational reputation and customer loyalty. Therefore, these 
customer energy efficiency initiatives were probably undertaken to maintain the 
generators’ social legitimacy. Similarly, the environmental/ sustainability policy was 
formulated to conform to RMA compliance requirements and the pressures from the 
Government and sustainability industry groups, and hence protect the generators’ 
legitimacy. Adopting a carbon neutrality strategy represents efforts to respond to 
climate change concerns of internal and external stakeholders (e.g. employees and 
consumers) and this strategy is strongly influenced by external consultants’ advice and 
expertise. Conversely, the adoption of emissions-related disclosure was largely to 
demonstrate the generators’ environmental responsibility in the face of increasing 
societal pressures associated with emissions reduction. Consequently, although having 
two external economic drivers, these four strategies were primarily driven by legitimacy 
objectives, thus providing support for an IT-based explanation (4.3.2).  
These legitimacy-driven strategic changes were also associated with a small number of 
internal characteristics and capabilities. Carbon neutrality and emissions-related 
disclosure strategies were predominantly affected by internal characteristics, including 
generation and non-generation emissions, organisational growth, and carbon-related 
cross functional coordination. These internal characteristics generally led to an increase 
in organisational exposure to emissions-focused societal pressures, which in turn 
motivated generators to undertake broader-scoped environmental strategies in order to 
maintain legitimacy. In contrast, customer energy efficiency and environmental policy 
strategies were influenced primarily by internal capabilities including prior experience, 
top management commitment and awareness, and organisational culture. Such 
capabilities facilitated the implementation of these strategies and enabled the generators 
to maintain or enhance their legitimacy more effectively. Consequently, while the 
impacts of internal characteristics on legitimacy-focused environmental strategies can 
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be explained from an IT-based view, the influence of internal capabilities on these 
strategies fits a RBT explanation. This supports a combined IT and RBT view that 
generators adopt some environmental strategies to preserve or further their legitimacy 
and their ability to do so depends on internal resource availability (4.3.4.2). 
7.6.3. Strategic changes driven by cost control 
Changes in emissions management, internal energy efficiency and internal restructuring 
strategies were primarily driven by cost control objectives rather than competitiveness 
or legitimacy. Thermal generators, driven by their generation emissions, needed to 
reduce their potential ETS carbon costs through an emissions management strategy. In 
contrast, renewable generators undertook internal energy efficiency strategies to reduce 
the resources and money consumed by internal non-generation activities which was 
especially important if the generators were pursuing carbon neutrality programmes. 
Internal restructuring was conducted within state-owned generators (from October 
2008) to control costs and improve operational efficiency. In addition, within some 
generators (A, B, E), generation investment and carbon credit strategies were driven by 
a need to control carbon costs.  
Consistent with this, Table 7-8 illustrates that internal characteristics were the dominant 
drivers of these cost-driven strategies. High generation emissions (high asset specificity) 
lead to high ETS compliance carbon costs. Carbon-related cross functional coordination 
and technological difficulty in reducing generation emissions (representing 
transactional uncertainty) increases the transactional costs associated with emissions 
management. Similarly, non-generation emissions (asset specificity) and organisational 
growth (transactional uncertainty) results in high operating costs associated with 
resource consumption and carbon offsets purchases. Thus, these internal characteristics 
caused an increase in costs which need to be controlled through the adoption of cost-
driven strategies. Support for a TCE perspective is therefore provided (4.3.1).  
Table 7-8 also indicates that these changes in emissions management and internal 
energy efficiency strategies and internal restructuring were influenced by institutional 
pressures including those from the Government, society, consumers, employees, 
sustainability industry groups, shareholders, and external consultants, rather than 
economic ones for efficiency reasons. These pressures provided an additional incentive 
for generators to pursue emissions management, internal energy efficiency strategies 
and internal restructuring because the failure to do so will result in a loss of legitimacy 
for the generators to its stakeholders. This suggests that while some strategies can be 
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motivated by cost control objectives, they are simultaneously designed to fit the 
predominant norms and expectations in the institutional environments. Consequently, 
this result supports a combined TCE and IT view suggested in Chapter 4 (4.3.4.1) that 
cost-economising decisions need to be made within institutional norms and constraints.  
In contrast, cost-focused generation investment and carbon credit strategies were driven 
by a number of external volatilities such as changing fuel economics, external 
technological development and carbon market fluctuations. These external economic 
drivers had implications for generators’ production and carbon costs (7.7.1), which led 
the generators to revise their generation investment and carbon credit strategies to 
optimise production and transactional efficiency. This result supports a TCE view in 
that cost control strategies are driven by external economic volatilities. 
Cost control for efficiency reasons was also related to internal capabilities. A number of 
internal capabilities consisting of prior experience, organisational culture, and top 
management commitment to sustainability, enabled the generators to implement 
emissions management and internal energy efficiency strategies. These strategies were 
aimed at reducing the levels of generation and non-generation emissions and controlling 
carbon and operating costs respectively. Additionally, generation investment and carbon 
credit strategies were enabled by internal capabilities, including the availability of fuel 
supply, economies of scale in renewable development, having a relationship with a 
majority shareholder, and the possession of carbon credits. These capabilities helped 
reduce production and carbon costs, and enabled internal efficiency optimisation to be 
achieved. This supports a combined TCE and RBT view that the availability of internal 
resources influences the effectiveness of cost control (4.3.4.3).  
7.6.4. Relationships between external and internal drivers and strategy 
objectives 
The analysis of strategic change objectives shows that changes in environmental 
strategies made by generators were motivated by three primary objectives: 
maintaining/enhancing competitiveness; reducing costs; and maintaining these 
generators’ social legitimacy in a GCCP-focused context. These differing objectives 
were driven by the impacts of GCCP-related external volatilities and pressures, internal 
characteristics and capabilities on the generators’ competitiveness, costs, and 
legitimacy. The impacts of external and internal drivers further provide an incentive for 
generators to change their environmental strategies so that their effects can be managed 
206 
 
(enhancing competitiveness, controlling costs, or maintaining legitimacy). Thus, further 
support for P1, P2 and P3 is provided.  
The empirical evidence for the relationships between RBT, IT and TCE are also found 
(Table 7-8). Results strongly suggest that changes in competitiveness-driven strategies 
are made to utilise internal capabilities or resource availability and match the 
institutional pressures (RBT and IT). Furthermore, strategic changes for cost control are 
strongly driven by institutional pressures (TCE and IT) and influenced to a limited 
extent by internal capabilities (TCE and RBT). Additionally, some evidence is provided 
for the argument that strategies designed to achieve legitimacy objectives were 
facilitated by available internal capabilities (IT and RBT). Figure 7-6 summarises the 
results above and highlights the relationships and interactions between TCE, IT and 
RBT. This framework is consistent with Figure 4-1 (Chapter 4) which proposes that 
relationships exist between TCE, IT and RBT and these can be used to explain 
environmental strategy and MCS choice. As illustrated in Figure 7-6, the key common 
insight that can be made is that environmental strategies are changed within the 
boundaries that are defined as acceptable by institutional pressures and resource 
availability as represented by internal capabilities. 
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Figure 7-6: Results framework for theoretical relationships between strategy 
objectives and external and internal drivers (P3) 
 
Thus, it can be argued that the generators made change to their environmental strategies 
for three major objectives, to: manage competitiveness; ensure cost control; and achieve 
social legitimacy in a GCCP-focused context. However, these objectives were not 
equally important across the five generators, as presented next. 
7.6.5. Variations in the importance of strategy objectives 
Analysis indicates that there were differences between the generators in the key 
objectives of each generator when establishing and implementing their environmental 
strategies, as illustrated in Table 7-9. These objectives are ranked by the frequency with 
which they motivated different environmental strategies within each generator. 
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Table 7-9: Primary objectives of environmental strategies in the five generators  
Ranking by 
frequency 
Firm A  Firm B Firm C Firm D Firm E 
1 Carbon cost 
control 
Carbon cost 
control 
Competitiveness 
 
Competitiveness 
 
Competitiveness 
 
2 Legitimacy Legitimacy Legitimacy  Legitimacy Legitimacy 
3 Competitiveness Competitiveness Operational cost 
control 
Transactional cost 
control 
Carbon cost 
control 
4 Transactional 
cost control 
Transactional 
cost control 
Transactional cost 
control 
 Transactional 
cost control 
The environmental strategies adopted in thermal generators (A and B) had the similar 
objectives of reducing carbon costs and ensuring legitimacy. The strategic focus on 
carbon cost control is self-explanatory, because these two generators had the highest 
levels of generation emissions and thus carbon costs in the industry under the ETS. 
Maintaining legitimacy was also very important for them since they were exposed to 
negative societal perceptions associated with their generation emissions. Additionally, 
competitiveness had some importance as an objective for generation, retail and political 
strategies within both generators. For Firm A, strategic choices were made to develop 
and reinforce its competitive advantage in geothermal energy. In contrast, Firm B’s 
strategies were undertaken to protect its traditional competitive advantage in thermal 
generation.  
The predominant strategic choice in the environmental strategies adopted by renewable-
based Firms C, D and E was differentiation in order to maintain or enhance market 
competitiveness. Having a substantial renewable asset base and expertise, they 
developed environmental strategies to take advantage of the potential positive 
opportunities associated with the GCCPs. Two renewable generators (C & D) were 
exposed to societal pressures associated with non-generation emissions and hence they 
needed to demonstrate their climate change responsibility. Therefore, a number of 
strategies, e.g. customer and internal energy efficiency initiatives and emissions-related 
disclosure, were undertaken to ensure or enhance their social legitimacy. Firm E, 
although a low thermal emissions profile, was still seen by the public as having thermal 
generation. It responded to these societal pressures through adopting a sustainability 
policy and emissions-related disclosure.  
Operational cost and carbon cost control were of some importance within Firms C and E 
respectively. Firm C also adopted differentiation strategies through implementing 
broad-scoped internal energy efficiency initiatives and a carbon neutrality programme to 
reduce the operating costs associated with its rapid organisational growth. Carbon cost 
was a concern in Firm E due to its low emissions profile and the sufficient carbon 
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credits it granted from the PRE scheme to meet its ETS compliance obligation. 
Therefore, it adopted an emissions management strategy, but did not assign significant 
strategic attention to that strategy. 
Transactional costs arising from GCCP-related external and internal drivers, e.g. carbon 
market fluctuations, emissions measurement and monitoring, and carbon trading 
transactions, presented some concern for all generators. Consequently, a number of 
environmental strategies (i.e. emissions management, internal energy efficiency and 
carbon credit strategies) were established with transactional cost control as one of the 
objectives. However, it is noted that transactional cost control is of secondary 
importance, as opposed to carbon cost and operating cost control which were the 
primary objectives that drove the adoption of these strategies. 
7.7. Summary 
To summarise, results presented in this chapter provide empirical support for P1, P2 and 
P3. External volatilities and pressures can be economic or institutional in nature, with 
economic volatilities affecting the generators’ competitiveness and costs, and 
institutional pressures having implications for their legitimacy (P1). Internal 
characteristics had an impact on the generators’ costs and legitimacy while internal 
capabilities enhanced generators’ competitiveness and legitimacy and enabled better 
cost control (P2).  
Additional insights are gained regarding the external and internal drivers. Results 
indicate that the internal drivers moderated the generators’ exposure to external drivers. 
Internal characteristics increased the negative impacts of the external drivers on the 
generators, e.g. by imposing additional costs and exposing them to stronger 
governmental and societal pressures. In contrast, internal capabilities enhanced the 
GCCP-related positive impacts by providing an advantage for the generators to control 
cost, and enhance competitiveness or legitimacy in the face of the external drivers. New 
drivers are found in addition to those suggested in the Research Framework. They are: 
regulatory and government pressures (external drivers); changing competition (external 
driver); organisational growth (internal characteristic); technological and financial 
constraints (internal characteristics); and ownership-related capabilities (internal 
capabilities). 
In support of P3, this study identified eleven different environmental strategies that 
generators changed in response to GCCP-related external and internal drivers. External 
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volatilities and internal capabilities are the most predominant influence of generation, 
retail, political and carbon credit strategies. Institutional pressures exerted the most 
significant impacts on emissions-related disclosure, carbon neutrality, customer energy 
efficiency, environmental policy, and internal restructuring strategies while internal 
characteristics primarily affected emissions management and internal energy efficiency 
strategies (Table 7-8).  
Additionally, changes in environmental strategies are reflected in the level of strategy 
proactiveness and changes in strategic emphasis. The level of strategy proactiveness of 
generators increased over time to respond to the increasing level of GCCP-related 
external exposure. The more proactive strategies were generally supported by a higher 
level of internal capabilities (P3). Further, top management assigned differing levels of 
emphasis to environmental strategies over time, corresponding to the changing GCCPs 
and associated volatilities and pressures experienced by the generators, and the impacts 
exerted by internal characteristics and capabilities (P3).  
In addition to supporting the propositions (P1, P2, and P3), the results suggest that 
changes in different environmental strategies were made to achieve the objectives of 
maintaining competitiveness, controlling costs or ensuring legitimacy. However, each 
generator focused on one (or two) objective(s) in choosing and implementing their 
environmental strategic changes. The results also provide evidence to support the use of 
three theoretical perspectives (TCE, IT and RBT) in explaining the impacts of external 
and internal drivers on generators’ environmental strategies, as well as the dynamics 
and variations in the use of these strategies across time and generators.  
The environmental strategies undertaken in response to GCCP-related external and 
internal drivers in turn had significant implications for organisational MCS. The next 
chapter – Chapter 8 presents and discusses the results of analysis into organisational 
MCS design, use and objectives that were adopted by the generators to implement their 
GCCP-related environmental strategies.  
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Chapter 8: Change in organisational 
MCS 
8.1. Introduction 
The results presented in Chapter 7 provide support for P1, P2, and P3 and suggest that 
generators modified eleven environmental strategies in response to the GCCP-related 
external and internal drivers. These environmental strategies were underpinned by three 
objectives (competitiveness, cost control, and social legitimacy) and used differently 
across generators and time, as reflected by the dynamics of and variations in the level of 
strategy proactiveness and changes in strategic emphasis. These environmental 
strategies and their associated aspects (i.e. proactiveness and emphasis) are likely to 
have different requirements and implications for organisational MCS, to ensure that 
these strategies are effectively planned and implemented. This chapter analyses MCS 
design, use and objectives in the five generators to understand how their MCS changed 
to support GCCP-related environmental strategies. This addresses the study’s research 
question and assesses the validity of P4: The change in environmental strategies 
requires corresponding modifications in organisational MCS.  
The results in this chapter are based on the analysis of the evidence presented in Chapter 
6 and other relevant interview and documentary data. Specifically, the classification of 
controls and control systems into their relevant MCS component types and groups are 
achieved using data mapping based on Excel-based matrix data displays, as discussed in 
Chapter 5 (5.7.2)12. The tables and figures (i.e. charts) presented are derived from the 
analysis and resulting matrix displays. Where applicable, a reference to a section in 
Chapter 6 will be made to highlight the source of evidence that supports a key argument 
or finding (e.g. 6.2.1). Relevant figures or sections in Chapter 7 that link MCS changes 
to the changes in environmental strategies will also be mentioned (e.g. 7.5).   
As outlined in Chapter 4 (4.4.5), this study considers MCS to be the collection of 
controls and control systems and their use by managers to ensure the adaptation of 
organisations to the environments and the achievements of organisational objectives. 
Therefore, the term “control” and “control system” will be used interchangeably with 
                                               
12
 These matrix displays are available on request provided they do not breach the confidentiality 
agreements with the interviewees. 
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“MCS” throughout this chapter. To further the analysis in this chapter, controls and 
control systems related to environmental strategies were firstly identified from interview 
and documentary data and classified into appropriate MCS component types and 
groups. For the methods used to analyse MCS design, use and objectives, see Chapter 5 
(5.7.2.4).  
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section examines MCS design and use as 
captured in different MCS component types or groups that were identified from the 
data, and discusses the changes and cross-firm variations in the degree of use of each 
MCS component type or group from 2000 to 2009. This is followed by an analysis of 
the objectives underlying the design and use of organisational MCS and inter-generator 
differences in the choice of key MCS objectives. Lastly, a summary of the chapter is 
presented.  
8.2. Change in MCS design and use 
The analysis of interview and documentary data suggests that one environmental 
strategy can be supported by multiple control and control systems. Similarly, one 
control or control system can support multiple environmental strategies. In this study, 
MCS design is reflected in the existence or establishment of particular controls and 
control systems, as listed in Tables 8-1 and 8-2, while MCS use refers to the 
employment of these controls and control systems to implement or plan environmental 
strategies. Additionally, this study examines the degree of use of a particular control/ 
control system at different levels of management. As discussed below, the degree of 
MCS component use depends on the level of strategy proactiveness and/or strategic 
emphasis placed on one or some environmental strategies in a given time period.  
A diverse range of controls and control systems were found that relate to GCCP 
concerns and the eleven environmental strategies that were undertaken by the generators 
in response. Where possible, the MCS components are classified into the four main 
types, following Simons (1991) categories, as discussed next. However, some controls 
and control systems did not fit these categories, as presented in Section 8.2.2. 
8.2.1. Simons (1991) control systems 
As outlined in Chapter 3 (3.5.2), the four MCS component types suggested by Simons 
(1991) are: boundary controls, belief systems, diagnostic controls and control systems 
and interactive control systems. The controls and control systems identified from 
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Chapter 6 evidence and matrix data displays are classified into their component types as 
shown in Table 8-1. Each type is discussed below. 
Table 8-1: Simons (1991) types of controls and control systems  
Boundary controls Diagnostic controls and control 
systems 
Interactive control systems 
Environmental/ sustainability policy 
Carbon-related spending limits 
Required rate of return 
Sustainable procurement policy 
Energy efficiency guide 
Separation of responsibilities 
Generation emissions measures 
Non-generation emissions measures 
Emissions reduction targets 
Emissions monitoring system  
Emissions key performance indicators  
Carbon-related budgetary controls  
Link to managerial compensation 
Integration of emissions measures in 
balanced scorecard 
Budgetary controls 
Emissions monitoring system 
ETS position information system 
Carbon price monitoring system 
Investment planning systems (with 
integration of climate change issues) 
Internal communication system  
Profit planning system 
Use of accounting in political strategy Belief systems 
Mission statement  
Unwritten corporate values  
Boundary controls 
Boundary controls define the limits, practices and rules to be expected and the risks to 
be avoided by organisational members in conducting organisations’ operations and 
activities (Simons, 1991) (3.5.2). An environmental policy highlights the approach a 
generator undertakes in relation to environmental issues and the mechanisms and 
practices through which they limit their operational impacts on the natural environment. 
A sustainability policy is wider, prescribing the processes/mechanisms by which a 
generator should implement its environmental strategies to ensure the achievement of 
economic performance in a sustainable manner within a carbon emissions-constrained 
context. In some generators, carbon-related spending limits are specified to ensure that 
adequate control is in place to avoid undertaking climate change projects (e.g. carbon 
credit purchases or internal energy efficiency initiatives) whose costs exceed the 
organisation’s risk appetite (6.2.5). A required rate of return on investment is a popular 
boundary control for all generators, although it appears to be set higher in publicly-
listed generators because of the capital market pressures (6.2.3). This control ensures 
that the generation projects that are pursued potentially provide a sufficient return to the 
generators’ shareholders. Sustainable procurement policy and energy efficiency guides 
are mechanisms that help organisational members change their procurement practices 
and resource consumption behaviour to ensure consistency with the generators’ internal 
energy efficiency strategies. Furthermore, there was a clear separation of responsibilities 
between the management, measurement and reporting of emissions and carbon market 
fluctuations and costs in some generators (6.4.4). Each of these responsibilities 
belonged to a separate department or team.  
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Figure 8-1 illustrates the change in the total degree of use of the boundary controls of 
the five generators from 2000 to 2009. It is evident that the degree of boundary control 
use has increased over the period. However, the degree of increase varies across the 
generators, as explained next. 
Figure 8-1: Use of boundary controls (2000-2009) 
 
From 2000 to 2002, Firm C and Firm E had a higher use of boundary controls than the 
other generators, because they were the first to adopt a sustainability policy, and 
sustainable procurement and energy efficiency guides. Firm C also had the highest use 
of boundary controls in all periods (except from October 2008 to October 2009), as their 
environmental strategies were more proactive and wider in scope than other generators 
(Figure 7-5). This led to Firm C employing all the boundary controls discussed above, 
while other generators only used some of these controls. Interestingly, thermal-based 
Firms A and B, were almost identical in their use of boundary controls over the different 
periods, mainly because both generators had high carbon emission costs under the 
GCCPs. Their boundary control use grew at a consistent rate from 2000 to 2008, 
reflecting their increasing emphasis on the carbon credit and emissions management 
strategies and thus, these control types as the generators prepared for their ETS 
obligations. From October 2008 to October 2009, due to an increase in strategic 
emphasis on renewable generation investment, Firm B integrated its environmental 
policy within the strategic planning process. This made emissions reduction a critical 
factor in its renewable investment decisions.  
Since April 2002, Firms E and D have lagged behind the other generators. Firm E’s 
carbon credit and emissions management strategies did not receive much top 
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management attention as in Firms A, B, and C. Similarly, Firm D didn’t place much 
strategic emphasis on internal energy efficiency initiatives throughout the period (Table 
7-7). This led to only an operational use of boundary controls, which explains their low 
level of total use within Firms E and D. 
Belief systems 
Belief systems work as informal control systems within the generators that potentially 
affect the behaviour of organisational members. They can be written documents (i.e. a 
mission /vision statement), or unwritten values and common understanding (i.e. 
“unspoken” corporate culture) (3.5.2). The degree of use of belief systems in the five 
generators is illustrated in Figure 8-2. 
Figure 8-2: Use of belief systems (2000-2009) 
 
Firm C had a corporate culture of innovation and high environmental awareness that 
enabled it to undertake proactive renewable investments and internal energy efficiency 
strategies. Its vision was to “become a leader in climate change issues” and this vision 
was formalised into a mission statement that was communicated and discussed 
frequently at operational and strategic levels to support its renewable-only generation 
investment strategy (6.4.2). This explains why the degree of use of belief systems in 
Firm C was higher than other generators. Similar to Firm C, Firm E’s corporate values 
were built around environmental responsibility (6.6.2). However, during the earlier 
periods, such values were only important at an operational level as they enabled more 
effective implementation of its internal energy efficiency initiatives. However, in the 
later periods, these values were incorporated into the strategic planning process as Firm 
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E moved from a diversified generation strategy to a renewable-focused one. Thus, the 
degree of belief system use has increased from October 2007.  
In contrast, Firms A and D, being publicly listed generators, had a similar corporate 
culture that focused upon financial performance and cost control (6.2.3; 6.5.2). This 
corporate culture strongly featured in the formulation and implementation of generation 
investment strategies, resulting in a similar degree of belief system use in Firms A and 
D (Figure 8-2). This culture also influenced the design and use of other control systems, 
such as the budgetary controls for carbon trading managers and the formal separation of 
duties in relation to environmental strategy implementation. Conversely, Firm B had the 
lowest level of belief system use before 2008. However, since October 2008, Firm B 
revised its mission statement to focus on making an adequate return for the shareholders 
under an ETS and used this control interactively to guide its generation investments 
(6.3.5). The degree of use of belief systems in Firm B has converged with that of Firms 
A and D, reflecting similar financially-focused belief systems. 
Diagnostic controls and control systems 
In order to monitor and control the implementation of emissions management and 
internal energy efficiency strategies, the generators designed and used an array of 
diagnostic controls and control systems (Table 8-1). Emissions measures were chosen 
for generation and non-generation activities. Firms A, B and E measured total carbon 
generation emissions from their thermal plants for RMA compliance purposes and as 
part of GCCP-related emissions management strategies. However, the scope of 
measurement for non-generation emissions varied across the five generators. Firm C 
measured emissions across the total electricity product lifecycle to support its proactive 
internal energy efficiency and carbon neutrality strategies (6.4.5). In contrast, the other 
generators only measured emissions for some business areas and activities (e.g. 6.2.4; 
6.5.3). Additionally, all five generators adopted emissions reduction targets, though the 
difficulty level of these targets varied across the generators. Emissions monitoring 
systems were updated or replaced to ensure accurate measurement and regular internal 
reporting of emission levels and the performance of specific emission reduction 
initiatives. Emission key performance indicators were adopted to enable top managers 
to assess the performance of the chosen environmental strategies. Firms A, B and C 
planned future budgetary controls for carbon trading and the linking of emissions-
related performance to managerial performance evaluation and compensation (carbon 
credit strategy) (6.2.5; 6.4.4). Further, Firm C integrated emissions measures into the 
217 
 
organisation-wide balanced scorecard to enable more effective reduction of non-
generation emissions (6.4.4). To improve operational efficiency and lift financial 
performance, state-owned generators (B, C, E) also adopted tight budgetary controls as 
part of internal restructuring from October 2008. Figure 8-3 shows the change in the use 
of diagnostic controls and control systems in the five generators.  
Figure 8-3: Use of diagnostic controls and control systems (2000-2009)  
 
Firm C ranked the highest in all the periods because it established a wider range of 
diagnostic controls and control systems to support its proactive internal energy 
efficiency strategy. Furthermore, Firm C used this MCS component type more 
intensively over time to ensure the effective reduction of non-generation emissions. In 
contrast, Firm B’s strategic focus is on emissions management and carbon credit 
strategies. Therefore, it adopted a wide range of diagnostic controls and control systems 
and used them intensively to reduce its generation emission levels and carbon costs, 
which are the highest among the five generators. From April 2002 to September 2008, 
Firm B experienced a higher rate of increase in the diagnostic use of MCS components 
than the other firms with thermal plants (A and E), which have a lower level of 
generation emissions. By October 2009, Firms B and C had converged in their use of 
diagnostic controls and control systems. This is consistent with the fact that these two 
generators had the highest level of generation emissions (B) and non-generation 
emissions (C) (Table 7-1). Additionally, both firms experienced an increase in 
budgetary controls due to internal restructuring (Oct2008-Oct2009). 
There was also an upward trend in the number and use of diagnostic controls and 
control systems in Firms A and E, as these generators updated their emissions 
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monitoring systems and introduced budgetary controls for carbon trading in preparation 
for an ETS. Additionally, Firms A and E have experienced a converging level of 
diagnostic control use since October 2007. However, closer examination of the data 
suggests that Firms A and E differed in the level of use assigned to specific diagnostic 
controls. Due to its higher emissions levels, Firm A placed importance on controls 
related to generation emissions, while Firm E considered the management of non-
generation emissions more critical. Similar to Firms B and C, from October 2008, state-
owned Firm E also increased the use of budgetary controls due to internal restructuring. 
Thus, the difference between Firms A and E in diagnostic MCS component use is 
consistent with the strategic emphasis associated with each firm’s emissions profile and 
ownership structure. In contrast and consistent with its limited-scope internal energy 
efficiency and carbon neutrality strategies, Firm D ranked the lowest in its use of 
diagnostic MCS components, although this use increased between 2002 and 2008 to 
reflect more managerial attention on these strategies. However, Firm D’s degree of 
MCS diagnostic use decreased during October 2008-2009 due to the cancellation of its 
carbon neutrality programme.  
Interactive control systems 
There are a number of control systems that the top managers used interactively to 
engage with lower levels of management and employees to ensure internal awareness of 
environmental strategies and to generate innovative strategic initiatives (Simons, 1991). 
As explained by Simons (1991), a control system can be used diagnostically in some 
periods, but may become interactive controls or control systems in others. MCS is used 
interactively within the five generators to support primarily their generation investment, 
retail, political and carbon credit strategies. 
In Firms B and C, the emissions monitoring systems were used diagnostically prior to 
2006. However, they were used interactively post-2006, at different management levels 
and cross-functionally, to increase staff understanding of potential GCCP impacts and to 
encourage behavioural change and new strategic ideas (6.3.3; 6.4.3). Further, since 
2007, top management in the thermal generators (A, B) have used ETS position 
information systems (i.e. systems that monitor a generator’s ETS carbon costs) and 
carbon price monitoring systems interactively to assess these organisation’s financial 
exposure to the upcoming ETS and thus revise generation investment and carbon credit 
strategies appropriately (6.2.4 and 6.3.4).  
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Additionally, climate change issues increasingly became critical considerations in 
investment planning systems. To ensure the viability of their generation investments, all 
generators had to estimate the potential ETS carbon costs arising from proposed thermal 
plants or the avoided emissions and costs for renewable projects, as well as the 
acceptability of such plants from a societal perspective (e.g. 6.3.5; 6.6.3). Further, 
internal communication systems were used both formally (e.g. strategy meetings) and 
informally (e.g. internal newsletters and networking) in most generators to promote staff 
morale and encourage employees’ behaviour alignment with their chosen generation 
and retail strategies (6.2.3). Additionally, due to the recent Governmental performance 
pressures, the state-owned generators (B, C, E) extensively used their profit planning 
systems to generate creative and innovative strategy ideas to help the organisations 
improve their economic performance (e.g. 6.4.5). Furthermore, in their political 
strategy, accounting-based techniques and analyses were used interactively by some 
generators to advocate or argue against particular GCCPs (e.g. 6.3.4). This accounting 
use was primarily driven by the generators’ self interests and biases, i.e. to protect the 
viability of their existing generation plants and development projects. 
Figure 8-4 illustrates that all the generators increasingly used their MCS components 
interactively from 2000 to 2008. This is consistent with the rising level of proactiveness 
displayed by all five generators in relation to their generation investment, retail and 
political strategies during this period (Figure 7-5). Proactive strategies required the 
active participation of multiple organisational functions to enable the generators to 
respond to the proposed GCCPs before they are introduced. Therefore, an increase in 
interactive MCS use is required to encourage input from employees and management 
throughout the organisation into strategy planning and implementation processes.  
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Figure 8-4: Use of interactive controls and control systems (2000-2009) 
 
The five generators display a relatively similar degree of interactive MCS use up until 
December 2005 (before the carbon tax cancellation). This generally reflects little 
strategic attention being paid to these controls and control systems and the lack of 
integration of GCCP-related information into strategy planning process within all five 
generators 13 . However, the degree of interactive MCS use began to diverge from 
January 2006. Firm C ranked the highest in all the periods, except for October 2008-
October 2009. This high ranking is consistent with its early pursuit of a renewable-only 
generation investment strategy, a green-focused retail strategy and a carbon credit 
strategy to take advantage of GCCP-related positive impacts. Firm B followed Firm C 
closely in its interactive MCS use, reflecting its proactiveness into integrating emissions 
and carbon information into its strategy planning process to mitigate GCCP negative 
impacts on organisational performance.  
From October 2008, Firms A, C and D substantially reduced the use of interactive 
control systems because of the decreased level of proactiveness of their generation 
investment and political strategies (Figure 7-5). Additionally, Firm C reduced the scope 
of its carbon trading business, thus experiencing a higher decrease in interactive MCS 
use than Firms A and D. In contrast, consistent with their change in generation strategy 
and higher level of strategy proactiveness, there was increasing interactive MCS use in 
Firms B and E from October 2008 (7.5.1). To facilitate this strategic change, top 
management in these generators used the profit planning, investment planning and 
internal communication systems more interactively to encourage input throughout the 
organisation into the strategic planning process. Consequently, by October 2009, Firms 
                                               
13
 Evidence from Chapter 6 sections that cover the periods from Jan2000 to Dec2005, e.g. 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. 
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B and E ranked the highest in terms of their interactive MCS use, followed by Firms A, 
C, and D.  
8.2.2. Additional controls and control systems 
The analysis of documentary and interview data through matrix data display also 
indicates additional control systems that do not fit Simons (1991) four MCS component 
types. These additional control systems serve four main purposes: to coordinate 
different organisational functions to implement environmental strategies; to enable the 
development of a competitive advantage; to monitor external risks; and to legitimise to 
external stakeholders. Therefore, they are classified into four types labelled: cross-
functional controls and coordinating systems; enabling controls and control systems; 
risk monitoring systems; and legitimising controls and control systems, as given in 
Table 8-2. Each of these will be discussed below. 
Table 8-2: Additional types of controls and control systems  
Cross-functional controls and coordinating 
systems  
Enabling controls and control systems 
Database sharing  
Inter-system linkages 
Internal coordination systems for energy 
efficiency  
Formal cross-functional reporting systems 
Inter-firm controls and trust  
Use of HRM system to acquire expertise in carbon 
neutrality and sustainability or carbon trading 
Budget for customer energy efficiency 
Use of HRM system to develop renewable expertise  
Budget for climate change initiatives 
Budget for carbon trading 
Risk monitoring systems  Legitimising controls and control systems 
Climate change risk register 
Carbon market monitoring system 
External fuel economics monitoring system 
Policy oversight system 
Competitors' action monitoring system 
External organisations' political agenda 
monitoring system 
Customer demand and expectation database 
External disclosure of emissions  
Sustainability reporting  
Customer energy efficiency information systems  
Audit of annual reports’ sustainability content  
External audit of emissions inventory  
External awards/accreditation for EMS  
Carbon neutrality certification  process 
Cross-functional controls and coordinating systems 
Cross-functional coordinating systems ensure coordination and cooperation between 
different functions to achieve the common objectives of the environmental strategies, as 
well as allow for between-function supervision and oversight to reduce/avoid local 
opportunism and manipulative behaviour. The primary environmental strategies 
supported by the cross-functional MCS components are internal energy efficiency, 
emissions management, and carbon credit strategies.  
In the thermal generators (A and B), there was database sharing between different 
functional areas responsible for implementing emissions management and carbon credit 
strategies (6.2.5). Firm E maintained a separate database system within each function, 
but developed inter-system linkages to ensure that managers and staff could acquire the 
information they need from other functions (6.6.5). Generators also used different 
internal coordination systems to implement their internal energy efficiency strategies. 
Formally, one generator (Firm C) assigned a centralised and dedicated team with full
time staff to collate information and coordinate initiatives between different functions
(6.4.3). In other generators (Firms A and E), such coordination was done informally 
through decentralised cross-functional teams who 
an add-on responsibility to their full
B, C and E), a strong emphasis wa
information such as the number of carbon credits on hand, carbon credit revenue or 
purchases, and generation and non
promoted transparency and supervision among different functions as well as provided 
senior managers with information so they could assess the achievement of 
environmental strategies.  
Additionally, some generators (A, B, E) used inter
entered into outsourcing relationships, partnerships and joint ventures in relation to 
thermal investment projects or carbon credit purchases. These inter
include mechanisms such as the sharing of information systems
disclosure of relevant performance measures to enable mutual learning and supervision. 
Trust also acted as a mutual control where the generators selected the partners with 
whom they had previous or on-going business relationships. 
Figure 8-5: Use of cross-functional controls and coordinating systems (2000
Figure 8-5 shows changes in the degree of use of cross
systems in the five generators. From 2000 to 2005, Firms C and E had the highest use of 
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cross-functional systems to ensure the effective implementation of their proactive 
internal energy efficiency initiatives. Firm E had the highest use of these systems during 
2006-2007 due to the need to coordinate diverse cross-functional energy efficiency 
teams. Firms A and B experienced an identical degree of cross-functional MCS 
component use from 2000 to 2009, potentially due to both generators’ high emission 
profiles and thus potential liabilities under the GCCPs. This led to a need to rely on 
cross-functional control systems to coordinate the monitoring and management of 
emissions and compliance carbon costs. Firms A and B also had the highest MCS use 
during the 2007-2009 period among the five generators, due to their more proactive 
carbon credit strategies to manage the potential carbon costs (6.2.5; 6.3.5). 
From October 2008, Firms A, B and E increased the use of inter-firm controls as they 
entered into relationships with external organisations to negotiate carbon credit 
purchases (e.g. 6.6.5). This reflects their changing strategic emphasis to focus on carbon 
credit strategies to meet their upcoming ETS compliance obligations. In contrast, cross-
functional MCS was used to a lower degree within Firm C, due to the cancellation of 
the carbon trading business and the substantial scale-back of internal energy efficiency 
initiatives as a result of internal restructuring from October 2008 (6.4.5). The other 
state-owned generators (B and E) also underwent internal restructuring, but as they had 
not established a carbon trading business, the impact of internal restructuring on their 
cross-functional systems was minimal. Figure 8-5 also illustrates that Firm D had the 
lowest use of cross-functional coordinating systems, corresponding to the limited scope 
of the internal energy efficiency initiatives it undertook. However, coordinating system 
use increased gradually to monitor the implementation of carbon trading activities to 
increase its retail competitiveness (6.5.4).  
Enabling controls and control systems 
Enabling controls and control systems are used by generators to increase employee 
innovation and managerial discretion and thus, to facilitate the development of the 
internal capabilities required to cope with external volatilities and pressures and build a 
GCCP-related competitive advantage. These MCS component types are primarily used 
in relation to generation, retail and carbon credit strategies.  
In Firm C, the HRM system was used to train existing staff or recruit new employees 
who specialised in sustainability and carbon neutrality; the areas that reinforce its green-
brand retail strategy (6.4.3). In contrast, as part of its carbon credit strategy, Firm B 
employed dedicated carbon traders to build internal expertise to prepare for future ETS 
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compliance obligations (6.3.4). These MCS component differences are consistent with 
the fact that Firm C has no carbon costs, while Firm B has high emission profile and 
thus substantial carbon costs (Table 7-1). Early on, Firm E also invested resources, e.g. 
through a separate budget, to promote customer energy efficiency and develop energy 
efficiency products and services, with a vision to make this one of its retail competitive 
advantages (6.6.2).  
Furthermore, most generators (A, C, D, and E) used their HRM systems to acquire and 
develop staff expertise in a particular renewable technology so they could pursue a 
large-scale renewable development programme in the later periods. In Firms C and E, 
an overall budget for climate change initiatives was established to encourage managerial 
discretion and staff innovation in relation to projects and initiatives, that could result in 
a potential competitive advantage (6.4.4). Additionally, some generators (A, B, E) 
assigned a separate budget for carbon trading, either to develop staff skills in managing 
future carbon costs or to maximise potential revenue from carbon trading. 
Figure 8-6: Use of enabling controls and control systems (2000-2009) 
 
Figure 8-6 illustrates a general increase over time in the use of enabling control systems 
for all generators. However, there are substantial differences in the timing of the 
adoption of these systems and the degree of their use. In earlier periods, there was no 
enabling control system in the thermal-based Firms A and B. However, the renewable 
generators (C, D and E) began to use their MCS early on to develop renewable 
expertise. Firm E was the earliest and used its MCS to build internal expertise in 
customer energy efficiency. 
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From January 2006 to September 2008, there has been a substantial increase in the use 
of enabling control systems in Firm C. Due to its decision to undertake proactive 
environmental strategies in response to the GCCPs (6.4.3), a separate budget was 
established and the HRM system was used to encourage innovation and expertise in 
wind development, carbon trading, and carbon neutrality. Firm E was behind Firm C, 
but had higher enabling control system use than other firms. This is because it 
established a budget for climate change initiatives and used the HRM system to develop 
geothermal expertise in this period. During 2006/07, Firm B recognised the need to 
develop carbon trading skills to prepare itself for future ETS compliance obligations. 
Therefore, it assigned a separate budget for carbon purchases and used the HR system to 
identify and recruit specialised carbon trading personnel (6.3.3). Firm A, initially behind 
Firm B in adopting these types of control systems, caught up and developed its 
geothermal human expertise and carbon trading capabilities to build a green advantage 
and manage its upcoming ETS compliance costs (6.2.3). Firm D had a lower use of 
enabling control systems than other four generators during Jan2006-Sep2007, due to its 
sole emphasis on the HRM system for wind energy expertise. However, it has since 
used a wider range of enabling control systems to develop the internal carbon trading 
skills required to implement differentiated carbon credit and retail strategies (6.5.3).  
During the last period (2008/09), the use of enabling control systems within the state-
owned generators (B, C, E) decreased. This is because governmental performance 
pressures led to a decrease in strategic emphasis and less resource discretion for 
developing expertise in carbon trading (B, C) and climate change initiatives (C, E) 
(Table 7-7). In contrast, because of capital market pressures, the publicly-listed Firms A 
and D considered expertise in carbon trading to be critical to their competitiveness in a 
GCCP-focused environment. Thus, the use of enabling control systems was maintained 
to support their environmental strategies.  
Risk monitoring systems 
As outlined in Table 8-2, there are also control systems that directly monitored changes 
in the external operating environments. Therefore, they are named as risk monitoring 
systems, with risk referring to the volatilities and fluctuations in the key institutional 
and economic environments of the generators. These risk monitoring systems provide 
externally-orientated information, based on which generators can make the appropriate 
strategic responses in order to maintain their competitiveness. The primary 
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environmental strategies supported by risk monitoring systems include generation 
investment, retail, political and carbon credit strategies. 
All the generators established a climate change risk register to identify, measure, and 
monitor a wide range of GCCP-related and climate change volatilities and pressures. By 
ranking each volatility or pressure by significance (potential impact) and time horizon 
(short, medium to long term), this risk register helped managers prioritise their attention 
and decision-making focus (e.g. 6.4.4). Additionally, the generators monitored market 
and regulatory changes such as movements in carbon markets, external fuel economics 
and modifications to the GCCPs (policy oversight system), to inform their carbon credit 
and generation strategies (e.g. 6.6.4). There were also systems that monitored 
competitors' GCCP-related competitive actions so the generators could adapt their retail 
strategies or undertake other appropriate responses. Understanding the political agenda 
of other organisations helped the generators to inform their political positions, e.g. to 
dismiss other generators’ arguments in their GCCP submissions (e.g. 6.5.2). Generators 
also maintained a database to monitor changes in the demands and expectations of 
different customer groups. The database information was critical to generators in 
designing their retail strategies and developing new products and services (6.6.4).  
Figure 8-7: Use of risk monitoring systems (2000-2009) 
 
Figure 8-7 illustrates that the use of risk monitoring systems grew over time for all 
generators. This potentially reflects the increasingly complex external environments 
associated with the GCCPs and the resultant multiple volatilities and pressures to which 
the generators were exposed. Such complexity requires broader-scope monitoring 
systems and more attention to be placed on these systems at the strategic level. 
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Interview data further suggests that these risk monitoring systems provided information 
to reduce the gap between organisational knowledge and changes in external 
environments, thus enabling more timely and effective organisational learning and 
adaptation.  
As illustrated in Figure 8-7, Firm E led the industry during 2000-2005 period as it used 
its customer demand and expectation database to support its strategic emphasis on 
customer energy efficiency (6.6.2). In contrast, the other generators only had one or two 
risk monitoring systems and used them on an ad hoc basis. Since 2006, Firm C has had 
the highest use of risk monitoring systems in order to support the planning and 
implementation of different environmental strategies. Further, Firm B paid more 
attention to risk monitoring MCS components than Firm A (and Firm E during Jan2006 
– Sep2007) because Firm B placed early emphasis on a carbon credit strategy. Firm A 
had lower risk monitoring use than Firms B and E because it did not pay as much 
attention to a carbon credit strategy (as Firm B) or a customer energy efficiency/retail 
strategy (as Firm E). Due to perceived low exposure to GCCP volatilities and pressures, 
Firm D was again behind the other generators in its use of risk monitoring systems 
before 2008. However, since October 2008, the change in its retail and carbon credit 
strategies has resulted in more strategic use of the carbon market monitoring system and 
customer demand and expectation database (6.5.4). By October 2009, the use of risk 
monitoring systems in Firms B, C and E had converged at a higher level than Firms A 
and D. This corresponds to the wider range of environmental strategies that received 
strategic emphasis within Firms B, C and E (Table 7-7), which led these generators to 
employ the information provided by risk monitoring systems more extensively during 
their strategic planning process.  
Legitimising controls and control systems 
Legitimising controls and control systems were used primarily to satisfy the demands 
and expectations of external stakeholders and thus maintain the generators’ social 
legitimacy. The external disclosure of emission levels and sustainability reporting were 
undertaken by all the generators to implement their environmental policy and disclosure 
strategies and thereby demonstrate their environmental responsibility. Further, customer 
energy efficiency information systems were adopted to support customer energy 
efficiency strategy, driven by governmental pressures. The use of these systems did not 
add to the generators’ profits or revenues and therefore did not result in significant 
changes at behavioural, processual or strategic levels.  
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Other legitimising controls and control systems involved advice or inspection from 
independent verifiers or auditors and thus possibly changed generators’ internal systems 
and processes. Such controls and control systems include: audits of AR sustainability 
content (A and B) and of emissions inventory (C); external awards or accreditation of 
organisational EMS (A and E); and the CarboNZero certification process (A, C, D). 
Generators undertook these control and control systems when implementing their 
environmental policy and carbon neutrality strategies, and to increase the transparency 
in emissions-related disclosure. By doing so, generators not only sought social 
acceptability, but also differentiated themselves from others and thus enhanced their 
market reputation.  
Figure 8-8: Use of legitimising controls and control systems (2000-2009) 
 
Figure 8-8 indicates that from January 2000 to September 2008, the use of legitimising 
controls and control systems increased to varying degrees for all five generators. This 
corresponds to the generators’ recognition of increasing governmental and societal 
pressures regarding emissions reduction and sustainability. Firms C and E had the 
highest use of legitimising control systems before 2006. This is because they both 
adopted customer energy efficiency systems, sustainability reporting, emissions-related 
disclosure and gained accreditation for their EMSs, and used these controls extensively 
to build a reputation for high environmental performance. Since January 2006, Firm C’s 
legitimising MCS use has surpassed Firm E. This is potentially due to Firm C’s 
proactive renewable-focused environmental strategies (Figure 7-5), and thus a strong 
emphasis on legitimising MCS to improve its green brand. From October 2008, Firm C 
publicly issued a full disclosure of its emissions inventory and had this inventory and its 
sustainability report externally verified, thus reinforcing its strategic vision to 
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differentiate and become a climate change leader. Thus, the use of Firm C’s legitimising 
MCS components increased substantially and ranked the highest among the five 
generators by October 2009. 
The rate of increase in Firm A’s legitimising control system use was the highest among 
the five generators until October 2008. This is because it adopted multiple controls such 
as CarboNZero certification, sustainability reporting and the verification of 
sustainability content in ARs, to demonstrate its environmental responsibility and 
support its geothermal investment strategy. These legitimising controls are of strategic 
importance within Firm A since they supported its competitive strategy. In contrast, 
while Firm B perceived stronger societal pressures associated with its emissions profile, 
it did not have as many legitimising controls or place a strong emphasis on them. This 
tentatively suggests that Firm B was not as proactive in protecting its legitimacy despite 
its high societal exposure. Legitimising MCS component use in Firm D was 
substantially lower than the other generators, since Firm D paid little attention to 
emissions-related disclosure, customer energy efficiency, or carbon neutrality strategies 
(except for 2007/2008 when it pursued a carbon neutrality programme). During 2008–
2009, legitimising MCS component use increased within Firms A, B, C and E as more 
strategic attention was paid to emissions-related disclosure strategies to manage social 
legitimacy in face of carbon-focused public pressures. In contrast, there is a drop in 
Firm D’s legitimising MCS component use, caused by the cancellation of its carbon 
neutrality programme (6.5.4).  
8.2.3. MCS groups and their relationships to changes in environmental 
strategies  
Further analysis indicates that the eight MCS component types discussed in 8.2.1 and 
8.2.2 above have a number of commonalities regarding their relationships with the 
environmental strategies and GCCP-related external and internal environments. 
Accordingly, these eight types of MCS components are classified into three component 
groups: internally-oriented strategy MCS; externally-oriented strategy MCS; and 
volatility/pressure-related MCS. These three groups are directly related to the three 
strategy objectives (Table 7-8). 
To enable quantitative analysis, the degree of use for a particular MCS group was 
obtained by adding up the degrees of use across the component MCS types. This allows 
an explanation of the relationships between MCS design and use and changes in 
environmental strategies (P4).  Each MCS component group is discussed next. 
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Group one: Internally-oriented strategy MCS for cost control 
Belief systems, boundary controls, diagnostic controls and control systems and cross-
functional controls and coordinating systems were grouped into internally-oriented 
strategy MCS. This is because these four are primarily designed and used to support 
changes in emissions management, internal energy efficiency, internal restructuring, 
generation and carbon credit strategies which are driven by cost control concerns.  
Figure 8-9: Use of internally-orientated strategy MCS component group (2000-
2009) 
 
As shown in Figure 8-9, the degree of use of internally-oriented strategy MCS 
component group increased consistently over time. This is potentially explained by the 
rising complexity of generators’ environmental strategies and the wider functional 
involvement required for their implementation (7.5.1). Firms A, B and E display a 
similar degree of use of these internally-oriented strategy MCS components. This 
similarity is probably associated with the generation emissions profile and the carbon 
obligations these generators have under the GCCPs, and the need to focus internal MCS 
efforts on emissions management, carbon credit and generation investment strategies for 
carbon cost control. Consistent with the carbon costs of each organisation, the 
difference in the rate of change in MCS use between these three generators correlates to 
the variations in emissions profile, with highest-emitting firm (B) experiencing the 
fastest growth in its MCS use. Further, the degree of use of these internally-oriented 
strategy MCS was highest in Firm C due to its renewable-only generation strategy and 
the extensive and wide-scope internal energy efficiency initiatives adopted. The 
simultaneous execution of these initiatives required a strong supporting belief system, 
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regular monitoring and reporting, strong internal commitment and coordination and 
clear guidance and responsibility assignment. The slight reduction in MCS use during 
Oct2008-Oct2009 is probably related to the decreased scope of its internal energy 
efficiency strategy due to Government performance pressures. Firm D ranked the lowest 
in internally-orientated strategy MCS component use in all periods, because it designed 
and used the smallest number of internally-oriented strategy controls and control 
systems. This corresponds to the narrower scope of Firm D’s energy efficiency efforts, 
which is potentially associated with its smaller size. 
Group two: Externally-oriented strategy MCS for competitiveness 
Interactive control systems, enabling control systems and risk monitoring systems are 
grouped into externally-oriented strategy MCS components for competitiveness. This is 
because these three control systems tend to be used to implement changes in the 
environmental strategies aimed at gaining a competitive advantage or helping generators 
to respond effectively to a key external volatility or pressure. These strategies include 
generation, political, retail, and carbon credit strategies as discussed in Chapter 7 (7.5, 
Table 7-8). Additionally, a number of externally-oriented control systems were used to 
support a customer energy efficiency strategy, since this strategy is integrated into some 
generators’ retail strategy.   
Figure 8-10: Use of externally-orientated strategy MCS component group (2000-
2009) 
 
Figure 8-10 shows that from 2000 to 2008, the use of externally-oriented strategy MCS 
components increased for all generators, potentially due to the rising level of strategy 
proactiveness (Figure 7-5). Firm E had the highest use of externally-oriented strategy 
MCS from January 2002 to December 2005 as it used this MCS component group to 
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monitor customer demand and develop internal expertise in customer energy efficiency 
as part of its proactive retail strategy. This is probably due to Firm E’s low carbon costs 
(Table 7-1) and internal expertise in customer energy efficiency, and thus increasing 
strategic emphasis on customer-based revenue management. From January 2006 to 
September 2008, Firm C had the highest use of this MCS component group. Its high 
level of strategy proactiveness (Figure 7-5) required the use of externally-oriented 
strategy MCS components to monitor external environmental changes and enable 
employee empowerment to support strategy planning and implementation. Further, 
thermal-based Firms A and B had similar increases in their externally-oriented strategy 
MCS component use, primarily due to the utilisation of risk monitoring and interactive 
control systems to support the planning of their generation strategies and carbon credit 
strategies. The change in this MCS component group use within renewable-based Firms 
D and E was similar, potentially associated with increasing use of enabling and 
interactive control systems to implement their green-focused generation and retail 
strategies.  
From 2008 to 2009, the use of this MCS component group decreased in Firms A and C. 
Both generators employed their MCS less interactively, consistent with their reduced 
strategy proactiveness due to regulatory uncertainty and the less positive incentive for 
renewable investments (7.5). Additionally, Firm C experienced a sharp decline in the 
use of enabling MCS due to the government financial pressures and thus reduced the 
scope and strategic emphasis given to its carbon credit strategy (6.4.5). Firms B and E 
were exposed to similar pressures from the Government and also used these enabling 
MCS components less. However, the strategy review undertaken in B and E 
simultaneously required higher interactive MCS use and more extensive employment of 
risk monitoring systems to facilitate the strategy renewal process (6.3.5 and 6.6.5). 
Consequently, the total use of externally-oriented strategy MCS components slightly 
increased within Firms B and E during 2008-2009. Similar to Firms A and C, Firm D 
experienced a drop in interactive MCS use associated with reactive political and 
generation strategies (7.5). However, it employed information from risk monitoring 
systems more extensively to support its differentiation carbon credit and retail 
strategies. This resulted in the stabilisation of externally-oriented strategy MCS 
component use within Firm D. 
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Group three: Legitimising MCS for legitimacy  
The remaining MCS component type, legitimising controls and control systems, 
respond directly to the demands and pressures in the generators’ external institutional 
environments. As discussed in 8.2.2, these controls and control systems are undertaken 
to implement changes in environmental policy, customer energy efficiency, emissions-
related disclosure and carbon neutrality strategies, which are in turn driven by 
legitimacy needs (Table 7-8). Accordingly, most generators increased the design and 
use of legitimising MCS over time in response to increasingly complex GCCP-related 
institutional environments, and the degree of use varied across the generators in 
accordance with the level of strategic emphasis and the degree of strategy proactiveness 
pursued within each time period.  
Change in the use of different MCS groups over time 
The use of each MCS component type, examined in Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2, is 
averaged across the five generators within each time period. Next, this resulted degree 
of use is averaged across the MCS component types comprising a MCS component 
group in order to gain an averaged degree of use for each MCS component group. This 
enables an assessment to be made about the trend of change over time for each MCS 
component group and inter-group variations. Figure 8-11 illustrates changes in the 
average use of the three MCS groups over time.  
Figure 8-11: Averaged degree of MCS component group use (2000-2009) 
 
Figure 8-11 illustrates that the use of internally-orientated strategy MCS component 
group increased gradually from 2000 to 2009. Over time, the generators perceived high 
carbon costs associated with generation emissions and operational and transactional 
costs associated with non-generation emissions. This led them to place increasing 
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strategic emphasis on emissions management, generation investment, and carbon credit 
strategies (for thermal generators) and internal energy efficiency strategies (for 
renewable generators), which had a cost control focus (Tables 7-7 and 7-8).  An 
increasing number of diagnostic controls and controls systems were employed and they 
received more emphasis at top management levels since they were critical to the 
achievement of these cost-focused environmental strategies. Additionally, there is a 
need for stronger internal coordination between different functions, departments and 
levels of management to minimise transactional costs (cross-functional MCS 
components). Belief systems and boundary controls were also used to increase cost 
consciousness and to prevent internal opportunism and inefficiencies in strategy 
implementation. Consequently, the combined use of these four MCS component types 
resulted in an increasing degree of internally-oriented MCS component group use.  
The use of externally-oriented strategy MCS increased from Jan2000 to Sep2008, but 
has reduced since. As discussed in Chapter 7 (Figure 7-5), from 2000 to 2008, the 
generators increased the proactiveness of some environmental strategies, including 
generation investment and retail strategies, to protect or enhance their competitiveness. 
Therefore, the generators used their MCS components more interactively and in an 
enabling manner (interactive and enabling MCS components) to encourage strategic 
renewal and the development of internal skills and expertise required to implement 
competitiveness-driven strategies. The generators also used the information provided by 
risk monitoring systems more extensively to inform the review of existing strategies and 
the formulation of new ones. In contrast, from 2008 to 2009, due to regulatory 
uncertainty and potential ETS changes, most generators reduced their strategy 
proactiveness, especially in relation to political and generation strategies. This in turn 
required less input from lower management levels into the strategy planning process and 
lessened the importance of building renewable expertise, thus leading to a decrease in 
the use of interactive and enabling control systems. Additionally, governmental 
performance pressures also led state-owned generators to reduce their strategic 
emphasis on carbon trading and to refocus on core businesses. This reduced the use of 
the enabling control systems that were previously utilised for the development of 
carbon-related expertise. In combination, these factors resulted in a drop in externally-
oriented strategy MCS use from October 2008 to October 2009.  
Figure 8-11 also indicates that the use of legitimising MCS components increased at a 
consistent rate throughout the period. As the generators recognised the increasing 
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governmental and societal pressures related to carbon emissions, they undertook more 
proactive environmental strategies in response (customer energy efficiency, external 
disclosure, environmental policy, and carbon neutrality strategies). Consequently, to 
implement these strategies, they adopted customer energy efficiency information 
systems, and undertook more extensive emissions disclosure and verification and wider-
scope carbon neutrality processes (legitimising MCS components). They also paid more 
attention to these controls at the top management levels as they realised that responding 
to institutional pressures is a prerequisite for social acceptability and thus organisational 
survival in the long term. For some generators, legitimising MCS components received 
an increasingly high level of strategic emphasis because its adoption was believed to 
increase the organisation’ legitimacy and thus promote a green advantage in a GCCP-
focused context. Additionally, the higher level of legitimising MCS component use than 
externally-oriented and internally-oriented strategy MCS component use confirms the 
importance of legitimising MCS components from a top management perspective.  
Overall, this section (8.2) has outlined the changes in the design and use of 
organisational MCS components to support the eleven environmental strategies 
undertaken by the generators as discussed in Chapter 7. Eight types of controls and 
control systems were found, four of which supported Simons (1991) MCS categories 
and the other four were new and have not been examined adequately in the prior 
literature. These eight MCS component types were used at varying degrees across 
generators and time periods, depending on the degree of strategy proactiveness and the 
level of strategic emphasis of their environmental strategies. Further, they can be 
classified into three main groups: internally-oriented strategy MCS components for cost 
control; externally-oriented strategy MCS components for competitiveness; and 
legitimising MCS components for legitimacy. In suggesting that changes in 
environmental strategies require corresponding modifications in the design, use, and 
objectives of MCS, these results provide empirical support for P4. Furthermore, they 
indicate that organisational MCS components were used not only to achieve an 
objective of internal efficiency but also to support the pursuit and development of a 
competitive advantage, and to ensure and enhance the generators’ social legitimacy in a 
carbon-constrained context (P4). Understanding these different objectives is important 
because it provides insights into the motivations underlying the design and use of 
different MCS component types and groups. The next section discusses in more detail 
the MCS objectives.  
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8.3. MCS objectives 
This section analyses the objectives suggested above in more detail and examines any 
additional ones that potentially motivated the design and use of organisational MCS 
components (P4). The analysis finds commonalities relating to these MCS objectives, 
but also identifies differences in their distribution across the generators. The next 
section discusses the common objectives that were found across the five generators in 
their MCS design and use. 
8.3.1. Common objectives of organisational MCS 
Analysis conducted into the objectives underlying all the controls and control systems 
undertaken by the five generators suggests five common MCS objectives: 1) reducing 
compliance carbon costs, 2) reducing transactional costs, 3) reducing operating 
overhead costs, 4) enhancing/protect market competitiveness, and 5) achieving 
legitimacy.   
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Table 8-3 summarises and lists these objectives and matches each organisational 
objective with the appropriate MCS component types and groups (as examined in 
Section 8.2) and the environmental strategic changes driving their design and use. This 
table suggests that different MCS component groups were aimed primarily at different 
objectives: internally-oriented strategy MCS components for cost reduction (carbon, 
operating or transactional), externally-oriented strategy MCS components for 
competitiveness, and legitimising MCS components for legitimacy. Each objective is 
discussed next. 
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Table 8-3: Ranking of organisational objectives of MCS, matching with MCS 
component types and groups and environmental strategies 
MCS objectives Correspond to MCS type Part of MCS group Supporting changes in 
environmental strategy 
1. Reduce 
compliance 
carbon costs 
Diagnostic controls and 
control systems  
Belief systems 
Internally-oriented 
strategy MCS 
Emissions management 
strategy 
Carbon credit strategy  
Generation strategy 
2. Reduce operating 
overhead cost 
Diagnostic controls and 
control systems 
Belief systems 
Internally-oriented 
strategy MCS 
Internal energy efficiency 
strategy 
Carbon neutrality strategy 
Internal restructuring 
3. Reduce 
transactional cost 
Cross-functional 
coordinating systems 
Boundary control 
systems 
 
Internally-oriented 
strategy MCS 
Emissions management 
strategy 
Internal energy efficiency 
strategy 
Carbon credit strategy 
Environmental policy 
4. Enhance/Protect 
market 
competitiveness 
Interactive control 
systems 
Enabling control systems  
Risk monitoring systems 
Belief systems 
Externally-
oriented strategy 
MCS 
Generation strategy 
Carbon credit strategy 
Retail strategy 
Political strategy 
Carbon neutrality strategy  
Customer energy efficiency 
strategy 
5. Achieve 
legitimacy 
Legitimising controls and 
control systems 
Legitimising MCS Emissions-related disclosure 
strategy 
Carbon neutrality strategy 
Environmental policy 
Customer energy efficiency 
strategy 
 
1. Reducing compliance carbon costs  
Many controls and control systems were designed and used within thermal generators to 
reduce the compliance carbon costs as part of their emissions management, carbon 
credit, and generation strategies. Diagnostic controls and control systems such as 
emissions monitoring system and reduction targets (Table 8-1) were used to ensure 
effective reduction of generation carbon missions and thus lower carbon costs. 
Similarly, carbon-related budgetary controls optimised the cost control when buying 
and selling carbon credits for ETS compliance purposes. The monitoring of emissions 
measures also enabled the generators to make a strategic shift to renewable investments 
(A, B, and E). In some generators, a belief system such as a financially-focused 
organisational culture supplemented diagnostic controls by creating an internal 
environment which expected and rewarded high cost awareness and control, thus 
increasing the effectiveness of managing compliance carbon costs. Belief systems led to 
stronger cost control within carbon trading function of Firm A and supported changes in 
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generation investment strategies within Firm B (to focus on making an adequate return 
from 2008) and Firm E (renewable-focused generation investment from 2007). Thus, 
the design and use of diagnostic controls and belief systems within these generators 
support a TCE-based objective and P4.  
2. Reducing operating overhead costs 
For most generators, reducing operating overhead costs associated with non-generation 
emissions was an important MCS objective. This is because the activities giving rise to 
such emissions (electricity, staff travel and paper use) caused significant overhead costs, 
which needed to be managed as part of internal cost control. An internal energy 
efficiency strategy was undertaken with a primary purpose to reduce these costs while 
the adoption of a carbon neutrality strategy also led to a reduction in non-generation 
emissions and associated overhead costs. To ensure the implementation of these 
strategies, these generators adopted many controls and control systems diagnostically 
(e.g. non-generation emissions measures and reduction targets and the link of the 
emissions measures to managerial performance evaluation) and environmentally-
focused belief systems. Furthermore, from October 2008, under governmental pressures, 
state-owned generators tightened budgetary controls as part of their internal 
restructuring, aimed at reducing operating costs and hence, improving internal 
efficiency. Consequently, this use of diagnostic controls and control systems and belief 
systems is consistent with P4 and a TCE-based explanation.  
3. Reducing transactional costs 
Reducing transactional costs was the primary objective for the use of cross-functional 
controls and coordinating systems and boundary controls. Cross-functional controls and 
control systems enhanced internal monitoring and coordination when implementing 
emissions management and internal energy efficiency strategies and ensured inter-
organisational cooperation in carbon credit strategy. Further, boundary controls (e.g. 
carbon-related spending limits and the separation of duties) minimised opportunism in 
carbon trading transactions (carbon credit strategy) and aligned employee behaviour 
with organisational environmental policy (goal congruence). By improving coordination 
and reducing opportunism, these MCS component types contributed to a reduction in 
transactional costs and thus ensured internal efficiency in respect of environmental 
strategies. Consequently, the focus on transactional cost economising supports P4 and a 
TCE view. 
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4. Protecting/ Enhancing competitiveness 
Enhancing or protecting generators’ competitiveness was the primary objective 
underlying the design and use of interactive control systems, enabling controls and 
control systems, as well as risk monitoring systems. Interactive control systems were 
used extensively within both renewable and thermal generators during the strategic 
planning process to revise their environmental strategies in response to GCCP changes 
and associated volatilities and pressures. Most generators used MCS components, such 
as an emission monitoring system and carbon price monitoring system, in an interactive 
manner to generate internal debate about the choice of a generation investment strategy 
that could maintain or enhance market competitiveness. Some generators also used 
internal communication and profit planning systems interactively to encourage creative 
carbon trading and retail initiatives that could be used to respond effectively to the 
GCCPs, and thus protect competitive advantage. Additionally, the generators used 
accounting-based analysis interactively within their political strategy to influence the 
policy-makers and regulators and their GCCP designs. Interview data suggest that such 
accounting use was not driven by a potential to increase political power, but primarily a 
need to protect or enhance the organisation’s existing competitiveness.  
Enabling controls and control systems (e.g. HRM system) were employed within the 
renewable generators to develop staff expertise in a particular renewable technology and 
thus, support their differentiation renewable-based generation strategy. As part of their 
carbon credit and retail strategies, some generators also established appropriate budgets 
to allocate resources for internal capability development in carbon trading, carbon 
neutrality, or customer energy efficiency. This would enable them to gain a competitive 
advantage in a future carbon-constrained economy.  
The generators also designed and used risk monitoring systems with a competitiveness-
driven objective. This MCS component type monitored changes in GCCP-related 
economic and institutional environments and provided information that allowed 
managers to make strategic assessment and adapt to external changes. The information 
from the policy oversight system, external fuel economics monitoring system and 
carbon market monitoring system enables the evaluation and formulation of generation 
investment and carbon credit strategies. The competitor actions monitoring system and 
customer demand and expectation database allowed the planning of retail strategy. 
Additionally, the policy oversight system and external organisations’ political agenda 
monitoring systems provided information for generators to choose an appropriate 
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political strategy. Therefore, the design and use of risk monitoring systems were driven 
by a need to continually assess the fitness of current environmental strategies against the 
changing external environments and formulate new ones, if necessary in order to 
preserve or enhance the generators’ competitiveness. Additionally, belief systems were 
used within Firm C to support its renewable-only generation investment strategy and 
thus, contribute to its green-focused market competitiveness. 
Therefore, these four MCS component types are used to enable generators to develop 
internal capabilities and to review and renew their environmental strategies in an 
informed and timely manner so that their market competitiveness is preserved or 
enhanced. Therefore, these results support P4 and a RBT-based view of organisational 
MCS. 
5. Achieving social legitimacy 
Additionally, most generators sought to achieve social legitimacy through their  
legitimising MCS components. This MCS component was used by generators to 
demonstrate publicly that they conformed to external GCCP-related institutional 
pressures and expectations. Their adoption is thus driven by legitimacy-driven 
environmental strategies including emissions-related disclosure and carbon neutrality 
strategies, environmental policy and customer energy efficiency strategy. Some 
generators sought to legitimate themselves by using controls and control systems that 
involved verification by an external organisation which potentially lead to internal 
changes. This is the case with the external audit of emissions inventory, carbon 
neutrality certification system and external awards for EMS. In contrast, other 
legitimising controls, such as emissions-related disclosure, sustainability reporting and 
customer energy efficiency information systems, provided general statements to 
external stakeholders without entailing major internal behavioural and processual 
changes. Hence, the use of these controls and control systems is consistent with an IT-
based view that generators employ organisational MCS components to ensure social 
legitimacy. 
Overall, the results indicate that all five generators designed and used their MCS to 
implement different environmental strategies and achieve three different objectives 
simultaneously (competitiveness, cost control, and legitimacy) (P4). This provides 
empirical support for the simultaneous use of RBT, TCE and IT to explain the 
objectives driving a generator’s organisational MCS. Accordingly, the design and use of 
externally-oriented strategy MCS components is explained from a RBT competitiveness 
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perspective, while TCE explains the motivations for an internally-oriented cost strategy 
MCS components and an IT-based view is appropriate for examining legitimising MCS 
components. Further, each MCS objective was driven by the primary objective of 
change in particular environmental strategies, thus providing further support for P4. 
However, these different objectives did not receive equal importance within the five 
generators, as discussed in the next section. 
8.3.2. Distribution of MCS objectives 
Figure 8-12 demonstrates the distribution of the different objectives of organisational 
MCS across the five generators, based on the data from October 2007 to October 2009. 
This time period is the most relevant as it was when there were plans for and suggested 
changes to an ETS which led to the highest degree of external GCCP exposure (Figure 
7-1). Thus, analysing MCS objectives in this period captures the highest number of 
controls and control systems employed by the generators and their associated objective 
diversity. To enable this analysis, the primary objective motivating each control and 
control system highlighted in Tables 8-1 and 8-2 was determined. This step was 
undertaken for all controls and control systems constituting the organisational MCS of 
each generator until all the objectives underlying the five generators’ MCSs were 
attained. The number of controls and control systems driven by different objectives was 
then divided by the total sum of controls and control systems within each generator to 
obtain the relative importance (in terms of %).  
Figure 8-12: Distribution of MCS objectives (2007-2009) 
 
Figure 8-12 demonstrates significant differences in the focus of the objectives intended 
by each generator in establishing and using their organisational MCS. These inter-firm 
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differences were consistent with inter-firm differences observed within the objectives 
motivating the environmental strategic changes discussed in Chapter 7 (Table 7-9). 
Based on Figure 8-12, Table 8-4 ranks the MCS objectives by the frequency with which 
they underlie a generator’s controls and control systems. Accordingly, the ranking of all 
MCS objectives, within the five generators, is identical to that of the strategy objectives 
(Table 7-9).  
Table 8-4: Ranking of MCS objectives in the five generators (2007-2009) 
Ranking by 
frequency Firm A Firm B Firm C Firm D Firm E 
1 Reduce carbon 
cost  
Reduce carbon 
cost  
Protect/Enhance 
competitiveness 
Protect/Enhance 
competitiveness 
Protect/Enhance 
competitiveness 
2 Gain legitimacy Gain legitimacy Gain legitimacy Gain legitimacy Gain legitimacy 
3 Protect/Enhance 
competitiveness 
Protect/Enhance 
competitiveness 
Reduce 
operational cost 
Reduce 
transactional cost 
Reduce carbon 
cost  
4 Reduce transactional cost 
Reduce 
transactional cost 
Reduce 
transactional cost  
Reduce 
transactional cost 
Thermal generators (Firms A and B) used their MCS to primarily reduce the carbon 
costs associated with fulfilling their ETS compliance obligations. This is consistent with 
the strategic emphasis placed on emissions management and carbon credit strategies and 
the primary objective of their environmental strategies which was carbon cost control 
(Tables 7-7 and 7-8). Managing social legitimacy is the second most important strategic 
and MCS objective, due to their high carbon emissions profile and associated 
institutional pressures. This corresponds to the strategic emphasis placed on their 
emissions-related disclosure strategies. Additionally, competitiveness is also a MCS 
concern in Firms A and B, since the GCCPs have the potential to change their 
competitiveness significantly. Organisational MCS was used in Firm A to support the 
development of geothermal expertise and a competitive advantage due to implementing 
its differentiated generation strategy. In contrast, Firm B used its MCS interactively in 
its GCCP-related investment planning and political processes, in order to protect its 
thermal competitiveness. 
In the renewable generators (Firms C, D and E), competitiveness is the key concern of 
MCS design and use. Such focus in MCS objectives ensures their controls and control 
systems were used to support renewable generation investment strategies and green 
branding retail strategies. They also used accounting-based analysis in their political 
strategy to support the proposed GCCPs and thus enhance their renewable-related 
advantage. A competitiveness-focused MCS corresponds to the strategic emphasis 
placed on the generation, retail, and political strategies within these generators (Table 7-
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7). Renewable generators also had an interest to use their MCS to manage and disclose 
their non-generation emissions to show their climate change responsibility. This is 
consistent with the strategic emphasis placed on carbon neutrality and emissions-related 
disclosure strategies which aims to maintain legitimacy. A MCS and strategic focus on 
legitimating these generators to internal and external stakeholders also enabled them to 
reinforce their green brand.  
Additionally, due to rapid organisational growth, Firm C experienced a high level of 
non-generation emissions and associated operating costs. Consequently, it established a 
proactive internal energy efficiency strategy and used MCS to measure, monitor, and 
control non-generation emissions, and thus reduce operating costs. Further, while also 
having an ETS compliance obligation, Firm E’s emissions profile is significantly 
smaller than Firms A and B and thus, carbon cost control was considered only a 
secondary MCS objective. 
The above table also suggests that reducing transactional cost as a MCS objective was 
only of secondary importance across the five generators. The use of boundary and cross-
functional MCS enables emissions management, internal energy efficiency and carbon 
credit strategies and environmental policy to be implemented with the least transactional 
costs and thus, optimise internal efficiency.  
The analysis further suggests that the objectives of MCS design and use were consistent 
with the objectives underlying the choice of environmental strategies in each generator. 
Further, a strong focus on particular MCS objectives is driven by the strategic emphasis 
placed on particular environmental strategies by management. Further, this provides 
support for P4.  
8.4. Summary  
To summarise, this chapter has investigated the design, use, and objectives of 
organisational MCS employed to support changes in generators’ GCCP-related 
environmental strategies, as presented in Chapter 7. It was found that each generator’s 
MCS incorporates a range of controls and control systems which can be classified into 
distinct MCS component types and groups. In addition to the boundary controls, belief 
systems, diagnostic and interactive control systems as suggested by Simons (1991), 
generators adopted additional MCS component types: enabling controls and control 
systems; cross-functional controls and coordinating systems; risk monitoring systems; 
and legitimising controls and systems. While a generator may establish and use all these 
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MCS component types, their degree of use and manner of use (diagnostic or interactive) 
varied across generators and over time, governed by the level of proactiveness and the 
relative priority (emphasis) of the environmental strategies that they supported. Further, 
these eight MCS component types can be grouped in three MCS component groups, 
each of which served a different MCS objective: i) internally-oriented strategy MCS for 
cost control, ii) externally-oriented strategy MCS for enhancing and protecting 
competitiveness, and iii) legitimising MCS for gaining and maintaining social 
legitimacy. While pursuing common MCS objectives, the importance of each objective 
varies across the generators depending on the primary objectives and strategic emphasis 
placed on each generator’s environmental strategies. Overall, depending on the MCS 
component type and group examined, the results provide empirical support for the use 
of RBT, TCE or IT in this study. Proposition 4 is also supported as these results suggest 
that a change in environmental strategies has significant impacts on organisational MCS 
design, use and objectives. 
The next chapter, Chapter 9, discusses the Chapter 6 evidence and analysis from 
Chapters 7 and 8, in relation to the research question, the proposed research framework 
and the four propositions (P1, P2, P3, and P4). This provides an understanding of this 
study’s theoretical and practical contributions to the literature. Chapter 9 also outlines 
the limitations of this study and opportunities for future research. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusion 
9.1. Introduction 
The GCCPs planned and modified by New Zealand Government from 2002 to 2009, 
have the potential to impose significant carbon-related costs on generators and increase 
the volatilities and pressures within the external environments in which generators 
operate. The key question arises as to what organisational changes have been 
undertaken within these generators to enable them to reduce these costs and prepare for 
the changing environments. This study’s research question is therefore:  
 
To answer this research question, a multiple-theory research framework was developed 
based on three theories, TCE, IT, and RBT and the prior literature. Four associated 
propositions were given in Chapter 4 and are restated below (9.2.2). In conducting the 
multiple-case study of the five generators in the NZEI (a discussed in Chapter 5), 
evidence related to environmental strategies and MCS change within each generator 
from January 2000 to October 2009 was provided in Chapter 6. The results of analysing 
this evidence were then presented in the two subsequent chapters. Chapter 7 identified 
the key GCCP-related external volatilities and pressures and internal characteristics and 
capabilities, discussed how they influenced generators’ environmental strategies, and 
explained why different generators made different strategic changes in response to the 
GCCPs. Chapter 8 examined how MCS design, use and objectives were modified over 
time to support these environmental strategic changes.  
This chapter concludes this study by firstly, discussing the implications for 
organisational MCS and how the results validate the Research Framework and 
propositions, and by providing an overall evaluation of the key results. Next, the 
contributions of these results to the academic literature and their implications for 
practice are outlined. This is followed by the limitations of this study and the remaining 
issues to be solved in future research. Lastly, the conclusions for this study are 
presented.  
What are the MCS implications arising from strategic choices New Zealand 
electricity generators make in managing economic volatility and societal pressures 
resulting from a prolonged period of GCCP changes?  
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9.2. Research Question - Implications for Organisational MCS 
The key results of this study can be evaluated in relation to the extent they have 
addressed the research question above. This study has identified a number of 
implications for organisational MCS in managing the volatilities and pressures 
associated with the GCCPs. First, generators need to make changes in their MCS to 
enable the planning and implementation of their organisation’s environmental strategies. 
Multiple types of controls and control systems needed to be adopted. To implement 
emissions management, internal energy efficiency strategies and internal restructuring, 
generators needed to establish and utilise the internally-oriented strategy MCS 
component group that contains diagnostic controls and control systems, belief systems, 
boundary controls, and cross-functional systems. To realise the changing strategic 
direction in their political, generation, retail, and carbon credit strategies due to the 
GCCPs, generators employed externally-oriented strategy MCS components including 
interactive and enabling control systems and risk monitoring systems. Further, the use 
of legitimising MCS components was essential to enable generators to implement their 
chosen environmental policy, emissions disclosure, carbon neutrality and customer 
energy efficiency strategies, and respond effectively to GCCP-related institutional 
demands and pressures.  
The second implication is that generators need to vary the degree of different MCS 
component group use, depending on the level of strategy proactiveness and strategic 
emphasis assigned to particular environmental strategies. In general, to implement more 
proactive environmental strategies in response to the multiple GCCP-related volatilities 
and pressures, generators needed to establish a higher number of controls and control 
systems and use MCS information with a broader scope and at a more strategic level. 
However, in response to regulatory uncertainty and potential ETS changes, generators 
may reduce the level of proactiveness relating to political and generation strategies, and 
thus make less use of enabling and interactive control systems. Regarding the degree of 
strategic emphasis, if a renewable generator prioritises a renewable investment strategy, 
it requires more interactive use of its external fuels economics monitoring system and 
an enabling HRM system to develop internal renewable expertise. Similarly, as a 
thermal generator places more strategic emphasis on emissions management and carbon 
credit strategies to prepare for the upcoming ETS, such MCS components as the 
generation emissions monitoring systems and carbon-related budgetary controls will 
receive more use at top management levels.  
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Thirdly, as with the strategy objectives, organisational MCS can be used for multiple 
objectives including competitiveness, legitimacy, and cost control. However, not all 
controls and control systems served these objectives simultaneously. Some MCS 
component types are geared towards competitiveness (externally-oriented strategy 
MCS), while some component types focus on cost control (internally-oriented strategy 
MCS), and the remaining component types serve to legitimise the generators to external 
stakeholders (legitimising MCS). Consequently, in designing their MCS, organisations 
need to be aware of the possible multiple objectives that MCS serves. Furthermore, to 
ensure that organisations can respond effectively to the diverse volatilities and pressures 
associated with the GCCPs, they need to establish a wide range of MCS component 
types and groups as identified in Chapter 8. It is also important that organisations 
clearly identify what environmental strategy (or mixture of strategies) and strategy 
objectives each of these MCS component types and groups support. This ensures that 
their environmental strategies are properly implemented and their objectives achieved, 
thus enabling organisational performance to be maintained, or enhanced in a GCCP-
focused context.  
Fourthly, while generators pursue common MCS objectives, the importance of these 
objectives need to be customised to match the primary objectives motivating each 
generator’s environmental strategic changes. Accordingly, due to their generation 
emission profiles and the resulted strategic focus on carbon cost control, the primary 
MCS objective within the thermal generators is to reduce carbon costs. In contrast, 
consistent with their renewable assets and expertise and competitiveness-focused 
strategic changes, renewable generators need to employ their MCS primarily to support 
the development and maintenance of their green competitiveness. Other objectives, such 
as legitimacy, operating costs, and transactional costs, may be assigned secondary 
importance within the generators’ organisational MCS. Therefore, the individual 
generators need to balance the competitiveness, cost control, and legitimacy objectives 
within their own organisational MCS in order to ensure that their MCS design and use 
fit their strategy objectives and strategic emphasis. 
In summary, this study’s results have identified four implications relating to how 
organisational MCS can be customised in order to achieve the strategic choices 
organisations make to manage the volatilities and pressures arising from GCCP-related 
environments. Accordingly, it is suggested that organisations need to design a wide 
range of controls and control systems and use them appropriately in accordance with the 
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level of strategy proactiveness and strategic emphasis they adopt. Simultaneously, 
organisations should focus MCS design and use on the primary objectives that are the 
highest concern to the organisation from an environmental strategic perspective. These 
implications are likely to be useful for practitioners and policy-makers in helping 
organisations adapt to a carbon-constrained world (as discussed in Section 9.5.2). 
Furthermore, to understand this study’s implications from a theoretical perspective, the 
next section discusses the results in relation to the Research Framework and 
propositions presented in Chapter 4. Doing so also provides a basis for further 
evaluation of this study’s results. 
9.3. Validation of the Research Framework and propositions  
The Research Framework (Figure 4-2) suggests that the GCCPs planned or introduced 
from 2002 to 2009 influenced generators’ external environments, which in turn would 
lead to a change in their environmental strategies and organisational MCS. Furthermore, 
GCCP-related internal characteristics and capabilities are argued to impact on the 
generators’ choice of environmental strategies. This framework results in four 
propositions.  
P1:  External GCCP-related economic and institutional drivers impact on generators’ 
competitiveness, costs and legitimacy; 
P2: Internal GCCP-related characteristics and capabilities impact on generators’ 
competitiveness, costs and legitimacy; 
P3: The impacts of GCCP-related external and internal drivers in turn lead 
generators to change their environmental strategies; 
P4: The change in environmental strategies requires corresponding modifications in 
organisational MCS. 
The results gained from the analysis of the multiple-case study data are summarised in 
Figure 9-1. Overall, these results support the four propositions and the key drivers 
included in the Research Framework. Moreover, a number of additional drivers are 
found and new relationships between GCCP-related external and internal drivers, 
environmental strategies and MCS identified. The new drivers are indicated by italics in 
Figure 9-1 and new relationships portrayed by dotted lines.  
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Figure 9-1: Results framework 
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fluctuations and changing competition. External economic volatilities primarily affected 
generators’ competitiveness and costs (RBT and TCE). The generators were also 
exposed to GCCP-related institutional pressures, namely, regulatory and government 
pressures, societal pressures, stakeholder pressures, and field and peer pressures. These 
institutional pressures in turn had implications for generator’s social legitimacy (IT). 
Thus, P1 is supported in that external drivers are found to impact on generators’ 
competitiveness, costs and legitimacy. Furthermore, new external drivers of changing 
competition (an economic volatility), and regulatory and government pressures 
(institutional pressures), were identified. Additionally, results indicate that GCCP-
related external drivers potentially drive the degree of the generators’ external exposure 
to the GCCPs. As these volatilities and pressures intensified over time, from 2000 to 
2009, due to GCCP changes, the degree of GCCP-related external exposure perceived 
by all five generators increased. 
Proposition 2 
Consistent with P2, the results suggest that internal characteristics and capabilities 
impacted on the generators’ competitiveness, costs, and social legitimacy. Different 
from the prior literature and the proposed framework, the results clearly distinguish 
between two types of GCCP-related internal drivers: internal characteristics and internal 
capabilities. Accordingly, internal characteristics, namely, emissions profile, 
transactional characteristics, organisational size and growth, and technological and 
financial constraints increased the carbon, transactional and operating costs (TCE) for 
generators and threatened their social legitimacy (IT). In contrast, internal capabilities 
including technological capabilities, managerial factors, prior experience and 
organisational learning, organisational culture, and ownership-related capabilities were 
found to enhance the generators’ market competitiveness (RBT) or social legitimacy 
(IT). The results also suggest a new internal characteristic, namely, organisational 
growth, and a new internal capability, ownership-related capabilities, which have not 
been examined in previous studies and was not part of the research framework. 
Relationships were also found between GCCP-related internal drivers and external 
drivers; the internal drivers moderated the degree of generators’ exposure to the external 
drivers. Internal characteristics increased the negative impacts of the external drivers on 
the generators by, for example, disadvantaging them in regards to changing fuel 
economics and carbon market fluctuations and exposing them to stronger governmental 
and societal pressures. In contrast, internal capabilities increased the positive impacts of 
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the external drivers on some generators by creating a market advantage for them, and/or 
reducing their exposure to carbon-focused institutional pressures. These results relating 
to the moderating role of internal factors on external exposure are insights not available 
from prior literature.  
Proposition 3 
The impacts exerted by GCCP-related external and internal drivers on organisational 
costs, competitiveness and legitimacy are found to lead to changes in environmental 
strategies undertaken by the generators. Eleven different environmental strategies were 
found to be used by the generators in response to GCCP-related external and internal 
drivers. These strategies were:  
(1) Environmental/ sustainability policy; 
(2) Generation investment strategy; 
(3) Retail strategy; 
(4) Emissions management strategy; 
(5) Internal energy efficiency strategy; 
(6) Emissions-related disclosure strategy; 
(7) Customer energy efficiency strategy; 
(8) Pursuit of carbon neutrality; 
(9) Carbon credit strategy; 
(10) Political strategy; and 
(11) Internal restructuring.  
Pursuing these different strategies enabled the generators to respond to the multiple 
volatilities and pressures arising from the GCCPs and manage the influence of internal 
characteristics and capabilities on their respective organisations.  
Furthermore, the eleven environmental strategies adopted by the generators to respond 
to the GCCPs and their associated volatilities and pressures can be classified into three 
groups: cost-driven, competitiveness-driven, and legitimacy-driven (Figure 9-1). Cost-
driven strategies were adopted with a primary objective to reduce carbon, operating and 
transactional costs arising from the GCCPs. They are driven strongly by internal 
characteristics and institutional pressures and to a lesser degree by external economic 
volatilities. This suggests that environmental strategies for cost control need to be 
formulated within the wider institutional norms and expectations (a combined TCE and 
IT view). Competitiveness-driven strategies were motivated by a need to maintain and 
enhance organisational competitiveness in a GCCP context and primarily driven by 
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external economic volatilities and internal capabilities, and to a lesser degree by 
institutional pressures. This indicates that generators sought to preserve their 
competitiveness within the bounds of their institutional environments and internal 
resource availability, providing support for an integrated RBT and IT perspective. 
Legitimacy-driven strategies were adopted in response to the increasing GCCP-related 
institutional pressures and simultaneously enabled by a number of internal capabilities, 
thus being consistent with a combined IT and RBT view. While previous studies tend to 
focus on one type of environmental strategy (emissions management, retail strategy, or 
political strategy), the study found many types of GCCP-related environmental 
strategies that were simultaneously adopted by generators. This study’s attempt to 
classify different environmental strategies into three categories is also a first in the 
literature. 
Consequently, the choice and implementation of environmental strategies within the 
five generators were motivated by three objectives: competitiveness, cost control and 
legitimacy, confirming the insights from RBT, TCE and IT respectively. However, the 
three objectives were not of equal importance to the generators. Accordingly, the 
changes in environmental strategies made by the thermal generators focused on carbon 
cost control, while renewable generators modified their environmental strategies 
primarily to maximise competitiveness. In contrast, maintaining legitimacy in a GCCP 
context was of secondary importance to all generators. The results regarding strategy 
objectives provide a further explanation of P1, P2 and P3 as they suggest that generators 
undertook environmental strategies with these specific objectives in mind, to mitigate 
the impacts of external and internal divers on their organisation.  
This study also found support for the two aspects (or dynamics) of environmental 
strategy change as suggested in the research Framework; level of strategy proactiveness 
and change in strategic emphasis. Over time (from 2000 to 2008), the generators moved 
to more proactive (early and wide-scope) environmental strategies, corresponding to the 
increased managerial awareness of organisational GCCP-related external exposure. 
However, from October 2008 onwards, some generators reduced their level of strategy 
proactiveness in response to the regulatory uncertainty associated with the new 
government’s ETS review. Variations in strategy proactiveness across the generators 
appear to be associated with differences in the degree of perceived external exposure to 
the GCCPs and the degree of total internal capabilities. The strategic emphasis or 
attention top management placed on environmental strategies also shifted over time, 
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consistent with changing external volatilities and pressures resulting from the various 
GCCP changes from 2000 to 2009. There were variations in the strategic emphasis 
across the generators within each time period, which potentially reflect inter-generator 
differences in the impact of internal characteristics and capabilities. Additionally, these 
results indicate that internal capabilities had an influence on the level of proactiveness 
of environmental strategies. Some internal capabilities, including managerial factors, 
organisational culture, and ownership-related capabilities, enable the generators to 
execute more proactive environmental strategies in response to the GCCPs (a RBT 
view). Hence, these results provide support for a RBT-based explanation in the 
examination of the relationship between internal capabilities and environmental 
strategies. Further, this direct relationship is a new insight that was not proposed in the 
Research Framework.  
Proposition 4 
Changes in environmental strategies in response to GCCP-related external exposure 
were found to drive organisational MCS design, use and objectives. MCS design and 
use are captured in the MCS component types and groups. Consistent with Simons 
(1991), empirical evidence was found for four MCS component types which were 
critical in the implementation of environmental strategies. These were boundary 
controls, belief systems, diagnostic controls and control systems, and interactive 
controls and control systems. Additionally, four new MCS component types were 
identified and named as: enabling controls and control systems, cross-functional 
controls and control systems, legitimising controls and control systems, and risk 
monitoring systems. The degree of use of each of these eight MCS component types 
changed over time and varied across the generators in conjunction with the level of 
strategy proactiveness and strategic emphasis undertaken. While previous studies 
recognise that organisations may use multiple controls and control systems to support 
their strategies, this study’s clear identification of eight different MCS component types 
presents a theoretical contribution to the literature.  
The eight MCS component types can be classified into three main MCS component 
groups underpinned by different MCS objectives. The first group is internally-oriented 
strategy MCS which contains belief system, boundary controls, diagnostic controls and 
controls systems, and cross-functional controls and control systems. This group aimed 
at controlling carbon, operational and transactional costs by facilitating and monitoring 
the implementation of emissions management, internal energy efficiency and internal 
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restructuring strategies, and generation investment and carbon credit strategies (in 
thermal-based generators). Thus, support for a TCE explanation is provided. The second 
group of interactive and enabling control and control systems and risk monitoring 
systems is classified as the externally-oriented strategy MCS. This component group 
facilitates the planning and implementation of competitiveness-driven strategies 
including generation investment, retail, political and carbon credit strategies. Thus, 
consistent with a RBT perspective, the design and use of this second MCS group is 
aimed at maintaining and enhancing generators’ competitiveness. In contrast, the third 
component group, legitimising MCS legitimate the generators in the face of GCCP-
related governmental and societal pressures, thus providing support for an IT-based 
explanation. The use of this MCS component group ensures the achievement of 
legitimacy-driven strategies, which include carbon neutrality, environmental policy, 
customer energy efficiency and emissions-related disclosure strategies. Furthermore, as 
with environmental strategies, the classification of controls and control systems into the 
three MCS component groups is new and has not been employed in the prior literature. 
These findings also provide empirical support for prior research (e.g. Langfield-Smith, 
1997, Chenhall, 2003) regarding the importance of strategy driving MCS design and 
use. 
Consistent with the prior literature, the results indicate there are multiple objectives 
underlying MCS design and use. Internally-oriented strategy MCS component group, 
externally-oriented strategy MCS component group, and legitimising MCS component 
group were used respectively to reduce carbon, transactional and operating costs, to gain 
competitiveness, and to maintain legitimacy. However, in contrast to previous studies, 
this study did not find that organisational MCS component groups were used 
specifically to manage external risks and uncertainty, or to gain political power. The 
objective of the risk monitoring systems is to provide information on external 
environmental changes to enable generators to revise and plan their environmental 
strategies to maintain competitiveness. Similarly, the interactive use of accounting in 
political strategy was not to gain political power, but to protect or enhance 
competitiveness. Furthermore, substantial differences between the five generators in 
relation to the primary objectives underlying their MCS were identified, with the 
objectives of each being in sync with those motivating the changes in its environmental 
strategies. While the direct relationship observed between strategy objectives and MCS 
objectives was not part of the Research Framework, it is consistent with the P4 
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argument and prior research that the choice of environmental strategies drives 
organisational MCS. 
9.4. Key results: Overall evaluation 
The results discussed above address the research question by providing a number of 
implications for organisational MCS arising from the strategic choices generators make 
to manage the volatilities and pressures associated with GCCP changes. Evidence is 
provided that confirms GCCP-related volatilities and pressures interact with internal 
characteristics and capabilities to drive the generators’ external exposure to the GCCPs, 
by increasing compliance, operating and transactional costs, enhancing market 
competitiveness, and ensuring societal legitimacy. To respond to this external exposure, 
the generators formulate multiple environmental strategies and used them with varying 
degrees of proactiveness and top management emphasis. In turn, these strategic changes 
have implications for the design, use and objectives of organisational MCS. New types 
of controls and control systems are established to assist in the planning and 
implementation of specific environmental strategies. The degree of use of these controls 
and control systems and their objectives also changed to reflect the strategic emphasis 
and the level of proactiveness within each generator in each time period. Overall, these 
results support the proposed Research Framework and the four propositions. They also 
confirm the relevance of using RBT, TCE and IT simultaneously in the examination of 
organisations’ environmental strategies and MCS changes in a GCCP-focused context. 
Additionally, a number of new insights were gained: 
1. Other drivers of environmental strategies identified are: changing competition 
(external economic volatility); regulatory and government pressures (external 
institutional pressures); organisational growth (internal characteristic); 
technological and financial constraints (internal characteristics); and ownership-
related capabilities (internal capabilities). 
2. GCCP changes led to an increasing degree of generators’ organisational 
exposure to external volatilities and pressures, reflecting an increasingly 
complex and volatile operating environment in which the generators operate, 
due to the introduction of the GCCPs. 
3. Internal characteristics and capabilities moderate the degree of a generator’s 
exposure to GCCP-related external volatilities and pressures. 
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4. Generators adopted multiple environmental strategies to manage the impacts 
exerted by GCCP-related external and internal drivers and these strategies can 
be classified into three groups: competitiveness-driven; cost control-driven; and 
legitimacy-driven. 
5. These multiple strategies and strategy groups were underpinned by three key 
objectives; controlling carbon and transactional costs, enhancing 
competitiveness, and maintaining legitimacy. 
6. A generator’s strategy proactiveness and strategic emphasis also changed over 
time in accordance with the changing external exposure to the GCCPs, to ensure 
that it could effectively respond to and manage the impacts of GCCP-related 
external and internal drivers.  
7. A wider range of MCS component types (8) were used to support environmental 
strategies than the four previously identified by Simons (1991) and the 
associated literature. These different MCS component types can be broadly 
classified into three MCS component groups, based on their relationships with 
environmental strategies: externally-oriented strategy MCS; internally-oriented 
strategy MCS; and legitimising MCS.  
8. The degree of each MCS component type and group’s use also depends on the 
level of strategy proactiveness and strategic emphasis a generator places on 
particular environmental strategies within each time period. 
9. While organisational MCS as a whole may serve multiple objectives, each MCS 
component type and group serve a small number of objectives, that are 
consistent with the primary objectives of changes in environmental strategies. 
These additional insights highlight the differences from prior research and suggest a 
number of contributions that this study can make to the literature. These contributions 
are discussed in the next section.  
9.5. Contributions 
This study’s results contribute to the academic literature and have implications for 
practice. Theoretical contributions to the academic literature are discussed next, 
followed by the practical implications.  
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9.5.1. Theoretical contributions 
It is stated at the end of Chapter 3 that a number of gaps exist in the academic literature. 
This study’s results provided empirical evidence that contributes to the narrowing of 
these gaps. 
Gap (1): Lack of understanding about organisations’ environmental strategies in a 
GCCP-focused context 
In relation to Gap 1, one of the key insights gained from this study is that generators not 
only modify existing environmental strategies, but also establish new ones to respond to 
the multiple volatilities and pressures associated with the changing GCCPs. 
Additionally, they changed the level of strategy proactiveness, and shifted the strategic 
emphasis among environmental strategies. Importantly, these multiple strategies were 
motivated by differing objectives (cost control, legitimacy, or competitiveness) to 
ensure generators manage their organisational exposure to the GCCPs effectively.  
Gap (2): Lack of a theoretical underpinning to explain the mechanisms by which 
economic factors influence strategy and MCS choice 
To address Gap (2), this study assessed the economics-based theoretical underpinnings 
of environmental strategies and MCS. Results suggest that GCCP-related external and 
internal economic drivers (in particular, regulatory and policy change, carbon market 
fluctuations, emissions profile, and transactional characteristics) can affect generators’ 
carbon-related, operating and transactional costs, thus providing support for a TCE 
perspective. In response, emissions management, internal energy efficiency, internal 
restructuring, generation investment and carbon credit strategies were adopted to focus 
on cost control. To implement these strategies, an array of internally-oriented strategy 
MCS components were designed and used. Therefore, by using TCE, this study 
highlights how external and internal economic drivers influence environmental 
strategies and identifies which types of organisational MCS components were used to 
ensure cost control and internal efficiency in responding to GCCP-related external 
volatilities and pressures.  
Gap (3): Little insight into how a longitudinal period of GCCP change affects 
organisations’ external and internal environments, and the potential inter-relationships 
between external and internal drivers in driving environmental strategies and MCS 
responses 
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This study found that a prolonged period of GCCP change brought about changes in the 
economic and institutional environments in which generators operated. The GCCPs led 
to many additional volatilities and pressures such as carbon market fluctuations, 
changing fuel economics, and increasing governmental and societal pressures associated 
with emissions reduction and disclosure. Consequently, generators were exposed to 
increasing degrees of exposure to the GCCP-related external volatilities and pressures 
over time. To manage this exposure, generators adopted multiple environmental 
strategies such as generation investment, carbon credit, retail, political and internal 
energy efficiency strategies. They also changed the level of strategy proactiveness and 
top management placed different levels of emphasis on particular strategies in order to 
effectively respond to the volatilities and pressures dominant within each period of 
GCCP change.  
This study also offers insights regarding the relationships between external and internal 
drivers in driving environmental strategies. Internal capabilities and characteristics are 
found to moderate the degree of external exposure which in turn drove generators’ 
environmental strategic responses. Internal characteristics led to more negative impacts 
being exerted by the GCCP-related external drivers on the generators, while internal 
capabilities enhanced the positive impacts. Furthermore, the generators with strong 
internal capabilities such as renewable inheritance assets and expertise, top management 
commitment and supportive organisational culture were able to pursue more proactive 
environmental strategies.  
Gap (4): Limited understanding regarding the link between environmental strategy and 
organisational MCS, and the role of MCS in strategy planning 
Further empirical evidence on the link between strategy and MCS is provided. 
Consistent with prior studies, some of the controls and control systems found were 
driven by a need to control specific environmental strategies and ensure cost reduction, 
i.e. internally-oriented strategy MCS component group. However, other control and 
control systems were used to build internal capabilities for a competitive advantage or 
to provide information to facilitate strategic planning. These are the externally-oriented 
strategy MCS component group that includes enabling and interactive controls and 
control systems and risk monitoring systems. Furthermore, some controls and control 
systems (legitimising MCS component group) were specifically used by the generators 
to legitimate themselves to external stakeholders. Therefore, in planning and controlling 
the generators’ environmental strategies, organisational MCS design and use were not 
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only driven by the need for internal efficiency and cost control as traditionally 
recognised in the literature, but simultaneously motivated by a wider range of objectives 
including increasing competitiveness and gaining legitimacy. Additionally, there is a 
close coupling between strategy and MCS in that the predominant objectives underlying 
strategy choice determine the predominant objectives of MCS design and use within 
each generator.  
In addition to narrowing the above gaps in the literature, this study makes a theoretical 
contribution by developing a multi-theory framework to explain generators’ 
organisational adaptation to external environmental regulatory changes. This framework 
argues for the need to consider multiple theories in this study, each of which offers a 
distinctive and valuable insight that contributes to a comprehensive and holistic 
understanding of environmental strategy and MCS changes in a GCCP context. The 
simultaneous use of TCE, IT and RBT explains the different mechanisms by which the 
GCCPs influence environmental strategies, as well as the complexity identified in 
environment-related MCS design, use, and objectives.  
A multiple-theory framework also allows for theory triangulation in determining the 
relative economic and social impacts of GCCP-related external and internal drivers, and 
the relative importance of different strategy and MCS objectives in responding to these 
drivers. Therefore, the impacts of external drivers on environmental strategies can be 
explained from a TCE, RBT or IT perspective, while internal capabilities affect 
environmental strategies from a RBT or IT view and internal characteristics from a TCE 
or IT view (Figure 9-1). Theory triangulation further enables an understanding of why 
some organisations (e.g. renewable generators) primarily focus on managing GCCP-
related competitiveness (RBT), while others (e.g. thermal generators) consider carbon 
cost control of paramount importance (TCE) in their  strategy formulation and MCS 
design and use.  
A further contribution is this study’s classification of controls and control systems into 8 
MCS component types and 3 MCS component groups. This classification captures a 
wider range of controls and control systems than previous studies and provides a useful 
mechanism to assess the role played by organisational MCS in: 
i) the planning and implementation of environmental strategies with different 
focuses, and  
ii) monitoring and responding to external volatilities and pressures. 
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Consequently, this classification facilitates an assessment of the match between 
organisational MCS and GCCP-related environmental strategies and external volatilities 
and pressures and enables discrepancies or mismatches to be identified and potentially 
explained. This, along with the other results, has practical implications for 
organisations, policy-makers and practitioners, as discussed next. 
9.5.2. Contributions to practice 
In Chapter 8 (8.4) and Section 9.2.1, the implications for organisational MCS arising 
from strategic choices generators make in response to the changing GCCPs have been 
discussed in relation to the research question. In this section, the implications of this 
study for practice are discussed in further detail, by relating back to the practical 
motivations highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2. Each motivation gives rise to one or a 
number of implications, as presented next.  
Motivation (1): Potential identification of the GCCP-related factors in the generators’ 
external and internal operating environments that drive generators’ decisions to change 
their environmental strategies.  
The generators undertook a diagnosis of the potential volatilities and pressures 
associated with the planned GCCPs, as well as assessing their internal characteristics 
and capabilities. As a result, the generators recognised that the GCCPs could exert 
multiple external economic volatilities and institutional pressures, which would not only 
affect their carbon and operating costs but also their market competitiveness and social 
legitimacy. Generators were also aware that their individual internal characteristics and 
capabilities moderated their exposure to the GCCPs. To prepare for a carbon-
constrained operating environment, the generators considered their GCCP exposure in 
their strategy planning processes and formulated appropriate climate change plans and 
environmental strategies. In doing so, they modified existing strategies (e.g. their 
generation and retail strategies) and established new ones (e.g. internal energy 
efficiency, emissions management and carbon credit strategies). Furthermore, their 
strategic choices and responses were designed to take advantage of existing internal 
capabilities, as well as reduce the impacts of internal characteristics (e.g. emissions 
profile). This implies that environmental strategies need to match firm-level internal 
characteristics and capabilities and thus there is no one-size-fits-all solution, despite the 
fact that organisations may operate in similar external economic and institutional 
environments. 
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Motivation (2): A potential understanding of how the generators have responded, and 
adapted organisationally to the changing external environments associated with the 
planned GCCPs. 
Most generators have increased their renewable investments and undertaken internal 
energy efficiency initiatives in response to the planned GCCPs. Most of them have also 
moved towards greening their retail brand and reputation, adopted carbon neutrality 
programmes, and encouraged customer energy efficiency. To protect their 
competitiveness, all generators participated actively in the GCCP policy processes. 
However, not all generators changed in the same manner. The generators with a high 
degree of exposure to the GCCPs, in terms of both positive and negative impacts, 
adopted more proactive, wider-scoped environmental strategies which involved multiple 
organisational functions in the strategy planning and implementation processes. In 
contrast, generators experiencing lower exposure tended to be slower in making change 
or their changes were not as extensive or as wide in scope. Over time, as the generators 
recognised the increasing volatilities and pressures associated with the GCCPs, the 
degree of strategy proactiveness and resulting resource assignment grew. Furthermore, 
top management emphasised a number of selected environmental strategies that could 
help them respond effectively to the predominant volatilities and pressures within each 
phase of GCCP change. Hence, a key implication is that organisations make varying 
strategic and operational changes, that are dependent upon their firm-specific external 
exposure to the GCCPs and how such exposure changes over time. 
Additionally, the results indicate that the GCCPs from 2000 to 2009 have been 
relatively successful in triggering strategic and operational changes within the 
generators. All the generators studied, including the thermal ones, have moved towards 
a renewable-focused generation investment strategy, in response to the carbon pricing 
signals provided by the GCCPs. This suggests that the generators are increasingly 
adopting lower-emitting generation technologies, and hence, contributing to the 
reduction of the sector and the nation’s total emission levels. There is also evidence that 
generators also promoted energy efficiency behaviour and practices among its 
employees, suppliers, and customers. However, the ETS review and modifications since 
October 2008 have caused a delay in the generators’ renewable investment decisions. 
Therefore, the tentative implication for policy-making is that a strong carbon pricing 
signal and a positive regulatory environment for renewable investments are possibly 
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required in order to encourage substantial renewable development and thus significant 
emission reduction by the generators. 
Motivation (3): An assessment of the implications for organisational MCS to enable and 
support the strategic choices generators make in relation to the GCCPs. 
Generators changed their MCS to support the implementation of their environmental 
strategies. Some of the controls and control systems found in the five generators were 
designed and used to meet short-term compliance obligations, such as emissions 
monitoring and reporting, and carbon credit purchases. However, generators 
increasingly used their organisational MCS to assist the planning and implementation of 
environmental strategies (e.g. emissions management, generation investment, internal 
energy efficiency and carbon neutrality strategies). These strategies, and associated 
MCS components, led generators to reduce their emissions levels and thus contributed 
to the achievement of long-term cost control and competitiveness. Additionally, some 
controls and control systems were used to directly respond to institutional expectations 
and pressures. Thus, these results imply that rather than merely focusing on compliance 
activities, generators need to employ a wider range of controls and control systems and 
use them at a more strategic level to enable internal change and the management of 
organisational performance in the face of the multiple volatilities and pressures 
associated with the GCCPs. 
Motivation (4): A practical insight regarding why generators chose and undertook the 
strategic and MCS changes they did (in response to the GCCPs). 
The three objectives of competitiveness, cost control and legitimacy, were found to 
motivate environmental strategy choices and MCS design and use. These multiple 
objectives ensure that generators can effectively respond to and manage the impacts 
exerted by multiple GCCP-related external volatilities and pressures on their 
organisation. However, while a generator may seek to achieve all three objectives in 
their environmental strategy and MCS changes, the relative importance of these 
objectives varies across each generator. Consequently, in a GCCP-focused context, 
thermal generators with high emissions levels, tend to use their strategies and MCS 
primarily to control carbon costs. In contrast, strategic and MCS responses undertaken 
by renewable generators are primarily motivated by the potential to enhance green 
competitiveness due to their internal renewable-based capabilities. Hence, the different 
levels of importance assigned to the different objectives enable management to focus on 
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managing the key impacts exerted by GCCP-related internal characteristics and 
capabilities.  
The above insights are useful for professionals and practitioners working in the areas 
related to GCCPs and climate change as well as the Government and regulators. For 
managers, accountants and external consultants, they need to understand the possible 
impacts of the GCCPs on organisational operations and take them into consideration in 
planning strategy and MCS changes. Furthermore, these results potentially give 
managers some guidance of how to customise their MCS so as to support strategy 
achievement and respond effectively to the volatilities and pressures emerging from the 
GCCPs. In doing so, it should highlight to managers the importance of aligning MCS 
design, use and objectives with strategy choice and objectives. The results also allow an 
assessment of whether and to what extent the changes in GCCPs over the years and the 
prospect of an ETS have triggered renewable investments and energy efficiency from 
the electricity generators. Based on this assessment, the Government and policy makers 
can evaluate the effectiveness of GCCPs, as economic instruments, in bringing about 
behavioral changes and achieving the desired environmental and economic objectives, 
for example, reduced emissions levels and lower Kyoto liabilities. They can also assess 
the change in level of generators’ engagement after the moderation of the Original ETS 
(since October 2008). In doing so, appropriate policy advice and adjustments can be 
made to improve the potential outcomes of the GCCPs.  
9.6. Limitations and future research 
Despite its contributions, this study has a number of limitations. These limitations 
correspond to the opportunities for future research. Firstly, this study focused on top 
managers and did not examine the perceptions and the role played by other staff. This is 
partly due to the nature of the research question and corresponding methodological 
choice to collect data relating to the strategic planning and decision-making at a top 
management level. Furthermore, the reliance on interview and documentary data meant 
that the researcher was not able to observe the actual implementation of environmental 
strategies and actual use of organisational MCS, especially at operational levels. 
Previous studies suggest that actual MCS design and use can differ from the intended or 
original model due to internal and external barriers to the MCS change process 
(Kasurinen, 2002). Additionally, individual business units may use different controls 
and control systems from those used at top management levels due to potential 
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disagreement between the top and lower management levels regarding the 
appropriateness of specific MCSs (Govindarajan, 1988; Malina and Selto, 2001). Future 
research can examine the actual implementation process of environmental strategies and 
MCS changes in relation to GCCPs, as well as investigate the role of lower level 
managers and other staff in this process.  
Secondly, this study did not investigate the actual impacts of strategy and MCS changes 
on organisational performance. It only examined the understanding of top management 
regarding the potential impacts of GCCP-related external and internal drivers on the 
generators and how their environmental strategies and MCS were modified in 
accordance with this understanding.  The results provide some evidence about how 
strategy and MCS changes in previous periods influenced organisational performance in 
later periods. For example, renewable investments made in the 2002-2005 period earned 
carbon credits and the renewable expertise gained allowed some generators to develop a 
competitive advantage in carbon trading and renewable energy in later periods. 
However, there is little evidence of how organisational revenue and profitability were 
enhanced or decreased due to the strategy and MCS changes made to respond to the 
GCCPs. A type of time-series data and potentially a higher number of 
cases/organisations may be required to enable the analysis of the association between 
strategy and MCS changes and organisational financial performance. In doing so, an 
understanding of the impacts of GCCP-related strategy and MCS changes on 
organisational performance could be gained.  
Thirdly, individual theories used in this study were not utilised to their fullest potential. 
This study focused on using a combination of TCE, RBT and IT to maximise their 
complementarities and on providing diverse and rich insights into GCCP-related 
strategic choices and their implications for organisational MCS. However, due to this 
focus, the study was not able to determine what the TCE-based implications of the 
GCCPs were for institutional pressures, e.g. the extent that GCCP-related economic 
impacts affected, or shifted, societal and stakeholder pressures. It was also not the 
purpose of this study to use TCE to assess the impact of individual generator’s strategic 
choices on their organisational transactional costs, nor to compare the relative 
transactional costs incurred by different generators when confronted by the same source 
of GCCP-related external volatility/pressure. These potential uses of TCE could be 
employed in future research related to GCCPs, or similar economic interventions. 
Similarly, within its scope, this study did not use IT to identify the potential different 
267 
 
strategic responses that generators can adopt to respond to the same source of 
institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). While the way that generators responded to 
GCCP-related pressures was captured to some extent by examining the degree of 
strategy proactiveness and top management emphasis on selected environmental 
strategies, it does not represent the specific strategic response categories suggested by 
Oliver (1991). Future research could investigate these responses and explain why 
organisations undertake varying responses despite being exposed to a similar source of 
institutional pressures. Furthermore, when using RBT, this study, to a large extent, 
treated the generators’ internal capabilities as being independent from one another and 
did not distinguish between static and dynamic resources or capabilities (Fiol, 2001; 
Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010). Future research could employ RBT to provide more in-
depth insights into the role played by different categories of internal resources and 
capabilities and the interaction among them during the implementation of environmental 
strategies and the maintenance of an organisation’s competitive advantage.  
Fourthly, one can argue that this study’s generalisability is limited because of its case 
focus (five generators) and single industry examination. However, this study enhanced 
its internal validity by choosing cases through the application of replication logic, using 
reflective strategies across the enquiry process, and triangulating results between 
different data sources and theories. Since the cases examined covered the key players in 
wholesale and retail electricity markets (accounting for more than 90% of the market 
share), this study’s results could be generalised to the electricity generating sectors in 
other countries, which are also planning or enforcing some form of GCCPs. 
Furthermore, many of the volatilities and pressures imposed by the GCCPs on 
generators, such as policy and regulatory change, and governmental and societal 
pressures associated with emissions reduction, can be argued to be relevant to other 
New Zealand organisations. Consequently, this study’s Research Framework can be 
applied to other industries and sectors which have compliance obligations under the 
GCCPs or are significantly influenced by them (e.g. due to an intensive use of 
electricity or fossil fuels). The employment of this framework in future research to 
analyse and interpret the data from other industries and sectors would also enhance the 
external validity of this study’s results.  
Fifthly, this study has only examined changes in generators’ environmental strategies 
and organisational MCS during the period from 2000 to 2009, which was before the 
actual enforcement of the ETS (July 2010). Thus the results are limited to insights into 
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the internal changes within the generators to prepare for an ETS. Future research could 
investigate whether these strategic and MCS adaptations are maintained or modified 
once the ETS comes into operation. 
Lastly, this study has examined the relationships between external and internal drivers, 
environmental strategies and organisational MCS in an assumed top-down direction. 
However, it is probable that these relationships are bi-directional or circular. There is 
some evidence in this study (7.5.1) that the choice of particular environmental strategies 
led to the development of internal capabilities. Further, the environmental strategies 
adopted by generators potentially leads to changes in their external environments. For 
example, an emissions-related disclosure pursued by a generator can “raise the bar” in 
terms of societal expectation of corporate disclosure practices. Similarly, a green 
branding campaign can intensify retail market competition. It is also possible that the 
adoption of particular controls and control systems, e.g. a carbon neutrality system, by 
one generator may be considered an industry best-practice and thus creates peer 
pressures for other generators to follow. These potential impacts of environmental 
strategies and organisational MCS on organisations’ GCCP-related external and internal 
environments provide a fruitful avenue for future research.  
9.7. Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to examine the impacts of GCCP changes (from 2000 to 
2009) on the environmental strategies and organisational MCS of New Zealand 
electricity generators. To achieve this aim, the research question investigated was: What 
are the MCS implications arising from strategic choices New Zealand electricity 
generators make in managing economic volatility and societal pressures resulting from 
a prolonged period of GCCP changes?  
This study has addressed the research question by providing empirical evidence 
regarding the changes in generators’ environmental strategies to respond to the 
volatilities and pressures associated with the GCCP changes and highlighting the 
implications of such strategic changes for organisational MCS design, use and 
objectives.  
The key academic contribution of this study is in developing a multiple-theory 
framework that integrates TCE, IT and RBT to explain how and why GCCP drives an 
organisation’s environmental strategies and associated MCS change. In doing so, this 
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study demonstrates the relevance and complementarity of the three theories to provide 
rich insights into the dynamics and objectives underlying organisational adaptations to 
external environmental changes. This framework allows an understanding of why 
different external economic and societal factors motivate organisations to undertake 
different environmental strategies with varying objectives. It further provides insights 
into what types of controls and control systems support these different strategies and for 
what objectives. This framework can be employed in future research to assess the 
impacts of the GCCPs in other industries and countries.  
The results have significant implications for practice. As the volatilities and pressures 
associated with the GCCPs are likely to increase, especially as the ETS comes into 
operation, organisations need to be aware of the degree of their organisational exposure 
to the GCCP-focused operating environment. This awareness is critical because it 
enables organisations to formulate appropriate strategic responses. Therefore, they need 
to identify the external volatilities and pressures arising from the GCCPs, and 
understand that these volatilities and pressures not only impose direct financial impacts 
on organisations, but also could affect their social legitimacy and competitiveness. 
Managers also need to assess their organisation’s internal characteristics and capabilities 
and determine how these internal factors drive and affect the organisation’s external 
GCCP exposure.  
In formulating their environmental strategies, it is important for organisations to 
recognise that there is no one-size-fits-all strategic solution regarding how to respond to 
the GCCPs. To ensure that all their applicable GCCP-related volatilities and pressures 
are adequately responded to, organisations may adopt multiple environmental strategies 
simultaneously. The level of strategy proactiveness and top management emphasis on 
different strategies will vary over time and across organisations, corresponding to the 
changing external volatilities and pressures and the impacts exerted by internal 
characteristics and capabilities. Furthermore, some organisations will need to formulate 
their environmental strategies to focus more on controlling and reducing their 
compliance carbon costs due to their high emissions profile. Other organisations, with a 
low emissions level or no emissions, will not consider this objective important. Instead, 
these organisations will need to channel their strategic attention and resource allocation 
into creating a green competitive advantage. Additionally, due to increasing societal 
pressures associated with climate change and the need for carbon emissions reduction, 
all organisations should allocate adequate resources to emissions-related disclosure and 
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carbon-focused strategies, in order to demonstrate their environmental responsibility 
and thus, maintain their legitimacy.  
The implication for any organisational changes made in response to GCCPs, is that the 
MCS needs to be substantially modified in order to support organisations’ 
environmental strategies. It is not sufficient for organisations to just establish 
compliance-focused control systems to satisfy their GCCP-related obligation 
requirements. Organisations need to design and use a wide range of MCS component 
types to assist with the planning and implementation of multiple environmental 
strategies and to enable the effective achievement of GCCP-related strategic objectives. 
Furthermore, managers need to ensure that organisational MCS is designed and used to 
achieve the same objectives that underline the choice of their environmental strategies.  
In conclusion, it is recognised that climate change policies, such as a carbon tax or an 
ETS, are becoming important to organisations in New Zealand and internationally. 
These policies bring about additional volatilities and pressures that have the potential to 
affect organisations significantly and beyond the boundaries of traditional 
environmental regulatory frameworks. Strategically assessing the GCCP-related impacts 
on the organisation, and formulating appropriate environmental strategies and changing 
organisational MCS in response is a necessity for organisations to remain profitable, 
competitive, and legitimate. This study’s results suggest that organisations should 
modify their environmental strategies to effectively respond to the volatilities and 
pressures arising from the GCCPs and the associated impacts of internal characteristics 
and capabilities. To effectively plan and implement these strategic changes, a wide 
range of controls and control systems (i.e. MCS component types) need to be 
established and used. Furthermore, the degree of use of different MCS component types 
will vary in accordance with the level of strategy proactiveness and the emphasis placed 
on environmental strategies by top management. Although the MCS can be used to 
achieve multiple objectives of competitiveness, cost control, and legitimacy, the relative 
importance of these objectives should be customised to match the primary objectives 
that underpin each organisation’s environmental strategies. This study’s results provide 
important insights for regulators and policy-makers into the potential economic and 
social impacts that climate change policies could exert on organisations. These results 
are also useful for practitioners, managers, and academics in understanding how 
organisations may respond to those impacts to ensure organisational survival in a 
carbon-constrained operating environment.   
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A: PROPOSAL FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPATION 
Introduction 
I am a PhD student in the School of Accounting and Commercial Law, Victoria 
University of Wellington. My PhD thesis is in investigating the impacts of the 
Government Climate Change Policies (GCCPs) on electricity generators and their 
strategies and management control system (MCS). More specifically, I am examining 
whether the introduction of the GCCPs results in additional volatility and pressures for 
generators and the implications of such volatility and pressures for GCCP-related 
environmental strategies and organisational MCS in order to ensure organizational 
survival and growth. Ethics Approval has been granted for this study.  
Desired participants 
I would like to invite you to participate in this research. The research primarily involves 
interviews of senior executives of New Zealand electricity generators, industry 
regulators, professionals and experts in risk management, carbon trading, sustainability 
and climate change. The potential interviewees are directors, senior and middle 
managers from your organisation who are involved in the planning and implementation 
of the climate change action plan and initiatives in response to the GCCPs or who have 
expert knowledge and experience in the electricity industry and the GCCP policy 
processes.  
Interview schedule 
A list of semi-structured interview questions will be sent to the interviewees at least two 
days prior to the interview. It is envisaged that the interviews will last about one hour. 
The time and location of the interviews will be arranged to the interviewees’ 
convenience. The interview will be taped and transcribed afterwards.  
Data analysis and reporting 
The transcribed interviews will be analysed and form the basis of the findings of my 
research. The interviewees will not be individually identifiable in the thesis. All data 
will be kept confidential and exclusive to me and my supervisors, Dr Carolyn Fowler 
and Dr Chris Hunt. The thesis will be deposited in the library of Victoria University of 
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Wellington. It is intended that data and results from the interviews will be also used for 
publications in scholarly journals, presentations at academic conferences, and potential 
reports and discussion papers to inform relevant policy planning and regulatory 
processes. At the conclusion of the project, a summary of findings will be sent to all the 
interviewees. We hope you will find this research of value to you.  
Contact details 
If you wish to participate in this research or desire further information, please contact 
me by email at Binh.Bui@vuw.ac.nz or phone 04 463 6679, or my supervisor Dr 
Carolyn Fowler at Carolyn.Fowler@vuw.ac.nz (04 463 6506), or mail us at:  
School of Accounting and Commercial Law 
Victoria University of Wellington 
PO Box 600, Wellington 
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Questions for electricity generators 
1. What are the volatilities and pressures that the different GCCPs might bring, or 
have brought, to your organisation?  
2. Do you perceive that your organisation is exposed to a different set of GCCP-
related volatility and pressures from other generators? What internal characteristics 
or capabilities do you think that might have driven such differences? 
3. What strategic responses have been taken by your organisation to respond to these 
volatilities and pressures and manage organisational performance? Can you give me 
an example of such response in the different areas of the business? 
4. Do you think the focus/importance on each of the above areas has changed due to 
the various changes in the GCCPs from 2002 to 2009?  
5. Why does your organisation choose to undertake these specific responses? What 
are the key internal (characteristics or capabilities) that have enabled, or driven, 
these strategic responses? What benefits or objectives do you perceive that such 
responses may bring to the organisation? 
6. How do you implement these GCCP-related strategic responses? What are the key 
human and non-human resources that are allocated to climate change and GCCP 
areas? Have you experienced any problems in implementing the climate change 
plan across the organisation?  
7. What types of management control system (MCS) have been planned, or 
established within your organisation, to prepare for the GCCPs and support the 
above strategic responses? 
8. How are controls and control systems used? What types of decisions does MCS 
information assist? At which level of management is such MCS information used? 
9. What controls or control systems receive the highest top management attention 
within each period of GCCP change? Why? 
10. What objectives (or roles) do you perceive the above controls and control systems 
are fulfilling within your organisation?  
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Questions for external organisations and stakeholders 
1. What are the risks and opportunities that the ETS brings about to the NZ economy, 
and in particular, the electricity industry? Would the potential electricity price 
increases due to the ETS influence the competitiveness of NZ businesses? 
2. What are the major strategic and operational risks of an ETS for electricity 
generators? How do these differ across different generators? 
3. How has your organisation been involved in the development of the GCCPs and in 
preparing the electricity generators for the introduction of such policies? 
4. What role do you think that external organisations play in influencing businesses’ 
response (including changes to their strategies and operations) to climate change 
and an ETS? Which organisation has been the most influential? 
5. Do you think that the proposed ETS will lead to major strategic changes in 
electricity generators, including generation investment and competitive strategies? 
If yes, why is that so? 
6. From your experience in electricity industry and emissions trading, what changes 
have you seen as happening within electricity generators to respond to and prepare 
themselves for the GCCPs?  
7. Have the generators’ responsiveness and reaction towards the GCCPs changed over 
the years (2002-2009)? If yes, what are the drivers for such change? 
8. In order to monitor and manage the impacts of the GCCPs, what changes are 
required in regards to management control systems, e.g. the emissions internal 
reporting systems, carbon market monitoring system, carbon accounting system, 
budgetary and strategic planning processes? To which extent do you perceive that 
electricity generators have undertaken these changes? 
9. Do you perceive that emissions-related disclosure by electricity generators has 
increased from 2000 to 2009? If yes, what are the drivers and objectives for such 
change?  
10. Do you think that the introduction of the GCCPs such as an ETS will lead to the 
development of more sustainable business? For example, do you think that an ETS 
will lead to the adoption of lower-emissions technologies and behaviour? 
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